No Dismissal With Prejudice Without Service: Personal Jurisdiction Limits on Inherent Dismissal Power in Bilal v. Benoit

I. Introduction

This Eleventh Circuit decision, Jamaal Ali Bilal v. Jeffrey Benoit, et al., No. 23‑11703 (11th Cir. Nov. 20, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished), arises from a civil-rights challenge brought by a former Florida civilly committed “sexually violent predator” under the Jimmy Ryce Act. After spending roughly twenty years under civil commitment, Jamaal Ali Bilal (formerly John Burton) sued numerous public officials and mental-health professionals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constitutional violations relating to:

• the conditions of his confinement when transferred to the Escambia County Jail for court hearings; and
• an alleged malicious prosecution based on the use of another person’s criminal history (the “Banks papers”) in his civil‑commitment file.

Only two defendants were ever served: Dr. John Hodges and the Escambia County Sheriff’s Office (“ECSO”). The district court dismissed all of Bilal’s federal claims with prejudice and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, entering judgment with prejudice as to all defendants—including those never served.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit:

• Affirmed dismissal with prejudice of the § 1983 claims against the two served defendants (Hodges and ECSO); but
• Vacated the dismissal with prejudice as to all unserved defendants and remanded with instructions to re-enter judgment without prejudice as to them.

The most significant doctrinal point is procedural: the court squarely reiterates that a federal district court lacks personal jurisdiction over unserved defendants and therefore cannot enter a dismissal with prejudice (a merits judgment) against them, even when the claims appear frivolous and even when the court invokes its “inherent authority” to dispose of baseless actions.

Substantively, the opinion also:

• clarifies the limits of § 1983 substantive due process claims by civilly committed persons briefly housed in a jail for court appearances; and
• applies the statute of limitations and the narrow “continuing violation” doctrine to a § 1983 malicious prosecution theory arising from long-running civil commitment proceedings.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Disposition:

• Conditions-of-confinement claim (Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process; ECSO): Affirmed dismissal with prejudice. Bilal failed to plead facts showing that his short (< 40-hour) jail stays for court hearings involved conditions substantially worse than his usual civil-commitment facility, or that they were punitive.
• Malicious prosecution claim (§ 1983; Dr. Hodges and others): Affirmed dismissal with prejudice as to Hodges because the claim was time-barred under Florida’s four-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims. The court rejected Bilal’s reliance on the “continuing violation” doctrine and upheld the district court’s use of judicial notice of state-court records at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. The panel did not reach the alternative Heck v. Humphrey bar.
• Unserved defendants (multiple doctors and officials): Vacated the dismissal with prejudice. Because service of process is a jurisdictional prerequisite to personal jurisdiction, the district court lacked authority to enter a merits judgment (dismissal with prejudice) against defendants who had never been served and had never appeared.
• Remand instructions: As to unserved defendants only, the district court must reenter judgment dismissing Bilal’s claims without prejudice.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Civil Commitment Under the Jimmy Ryce Act

Bilal’s underlying story spans over four decades:

• 1982: Arrested and charged with rape in Florida state court. The first trial ended in a hung jury; a second trial resulted in conviction, later overturned on appeal. To avoid a third trial, Bilal took a plea deal and received a three-year sentence.
• Later conviction: After release, he was again convicted, this time for battery on a law-enforcement officer, and sentenced to 44 months.
• Jimmy Ryce civil commitment petition: Before he completed that second sentence, the State of Florida petitioned to civilly commit him under the Jimmy Ryce Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 394.910–.932, which authorizes involuntary commitment of “sexually violent predators”—persons previously convicted of a sexually violent offense who suffer from a qualifying “mental abnormality or personality disorder” making them likely to reoffend if not confined. Fla. Stat. § 394.912(10).

Rather than fully contest the petition, Bilal alleges he “brokered a deal” in May 2001: he would accept civil commitment in return for the State’s promise to review him for release every six months. Separately, the statute itself requires at least annual examinations and judicial review of the detainee’s mental condition. Fla. Stat. § 394.918(1), (3).

