No Continuing Violation for FDCPA Suits Based on Debt-Collection Litigation; Post-Complaint Filings Do Not Restart the One-Year Clock

Case: Helisha Moore v. Cohn, Lifland, Pearlman, Hermann & Knoph LLP (3d Cir. Sept. 25, 2025)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Panel: Judges Bibas, Phipps (author), and Ambro

Disposition: Affirmed (not precedential)

Introduction

This appeal presented a recurring timeliness problem in Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) litigation: when a debt collector files a time-barred state-court collection action, can the consumer wait more than a year to sue under the FDCPA by arguing that the later steps in that litigation—motions, subpoenas, writs, and garnishments—either (1) extend the limitations period under a “continuing violation” theory or (2) constitute separate, independently actionable FDCPA violations that reset the one-year clock?

In a non-precedential opinion, the Third Circuit said no on both fronts. First, it held that the continuing-violation theory—famously applied to hostile work environment claims under Title VII—does not fit FDCPA claims predicated on discrete litigation acts. Second, it rejected the attempt to recast ordinary post-complaint litigation steps and collection efforts (default motions, information subpoenas, wage executions, garnishments) as independent FDCPA violations that could salvage an otherwise untimely claim. The court emphasized the Supreme Court’s admonition in Heintz v. Jenkins that the FDCPA should not be read to halt the communications inherent in ordinary debt-collection lawsuits.

Case Background

A. The underlying debt and time-barred state suit

2014: Helisha Moore financed a used Chevrolet Cruze with a loan from USAlliance Federal Credit Union.
2016: After default, the vehicle was repossessed and sold, leaving a deficiency. The creditor sent an October 2016 deficiency notice seeking roughly $12,386.
August 23, 2021: Represented by attorney Christina N. Stripp of Cohn Lifland Pearlman Herrmann & Knopf LLP, the creditor sued Moore in New Jersey Superior Court to collect the balance—more than four years after default.
New Jersey’s UCC limitations period for contracts for sale of goods is four years. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-725(1). Moore did not answer or raise a statute-of-limitations defense, and—after a January 10, 2022 default-judgment motion—the court entered a default judgment on February 4, 2022 for approximately $28,489.
Post-judgment, Cohn Lifland pursued enforcement: an information subpoena, a writ of execution against wages (filed April–May 2022), and wage garnishments for three pay periods in July–August 2022 totaling about $422. Moore later succeeded in vacating the default judgment and wage execution.

B. The FDCPA suit and procedural posture

January 10, 2023: Moore filed a putative class action in New Jersey state court alleging FDCPA violations for suing on a time-barred debt and unjust enrichment.
Removal: Defendants removed on federal-question grounds (28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367, 1441).
District court dismissal: The court dismissed the FDCPA claim as time-barred under the FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations (15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d)) and declined supplemental jurisdiction over unjust enrichment. See Moore v. Cohn Lifland Pearlman Herrmann & Knopf, LLP, 2023 WL 4295746 (D.N.J. June 28, 2023); 2024 WL 493448 (D.N.J. Feb. 8, 2024).
Amended complaint: Moore highlighted seven post-complaint acts falling within one year of her FDCPA filing (default motion, subpoena, wage-execution application and docketing, and three garnishments).
Appeal: Moore elected to stand on the amended complaint (per Batoff v. State Farm) and appealed. During appeal, she stipulated to dismissal of claims against attorney Stripp and focused on the FDCPA claim against the firm, abandoning any separate unjust-enrichment theory.

Summary of the Opinion

On de novo review, the Third Circuit affirmed dismissal. The court held:

No continuing-violation theory under the FDCPA in this context: The theory is limited to claims like hostile work environment that cannot be pinned to a discreet date. Discrete debt-collection acts (including the filing of a collection lawsuit) are each separately actionable, so the theory does not apply. The court aligned with the Sixth and Ninth Circuits in rejecting this expansion (Bouye v. Bruce, Brown v. Transworld Systems).
Post-complaint litigation steps are not independent FDCPA violations that reset the limitations clock: Treating routine litigation communications and collection efforts as fresh violations would contravene the Supreme Court’s caution in Heintz v. Jenkins against reading the FDCPA to grind ordinary debt-collection lawsuits to a halt.

