No Conviction, No Heck: First Circuit Declines to Extend Heck Bar to Massachusetts § 87 Pretrial Probation Dismissals

Introduction

In Aprileo v. Clapprood, No. 24-2081 (1st Cir. Nov. 10, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed a recurring and nationally significant question at the intersection of criminal procedure and civil rights litigation: when does the Heck v. Humphrey doctrine bar a damages action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983? The court held that Heck’s bar does not apply where the plaintiff was never convicted or sentenced, and the criminal charges were dismissed after completion of pretrial probation under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 276, § 87, a disposition that involves neither a guilty plea nor any admission of wrongdoing.

The decision aligns the First Circuit with the majority of federal courts of appeals holding that an “outstanding criminal judgment” (i.e., a conviction or sentence) is an antecedent requirement for Heck to apply. It also clarifies the effect, within Massachusetts, of a widely used pretrial probation disposition on subsequent civil rights litigation.

The parties were plaintiff-appellee Guistina Aprileo and defendants-appellants Police Commissioner Cheryl Clapprood (in her individual and official capacities), the City of Springfield, and Officers Richard T. Ward, Thalia Castro, and Jason Bacis (in their individual and official capacities). On appeal, the key defendants were Officers Ward and Castro. Amici included the Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Association, Inc., and the Institute for Justice—underscoring the broader importance of the issue.

Background and Procedural Posture

November 7, 2018: Aprileo called Springfield police regarding a domestic dispute among her adult children. Officers Bacis and Castro de-escalated the situation. When Officer Ward arrived, a conflict arose between Ward and Aprileo, culminating in Ward using a “forced arm bar” and arresting Aprileo. Her elbow was fractured. She was charged with resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and assault and battery on a police officer.
January 29, 2020: Without entering any plea or admitting any facts, Aprileo and the Commonwealth agreed to three months of pretrial probation under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, § 87, with dismissal to follow upon successful completion. The standard “Tender of Plea or Admission” form contained three options (guilty plea; admission to sufficient facts; binding plea), but none were checked. No factual findings were made.
After completion: The Commonwealth dismissed all charges.
October 2021: Aprileo filed a § 1983 action (excessive force against Ward; failure to intervene against Bacis and Castro) and related state-law claims. The case was removed to federal court.
District Court: Granted summary judgment for the City and for Officer Bacis; denied summary judgment to Ward and Castro on the § 1983 claims, holding that Heck did not bar the suit because there was no conviction. The court certified the Heck question for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
First Circuit: Granted permission to appeal and affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Rikelman held that the Heck doctrine does not bar Aprileo’s § 1983 claims because she was never convicted or sentenced. Under Massachusetts law, pretrial probation under § 87, when used “before trial and before a plea of guilty,” is not a conviction or its functional equivalent, requires no plea or admission, and results in dismissal if completed successfully. With no “outstanding criminal judgment” to impugn, Heck’s rationale—avoiding conflicting resolutions with valid convictions and preventing collateral attacks outside habeas—does not apply.

