No Direct Appeal as of Right from Denial of Motion to Modify Pretrial Detention: Utah Supreme Court Narrows § 77-20-209

Introduction

In State v. Harris, 2025 UT 48, the Utah Supreme Court resolved a recurring procedural question arising under Utah’s reformed pretrial release regime: when does a criminal defendant have a statutory, expedited appeal as of right from a pretrial detention ruling? The answer turns on the scope of Utah Code § 77-20-209.

The case involves appellant Christoffer Alan Harris, detained without bail on numerous serious felonies involving a minor. After an initial detention order, Harris did not take an immediate appeal. Months later, he moved to modify that order based on purportedly new evidence (negative DNA results). The district court denied modification, finding no material change in circumstances. Harris sought to appeal that denial as a matter of right. The State argued the appellate courts lacked jurisdiction because § 77-20-209 does not authorize a direct appeal from a denial of a motion to modify pretrial detention.

The key issue: whether § 77-20-209’s right to an “expedited appeal of the pretrial status order” applies to a ruling denying a motion to modify an existing detention order. The Court held it does not. Instead, a defendant must seek discretionary, interlocutory review to challenge a denied motion to modify detention. The majority opinion by Justice Hagen (joined by Justices Petersen and Pohlman) partially abrogates contrary court of appeals precedent. Chief Justice Durrant dissented, joined by Judge Blanch, concluding that the statute’s text encompasses continued detention and therefore permits a direct appeal.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court dismissed Harris’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. It interpreted § 77-20-209 to grant an expedited appeal as of right only when a court “issues a pretrial status order that orders the individual be detained” while the person awaits trial. That right covers:

• an initial pretrial status order that denies pretrial release and orders detention; and
• a later order granting a motion to modify that newly orders detention (e.g., a defendant previously released is subsequently detained).

But the statute does not confer a direct appeal as of right from a court’s denial of a motion to modify an existing detention order because such a ruling neither “issues” a new pretrial status order nor “orders” detention; it merely preserves the status quo. The appropriate avenue to challenge a denied motion to modify is a petition for interlocutory appeal, not a notice of appeal. Because Harris did not timely seek interlocutory review, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed.

The Court explicitly abrogated in part two court of appeals decisions—State v. Groce, 2024 UT App 166, and State v. Stubbs, 2025 UT App 48—to the extent they recognized a right to a direct, expedited appeal from orders denying motions to modify pretrial detention. The dissent argued that the statutory phrase “be detained” includes continued detention and thus encompasses the district court’s order denying release and continuing detention.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Discussed

The Court’s analysis is primarily statutory. It situates § 77-20-209 within Utah’s pretrial release statutes enacted or amended in 2021 and 2023, and it draws on several interpretive guideposts:

• Statutory interpretation canon: Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, and McKitrick v. Gibson, 2021 UT 48, reaffirm the primacy of plain text and the presumption that the Legislature uses terms advisedly.
• Jurisdiction and dismissal principle: Weber County v. Ogden Trece, 2013 UT 62, confirms that if jurisdiction is lacking, an appellate court’s only authority is to dismiss.
• Applicable law timing: State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23, provides that courts apply the law in effect at the time of the relevant procedural act; here, the 2024 version of the code controlled both the denial of modification and the notice of appeal.
• Substance-over-labeling: Bishop v. GenTec Inc., 2002 UT 36, warns that the substance of a motion, not its caption, governs; the Court treats Harris’s “Second Motion for Pretrial Release” as a motion to modify.
• Constitutional allocation: Utah Const. art. VIII, § 3 emphasizes that the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction is exercised as provided by statute—a cornerstone for the majority’s refusal to expand jurisdiction by policy.
• Court of Appeals decisions abrogated in part: State v. Groce (2024 UT App 166) and State v. Stubbs (2025 UT App 48) recognized a right to appeal “subsequent orders” that keep a defendant detained. The Supreme Court limits § 77-20-209 to orders that newly “order” detention.

The dissent canvasses related authorities to underline a broader reading, including:

• Definitions of “detain/detention” in Merriam-Webster and Black’s Law Dictionary (arguing “be detained” naturally includes continued detention).
• Seat (2022 UT App 143) and other appellate cases illustrating the iterative nature of pretrial status orders and the frequent mootness of bail appeals.
• Inter-statutory harmony: Croft v. Morgan County (2021 UT 46) encourages harmonizing § 77-20-209 with § 77-18a-1(1)(d) (direct appeals from “order denying bail,” with “bail” redefined in 2023 as “pretrial release”).

