No Deferral and No “Non‑Adjudication”: Reopened Adjudication and Amended Petitions in West Virginia Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings – Commentary on In re W.B., A.B.-1, L.B.-1, E.B., L.B.-2, and A.B.-2

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s memorandum decision in In re W.B., A.B.-1, L.B.-1, E.B., L.B.-2, and A.B.-2, No. 24‑768 (Nov. 25, 2025), addresses two critical procedural questions in child abuse and neglect litigation:

When and how a circuit court may (and must) permit amendment of an abuse and neglect petition to add new allegations after an initial adjudication; and
Whether a circuit court can later adjudicate abuse allegations that a previous judge explicitly declined to decide, in the face of a respondent’s “law of the case” argument.

The case arises from egregious sexual abuse of an eleven‑year‑old child, L.B.-2, and the failure of her father (the petitioner) to protect her from a known child abuser, M.D., who was allowed to reside in the home. The Department of Human Services (“DHS”) alleged both:

Neglect, based on failure to protect the children from M.D.; and
Direct sexual abuse of L.B.-2 by the petitioner.

The first circuit judge adjudicated neglect (based on failure to protect from M.D.), but expressly refused to rule on the separate allegations that the father had sexually abused the child, saying that would be “for other people to decide,” apparently deferring to ongoing criminal proceedings against the petitioner.

After the case was reassigned to a different judge, new, more detailed incriminating statements by M.D. emerged in 2024, describing additional sexual acts by the petitioner and the petitioner’s alleged offering of the child to other men. DHS sought to amend the petition again and to reopen adjudication. The father opposed, arguing that:

The new material was not truly “new,” so amendment under the abuse and neglect rules was improper; and
The court’s earlier “non‑adjudication” of the sexual abuse allegations was, in effect, a final determination in his favor that became the “law of the case” and could not be disturbed.

The Supreme Court rejected both arguments and affirmed the circuit court’s order terminating the father’s parental rights. The decision reinforces three important principles:

Under Rule 19(b) of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and prior precedent, circuit courts have authority, and often an obligation, to ensure that new abuse allegations are added to the petition and adjudicated, even after a prior adjudication has occurred.
Child abuse and neglect proceedings may not be deferred or limited simply because related criminal charges are pending; Rule 5 explicitly forbids such delay or deference.
The “law of the case” doctrine does not bar a successor judge from adjudicating allegations that a prior judge simply refused to decide; there must be an actual prior decision, not a deliberate non‑decision, for law‑of‑the‑case to apply.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court, in a memorandum decision under Rule 21 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, affirmed the Mineral County Circuit Court’s December 21, 2024 order terminating the petitioner father’s parental rights.

Key holdings and conclusions include:

Amendment of petition: The circuit court did not err in granting DHS leave to file a third amended petition in 2024, adding new allegations arising from M.D.’s recent disclosures to law enforcement. These constituted “new allegations” under Rule 19(b), and the court was entitled to, and arguably required to, ensure that they were added to the petition and adjudicated.
Reopened adjudication: The circuit court properly reopened the adjudicatory hearing to hear evidence on the new allegations, as contemplated by Rule 19(b) and explained in In re C.L. and In re Lilith H..
No “law of the case” bar: The petitioner’s argument that the earlier judge’s refusal to adjudicate the father’s own sexual abuse of the child created a binding “law of the case” was rejected. Because that issue was never actually adjudicated, the doctrine was inapplicable.
Duty to adjudicate allegations: The circuit court correctly observed that the earlier judge’s decision to “defer” the sexual abuse allegations to criminal proceedings violated Rule 5 (no delay for criminal proceedings) and W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑601(i), which requires the court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on whether the child is abused or neglected and whether the respondent is an abuser.
Evidence of abuse: The circuit court’s finding that the petitioner sexually assaulted L.B.-2 was supported by clear and convincing evidence, particularly the forensic nurse’s testimony and findings, the investigating trooper’s evidence, and the child’s disclosures.
Sibling status as abused: Once the court found that L.B.-2 was an abused child, her siblings were also adjudicated abused children under W. Va. Code § 49‑1‑201(1)(A) because they resided in the same home where the abuse occurred.
Termination of parental rights: Although the opinion focuses narrowly on the procedural challenges (amendment and adjudication), it notes that the circuit court terminated the petitioner’s parental rights after a dispositional hearing in November 2024, and that the petitioner appeals from that final dispositional order. The termination was affirmed.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Abuse and Initial DHS Involvement

