No Constitutional Limit on Congress’s Venue Choices for High‑Seas Crimes: Third Circuit Upholds MDLEA’s “Any District” Clause and Affirms Denial of Pretrial Venue Hearing

No Constitutional Limit on Congress’s Venue Choices for High‑Seas Crimes: Third Circuit Upholds MDLEA’s “Any District” Clause and Affirms Denial of Pretrial Venue Hearing

Introduction

In United States v. Carlos Cuevas‑Almonte, the Third Circuit addressed two recurring questions in maritime narcotics prosecutions under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. § 70501 et seq. First, does the Constitution constrain Congress from authorizing venue in “any district” for crimes committed on the high seas? Second, when is a defendant entitled to a pretrial evidentiary hearing to contest venue, especially where facts are disputed about where the defendant was “first brought” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3238?

The case arose after the U.S. Coast Guard interdicted a go‑fast vessel approximately 75 nautical miles south of Puerto Rico. The vessel’s occupants—one of whom was Cuevas‑Almonte—jettisoned cocaine bales and failed to “heave to” before being stopped and taken under Coast Guard control. The Government transported the defendants to St. Thomas in the U.S. Virgin Islands and secured an indictment for MDLEA trafficking and related offenses. Cuevas‑Almonte moved to dismiss for improper venue, arguing: (1) the MDLEA’s “any district” venue clause (46 U.S.C. § 70504(b)(2)) is unconstitutional under Article III and the Sixth Amendment; and (2) venue lay in Puerto Rico under 18 U.S.C. § 3238 because he was “first brought” there. He also sought a pretrial evidentiary hearing and subpoenas for Coast Guard witnesses to bolster his venue challenges and to advance a “manufactured venue” theory alleging the Government routed him to the Virgin Islands to obtain harsher sentences.

After the district court denied his motions, Cuevas‑Almonte entered a conditional plea preserving his venue arguments and the denial of a hearing. On appeal, the Third Circuit (Judge Restrepo writing for a unanimous panel) affirmed, upholding the MDLEA’s “any district” venue provision as constitutional and finding no abuse of discretion in denying a pretrial evidentiary hearing on venue.

Summary of the Opinion

  • The court affirmed the constitutionality of 46 U.S.C. § 70504(b)(2), which allows prosecution of MDLEA high‑seas offenses “in any district.” Relying on the plain text of Article III’s Venue Clause and on binding Supreme Court precedent (Cook v. United States), the court held that when crimes are “not committed within any State,” Congress may designate the “Place or Places” of trial without the limitations urged by the defendant. The Sixth Amendment’s Vicinage Clause governs jury composition for crimes committed “within a State” and thus does not restrict venue for high‑seas offenses.
  • The as‑applied constitutional challenge failed because trying Cuevas‑Almonte in the Virgin Islands for high‑seas conduct is consistent with Article III and the Sixth Amendment. Consequently, the facial challenge failed as well because the statute is not unconstitutional in all applications.
  • The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a pretrial evidentiary hearing on venue. A hearing is warranted only upon a “colorable claim” supported by specific, non‑conjectural facts that, if proven, would affect the outcome. Here, the defendant’s shifting narratives did not meet that threshold, and even his best‑case factual scenario (mere transit through Puerto Rico’s territorial waters during an inter‑vessel transfer) would not have changed the legal analysis under § 3238.
  • The panel did not reach the defendant’s Touhy/subpoena issues because, under the conditional plea agreement, those matters became immaterial absent a finding that the district court erred in denying a pretrial venue hearing.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157 (1891): The court’s anchor. Cook interprets Article III’s Venue Clause to impose no restriction on Congress’s choice of trial location(s) for offenses “not committed within any State,” other than that Congress must have designated the place(s) “by law” before trial. The panel follows Cook under the Agostini principle, treating it as dispositive of the constitutional venue framework for extraterritorial/high‑seas crimes.
  • United States v. Dawson, 56 U.S. 467 (1853), and Smith v. United States, 599 U.S. 236 (2023): These authorities clarify the Sixth Amendment’s Vicinage Clause. Dawson indicates the clause applies to crimes within a State. Smith underscores that vicinage concerns jury composition, not the place of trial. Together, they foreclose using the Sixth Amendment to cabin Congress’s venue choices for high‑seas offenses.
  • Zicarelli v. Dietz, 633 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1980): The Third Circuit’s own precedent aligns with Cook, recognizing that Article III authorizes Congress to prescribe venue for offenses not committed within a State, without Sixth Amendment limitation.
  • Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), and Third Circuit applications (e.g., Singletary; Extreme Associates): Lower courts must follow directly controlling Supreme Court precedent even if other doctrinal developments exist. This foreclosed the defendant’s invitation to adopt a history‑only approach inconsistent with Cook.
  • Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008); Sabri v. United States, 542 U.S. 600 (2004); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936): These decisions set the ground rules for facial challenges and constitutional avoidance. Facial challenges are disfavored, particularly on sparse records, and courts should not craft constitutional rules broader than necessary. Applied here, they reinforced the court’s choice to resolve the as‑applied challenge and conclude the facial challenge necessarily fails.
  • NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 (1927); Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U.S. 466 (1883): These authorities emphasize judicial restraint and the presumption of constitutionality when reviewing Acts of Congress—an important backdrop as the panel declined to strike down § 70504(b)(2).
  • United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) (Barrett, J., concurring), and N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): Cuevas‑Almonte urged a historically inflected approach to venue similar to recent jurisprudence in other constitutional contexts. The panel declined to displace Cook with such an approach, noting it would be improper for a court of appeals to undercut controlling Supreme Court precedent.
  • United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011); Marcavage v. City of Philadelphia, 609 F.3d 264 (3d Cir. 2010): These cases clarify the distinction between as‑applied and facial challenges and the principle that failure of the as‑applied challenge typically defeats the facial challenge.
  • United States v. Hines, 628 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Fattah, 858 F.3d 801 (3d Cir. 2017): These decisions define when a pretrial evidentiary hearing is warranted. A defendant must present a colorable, specific, non‑conjectural factual proffer that would affect the outcome. The panel applied this standard to affirm denial of a venue hearing.
  • United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855 (11th Cir. 2010): Cited for the standard of review (abuse of discretion) when a district court denies a pretrial venue hearing.
  • Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948); Pedersen v. United States, 271 F. 187 (2d Cir. 1921); United States v. Arwo, 86 U.S. 486 (1873): Though the Third Circuit did not finally resolve the “first brought” question as a matter of first impression, it favorably cited these authorities for the proposition that mere transit through a district’s airspace or territorial waters, without landing or arrest there, does not make that district the one into which a defendant was “first brought” under § 3238.
  • United States v. Heatherly, 985 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2021): Confirms that at trial, the Government must establish venue by a preponderance of the evidence. The panel clarified that denying a pretrial hearing did not shift that ultimate burden.
  • United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984): Overbreadth doctrine does not apply outside the First Amendment context; a statute is not invalid merely because some hypothetical applications might be problematic.