Bilal remained civilly committed for about 20 years, usually at the Florida Civil Commitment Center. He contends that:

• he received only three “release trials” during that time; and
• evaluators and officials repeatedly relied on criminal records of another man, Eddie Lee Banks, whose child-rape convictions were erroneously included in Bilal’s clinical file as though they were his.

In 2007, a Florida state judge (Judge Terry Terrell) ordered that the “Banks papers” “shall not be considered” in reviewing Bilal’s commitment status. According to Bilal, officials ignored this order and continued to rely on those records when recommending continued commitment.

For court appearances related to his commitment, Bilal would be temporarily housed in county jails, including the Escambia County Jail. He viewed these transfers as punitive and unconstitutional because he was a civilly committed patient, not a criminal prisoner serving a sentence.

He was released from civil commitment in May 2019.

B. The Federal Lawsuit

In May 2021, Bilal, then proceeding pro se, filed suit in Florida state court against a broad array of defendants, including:

• mental-health professionals who evaluated or treated him (including Benoit, Hodges, Shaw, Pritchard, and others),
• the Florida Department of Children and Families and officials,
• county sheriffs and jail officials,
• the Florida Attorney General, and
• a Navy investigator and a federal public defender.

His claims included, among others:

• A § 1983 substantive due process claim alleging that housing him in the Escambia County Jail (and other jails) while civilly committed amounted to unconstitutional punishment; and
• A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against various individuals (including Dr. Hodges) involved in his civil commitment, based on alleged reliance on the false “Banks” criminal history.

Only two defendants were actually served:

• The Escambia County Sheriff’s Office (for the jail-conditions claim), and
• Dr. John Hodges (for the malicious prosecution claim and perhaps others).

Those two defendants removed the case to federal court, where they moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

C. District Court Rulings

A magistrate judge (to whose report and recommendation the district judge later fully subscribed) recommended:

• Dismissing all federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6);
• Declining supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims; and
• Dismissing the entire case with prejudice as to all defendants—served and unserved.

Regarding the two claims central on appeal:

1. Conditions of confinement at Escambia County Jail (ECSO)

   • The magistrate took judicial notice of jail records showing Bilal’s stays at Escambia County Jail between October 2017 and May 2019, each lasting less than 40 hours.
   • Bilal’s complaint did not describe any specific adverse conditions at Escambia County Jail, nor how they differed from conditions at the Florida Civil Commitment Center.
   • The magistrate concluded that such brief detentions for the purpose of attending court hearings, without allegations of substantially harsher conditions, could not plausibly be considered “punishment” or unconstitutional confinement under the Fourteenth Amendment.

2. Malicious prosecution claim

   • Florida’s four-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims applied.
   • The magistrate took judicial notice of state-court records, including the 2007 order directing that the Banks papers not be used, as proof that Bilal knew of the Banks issue by 2007 at the latest.
   • Since Bilal did not file suit until 2021, the limitations period had long expired.
   • The magistrate rejected Bilal’s argument that each later reliance on the Banks papers constituted a “continuing violation” that restarted the limitations clock, concluding (based on judicially noticed records) that the Banks papers were not actually used in subsequent reassessment hearings after 2007.
   • The magistrate also concluded the claim was independently barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), but the Eleventh Circuit ultimately did not reach that issue.

The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation in full and dismissed Bilal’s claims with prejudice as to all defendants, including those never served.

D. Appeal and Issues Presented

On appeal, now with appointed counsel, Bilal raised three principal issues:

1. Whether the district court erred in dismissing his Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim against ECSO.
2. Whether the district court erred in dismissing his § 1983 malicious prosecution claim as time-barred and in taking judicial notice of state-court records to determine accrual.
3. Whether the district court lacked authority to dismiss his claims with prejudice against unserved defendants.

The Eleventh Circuit addressed each in turn.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Conditions of Confinement: Short-Term Jail Detention of Civilly Committed Persons

1. Legal Framework: Substantive Due Process for Civilly Committed Persons

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects against deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. It has both procedural and substantive dimensions. For individuals who are civilly committed, the Supreme Court has recognized substantive liberty interests in reasonable conditions of confinement and safety. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315–19 (1982).