The DHS initiated the case in August 2022. Its petition alleged that the petitioner father failed to protect his children by permitting his girlfriend’s brother, M.D., to live in the home despite knowing that M.D. had a prior conviction for “child abuse resulting in death”—a conviction that the circuit court later described as illustrating M.D.’s “violent propensity toward children.”

Despite a prior warning from a Child Protective Services (CPS) worker in 2021 that M.D. should not be left alone with the children, the petitioner allowed M.D. to take eleven‑year‑old L.B.-2 out alone. M.D. raped her. In a forensic interview, L.B.-2 disclosed:

That M.D. had raped her; and
That the petitioner had digitally penetrated her on many occasions.

The DHS responded by filing a first amended petition in October 2022, expressly alleging that the petitioner himself had sexually abused L.B.-2. Criminal charges followed, including multiple counts of incest, sexual abuse by a parent, and first‑degree sexual assault.

B. The First Adjudicatory Hearing and Partial Adjudication (Neglect Only)

After several continuances, a contested adjudicatory hearing took place in January and March 2023. The evidence included:

CPS worker testimony – She confirmed she had warned the petitioner in 2021 not to leave M.D. alone with the children and recounted the child’s disclosures of M.D.’s rape and the petitioner’s inappropriate touching.
State Trooper testimony – He relayed the forensic nurse’s observation that the girl’s hymen resembled that of “a thirty‑year‑old woman who had been sexually active her entire life,” indicating serious and repeated sexual trauma. He also noted that M.D., when interrogated, hinted that “other abuse” was occurring in the home.
Forensic nurse (expert) testimony – At the resumed hearing in March 2023, she described an acute genital injury consistent with sexual assault.
Forensic interviewer testimony – She testified that in a second interview, the child described frequent (almost daily) digital penetration by the petitioner for approximately two years, beginning when she was seven.
Girlfriend’s testimony – The petitioner’s girlfriend denied believing the child’s disclosures and claimed the petitioner never had opportunity to molest the child within the alleged timeframe.

In a March 2023 order, the circuit court made findings about M.D.’s rape and adjudicated:

L.B.-2 as a neglected child by reason of the petitioner’s failure to protect her from M.D.; and
Her siblings as neglected “by proxy” because they resided in the home when the rape occurred.

Crucially, the circuit court declined to adjudicate the allegations that the petitioner sexually abused L.B.-2. On the record, the court stated it was “not going to rule on the sexual stuff” because that would be for “other people” (i.e., the criminal court) to decide.

C. Case Reassignment and Subsequent Proceedings

The case was later reassigned to a different circuit judge (sometime before September 2023). In December 2023:

The petitioner voluntarily relinquished his parental rights to L.B.-2; and
The court granted him a post‑adjudicatory improvement period as to the remaining children.

Thus, at that stage, the case stood with:

A neglect adjudication based on failure to protect from M.D.;
No adjudication (one way or the other) of the petitioner’s alleged direct sexual abuse of the child; and
An improvement period for the other children, with the petitioner still a legal parent to them.

D. New Disclosures from M.D. and the Third Amended Petition

In March 2024, during plea negotiations in M.D.’s criminal case, he gave a more detailed statement to police. In that statement (filed with the family court in April 2024), M.D. alleged:

That the petitioner engaged in additional sexual acts with L.B.-2 (including witnessing her performing oral sex on the petitioner); and
That the petitioner offered L.B.-2 to other adult men.

At an April 2024 review hearing, DHS moved to amend the petition (or file a new petition) to incorporate these new allegations. The petitioner opposed, arguing:

M.D.’s disclosures were not “new” because DHS could have obtained them earlier with due diligence, given M.D.’s earlier reference to “other abuse” in the home; and
The evidence related to the same abuse scenario for which he had already been adjudicated (or at least heard about) during the initial proceedings.

