No Custody Fee Award Without Explicit AS 25.20.115 Findings; Rule 77(j) Sanctions Run Against Counsel, Not Parties — Commentary on Wallace v. O’Hara (Alaska 2025)

No Custody Fee Award Without Explicit AS 25.20.115 Findings; Rule 77(j) Sanctions Run Against Counsel, Not Parties

Case: Amye Wallace v. John O’Hara, Supreme Court of the State of Alaska, No. S-19241 (Memorandum Opinion and Judgment No. 2104, Aug. 27, 2025)

Note: This is a memorandum decision under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d); it is non-precedential but is consistent with, and reinforces, Alaska’s established jurisprudence on attorney’s fee awards in custody enforcement proceedings and sanctions under Rule 77(j).

Introduction

This appeal arises from a custody enforcement dispute between co-parents sharing alternating weekly physical custody of their child. A travel clause in their revised 2020 parenting agreement permitted each parent to borrow up to seven days of the other parent’s custodial time annually to facilitate a 14-day travel period, coupled with a “make-up week” for the displaced parent either directly before or directly after the travel period.

Tension over how that clause operated in practice—specifically whether it authorized a three-week consecutive block of custody—led to motions to enforce and to modify the agreement’s wording. After denying the mother’s motions and largely granting the father’s, the superior court awarded the father attorney’s fees and costs without identifying a legal basis or making supporting findings. On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court vacated the fee award and remanded, holding that the trial court failed to make the explicit statutory findings required by AS 25.20.115 and that the award could not be sustained under Civil Rule 77(j) either.

Parties: Appellant Amye Wallace (mother) and Appellee John O’Hara (father). Appellee did not appear on appeal.

Summary of the Judgment

  • The Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s attorney’s fees and costs award to O’Hara and remanded for further proceedings.
  • AS 25.20.115 (custody enforcement fee-shifting) requires explicit findings on:
    • the parties’ relative financial resources; and
    • whether each party acted in good faith.
    The trial court made neither finding explicitly and lacked current evidence to assess financial resources.
  • Rule 77(j) (sanctions for frivolous or unnecessary motions) could not sustain the award because:
    • By its text and Alaska authority, Rule 77(j) sanctions run against counsel, not the party, yet the award here was entered against Wallace.
    • There were no findings that Wallace’s motions were frivolous or unnecessary or that they unduly delayed the proceedings.
  • The superior court permissibly clarified the internally inconsistent travel provision, but that merits ruling did not justify the fee award absent proper legal findings.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • S.L. v. J.H., 883 P.2d 984 (Alaska 1994): Establishes that courts “must make explicit findings” on both (1) relative financial resources and (2) good faith when awarding fees under AS 25.20.115. This case provides the bedrock rule the Supreme Court applied to vacate the fee award. Implicit or assumed findings will not do.
  • Rowen v. Rowen, 963 P.2d 249 (Alaska 1998): Reaffirms S.L.’s explicit-findings requirement in custody-related fee awards.
  • Collier v. Harris, 261 P.3d 397 (Alaska 2011): Clarifies:
    • Standard of review: abuse of discretion for AS 25.20.115 fee awards; independent judgment for legal questions.
    • Both statutory factors must be addressed; relative resources need not “take primacy” over good faith, but the court must make findings on both.
    • Courts cannot rely on a barren record; if financial information is not before the court, an award under AS 25.20.115 is reversible.
    The Supreme Court here echoed Collier, noting the lack of recent financial disclosures and the insufficiency of a 2017 stipulation to establish current relative resources.
  • Hartland v. Hartland, 777 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1989): Confirms de novo review of whether the court had authority to award fees under the relevant rule (then Rule 77(l), now Rule 77(j)). This supported the Supreme Court’s independent analysis of the Rule 77(j) issue.
  • Kozevnikoff v. Tanana Village Council, 89 P.3d 757 (Alaska 2004): When interpreting the Civil Rules to review a fee award, the Court applies independent judgment; again, bolsters the de novo lens applied to Rule 77(j).
  • Pennington v. Hanna Auto Wash, Inc., No. S-7660, 1997 WL 33812771 (Alaska Oct. 29, 1997) (mem.): Rule 77(j) “subjects counsel, not parties,” to sanctions for frivolous or unnecessary motions. This textually grounded principle was dispositive against sustaining the fee award under 77(j) here, because the trial court imposed fees on Wallace, not her counsel.

Legal Reasoning Applied by the Court

1) AS 25.20.115 Required Explicit Findings That Were Not Made. The statute permits fee awards in actions to modify, vacate, or enforce custody orders, but expressly commands that courts consider the parties’ relative financial resources and whether they acted in good faith. Alaska precedent requires explicit findings on both. The superior court made neither:

  • Good faith: The trial court’s narrative suggested O’Hara acted reasonably and Wallace less so, but the appellate court deemed such inferences insufficient. Findings must be explicit.
  • Relative financial resources: No current financial information was in the record; the parties had not recently exchanged disclosures. A 2017 parity stipulation was too stale to support 2024–2025 findings. Without current evidence and explicit findings, a fee award under AS 25.20.115 cannot stand.