Legal Reasoning

1) Article III and the Sixth Amendment permit the MDLEA’s “any district” venue provision

The Venue Clause of Article III provides that when a crime is “not committed within any State,” “the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.” The court emphasized the text’s breadth—Congress may choose the “Place or Places.” Cook v. United States held that this language “impose[s] no restriction as to the place of trial,” beyond requiring that Congress designate the place(s) before trial. The Sixth Amendment’s Vicinage Clause guarantees a jury “of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,” which the Supreme Court has long limited to crimes “committed within a State,” and, per Smith (2023), concerns jury composition rather than the location of trial. Together, these provisions authorize Congress’s selection of venue for high‑seas crimes; neither text nor precedent imposes a one‑district limit.

The defendant’s effort to convert the practice reflected in the Crimes Act of 1790 and the modern § 3238 (“arrested or first brought”) into a constitutional limitation failed for three reasons. First, the historical practice is not singular or unbroken: since 1948, § 3238 has permitted venue also in the district of the offender’s last known residence or in the District of Columbia. Second, the court rejected the “use it or lose it” theory: Founding‑era legislative choices do not mark the outer boundary of constitutional authority. Third, and most important, Cook governs; under Agostini, only the Supreme Court may reconsider it.

The opinion also addressed the defendant’s reliance on the Declaration of Independence’s grievance about being “transported beyond Seas” for trial. The court explained that this concern—trials in distant, foreign tribunals—does not map onto modern prosecutions of high‑seas offenses in a nearby federal district. Nor would the “first brought” concept reliably cure the Founders’ grievance: a defendant “first brought” to Alaska or Guam for an Atlantic interdiction could still face a remote forum under the defendant’s own theory.

2) The as‑applied challenge fails; therefore, the facial challenge fails

Applying these constitutional principles to Cuevas‑Almonte’s case, trying him in the Virgin Islands for high‑seas conduct fell squarely within Congress’s Article III grant of authority, unaffected by the Sixth Amendment. Because the statute was constitutional as applied, the broader facial attack necessarily failed. The court also invoked the general presumption of constitutionality, the disfavoring of facial challenges (especially on sparse records), and the admonition not to decide constitutional questions more broadly than necessary.

3) No abuse of discretion in denying a pretrial evidentiary hearing on venue

Under Rule 12 and Third Circuit precedent, a pretrial evidentiary hearing is warranted only if the defendant presents a colorable, specific, non‑conjectural proffer that raises a material factual dispute whose resolution would affect the outcome of the motion. Cuevas‑Almonte’s multiple iterations of where, when, and how he was transferred between Coast Guard vessels were inconsistent and speculative. More importantly, even crediting his latest account—that he was transferred while in Puerto Rico’s territorial waters—would not carry the day for venue. The district court applied a legally supportable view (consistent with Chandler and other authorities) that mere transit through territorial waters, without landing or arrest there, does not render a defendant “first brought” into that district under § 3238. Because the posited factual dispute would not alter the legal outcome, a hearing would have served only to facilitate discovery in hopes of later justifying the motion, which Rule 12 does not permit.