In May 2024, the new circuit judge reviewed the recording of the prior adjudication hearing and concluded that the prior judge had explicitly refused to rule on the sexual abuse allegations, effectively deferring to the criminal case. The new judge “wholeheartedly disagree[d]” with that approach and recognized it as a violation of Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, which states that abuse and neglect cases may not be delayed because of criminal proceedings.

The new judge determined that the court was required to fully adjudicate all allegations in the petition and to make definite findings on whether DHS met its burden of proof. Accordingly, the court:

Granted DHS leave to amend; and
Directed that adjudication be reopened on the newly added allegations.

DHS then filed a third amended petition in June 2024, incorporating M.D.’s new statements about the petitioner’s sexual abuse of L.B.-2.

E. Reopened Adjudication and Final Disposition

The reopened adjudicatory hearing on the third amended petition began in August 2024. The court:

Took judicial notice of all prior testimony; and
Heard new testimony from M.D., the girlfriend, and a former foster parent.

Key points from the reopened adjudication:

M.D.’s testimony – He claimed to have witnessed L.B.-2 performing oral sex on the petitioner, but admitted his statement was given in the context of a plea agreement, raising questions about his motives and credibility.
Petitioner’s girlfriend’s testimony – She again insisted that she did not believe the allegations and that the petitioner and the child were never alone, reinforcing her earlier defense of the petitioner.
Former foster parent’s testimony – The foster parent testified that the child could be dishonest, an assertion meant to undercut her credibility.

The circuit court ultimately found M.D. and the girlfriend not credible but relied on:

The forensic nurse’s findings of acute, non‑accidental genital injury consistent with sexual assault;
The trooper’s investigation; and
The child’s detailed disclosures of repeated digital penetration and sexual acts by the petitioner.

The court concluded that this “combination” of evidence constituted clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had sexually assaulted L.B.-2. It found that:

L.B.-2 was an abused child who sustained significant, non‑accidental injuries while in the petitioner’s custody; and
Her siblings were also abused children under W. Va. Code § 49‑1‑201(1)(A) because they resided in the same home where the abuse occurred.

Following a dispositional hearing in November 2024, the court terminated the petitioner’s parental rights to all the children. Various permanency plans were put in place:

W.B. – to remain with his nonabusing mother, who successfully completed a preadjudicatory improvement period;
A.B.-1, L.B.-1, E.B., and A.B.-2 – to remain in the custody of their nonabusing mother; and
L.B.-2 – termination of her mother’s rights and a permanency plan of eventual placement and adoption in a foster home.

The petitioner appealed from the final dispositional order, challenging only the amendment of the petition and the reopened adjudication—not the underlying sufficiency of the evidence at disposition.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Standard of Review: In re Cecil T.

The Court restated the standard of review typical in West Virginia abuse and neglect appeals, citing syllabus point 1 of In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011):

Findings of fact by the circuit court are reviewed under a “clearly erroneous” standard; and
Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.

This framework is significant because:

The petitioner’s challenges here are primarily legal (permissibility of amendment and adjudication), subject to de novo review.
Any implicit challenge to the sufficiency of evidence at adjudication would be heavily constrained by the deference owed to the circuit court on credibility determinations and fact‑finding.

B. Rule 19(b) – Amended Petitions and Reopened Adjudication

Rule 19(b) of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings states that when new allegations arise after the final adjudicatory hearing, they “should be included in an amended petition” and the final adjudicatory hearing “shall be re-opened” to receive evidence on those new allegations.

The Supreme Court applied this rule directly, emphasizing that:

M.D.’s 2024 disclosures were new allegations of additional sexual abuse; and
Rule 19(b) not only allows but expects the petition to be amended and adjudication reopened in such circumstances.

C. In re C.L. and In re Lilith H. – Court’s Inherent Authority to Compel Amendment

The Court relied heavily on its prior decisions in In re C.L., 249 W. Va. 95, 894 S.E.2d 877 (2023), and In re Lilith H., 231 W. Va. 170, 744 S.E.2d 280 (2013). These decisions articulate the circuit courts’ “inherent authority” to ensure that all abuse and neglect allegations are put before the court and adjudicated.