The Eleventh Circuit has applied this framework to persons committed under Florida’s Jimmy Ryce Act. Notably, in an earlier case brought by this same plaintiff, Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903 (11th Cir. 2020), the court held that individuals civilly committed under the Act:

• have served their criminal sentences and are therefore not prisoners; and
• enjoy a substantive liberty interest in “not being housed unnecessarily in jails.”

Geo Care emphasizes that conditions of confinement for civilly committed persons cannot be “substantially worse” than the conditions they would face upon commitment, absent a legitimate non-punitive justification. Civilly committed persons are thus distinct from convicted prisoners; the State may restrain them to prevent danger but may not punish them.

2. Application to Bilal’s Escambia County Jail Claim

Bilal alleged that:

• he was detained at the Escambia County Jail solely to attend court appearances in his civil-commitment proceedings; and
• being housed in the jail “amounts to punishment and unlawful seizure.”

Crucially, the complaint did not describe:

• any particular conditions he faced at the jail, or
• how those conditions differed from, or were worse than, conditions at the Florida Civil Commitment Center.

The court—relying on judicially noticed jail records—found that each of Bilal’s jail stays lasted less than 40 hours, and were plainly linked to his appearance at court proceedings.

Comparing this case with Bilal v. Geo Care is revealing:

• In Geo Care, Bilal alleged that during a one-month stay at Santa Rosa County Jail he:
  • was put in a confinement unit with no TV, phone, law library, visitation, exercise, canteen, or religious/group activities;
  • received no mental-health treatment;
  • was subjected to “abusive” guards and “show of force” tactics;
  • became suicidal and spent over two weeks in a suicide cell;
  • was jailed for a full month to attend a one-day hearing.
  On those allegations, the Eleventh Circuit held that he had plausibly alleged unconstitutional punishment.
• Here, by contrast:
  • no analogous facts were pleaded;
  • the detention periods were extremely short (< 40 hours each); and
  • no clear disparity between jail conditions and his regular civil-commitment conditions was alleged.

Under the pleading standard of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), a complaint must allege facts that make the claim “plausible on its face”—not merely conceivable or consistent with liability. Even though Bilal is a pro se litigant (and his complaint is construed liberally under Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007)), the court held he did not allege enough factual content to allow a reasonable inference that ECSO subjected him to unconstitutional punishment or conditions.

Because the transfers:

• were of short duration,
• were tied to a legitimate non-punitive purpose (attendance at court proceedings), and
• were not accompanied by pleaded facts showing substantially worse or punitive conditions,

the court affirmed dismissal of the due process claim for failure to state a claim.

3. Doctrinal Significance

This part of the opinion reinforces several principles:

• Civilly committed persons can challenge jail housing under substantive due process, but success depends on fact-specific allegations of punitive or unduly harsh conditions, especially when compared to the civil-commitment facility.
• Short, court-related jail stays—absent special aggravating circumstances—will often be viewed as constitutionally permissible logistical incidents of litigation, not punishment.
• Pleading detail matters. Even for pro se litigants, “labels and conclusions” and bare assertions that something “amounts to punishment” are not enough under Twombly/Iqbal.

B. Statute of Limitations and the Malicious Prosecution Claim

1. Malicious Prosecution Under § 1983

The Eleventh Circuit recognizes a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution that can apply to “a wide array of baseless legal proceedings, civil and criminal alike.” Gervin v. Florence, 139 F.4th 1236, 1254 (11th Cir. 2025). The core idea is that an official misuses legal process (e.g., criminal charges, civil commitment) without probable cause and with malice, causing a constitutional injury.

Here, Bilal did not challenge the legality of the Jimmy Ryce Act itself, but alleged that:

• his initial civil commitment and subsequent recommitments were tainted by the presence of the Banks criminal records in his file; and
• the defendants “relied upon” those false records “as a basis” for recommending and continuing his commitment.

2. Statute of Limitations: Four Years Under Florida Law

For § 1983 claims, federal courts borrow the personal-injury statute of limitations from the forum state. See Doe ex rel. Doe #6 v. Swearingen, 51 F.4th 1295, 1302–03 (11th Cir. 2022).