The court explicitly joined the majority of circuits holding that the absence of a conviction or sentence is dispositive for Heck’s application. Because that antecedent requirement was not met, the court did not reach whether the criminal case terminated in Aprileo’s favor or whether her civil claims would otherwise imply invalidity of any criminal adjudication. The court emphasized the narrowness of its holding, leaving open whether Heck could apply to other forms of probation or diversion that do involve pleas, admissions, or findings of guilt.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994): Heck held that a § 1983 plaintiff seeking damages cannot advance claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence, unless that conviction or sentence has been invalidated. The First Circuit emphasizes two guiding rationales in Heck: avoiding conflicting resolutions between criminal judgments and civil suits, and preserving finality/comity by channeling attacks on convictions through habeas rather than § 1983. Here, however, the threshold premise of Heck—a valid, outstanding criminal judgment—was absent.
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007): Wallace clarified that Heck’s rule is “called into play only when there exists a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated” and warned against the “bizarre extension” of applying Heck to anticipated or hypothetical convictions. The First Circuit relied on Wallace to underscore that a conviction or sentence is an antecedent requirement for Heck’s bar.
Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022): Thompson held that, for a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution-type claim under § 1983, “favorable termination” requires only that the prior criminal case ended without a conviction. While Aprileo’s appeal did not turn on Thompson’s holding, the panel observed that Thompson undercuts older cases (e.g., Gilles) that treated certain dismissals following probation as not “favorable” for § 1983 purposes.
Massachusetts cases: Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 802 N.E.2d 1039 (Mass. 2004); Commonwealth v. Tim T., 773 N.E.2d 968 (Mass. 2002): The SJC has squarely held that dismissal following pretrial probation under § 87 (before any plea) “is not a conviction, or its functional equivalent,” and that “guilt was not established in any fashion.” These decisions were pivotal, as they establish the state-law character of § 87 pretrial probation and confirm that Aprileo’s disposition involved no plea, admission, or finding of guilt.
Majority of circuit authority: The First Circuit aligned with the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, which have declined to apply Heck where criminal charges were diverted or dismissed without a conviction:
- Mitchell v. Kirchmeier (8th Cir. 2022): Pretrial diversion is a contract to forgo prosecution; absent conviction/sentence, Heck does not apply.
- Duarte v. City of Stockton (9th Cir. 2023); Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks (10th Cir. 2009); S.E. v. Grant County Board of Education (6th Cir. 2008); McClish v. Nugent (11th Cir. 2007): Similar holdings rejecting Heck in the absence of a conviction.
Distinguishing minority or earlier contrary authority:
- Gilles v. Davis (3d Cir. 2005): Applied Heck after dismissal following probation, focusing on “favorable termination” rather than the antecedent issue of conviction. Decided pre-Wallace; its reasoning appears difficult to reconcile with Thompson and was not followed here.
- DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi (5th Cir. 2007): Applied Heck to a Texas “deferred adjudication” while it was ongoing, where the plaintiff had sworn to guilt and there were judicial findings substantiating guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. DeLeon expressly left open whether Heck would apply after successful completion and dismissal; it involved admissions and findings absent here.
- Havens v. Johnson (10th Cir. 2015): Applied Heck following an Alford plea that resulted in a conviction; the presence of a conviction distinguishes it from Aprileo’s case.
- Roesch v. Otarola (2d Cir. 1992): A pre-Heck case about favorable termination in malicious prosecution, not controlling on the Heck bar and unpersuasive post-Thompson.

Legal Reasoning

The court reasoned from first principles as articulated in Heck and Wallace: a § 1983 action is barred only if success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an existing conviction or sentence. Without a conviction or sentence, there is no “outstanding criminal judgment” to impugn, so the core concerns of Heck—conflict with a valid judgment and circumvention of habeas—do not arise.

Massachusetts law was decisive. Section 87 expressly permits probation “before trial and before a plea of guilty,” and the SJC has held that dismissal after § 87 pretrial probation “is not a conviction, or its functional equivalent.” The record confirmed that Aprileo entered no plea, made no admissions, and that the trial court made no findings. The “Tender of Plea or Admission & Waiver of Rights” form included plea/admission options, but none were selected. In short, “guilt was not established in any fashion.”

The defendants asked the court to read Heck flexibly and treat pretrial probation as functionally analogous to a conviction or to deem the later dismissal not “favorable.” The court declined. Wallace instructs that Heck is triggered only when there exists a conviction or sentence. Moreover, the policy interests behind Heck are not served by extending it to a non-adjudicative diversion that yields no factual findings and no judgment of guilt. There is nothing for a civil judgment to contradict.

Because the lack of a conviction or sentence is dispositive, the court did not reach two further Heck inquiries that often arise:

Whether the criminal case ended in a favorable termination; and
Whether the civil claims necessarily imply the invalidity of the criminal adjudication.

The court also carefully limited its holding, expressly leaving open whether Heck could apply to other probationary or diversionary schemes—under § 87 or elsewhere—that follow a finding of guilt, a plea (including admissions to sufficient facts), or an Alford plea.

Impact and Implications

This decision has immediate and practical consequences for civil rights litigation and criminal case dispositions within the First Circuit (which includes Massachusetts):