The panel also rejected the argument that denying a pretrial hearing shifted the burden of proving venue at trial. The Government would still bear the preponderance burden at trial; declining a pretrial hearing simply reflected the insufficiency of the motion’s proffer.

4) “Manufactured venue” and Touhy issues

The court found no colorable basis for the “manufactured venue” claim (the allegation that the Government routed the defendants to the Virgin Islands to secure harsher sentences). As to subpoenas for Coast Guard witnesses and the challenge to Department of Homeland Security Touhy regulations, the panel did not reach those questions because the conditional plea made them immaterial absent error in denying a pretrial venue hearing.

Impact

  • MDLEA prosecutions in the Third Circuit: The Government may file MDLEA high‑seas prosecutions “in any district” under § 70504(b)(2) without violating Article III or the Sixth Amendment. Defense efforts to confine venue to the “first brought” district via constitutional attack are foreclosed by this opinion.
  • Venue hearings will be rare absent precise, outcome‑determinative proffers: Defendants seeking pretrial venue hearings must present specific, non‑conjectural facts that, if proven, would change the legal venue analysis. Speculative or shifting narratives will not suffice.
  • Guidance on § 3238’s “first brought” concept: While the panel did not definitively decide the issue as a matter of circuit law, its analysis endorses the view—supported by other courts—that mere passage through territorial waters or airspace, without landing or arrest, does not make a defendant “first brought” into that district. Litigants should tailor proffers accordingly (e.g., evidence of landing, formal arrest, or comparable “entry” into a district).
  • Strategic considerations for defendants: Challenges to forum choice will more plausibly proceed via discretionary transfer under Rule 21 (convenience or prejudice) rather than constitutional attacks on the MDLEA venue clause. Claims of “manufactured venue” will require substantial, concrete evidence of government bad faith or prejudice to be colorable.
  • Institutional stakes: The opinion hews closely to constitutional text and Supreme Court precedent, signaling that courts of appeals will not extend historically oriented methodologies from other constitutional domains to upset long‑settled rules about venue for extraterritorial crimes absent explicit Supreme Court direction.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Article III Venue Clause vs. Sixth Amendment Vicinage Clause:
    • Venue Clause (Art. III): Specifies where trials are held. If a crime is not committed within any State (e.g., on the high seas), Congress may designate the trial’s “Place or Places.”
    • Vicinage Clause (Amend. VI): Concerns the composition of the jury—an impartial jury of the State and district where the crime was committed. It applies to crimes within a State and does not limit Congress’s choices for high‑seas crimes.
  • As‑applied vs. Facial Challenges:
    • As‑applied: Claims a statute is unconstitutional in the specific way it was applied to the challenger’s case.
    • Facial: Claims a statute is unconstitutional in all its applications. Disfavored and difficult to win, especially on limited records. If the as‑applied challenge fails, the facial challenge usually fails too.
  • “Any district” under the MDLEA (46 U.S.C. § 70504(b)(2)):
    • For MDLEA offenses begun or committed on the high seas or outside any State or district, Congress has authorized prosecution in any federal judicial district. The Third Circuit holds this is constitutionally permissible.
  • “First brought” under 18 U.S.C. § 3238:
    • For non‑MDLEA offenses committed on the high seas or outside any State, § 3238 often uses “arrested or first brought” to set venue. Courts have generally held that mere transit through territorial waters or airspace, without landing or arrest, is insufficient to make that district the “first brought” venue.
  • Pretrial evidentiary hearing threshold:
    • To obtain a hearing on a Rule 12 motion (like venue), a defendant must present a specific, non‑speculative, outcome‑affecting factual dispute—a “colorable claim.” Hearings are not discovery tools to search for facts that might later support the motion.
  • “Heave to”:
    • Defined by statute (18 U.S.C. § 2237(e)(2)) as causing a vessel to slow, stop, or adjust to facilitate law enforcement boarding. Failure to “heave to” can itself be an offense.

Conclusion

United States v. Cuevas‑Almonte powerfully reaffirms a foundational principle of federal criminal venue: when crimes are not committed within any State, Article III allows Congress to designate the “Place or Places” of trial, and the Sixth Amendment’s vicinage guarantee does not constrain that choice. On that textual and precedential footing, the Third Circuit upheld the MDLEA’s “any district” venue clause against both as‑applied and facial challenges.

The court also tightened the gatekeeping for pretrial venue hearings, insisting on specific, outcome‑determinative proffers. It signaled skepticism toward arguments that mere transit through territorial waters makes a defendant “first brought” into a district under § 3238, aligning with other courts’ reasoning.

For maritime prosecutions and other extraterritorial crimes, the opinion provides clear guidance: constitutional venue protections remain robust where crimes occur within a State, but for high‑seas offenses Congress’s venue choices are broad. Defendants seeking to challenge forum selection should focus on concrete, non‑speculative facts and traditional transfer tools, rather than constitutional attacks on the MDLEA’s venue provision.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

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