In Florida, that limitations period is four years. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3); Swearingen, 51 F.4th at 1303. That much was uncontested.

3. Federal Accrual Rule: When the Plaintiff Knew or Should Have Known

Although the length of the limitations period comes from state law, the question when it starts running—“accrual”—is governed by federal law.

Accrual occurs when “the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.” Swearingen, 51 F.4th at 1303 (cleaned up).

The key finding here was that Bilal knew or should have known of the Banks records problem—and the alleged misuse of that information—no later than 2007. The court relied on judicially noticed state-court records from his 2007 reassessment hearing, where the judge explicitly ordered that the Banks papers not be considered. The panel also noted (in a footnote) that Bilal likely knew as early as 2000, based on a habeas petition where he himself complained that another man’s crimes were “intertwined” with his record.

Because Bilal did not file this suit until May 2021, the four-year period (however measured from 2000 or 2007) had plainly expired.

4. The “Continuing Violation” Doctrine and Why It Failed

To avoid the time bar, Bilal invoked the “continuing violation” doctrine. Under Eleventh Circuit law:

“The continuing violation doctrine permits a plaintiff to sue on an otherwise time-barred claim when additional violations of the law occur within the statutory period.”
—Center for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006).

But the doctrine is narrow. It applies only where:

• there are genuine new violations within the limitations period; and
• a reasonably prudent plaintiff could not have determined that a violation occurred earlier. See Hamilton, 453 F.3d at 1335.

Bilal argued that every reassessment hearing at which officials considered his file constituted a new violation, because the Banks papers allegedly remained in his file and affected the outcome. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this for two reasons:

1. No plausible allegations of post-2007 misuse

   The magistrate judge took judicial notice of state-court records from Bilal’s reassessment hearings after 2007. Those records, the court noted, showed that the Banks papers were not actually relied upon in those later proceedings. Bilal did not challenge the authenticity or accuracy of those records in his objections or on appeal.

   Absent plausible allegations of actual use of the Banks materials within the four-year period before 2021, there was no continuing violation.

2. Bilal knew of the alleged wrong long before

   Even if renewed misuse had occurred, the doctrine would still not apply if a reasonable person in Bilal’s position would have realized the alleged violation back when he learned of the Banks problem (at least by 2007). Hamilton explicitly states that if prior events should have alerted the plaintiff “to act or assert his or her rights,” the continuing violation doctrine is unavailable. 453 F.3d at 1335.

   Because Bilal knew about the Banks error and believed it was being wrongfully used against him many years before 2017, he could not restart the limitations clock by characterizing repeated consequences as new violations.

Thus, the malicious prosecution claim was conclusively time-barred.

5. Judicial Notice at the Rule 12(b)(6) Stage

Bilal also challenged the use of judicial notice of state-court documents at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Under Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007), a court deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must consider the complaint and also “matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”

Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2) permits a court to judicially notice a fact that is:

• “not subject to reasonable dispute” because it “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”

Certified state-court records typically qualify. The Eleventh Circuit reviews such decisions for abuse of discretion. Paez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 947 F.3d 649, 651 (11th Cir. 2020).

Here, the panel emphasized that:

• Bilal never asked to be heard under Rule 201(e) about the noticed documents;
• he did not challenge the authenticity or accuracy of the state-court records; and
• on appeal, he did not argue that those records were subject to reasonable dispute.

Bilal’s only procedural complaint was that the district court failed to attach copies of the judicially noticed records to its order. In Paez, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that district courts, as a “best practice,” should attach such records, especially in prisoner cases where litigants may lack Internet or file access. 947 F.3d at 652–53. But the court in Bilal clarified that:

• this is a recommendation, not a binding requirement; and
• it was proposed mainly to protect inmates, whereas Bilal was no longer confined when his case was decided.

Therefore, there was no abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice, and the court was entitled to rely on those records in resolving the statute-of-limitations issue at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.

6. Heck v. Humphrey Issue Left Unresolved

The magistrate judge had also held that Bilal’s malicious prosecution claim was barred by the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which prevents § 1983 plaintiffs from seeking damages in a way that would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding criminal conviction or confinement when that conviction or confinement has not been invalidated.