Clear rule in the First Circuit: Absent a conviction or sentence, Heck does not bar a § 1983 damages action. Prosecutors, defense counsel, and civil litigators now have binding guidance that mere participation in a pretrial probation program under § 87—without pleas or admissions—does not foreclose subsequent civil remedies.
Massachusetts § 87 pretrial probation is safe from Heck: Because § 87 pretrial probation (before trial and before any plea) is not a conviction or its equivalent, civil plaintiffs who complete such probation and obtain dismissals may proceed with § 1983 claims, subject to all other defenses (e.g., qualified immunity, causation, reasonableness).
Alignment with the national majority: The First Circuit joins the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, reinforcing a broad consensus that avoids converting diversionary programs into de facto civil immunity for constitutional violations.
Preservation of § 1983 accountability: Individuals who accept non-adjudicative resolutions to avoid the risks of trial are not forced to relinquish the ability to seek redress for police misconduct simply because they engaged in pretrial probation with no admissions or findings.
Limits and open questions: The court did not decide whether Heck applies to other forms of probation or diversion that do involve admissions, a plea, or a finding of guilt (e.g., dispositions akin to a continuance without a finding (CWOF) or “deferred adjudication” with fact admissions in other states). Nor did it address the separate “favorable termination” element for claims sounding in malicious prosecution after Thompson, or the merits defenses that remain (including qualified immunity).
District court practice: Where a plaintiff’s charges were dismissed without a conviction, district courts should not dismiss § 1983 claims on Heck grounds. They must instead reach other threshold issues (jurisdiction, accrual/limitations per Wallace, standing), merits questions (probable cause, reasonableness of force), and immunities.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Heck bar: A rule from the Supreme Court that prevents § 1983 plaintiffs from using damages suits to undermine a valid, outstanding criminal conviction or sentence. If success in the civil suit would imply that a still-valid criminal judgment is invalid, the civil case is barred unless the criminal judgment has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated.
“Outstanding criminal judgment”: Shorthand for a conviction or sentence that remains in effect. Without such a judgment, Heck does not apply.
Pretrial probation under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, § 87: A Massachusetts statute allowing courts, with the defendant’s consent (and in practice, the Commonwealth’s agreement), to place a person on probation “before trial and before a plea of guilty,” often resulting in dismissal upon successful completion. No plea, admission, or adjudication is required.
Continuance without a finding (CWOF) / “admission to sufficient facts” (Massachusetts): A different disposition in which a defendant may admit to sufficient facts for a finding of guilt, with the case continued for a period and then dismissed if conditions are met. This involves admissions not present in § 87 pretrial probation and could present different Heck questions not decided here.
Deferred adjudication (some states): A diversionary scheme where a defendant may enter a plea or admit facts, and adjudication is deferred pending compliance. Depending on the jurisdiction, there may be admissions and even judicial findings—facts that have led some courts to apply Heck during the deferral period.
Alford plea: A guilty plea in which a defendant maintains innocence but acknowledges that the prosecution’s evidence would likely result in a conviction. It results in a conviction and thus can trigger Heck.
Favorable termination (post-Thompson): For § 1983 claims analogous to malicious prosecution, the criminal case must have ended without a conviction. Thompson rejected the requirement that the termination affirmatively indicate innocence.
Failure to intervene (police liability): A § 1983 theory alleging that an officer who observes another officer violating someone’s constitutional rights had a realistic opportunity to prevent the harm but did not act.
Interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b): A procedure allowing appellate review of a controlling legal question before final judgment when the district court certifies, and the court of appeals permits, the appeal. The First Circuit reviewed the Heck question de novo under this provision.

What This Decision Does—and Does Not—Do

Does: Establish that in the First Circuit, Heck requires an existing conviction or sentence. If none exists, a § 1983 damages action is not barred on Heck grounds.
Does: Confirm that, under Massachusetts law, § 87 pretrial probation without pleas or admissions is not a conviction or its functional equivalent.
Does not: Decide whether Heck could apply to other probation/diversion dispositions that include pleas, admissions, or post-finding probation under § 87.
Does not: Resolve whether Aprileo’s criminal case was a “favorable termination” under Thompson; the court found it unnecessary to reach that issue.
Does not: Address the merits of the excessive force or failure-to-intervene claims, or qualified immunity. Those issues remain for the district court on remand.

Conclusion

Aprileo v. Clapprood crystallizes a straightforward and administrable rule in the First Circuit: No conviction, no Heck. Where criminal charges are dismissed after Massachusetts § 87 pretrial probation—a process that requires no plea, admission, or judicial finding—there is no “outstanding criminal judgment” to protect, and § 1983 claims are not barred on Heck grounds. The court’s careful reliance on Wallace and on Massachusetts’ own characterization of § 87 aligns the First Circuit with the national majority, curbs overbroad uses of Heck to derail civil rights suits, and preserves the availability of non-adjudicative criminal case resolutions without unintended forfeiture of civil remedies. At the same time, the opinion leaves important questions for another day, including how Heck applies to dispositions involving admissions or findings of guilt, and how Thompson’s favorable-termination standard interacts with various diversionary frameworks. The case now returns to the district court for resolution of the surviving claims on their merits.