Syllabus point 3 of In re C.L. (quoting syllabus point 6 of In re Lilith H.) states that in order to facilitate prompt, fair, and thorough resolution of such actions:

[If], in the course of a child abuse and/or neglect proceeding, a circuit court discerns from the evidence or allegations presented that reasonable cause exists to believe that additional abuse or neglect has occurred … which is not encompassed by the allegations contained in the [DHS’s] petition, then pursuant to Rule 19 … the circuit court has inherent authority to compel the [DHS] to amend its petition to encompass the evidence or allegations.

By invoking this principle, the Court underscored:

Circuit courts are not passive recipients of whatever DHS happens to plead; they have an active role in ensuring that all apparent abuse is addressed.
If the record suggests additional abuse beyond the petition, the court can compel DHS to amend—even without DHS initiating the amendment.

Here, DHS itself moved to amend, but the Court highlighted that even if DHS had not, the circuit court would have had the authority to compel an amendment once M.D.’s new disclosures were known.

D. Rule 5 – No Delay for Criminal Proceedings

Rule 5 of the abuse and neglect rules provides that under no circumstances may child abuse and neglect proceedings be delayed pending the initiation, prosecution, or resolution of other proceedings, including criminal cases.

The successor circuit judge expressly found that the previous judge’s decision to “defer” the sexual abuse allegations to criminal proceedings violated Rule 5. The Supreme Court agreed with that characterization. This is central to the Court’s reasoning:

The family court has an independent duty to protect children; this duty cannot be subordinated to the criminal system’s pace or choices.
Refusing to rule on abuse allegations because a criminal case is pending is itself an error that can and should be corrected.

E. W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑601(i) – Duty to Make Findings at Adjudication

The Court cited W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑601(i), which mandates that at the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing, the court must:

Make a determination based upon the evidence; and
Make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the child is abused or neglected and whether the respondent is an abuser or neglector.

This statutory obligation was used to justify the successor judge’s decision to correct the earlier judge’s failure to adjudicate the sexual abuse allegations. The Court also linked this duty back to In re Lilith H. and In re Randy H., where it emphasized that courts must make findings on allegations that arise after the initial petition is filed.

F. W. Va. Code § 49‑1‑201(1)(A) – Sibling Abuse

The Court applied W. Va. Code § 49‑1‑201(1)(A) to hold that the siblings of an abused child who reside in the same home are themselves abused children under the statute. While the full text of § 49‑1‑201 is not reproduced in the opinion, the Court’s application reflects the legislative intent that:

Abuse of one child in a household places siblings at serious risk of harm; and
The statute allows the court to treat those siblings as “abused children” to ensure they receive protection and services, even if no direct physical or sexual abuse against them is proven.

G. Law of the Case Doctrine: Frazier & Oxley, Noland, and State v. Elza

The petitioner invoked the “law of the case” doctrine, arguing that the initial judge’s refusal to adjudicate his alleged sexual abuse should be treated as a binding determination that could not be revisited. The Supreme Court rejected this by reference to:

Frazier & Oxley, L.C. v. Cummings, 214 W. Va. 802, 591 S.E.2d 728 (2003), explaining that the law of the case doctrine prohibits relitigation of issues already decided on appeal in the same case;
Noland v. Virginia Ins. Reciprocal, 224 W. Va. 372, 686 S.E.2d 23 (2009), extending law‑of‑the‑case to issues fully litigated below and not appealed; and
State v. Elza, No. 12‑1049, 2013 WL 3388258 (W. Va. July 8, 2013) (memorandum decision), which reiterates and applies that doctrine.

The key point is that law‑of‑the‑case requires:

A prior determination of an issue; and
Either an appellate decision or a fully litigated and unappealed issue in the same case.

Because the original judge declined to decide the sexual abuse allegations, there was never a determination on that issue, and the matter was neither fully litigated nor appealed. Thus, law‑of‑the‑case simply did not apply.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Amendment of the Petition and the Meaning of “New Allegations”

The petitioner argued that M.D.’s 2024 disclosures did not constitute “new allegations,” claiming that DHS could have elicited the same information earlier had it been diligent. The Supreme Court rejected this.