The Eleventh Circuit, however, explicitly declined to reach the Heck issue, having already determined the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. This leaves unresolved (in this opinion) how Heck applies to civil-commitment-based malicious prosecution claims post-release, an issue that may arise in future litigation.

C. Personal Jurisdiction, Service of Process, and the Inability to Dismiss with Prejudice Against Unserved Defendants

1. The District Court’s Reliance on “Inherent Authority”

The district court dismissed Bilal’s claims with prejudice against all named defendants, including those who had never been served and who never appeared. To justify that, the court invoked its “inherent authority” to dismiss frivolous claims.

The Eleventh Circuit has acknowledged that district courts possess inherent power to dismiss actions that are “so patently lacking in merit as to be frivolous.” Jefferson Fourteenth Assocs. v. Wometco de P.R., Inc., 695 F.2d 524, 526 n.3 (11th Cir. 1983). Likewise, in an earlier case involving Bilal, the court explained that a “claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001).

But the question here was not whether a frivolous action may ever be dismissed sua sponte; it was whether, in the absence of service and personal jurisdiction over a given defendant, the court may dismiss the claims against that defendant with prejudice—i.e., with the preclusive effect of a merits adjudication.

2. Service of Process as a Jurisdictional Requirement

The Eleventh Circuit’s answer is clear: No.

The panel underscores a basic principle of civil procedure: “Service of process is a jurisdictional requirement.” Pardazi v. Cullman Med. Ctr., 896 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990). Until a defendant has been properly served (or waives service), the court lacks personal jurisdiction over that defendant. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.

Without personal jurisdiction, a court cannot issue a binding judgment on the defendant’s rights or obligations. And a dismissal “with prejudice” is precisely such a binding, merits-based judgment; it operates as a “final judgment on the merits” for res judicata purposes. Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 904 F.2d 1498, 1501 (11th Cir. 1990).

The panel also highlights that objections to personal jurisdiction based on improper or lack of service can be waived—but only by the defendant. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h), a defendant waives service-based objections by omitting them from a Rule 12 motion or a responsive pleading. The Eleventh Circuit has similarly held that “[o]bjections to service of process, like any other objection to jurisdiction over the person, can be waived by the party over whom jurisdiction is sought.” Pardazi, 896 F.2d at 1317.

In this case, none of the unserved defendants:

• was served;
• appeared; or
• filed any pleading or motion.

Therefore, there was no waiver, and the court lacked jurisdiction over them.

3. No Merits Dismissal Without Personal Jurisdiction

Once the lack of personal jurisdiction is recognized, the consequence is straightforward: the court cannot enter a merits disposition, such as a dismissal with prejudice, against unserved defendants. The Eleventh Circuit notes that it has previously vacated such rulings. See, e.g., Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1341–43 (11th Cir. 2005) (vacating dismissal with prejudice as to a party not properly served).

The panel draws a sharp line:

• A district court may, under various authorities (including Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), Rule 41, or its inherent power), dismiss claims without prejudice as to unserved defendants. Such dismissals reflect the court’s refusal to proceed without service, and they do not adjudicate the merits.
• But it may not enter a dismissal with prejudice—which necessarily resolves the merits—for a defendant over whom it lacks personal jurisdiction.

Thus, even if Bilal’s claims against the unserved defendants were frivolous, the district court’s lack of personal jurisdiction barred it from entering a merits judgment against them. The Eleventh Circuit therefore vacated the dismissal with prejudice as to these defendants and remanded for the limited purpose of reentering judgment as a dismissal without prejudice.

4. Practical Implications for District Courts

This part of the decision is particularly significant for case-management and screening practices:

• In multi-defendant cases—especially those involving pro se litigants—district courts often screen complaints early and may be tempted to dismiss claims across the board as frivolous.
• However, when some defendants have not been served and have not appeared, the court must distinguish between:
  • Merits-based dismissals (with prejudice) for defendants over whom the court has personal jurisdiction; and
  • Non-merits dismissals (without prejudice) as to unserved defendants, unless some other valid procedural mechanism is available.
• Courts must be especially careful when relying on their “inherent authority” to dismiss frivolous claims: inherent power cannot override jurisdictional limits.