2) Rule 77(j) Could Not Salvage the Award. Rule 77(j) allows sanctions for frivolous or unnecessary motion practice that unduly delays proceedings, but it has two critical constraints:

  • Proper target: The rule sanctions counsel, not parties. The superior court ordered fees against Wallace personally, rendering Rule 77(j) inapplicable as a matter of law.
  • Required predicates: The record and the court’s findings did not establish that Wallace’s motions were frivolous or unnecessary or caused undue delay. To the contrary, the court recognized the travel clause “contradicts itself,” making both sides’ efforts to clarify it facially reasonable. The sequence of filings culminated in a consolidated omnibus order a month later, undermining any claim of undue delay attributable to Wallace’s motions.

3) Standards of Review Framed the Outcome. The Court reviewed the existence of the statutory and rule-based predicates under its independent judgment while deferring (under the abuse-of-discretion/clear-error standard) to the trial court on any factual findings. Because the necessary findings were either missing or unsupported by the record, the appellate court vacated the award.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although non-precedential, this decision harmonizes with settled Alaska law and offers clear guidance for trial courts and practitioners in custody enforcement litigation:

  • For trial courts:
    • When awarding fees under AS 25.20.115, always:
      • Identify the statute as the legal basis;
      • Make explicit findings on both good faith and the parties’ relative financial resources;
      • Ensure the record contains current financial information (e.g., updated affidavits or disclosures) sufficient to support those findings.
    • When invoking Rule 77(j):
      • Direct sanctions at counsel, not the represented party;
      • Specify which filing(s) were frivolous or unnecessary and how they unduly delayed the case;
      • Articulate findings that connect the facts to the rule’s standards; and
      • Provide notice and an opportunity to be heard before imposing sanctions.
    • When a parenting-plan clause is internally inconsistent, clarify the text prospectively and explain the court’s interpretation to guide compliance.
  • For practitioners:
    • Do not assume a favorable merits ruling will carry a fee award; build a record for AS 25.20.115 by filing current financial information for both parties and briefing good faith.
    • Before seeking Rule 77(j) relief, evaluate whether the opposing motion is truly frivolous or unnecessary in light of the record. Ambiguities in court orders often make enforcement motions reasonable, not sanctionable.
    • In custody disputes, contacting law enforcement to “interpret” a parenting plan is rarely helpful absent safety concerns; seek judicial clarification instead.
    • Drafting tip for parenting plans: If a “14-day travel” and “make-up week” could create three consecutive weeks of custody, say so explicitly. Address whether the weekly exchange schedule “flips,” and cap or permit consecutive weeks outright to avoid later disputes.
  • For litigants: Expect courts to assess not only who prevailed on the dispute, but also whether each parent acted in good faith and what each can afford when allocating enforcement-related fees.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • AS 25.20.115 fees: A special fee-shifting statute for custody enforcement and modification proceedings. The court can award fees, but only after explicitly considering (1) who can better afford to pay (relative financial resources) and (2) whether each side acted in good faith.
  • Good faith vs. bad faith: Good faith means acting honestly, reasonably, and with a fair interpretation of the order. Bad faith includes dishonest motives, harassment, or knowingly unreasonable positions. A disagreement over an ambiguous clause, without more, typically does not prove bad faith.
  • Explicit vs. implicit findings: Explicit findings are clearly stated on the record (or in writing). Implicit findings are assumptions or inferences a court might be thought to have made. Alaska law requires explicit findings for AS 25.20.115 awards.
  • Rule 77(j) sanctions: A court rule that allows sanctions for frivolous or unnecessary motion practice that unduly delays the case. Critically, it targets the lawyer (counsel), not the client, and requires specific findings.
  • Standards of review:
    • Abuse of discretion (with clear-error review of supporting facts): deferential to the trial court’s decisions on fee awards when the right legal standards and adequate findings are used.
    • Independent judgment (de novo): the appellate court decides legal interpretation questions (like whether a rule authorizes a sanction) afresh, without deference.
  • “Omnibus order”: A single ruling resolving multiple pending motions together. Using an omnibus order can streamline proceedings and, as here, undercut claims that a party’s filings caused undue delay.
  • Statutory damages for visitation interference (AS 25.20.140): Available when a party “wilfully and without just excuse” fails to permit court-ordered visitation. Where a parent follows a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous plan, willfulness is hard to show.

Key Takeaways

  • Courts cannot award fees under AS 25.20.115 without explicit findings on both good faith and relative financial resources based on current evidence.
  • Rule 77(j) sanctions cannot be imposed against a party; they run against counsel and require findings of frivolousness or unnecessary filings that actually caused undue delay.
  • Ambiguous parenting-plan provisions invite enforcement and modification motions; those filings are often reasonable, not sanctionable.
  • Practitioners should proactively exchange updated financial information when moving for or opposing fees in custody enforcement matters.
  • Clear drafting of travel and make-up time provisions can prevent multi-week custody block disputes from arising in the first place.

Conclusion

While non-precedential, Wallace v. O’Hara squarely reaffirms two bedrock principles in Alaska custody enforcement litigation. First, AS 25.20.115 fee awards must rest on explicit findings as to both good faith and the parties’ relative financial resources, supported by current evidence. Second, sanctions under Rule 77(j) target counsel, not parties, and require specific findings that the challenged filings were frivolous or unnecessary and caused undue delay.

The decision also serves as a cautionary tale about drafting and administering travel provisions in parenting plans. When internal inconsistencies exist, both sides’ efforts to seek clarification can be reasonable—and fee-shifting or sanctions should not be assumed. On remand, any fee determination must identify the legal basis and include the statutorily or rule-mandated findings, ensuring transparent, reviewable judicial decision-making in sensitive family law disputes.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court Of The State Of Alaska

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