Key aspects of the Court’s reasoning:

Timing and content matter: While M.D. had earlier hinted at “other abuse” in the home, he did not make specific, detailed disclosures about the petitioner’s additional sexual conduct with the child nor about the petitioner allegedly offering the child to other men until plea negotiations in 2024.
“New allegations” under Rule 19(b): Rule 19(b) is triggered by new allegations that arise after the final adjudicatory hearing; the focus is on whether the allegations now available to DHS and the court are new in substance, not whether the underlying events predated the initial adjudication. Facts may have occurred earlier, but they become “allegations” in the legal sense when they are disclosed and available for pleading.
No “due diligence” limitation in Rule 19(b): The Court did not accept the idea that failure to extract such disclosures earlier, even if arguable, deprives the new allegations of their “new” status or bars amendment. The rule focuses on the emergence of new allegations, not on whether DHS could have discovered them earlier by different investigative tactics.
Inherent authority reinforced: By tying Rule 19(b) to In re Lilith H. and In re C.L., the Court emphasized that circuit courts must ensure that any newly revealed abuse is brought within the case, whether as new counts or by compulsion of amendment. This prevents technical or timing arguments from thwarting the child protection function of abuse and neglect proceedings.

As a result, the Court held that the circuit court properly allowed DHS to file the third amended petition in June 2024, and properly reopened adjudication to consider those new allegations.

B. Reopened Adjudication vs. “Re‑Adjudication” and the Statutory Duty to Decide

The petitioner framed the reopened adjudication as an impermissible “re‑adjudication” of the same conduct, arguing that once the prior judge chose not to adjudicate the sexual abuse allegations, that decision (even if erroneous) had become final and could not be revisited. The Supreme Court disagreed, for several reasons.

Initial adjudication was incomplete, not final on the sexual abuse issue: The first circuit judge explicitly refused to decide the sexual abuse allegations. Under § 49‑4‑601(i), however, the court had a statutory duty to decide whether the child was abused and whether the respondent was an abuser, based on the evidence presented. The omission was an error, not a final determination.
Reopened adjudication was, in part, a correction of prior error: The successor judge recognized that the initial refusal to decide violated both Rule 5 (by deferring to criminal proceedings) and § 49‑4‑601(i) (by failing to make required findings). Reopening adjudication allowed the court to fulfill its statutory duty to decide the allegations and to address new allegations that had since emerged.
New allegations justify reopening on their own: Separate from correcting prior error, the new allegations under Rule 19(b) independently required reopening adjudication. The process was thus both a new adjudication of new allegations and a completion of the previously unfulfilled duty to adjudicate earlier allegations.
No double jeopardy analogue: Abuse and neglect proceedings are civil, not criminal; there is no “double jeopardy” bar to further adjudication when a prior hearing failed to fully resolve the allegations as required by statute. What matters instead is whether the statutory and rule‑based procedures have been followed and whether due process is afforded—both of which the Court found satisfied here.

C. Why Law of the Case Did Not Apply

The petitioner relied on law‑of‑the‑case to argue that the prior judge’s “non‑adjudication” bound the successor judge. The Supreme Court’s analysis was straightforward:

Law of the case concerns issues that have been decided—either on appeal or fully litigated below and not appealed.
The March 2023 order clearly shows that the prior judge declined to rule on the sexual abuse allegations, leaving them undetermined.

Because:

No adjudication on the merits of the petitioner’s sexual abuse occurred; and
No appeal raised or decided that issue,

the doctrine was inapplicable. The Court stressed that an erroneous failure to decide is not transformed into a binding ruling by inaction; it remains an error subject to correction, especially where statutory and rule‑based duties have not been met.

D. Weighing the Evidence and the Clear and Convincing Standard

Although the appeal was framed narrowly around procedural issues, the Court necessarily reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the second adjudication of abuse. The standard applied was “clear and convincing evidence,” higher than the preponderance standard used in ordinary civil cases but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt” used in criminal prosecutions.