The opinion thus reinforces a basic but sometimes overlooked structural constraint: subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction are prerequisites to binding merits adjudications.

D. Treatment of Pro Se Pleadings: Liberal Construction Still Meets Twombly/Iqbal

Throughout, the panel reaffirms that pro se complaints are construed liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). For example, the court:

• accepted the first amended complaint (filed March 23, 2023) as the operative pleading because the district court never granted leave to file a second amended complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); and
• treated Bilal’s reference to a 2005 order as if it referred to the 2007 order by the same judge, taking judicial notice to harmonize his allegations.

However, liberal construction does not exempt a pro se plaintiff from the plausibility requirement. The complaint must still contain factual content sufficient to allow a reasonable inference of liability. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

In short, the court interprets Bilal’s filings charitably but not “blindly”; conclusory constitutional labels without factual support remain vulnerable to dismissal.

E. Key Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Several precedents structure the court’s analysis:

• Hunt v. Aimco Props., L.P., 814 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2016)

  Cited for the Rule 12(b)(6) standard that courts must accept well‑pleaded factual allegations as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but not legal conclusions.

• United States ex rel. Sedona Partners LLC v. Able Moving & Storage Inc., 146 F.4th 1032 (11th Cir. 2025)

  Cited for the de novo standard of review applicable to an order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

• Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)

  Provide the modern plausibility standard for federal pleading. The court relies on them to conclude that Bilal’s bare assertion that jail housing “amounted to punishment” without any factual elaboration fails to state a claim.

• Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)

  Establishes that those civilly committed by the State enjoy substantive liberty interests under the Due Process Clause in reasonably safe, non-punitive conditions and professional judgment-based care. This underpins the recognition in Bilal v. Geo Care that civilly committed Jimmy Ryce detainees have a liberty interest against unnecessary jail housing.

• Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903 (11th Cir. 2020)

  A critical precedent from Bilal’s prior litigation. It:

  • recognizes a substantive due process right “not to be housed unnecessarily in jails” for Ryce Act detainees;
  • finds that a month-long, harsh jail confinement could be punitive; and
  • provides the comparison that the panel now uses to assess the adequacy of Bilal’s current allegations about Escambia County Jail.

• Gervin v. Florence, 139 F.4th 1236 (11th Cir. 2025)

  Describes malicious prosecution as a tort covering a wide array of baseless legal proceedings, both civil and criminal. The court cites it to situate Bilal’s claim.

• Gonsalvez v. Celebrity Cruises Inc., 750 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2013)

  Confirms that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds is appropriate where the time bar is apparent from the face of the complaint.

• Doe ex rel. Doe #6 v. Swearingen, 51 F.4th 1295 (11th Cir. 2022)

  Establishes that Florida’s four-year limitations period applies to § 1983 claims in Florida and describes the federal accrual rule—knowledge of facts supporting the cause of action triggers accrual.

• Center for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2006)

  Defines and narrows the continuing violation doctrine; the panel uses it to hold that Bilal cannot resurrect an old, known grievance merely by characterizing ongoing effects as fresh violations.

• Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007) and Fed. R. Evid. 201

  Provide the framework for considering judicially noticeable materials at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Combined with Paez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr. (947 F.3d 649 (11th Cir. 2020)), they support the district court’s reliance on state-court records to resolve the limitations question.

• Paez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 947 F.3d 649 (11th Cir. 2020)

  Advises district courts—especially in prisoner cases—to attach copies of judicially noticed records as a “best practice,” but clarifies this is not mandatory. The panel leans on this to reject Bilal’s argument that failure to attach the records was reversible error.

• Jefferson Fourteenth Assocs. v. Wometco de P.R., Inc., 695 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1983) and Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2001)

  Recognize the district court’s inherent authority to dismiss frivolous cases, but the panel uses them in tandem with jurisdictional principles to emphasize that even frivolous claims cannot be dismissed with prejudice against unserved, non-appearing defendants.