Result: Moore’s FDCPA claim—filed roughly sixteen months after the debt-collection suit—was untimely. The district court’s dismissal (and its declination of supplemental jurisdiction over unjust enrichment) was affirmed.

Analysis

1) Precedents and authorities the court relied on

Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995): The Supreme Court held that litigating attorneys can be “debt collectors” under the FDCPA, but cautioned against interpretations that would empower debtors to halt the communications inherent in ordinary lawsuits. The panel invoked this caution to reject treating post-complaint filings and routine enforcement efforts as independent FDCPA violations that would perpetually reset the one-year clock.
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002): Established the modern articulation of the continuing-violation doctrine in Title VII. The Court distinguished between discrete acts (each individually actionable and time-bound) and cumulative wrongs like hostile work environments that cannot be said to occur on a particular day. The Third Circuit leaned on Morgan to underscore that FDCPA litigation acts are discrete, not continuing.
Cowell v. Palmer Township, 263 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2001): A Third Circuit application of the continuing-violation concept outside Title VII. The panel acknowledged that broader use exists but stressed its exceptional and narrow reach, which does not fit the FDCPA’s structure of discrete, separately actionable violations.
Brown v. Transworld Systems, Inc., 73 F.4th 1030 (9th Cir. 2023) and Bouye v. Bruce, 61 F.4th 485 (6th Cir. 2023): Both circuits rejected applying continuing-violation principles to FDCPA claims arising from litigation conduct. The Third Circuit aligned with this growing consensus, noting that no federal appellate court has extended the theory to FDCPA claims.
Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 2011): Recognized that attempting to collect time-barred debts can violate the FDCPA, including by misrepresenting the legal status of a debt. The panel acknowledged this principle but held that Moore’s FDCPA claim, even if substantively viable, was untimely.
M.S. ex rel. Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 2020): Applied forfeiture principles for arguments not raised in an opening brief. The court noted Moore did not pursue unjust enrichment separately if the FDCPA theory failed.
Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848 (3d Cir. 1992): Confirmed appellate jurisdiction when a plaintiff elects to stand on a complaint after a dismissal without prejudice.

Contextual note: While not cited by the panel, the Supreme Court’s Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U.S. 8 (2019), is consistent with the court’s timeliness approach: the FDCPA’s one-year period generally runs from the date the violation occurs, not from discovery, absent equitable tolling or other exceptions. This underscores the panel’s emphasis on timeliness from the discrete act at issue.

2) The court’s legal reasoning

a) Why the continuing-violation theory does not apply to FDCPA litigation conduct

Discrete vs. cumulative wrongs: The continuing-violation doctrine applies where a claim is the product of cumulative conduct not anchored to any single day (e.g., a hostile work environment). By contrast, FDCPA violations in litigation—filing a complaint, seeking default, serving an information subpoena, applying for a writ, executing a garnishment—are discrete, date-stamped events. Each either violates the Act on its own terms or not; it does not require aggregation to be actionable.
Structure of the FDCPA: The FDCPA defines a host of discrete prohibitions (e.g., false, deceptive, or misleading representations; misrepresenting the character, amount, or legal status of a debt). This structure presumes individual, separately actionable events with their own accrual dates, not an amorphous ongoing violation.
Appellate unanimity against expansion: No federal appellate court has extended the continuing-violation theory to FDCPA litigation claims. The Third Circuit tracked the Sixth and Ninth Circuits in declining to broaden the doctrine beyond its limited role.

b) Why post-complaint acts in the same debt-collection case do not restart the limitations period

Heintz’s caution against freezing litigation communications: Reading the FDCPA to treat every routine litigation step as a fresh, independent violation would empower a debtor to halt ordinary lawsuit communications—contrary to Heintz’s guidance. Motions, filings, writs, and enforcement actions are normal features of litigation and judgment collection; treating them as new violations would disrupt the litigation process and nullify the statute’s one-year limitations discipline.
Anti-bootstrapping principle: Allowing a plaintiff to sue outside the one-year window for the initial time-barred filing by recharacterizing later litigation steps as new violations would eviscerate § 1692k(d). The clock begins with the initial discrete violation; later routine steps in the same case do not “refresh” the claim.
Preserving actionable misconduct without stretching timeliness rules: The court did not announce a general immunity for litigation conduct under the FDCPA; rather, it rejected using post-complaint filings and enforcement steps as a workaround for an untimely claim arising from the original complaint. If later filings contain their own independent misrepresentations or abuses distinct from the original theory (e.g., fresh false statements about amounts or status), those could be evaluated on their own timeliness and merits in another case. This opinion simply holds that the steps Moore identified do not, by themselves, restart the clock for her time-bar claim.