The circuit court found clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner sexually assaulted L.B.-2, relying primarily on:

The expert testimony of the forensic nurse about acute genital injury consistent with assault;
The investigating trooper’s testimony and corroboration of medical findings; and
The child’s detailed disclosures, including the frequency, nature, and duration of the digital penetration and other sexual conduct.

The court explicitly discredited:

M.D., whose plea‑related testimony was self‑serving; and
The petitioner’s girlfriend, whose testimony appeared motivated by loyalty and contradicted the weight of forensic evidence.

The Supreme Court did not disturb these credibility determinations. Under In re Cecil T., such determinations are factual findings reviewed for clear error and are rarely overturned absent a firm conviction that a mistake has been made, which the Court did not have here.

E. Siblings as Abused Children Under § 49‑1‑201(1)(A)

The Court extended the adjudication of abuse from L.B.-2 to her siblings by application of W. Va. Code § 49‑1‑201(1)(A), holding that because the siblings resided in the same home where the abuse occurred, they were abused children as well.

Doctrinal implications:

Protection based on household environment: The statute allows a child to be deemed “abused” not only by direct victimization but also by exposure to an environment where sibling sexual abuse has occurred.
Facilitating protective intervention: This legislative approach ensures that the court can promptly intervene and provide services and protection to siblings without waiting for evidence of direct abuse to each child—a process that could expose them to further danger.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. Reinforcing the Independence and Primacy of Abuse and Neglect Proceedings

The decision firmly reiterates that child abuse and neglect proceedings are not subordinate to criminal prosecutions. Rule 5’s prohibition on delaying such cases for criminal proceedings is not merely aspirational; it has real teeth.

Practical consequences for trial courts:

Judges may not “punt” difficult abuse allegations to the criminal system.
They must make their own findings on whether abuse occurred, regardless of the timing or outcome of criminal charges.
Criminal outcomes (convictions, acquittals, plea agreements) may be relevant evidence but cannot control or delay the family court’s duties.

B. Expanded and Clarified Use of Rule 19(b) and Inherent Authority

By affirming amendment of the petition and reopened adjudication, the Court reinforces that:

New disclosures, even about past events, count as “new allegations” when they first become available to the agency and the court.
Circuit courts must be attentive to any evidence suggesting further abuse or neglect beyond the existing pleadings and should require DHS to amend where appropriate.

For DHS and CPS practitioners:

They should be proactive in amending petitions when new evidence emerges, even late in a case.
They cannot assume that once an adjudication is entered, the allegations are frozen; the law expects ongoing vigilance as new information arises.

C. Limitations on Defensive Use of Law of the Case in Abuse and Neglect Matters

The petitioner’s attempt to use law‑of‑the‑case to lock in a prior non‑decision illustrates an important limitation of that doctrine: it protects settled, decided issues, not omissions or refusals to decide. In abuse and neglect cases, where the child protection imperative is strong:

Defense strategies premised on procedural omissions being treated as substantive victories are unlikely to succeed.
Respondents must expect that unadjudicated or newly disclosed abuse allegations can be brought forward later, so long as due process is afforded in the reopened proceedings.

D. Sibling Adjudications and Household‑Level Risk

The opinion’s application of § 49‑1‑201(1)(A) to treat siblings as abused children based on their residence in the same home where serious sexual abuse occurred confirms a broad protective approach:

Court‑ordered services, supervision, and restrictions on parental contact can be extended to all children in the household, not just the direct victim.
Attorneys and caseworkers must prepare to address the needs of all siblings, both in evidence and in crafting appropriate permanency plans.

E. Institutional Lessons for Successor Judges

Finally, this case provides guidance for successor judges inheriting abuse and neglect dockets:

They have not only the authority but the responsibility to correct earlier procedural or legal errors where statutory duties were left unfulfilled.
They should review prior transcripts and orders critically to ensure that all allegations have been adjudicated as required by § 49‑4‑601(i).

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Adjudicatory vs. Dispositional Hearings

Adjudicatory hearing: The court decides whether the child is abused or neglected and whether the respondent is an abuser or neglector, based on the evidence and statutory definitions. This is about what happened and who is responsible.
Dispositional hearing: If abuse or neglect is found, the court then decides what to do—ranging from services and improvement periods to termination of parental rights. This is about what should happen next to protect the child.