• Pardazi v. Cullman Med. Ctr., 896 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990)

  The key service-of-process case, holding that service is a jurisdictional prerequisite and that a court lacks jurisdiction over an unserved defendant. This undergirds the holding that the district court lacked authority to enter a dismissal with prejudice against unserved defendants.

• Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 904 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1990)

  Establishes that dismissal with prejudice constitutes a final judgment on the merits, critical to the panel’s reasoning that such a dismissal cannot be entered in the absence of personal jurisdiction.

• Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2005)

  Provides the direct procedural precedent for vacating a dismissal with prejudice where the defendant was not properly served. The panel follows that path here.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

The opinion assumes familiarity with several legal concepts. In simpler terms:

• 42 U.S.C. § 1983

  A federal statute that allows individuals to sue state and local officials (and, in some circumstances, entities) for violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights, committed under color of state law.

• Civil Commitment vs. Criminal Incarceration

  A person who is civilly committed (as under the Jimmy Ryce Act) is not serving a criminal sentence. Instead, the State holds them for treatment and preventive purposes because they are deemed dangerous. They retain greater liberty protections than convicted prisoners; they may be confined but may not be punished.

• Substantive Due Process

  Beyond procedural guarantees (like notice and a hearing), the Due Process Clause sometimes protects certain fundamental rights from governmental infringement outright, regardless of procedure. For civilly committed individuals, it protects against punitive or unduly harsh conditions of confinement, and requires conditions reasonably related to legitimate state interests (like treatment and public safety).

• Malicious Prosecution (in § 1983)

  A claim that governmental actors initiated or continued legal proceedings (criminal, civil, or quasi‑criminal like civil commitment) without probable cause and with malice, and that the proceedings ended in the plaintiff’s favor, thereby causing constitutional injury (often under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment).

• Statute of Limitations

  A law that sets the maximum time after an event within which legal proceedings may be initiated. For § 1983 claims in Florida, the limit is four years from when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known the key facts giving rise to the claim.

• Accrual

  The moment when the statute of limitations starts running. In § 1983 actions, this is when the plaintiff has sufficient notice of both the injury and its cause to bring suit, even if the full extent of harm is not yet known.

• Continuing Violation Doctrine

  A limited doctrine allowing a plaintiff to sue for a pattern of wrongful acts that continue into the limitations period. It does not apply merely because a single past violation has ongoing consequences; there must be discrete, fresh violations within the limitations period, and the plaintiff must not have reasonably recognized the violation earlier.

• Judicial Notice

  A procedural tool allowing a court to accept certain facts as true without requiring formal proof, if they are not reasonably disputed and can be accurately determined from sources of unquestioned reliability (such as official court records).

• Service of Process

  The formal delivery of legal papers (such as a summons and complaint) to a defendant, giving them notice of the lawsuit and activating the court’s power over them. Without proper service (or waiver), the court lacks personal jurisdiction over that defendant.

• Personal Jurisdiction

  A court’s power to issue binding judgments over a particular person or entity. Proper service of process is a fundamental prerequisite to personal jurisdiction in ordinary civil litigation.

• Dismissal “with prejudice” vs. “without prejudice”

  A dismissal with prejudice is final on the merits; the plaintiff generally cannot refile the same claim against the same defendant. A dismissal without prejudice leaves the plaintiff free to correct defects (such as service) or refile, subject to any applicable limitations period or other constraints.

• Pro Se Litigant

  A person who represents himself or herself in court, without a lawyer. Courts liberally construe pro se filings but still apply basic procedural and substantive rules, including the requirement to plead enough facts to state a plausible claim.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

1. Civilly Committed Persons and Jail Housing

Combined with Bilal v. Geo Care, this opinion refines the contours of the substantive due process right of civilly committed persons not to be housed unnecessarily in jails:

• Long-term, harsh jail confinement for purposes extraneous or disproportionate to court proceedings may plausibly violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
• Short-term, court-related jail stays, where no harsher or punitive conditions are plausibly alleged, are unlikely to support a constitutional claim.
• Future plaintiffs challenging jail transfers while civilly committed will need to plead specific, concrete facts about:
  • duration of confinement,
  • conditions at the jail,
  • comparison to conditions at the commitment facility, and
  • the presence (or absence) of therapeutic or safety justifications.