3) Impact and implications

Practical deadline discipline for FDCPA plaintiffs: In the Third Circuit, consumers challenging debt-collection lawsuits as time-barred must file any FDCPA suit within one year of the discrete violation they are challenging—often the filing of the state-court complaint. Post-complaint litigation activity does not extend or reset that period.
Alignment with other circuits: The decision harmonizes Third Circuit district court practice with the Sixth and Ninth Circuits’ rejection of continuing-violation arguments in FDCPA litigation contexts, promoting nationwide consistency.
Strategic consequences for both sides:
- For consumers and their counsel: Act quickly once a suspect collection complaint is filed; do not rely on the accrual “drifting” forward to later litigation steps.
- For debt collectors and their counsel: Motions to dismiss on timeliness grounds will be stronger where plaintiffs rely on continuing-violation or post-complaint-activity theories to revive late-filed FDCPA claims arising from initial litigation conduct.
Unresolved nuances left for future cases:
- Accrual trigger. The panel spoke of the one-year period by reference to when the debt-collection suit was “initiated.” It did not squarely decide whether accrual is pegged to filing or service; other circuits have divided on that question. Parties should brief accrual carefully in cases where service timing matters.
- Equitable tolling and non-service. Moore denied receiving service, but did not prevail on timeliness based on tolling or discovery. The opinion does not foreclose tolling where warranted by fraud, concealment, or extraordinary circumstances; it simply was not at issue.
- Independent post-complaint misrepresentations. While routine steps do not reset the clock, a later filing containing new, self-contained FDCPA violations (e.g., fresh false statements about amounts or legal status) may stand or fall on its own timeliness and merits in a different case posture.

Complex Concepts Simplified

FDCPA (15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.): A federal statute regulating debt-collection conduct. It prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations and forbids misrepresenting the character, amount, or legal status of a debt. It applies to attorneys who regularly engage in debt collection.
One-year statute of limitations (§ 1692k(d)): An FDCPA claim must be filed “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” Generally, the clock starts on the date of the specific act being challenged.
Continuing-violation doctrine: A rule from employment law that can treat a series of acts as one unlawful practice for limitations purposes, used mainly in hostile work environment claims. It does not typically apply where each act is individually actionable on the day it happens.
Default judgment: A court judgment entered when the defendant fails to appear or respond. It can be vacated upon a sufficient showing (e.g., lack of service, excusable neglect, meritorious defense).
Writ of execution and wage garnishment: Court mechanisms allowing a judgment creditor to collect on a judgment by directing a debtor’s employer to withhold a portion of wages to satisfy the judgment.
Removal and supplemental jurisdiction: A defendant may remove a state case raising federal questions to federal court. If the federal claim is dismissed, the court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims.
Non-precedential opinion: In the Third Circuit, such dispositions are not binding precedent (see I.O.P. 5.7) but may be persuasive. District courts and litigants often treat them as informative, especially where they align with other circuits.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s opinion in Moore v. Cohn Lifland reinforces a clear limitations rule for FDCPA suits arising from debt-collection litigation: the one-year clock is keyed to the discrete act at issue—most commonly the filing of the allegedly unlawful complaint—and neither the continuing-violation doctrine nor routine post-complaint litigation and enforcement steps will extend or restart that period. The court’s approach is doctrinally consistent with Morgan’s discrete-acts framework and Heintz’s caution against freezing ordinary litigation communications, and it aligns the Third Circuit with the Sixth and Ninth Circuits’ recent authority on this point.

For practitioners, the takeaway is straightforward. Consumers who believe a collection lawsuit violates the FDCPA—such as by attempting to collect a time-barred debt—must move promptly to file within one year of the triggering act. Debt collectors cannot rely on litigation immunity, but they can resist attempts to revive stale FDCPA claims through continuing-violation rhetoric or by relabeling standard litigation steps as new violations. Even though non-precedential, this opinion offers a practical and persuasive template for handling timeliness in FDCPA litigation based on court-filed collection actions.