B. Improvement Period

An “improvement period” is a court‑supervised period during which a parent is given an opportunity to correct the issues that led to the abuse or neglect finding. The parent must comply with a case plan (such as attending therapy, parenting classes, substance abuse treatment). Failure to improve can lead to termination of parental rights.

C. Clear and Convincing Evidence

“Clear and convincing evidence” is a standard of proof higher than “more likely than not” but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” It means the evidence must firmly convince the fact‑finder of the truth of the allegations—often described as creating a “high probability” of their truth.

D. “Neglected” vs. “Abused” Child

Neglected child: Typically refers to situations where a child’s health or welfare is harmed or threatened by a parent’s failure to provide proper care, supervision, or necessary support (for example, leaving a child with a known abuser, or failing to provide adequate food or medical care).
Abused child: Involves direct acts (or threats) of physical, sexual, or emotional harm by a parent or custodian, or being subjected to conditions that constitute such harm. Here, the court found that L.B.-2 was both neglected (failure to protect from M.D.) and abused (direct sexual abuse by the petitioner).

E. Rule 5: No Delay for Criminal Proceedings

Rule 5 of the abuse and neglect rules says the family court cannot delay its proceedings waiting for criminal cases to start, progress, or conclude. The purpose is simple:

Children cannot safely “wait” while criminal courts move at their own pace.
The state’s duty to protect children is immediate and independent of criminal prosecution.

F. Rule 19(b): Amended Petitions and Reopened Hearings

Rule 19(b) deals with what happens if new abuse or neglect allegations arise after the adjudication:

The new allegations should be added to the case in an amended petition; and
The adjudicatory hearing must be reopened so that the court can receive evidence and adjudicate those additional allegations.

This ensures that the case can evolve as more information comes to light, rather than being locked in place at the time of the first hearing.

G. Law of the Case Doctrine

The “law of the case” doctrine generally means that once a court (especially an appellate court) has decided an issue in a case, that decision governs the rest of the case and cannot be relitigated. It requires:

An actual decision on the issue; and
No subsequent appeal rectifying or reversing that decision (unless a higher court does so).

In In re W.B., the Court clarifies that a judge’s failure to decide an issue—or refusal to decide it—is not a “decision” that triggers law‑of‑the‑case. It is an error that can be corrected.

H. “Neglect by Proxy” and Household‑Level Abuse

When the opinion refers to the siblings as “neglected by proxy” (and later as “abused” by virtue of residing in the same home), it is capturing a concept built into the statutory scheme:

Serious abuse of one child in a household often signals danger to other children in that household.
West Virginia’s statutes and case law allow courts to extend protective findings and services to siblings based on that shared environment, even if the siblings have not yet disclosed or proven direct abuse.

VIII. Conclusion

In re W.B., A.B.-1, L.B.-1, E.B., L.B.-2, and A.B.-2 is a concise but significant memorandum decision that reinforces several vital principles in West Virginia’s child abuse and neglect jurisprudence:

Child abuse and neglect proceedings must be fully adjudicated on the merits of the allegations before the court; judges may not sidestep abuse allegations by deferring to criminal prosecutions.
When new allegations arise—whether from plea negotiations, late disclosures, or ongoing investigations—Rule 19(b) requires that they be added to the petition and adjudicated in reopened proceedings.
The law of the case doctrine protects decided issues, not judicial omissions. A prior judge’s refusal to decide an issue does not insulate that issue from later, proper adjudication, especially where statutory duties have not been fulfilled.
Clear and convincing evidence of serious sexual abuse to one child supports not only the adjudication of abuse as to that child but also the adjudication of siblings as abused children under § 49‑1‑201(1)(A) when they reside in the same home.

Beyond its immediate holding affirming termination of the petitioner’s parental rights, the decision sends a strong message to trial courts, agencies, and practitioners: abuse and neglect cases are dynamic, evidence‑driven proceedings in which the court carries an ongoing, non‑delegable duty to identify and adjudicate all abuse and neglect it reasonably discerns from the record. Technical arguments about timing and prior omissions cannot override that duty or the overarching imperative to protect vulnerable children.