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The majority proceeds from the operative text: a defendant has “the right to an expedited appeal of the pretrial status order” if a court “issues a pretrial status order that orders the individual be detained during the time the individual awaits trial.” The opinion construes that language narrowly and functionally:

• What counts as a qualifying order?
  • Initial “pretrial status orders” denying release and ordering detention after a detention hearing (see § 77-20-201 and § 77-20-205(2)) qualify.
  • Orders granting a motion to modify that newly impose detention (e.g., where a defendant had previously been released) also qualify, because they “issue” a (modified) pretrial status order that “orders” detention.
  • By contrast, a denial of a motion to modify does not qualify. It does not “issue” any new or “modified pretrial status order,” and it does not itself “order” detention; it leaves the earlier order intact and merely “maintains the status quo.”
• Temporary versus pretrial status orders:
  • Temporary pretrial status orders (e.g., no-bail warrants) can detain a defendant only “until a pretrial status order is issued.” They are not the “pretrial status order” that governs “during the time the individual awaits trial.” Thus, the appealable event under § 77-20-209 occurs at the pretrial status order stage, not at the temporary stage.
• Policy neutrality: The Court rejects policy invitations to broaden jurisdiction. It underscores that the Constitution assigns appellate jurisdiction “as provided by statute,” and § 77-20-209’s language is not broad enough to cover denials of modification.
• Interlocutory review remains available: A denial of modification can be challenged via a petition for interlocutory appeal under § 77-18a-1(2) and Utah R. App. P. 5. The Court even suggests a practical safeguard: when in doubt about a right to appeal, file both a notice of appeal and a petition for interlocutory review within the respective deadlines.

Applying these principles, Harris had two missed opportunities:

• He could have taken a direct, expedited appeal as of right from the October 2024 pretrial status order that denied release and ordered detention; he did not.
• He could have sought interlocutory review of the 2025 denial of his motion to modify; he did not do so within the time allowed, and a late direct appeal cannot supply jurisdiction.

3) The Dissent’s Reading

Chief Justice Durrant would find jurisdiction. He reasons that a court’s order denying pretrial release and directing that the defendant “continue to be held” is a pretrial status order that both “denies pretrial release” and “orders that the individual be detained.” In ordinary usage, “be detained” naturally includes continued detention. He emphasizes:

• Utah’s pretrial scheme contemplates ongoing reevaluation—at warrant issuance (temporary orders), at initial appearance (pretrial status orders), and upon motions to modify—each potentially producing appealable pretrial status orders.
• Nothing in § 77-20-209 limits appeals to the “first” order imposing detention; “a pretrial status order” sensibly means “any” such order.
• Harmonizing § 77-20-209 with § 77-18a-1(1)(d) (direct appeals from orders denying “bail,” now defined as “pretrial release”) supports permissive jurisdiction in this posture.

4) Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

The Court’s decision is a significant procedural inflection point in Utah’s post-reform pretrial practice. Key impacts include:

• Scope of direct, expedited appeals narrowed: Defendants may no longer file a direct appeal as of right from orders denying motions to modify existing detention. Only orders that newly order detention trigger § 77-20-209.
• Interlocutory petitions are essential: To obtain appellate review of a denied motion to modify detention, defendants must file a petition for permission to appeal an interlocutory order under Utah R. App. P. 5 (typically within 21 days). Missed deadlines will forfeit appellate review.
• Partial abrogation of court of appeals precedent: To the extent Groce and Stubbs permitted direct appeals from denials of modification, they are no longer good law. Litigants and trial courts should adjust expectations accordingly.
• Fewer serial “as of right” appeals: The decision curbs repeated direct appeals following successive denials of modification, channeling such challenges to discretionary review. This can promote stability and conserve judicial resources, though at the cost of limiting automatic appellate oversight.
• Strategic timing pressures: Defense counsel must vigilantly appeal the initial pretrial status order that detains or promptly seek interlocutory review of any later denials of modification. Prosecutors should anticipate that if a court newly detains a previously released defendant on the State’s motion to modify, a direct appeal as of right will be available and expedited.
• Temporary pretrial status orders: The Court clarifies that temporary detention via no-bail warrants is not the event that triggers § 77-20-209; the appealable pivot point is the subsequent pretrial status order after the required hearing.
• Potential legislative response: If the Legislature intended a broader right to appeal any detention-maintaining decision, it may choose to amend § 77-20-209 to clarify that denials of modification are included.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Temporary pretrial status order: A short-lived order (often embedded in a warrant) that may detain a defendant until a “pretrial status order” is issued after an appearance or detention hearing. It does not govern “during the time the individual awaits trial.”
• Pretrial status order: The operative order entered after the initial appearance/detention hearing. It either (1) releases on recognizance, (2) sets conditions for release, or (3) denies release and orders detention pending trial.
• Material change in circumstances: The statutory threshold to modify a pretrial status order. It focuses on new developments (not known at issuance) that meaningfully alter risk of flight or danger, availability of services/conditions, or delays not attributable to the defendant.
• Expedited appeal as of right (§ 77-20-209): A direct appeal available when a court issues a pretrial status order that newly orders detention. It is subject to tight deadlines (e.g., notice within 30 days under URAP 4).
• Interlocutory appeal: Discretionary appellate review of a nonfinal ruling, obtained by petition (usually within 21 days under URAP 5). It is the proper vehicle to challenge a denial of a motion to modify.
• “Substantial evidence” and “clear and convincing”: For detention on felony charges, the State must show substantial evidence of the charge and, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant poses substantial danger or is likely to flee (§ 77-20-201(1)(c)).
• Labels don’t control: Even if a filing is titled “Second Motion for Pretrial Release,” courts look to its substance. If it seeks to change an existing pretrial status order based on new facts, it is a motion to modify.