2. Timeliness of § 1983 Challenges to Long-Running Civil Commitment

The opinion sends a clear message on limitations and malicious prosecution in the civil‑commitment context:

• Once a committed person learns that erroneous or unlawfully obtained information (like another person’s crimes) is being used in their civil-commitment proceedings, the limitations period for any § 1983 malicious prosecution theory starts to run.
• Repeated proceedings that are arguably influenced by the same old error do not necessarily reset the clock; plaintiffs must show new, discrete violations within the limitations period, and the continuing violation doctrine will not rescue claims where the plaintiff was already aware of the problem years earlier.
• This encourages timely filing of federal civil-rights claims, rather than attempts to aggregate decades of perceived wrongs into a single untimely lawsuit.

3. Judicial Notice in Civil-Rights Litigation

The court’s endorsement of judicial notice of state-court records at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage reinforces an important practical technique:

• Defense counsel may rely on publicly available state-court docket entries, orders, and transcripts to demonstrate when a plaintiff knew particular facts, supporting limitations defenses early in litigation.
• Plaintiffs must be prepared to confront such records and, if necessary, challenge their accuracy or context, or request an opportunity to be heard under Rule 201(e).
• District courts are reminded that while attaching such documents is a best practice (especially in prisoner cases), failure to do so is not automatically reversible error, particularly when the plaintiff is no longer incarcerated and does not dispute the records.

4. Personal Jurisdiction Constraints on Sua Sponte Dismissals

The most distinctive doctrinal contribution of the opinion is its insistence that no matter how frivolous a claim may appear, federal courts cannot enter a dismissal with prejudice against a defendant they have never acquired personal jurisdiction over.

Consequences include:

• For district courts:
  • In multi-defendant suits, they must differentiate between served and unserved defendants when entering final judgments.
  • If they wish to terminate claims against unserved defendants, they should do so without prejudice, for example under Rule 4(m) (failure to timely serve) or by declining to proceed without service.
  • Inherent authority to dismiss frivolous claims cannot be used to circumvent the requirement of personal jurisdiction.
• For defendants:
  • Parties not properly served cannot be bound by a merits judgment, nor can they benefit from claim preclusion based on a dismissal with prejudice in a case where they were never haled before the court.
• For plaintiffs:
  • Dismissal without prejudice keeps the door theoretically open to later, properly served litigation (subject to limitations), whereas dismissal with prejudice would permanently bar the claim.
  • Pro se litigants should note that failure to serve defendants will generally not lead to a permanent bar on the merits, but will waste time and resources if not addressed promptly.

5. Appellate Practice Note

Finally, the court’s brief denial (as moot) of ECSO’s motion for judicial notice of over 600 pages of documents illustrates a routine but important appellate practice: when the appellate court affirms on grounds that do not require additional materials, large record-expansion motions may simply become unnecessary.

VII. Conclusion

Bilal v. Benoit is a procedurally focused, yet doctrinally meaningful, Eleventh Circuit decision at the intersection of civil commitment, § 1983 practice, and federal civil procedure.

Substantively, it clarifies that:

• civilly committed individuals retain a substantive due process right not to be punished via unnecessary jail housing, but short, court-related jail stays without pleaded harsh conditions do not automatically rise to a constitutional violation; and
• § 1983 malicious prosecution claims arising from long-running civil-commitment proceedings are subject to ordinary statutes of limitation and cannot rely on a loosely framed “continuing violation” theory when the plaintiff knew of the underlying wrong years before.

Procedurally, and most importantly, the opinion reinforces a core jurisdictional constraint: a federal court cannot dismiss claims with prejudice against unserved defendants, because it lacks personal jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits as to those parties. This holds even when the claims appear frivolous and even when the court invokes its inherent authority.

In practical terms, the case serves as a reminder that:

• pro se litigants, while given liberal construction, must still meet modern plausibility standards and observe limitations periods; and
• district courts must be meticulous in tailoring the reach of their judgments to the parties properly before them, preserving the fundamental principle that jurisdiction is a prerequisite to a binding merits disposition.