Application to the Case

Procedurally, several milestones determined the outcome:

• After serious felony charges were amended, a magistrate issued a no-bail temporary pretrial status order.
• At Harris’s initial appearance, the court delayed final determination; later, after an evidentiary hearing, it issued an October 2024 pretrial status order denying release and ordering detention. Harris did not appeal that order within the 30-day window.
• In 2025, Harris moved to modify, citing negative DNA results. The court found no material change in circumstances and denied modification, expressly continuing the prior ruling. Harris filed a direct appeal from that denial, rather than petitioning for interlocutory review within the applicable deadline.
• The Supreme Court held it lacked jurisdiction over the direct appeal because a denial of modification is not appealable as of right under § 77-20-209 and, absent a timely interlocutory petition, no other vehicle was available.

Notable procedural nuance: the opinion references two dates for the denial of modification (January 23, 2025, and March 20, 2025). The discrepancy does not affect the analysis because the applicable version of the code (2024) governed both the denial and the notice of appeal.

Practice Pointers

• Defense counsel:
  • Appeal the first qualifying pretrial status order that orders detention within 30 days via a notice of appeal to secure expedited review under § 77-20-209.
  • If a later motion to modify detention is denied, do not rely on a direct appeal. File a petition for interlocutory appeal (typically within 21 days under URAP 5) and consider, in close cases, also filing a protective notice of appeal as the Court suggests when the availability of an appeal as of right is uncertain.
  • To meet the “material change in circumstances” standard, marshal genuinely new facts, not previously known at the time of the pretrial status order, that go to flight risk, danger, or available conditions.
• Prosecutors:
  • When a defendant is on pretrial release and new facts elevate risk, a granted motion to modify to detention will produce a new appealable pretrial status order subject to expedited review.
  • Expect that denials of defense motions to modify will be challenged via interlocutory petitions rather than direct appeal.
• Trial courts:
  • Be precise about the nature of the ruling. A denial of modification does not “issue” a new or modified pretrial status order; it continues the existing order.
  • Bishop’s substance-over-labeling principle applies: calling a denial a “pretrial status order” will not transform it into one for appellate jurisdiction purposes.

Unresolved or Sensitive Areas

• High-conditions release versus de facto detention: The opinion does not address whether exceptionally onerous release conditions that function like detention (e.g., unattainable monetary conditions) might trigger § 77-20-209. Under the current text, the right attaches when the court “denies pretrial release” and “orders” detention, not when it sets conditions.
• Harmonization with § 77-18a-1(1)(d): The dissent raises the interplay with the broader direct-appeal provision for orders “denying bail” (now defined as denying “pretrial release”). Future cases may further delineate the boundaries between these provisions and the procedural vehicles (direct versus interlocutory) for different types of orders.
• Court of Appeals decisions: The Supreme Court expressly abrogates Groce and Stubbs in part. Other decisions (e.g., Dowhaniuk) may warrant reassessment to the extent they relied on a broader reading of § 77-20-209.

Why This Decision Matters

Harris establishes a clear, administrable line for appellate jurisdiction in pretrial detention disputes:

• Only orders that newly “order the individual be detained” are directly and expeditiously appealable as of right.
• Denials of motions to modify an existing detention order are not directly appealable; they are reviewable, if at all, through discretionary interlocutory mechanisms (or, in rare cases, extraordinary writs).
• The ruling curbs serial automatic appeals, promotes finality of the initial detention decision, and places greater emphasis on showing a genuine material change to reopen detention questions.

Conclusion

State v. Harris, 2025 UT 48, delivers a definitive interpretation of Utah Code § 77-20-209’s expedited appeal right. The Utah Supreme Court holds that a defendant has an immediate appeal as of right from a pretrial status order that newly orders detention—either the initial pretrial status order after a detention hearing or a later order granting a motion to modify that imposes detention on a previously released defendant. But a denial of a motion to modify an existing detention order does not trigger § 77-20-209 because it neither issues a new pretrial status order nor orders detention; it maintains the status quo. Such denials must be challenged, if at all, via interlocutory petitions under Utah’s appellate rules.

The decision partially abrogates court of appeals precedent that had allowed direct appeals from denials of modification, clarifies the distinct roles of temporary and pretrial status orders in triggering appeal rights, and reaffirms that appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases is conferred by statute, not judicial policy. For practitioners, Harris underscores the importance of appealing the first qualifying detention order and, thereafter, rigorously pursuing interlocutory review for modification denials within tight timelines. For policymakers, it spotlights a potential gap in automatic appellate oversight that the Legislature may revisit if broader review of continued detention decisions is desired.