No Comparator Advantage, No Causation: Sixth Circuit Reaffirms Strict “Similarly Situated” Comparator and Causation Requirements in Title VII Claims

Case: Roscoe D. Echols v. Kentucky Justice & Public Safety Cabinet, et al., No. 24-5715
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (not recommended for publication)
Date: March 24, 2025
Panel: Gibbons, Larsen, and Murphy, Circuit Judges (Opinion by Judge Larsen)

Introduction

This appeal arises from the Kentucky Department of Juvenile Justice’s termination of Youth Worker Roscoe D. Echols (an African American employee) following four substantiated excessive-force incidents against juvenile residents at the Green River Youth Development Center. After internally investigated allegations led to progressive discipline and ultimately termination in January 2020, Echols sued under Title VII for race discrimination and retaliation. The Western District of Kentucky granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

The opinion reinforces two bedrock Title VII doctrines:

Comparator rigor: To raise an inference of discrimination, a plaintiff must identify similarly situated comparators under the same supervisor, subject to the same standards, and who engaged in materially similar conduct—but were treated more favorably. If the identified comparators actually received harsher discipline, the prima facie case fails.
Retaliation causation: A retaliation claim fails absent evidence that the decisionmaker knew of the protected activity and that, but for that activity, the adverse action would not have occurred; temporal proximity spanning years is insufficient, and arguments not raised below (including cat’s paw theories) are forfeited on appeal.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo and affirmed on both the discrimination and retaliation claims.

Race discrimination (Title VII): The court held Echols failed to establish differential treatment vis-à-vis similarly situated, non-protected comparators. Most proposed comparators did not share the same supervisor (Commissioner Lashana Harris). Of the two who did (Josh Bell and David Wilkerson, both non-Black), each received harsher discipline than Echols for comparable excessive-force misconduct. Attempting to recharacterize the “supervisor” as an investigator (IIB manager Ed Jewell) failed—both because the argument was not preserved below and because Jewell was not even employed by the Department.
Retaliation (Title VII): Even assuming Echols’ 2017 phone call and letter protesting the first two investigations were protected activity, there was no evidence the decisionmaker (Harris) knew about them, and the multi-year gap defeated any temporal-proximity inference. Echols forfeited appellate review by failing to engage the district court’s causation reasoning and, again, could not rely on a cat’s paw theory that he had not presented below.

Result: Affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Summary judgment and standard of review:
- Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a): Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
- El-Khalil v. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 23 F.4th 633 (6th Cir. 2022): De novo review standard reaffirmed.
Prima facie discrimination and comparators:
- Newman v. Fed. Express Corp., 266 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 2001): A prima facie case can be shown by evidence that the plaintiff was treated differently than similarly situated employees outside the protected class.
- Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1992): Classic articulation of “similarly situated” in the disciplinary context—same supervisor, same standards, same conduct without differentiating circumstances.
- Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2000): The prima facie burden is not onerous, but it must still be met with evidence.
- Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hosp., Inc., 814 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2016): At pretext, comparator evidence typically must show that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were not fired for substantially identical conduct.
Framing the burden-shifting sequence:
- Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2008): Once an employer articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, some courts treat the prima facie inquiry as effectively moot. The Sixth Circuit noted this debate but adopted the parties’ framing and found Echols’ claim failed either way.
Retaliation causation and knowledge:
- Boshaw v. Midland Brewing Co., 32 F.4th 598 (6th Cir. 2022): Elements of Title VII retaliation—including but-for causation and employer knowledge of the protected activity.
- Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2000): Temporal proximity can support causation only when coupled with decisionmaker knowledge and a close timing relationship.
Preservation and forfeiture:
- Bose v. Bea, 947 F.3d 983 (6th Cir. 2020): A party may not raise a new theory (e.g., cat’s paw) for the first time on appeal.
- McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989 (6th Cir. 1997); Castellon-Vogel v. Int’l Paper Co., 829 F. App’x 100 (6th Cir. 2020): Failure to address the district court’s reasons in appellate briefing constitutes forfeiture.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in two tracks—discrimination and retaliation—against the common backdrop of summary judgment principles.

1) Discrimination: The comparator showing fails

To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, Echols chose the “disparate treatment compared to similarly situated, non-protected employees” route. The opinion applies Mitchell’s exacting comparator standard: same supervisor, same standards, and materially similar conduct without differentiating circumstances.

On that score, most of Echols’ proposed comparators failed because they did not share the same supervisor—Commissioner Lashana Harris, who made the termination decision. Only two proposed comparators did: Josh Bell and David Wilkerson (both non-Black). But both of those comparators received harsher discipline than Echols for comparable excessive-force violations—Bell received a three-day suspension for a first violation; Wilkerson received a five-day suspension for a first violation and was later terminated for assaulting a coworker. By contrast, Echols received only a one-day suspension after his first two substantiated incidents and was not terminated until two further substantiated excessive-force incidents.

The court underscored a critical, often dispositive point: a plaintiff cannot raise an inference of discriminatory disparate treatment when the only suitable comparators (same supervisor, same standards, similar conduct) were treated more harshly than the plaintiff. That ends the prima facie case. And, even shifting the analysis to pretext (as Jackson contemplates), the outcome would be the same: comparators showing harsher treatment do not expose the employer’s stated reason as a pretext for discrimination.

Echols attempted to sidestep the “same supervisor” defect by recasting his supervisor as Ed Jewell, a manager in the Internal Investigations Branch (IIB) of the Kentucky Justice & Public Safety Cabinet. The court rejected this move on two grounds:

Substantively, it doubted that Jewell, who was not even an employee of the Department, could qualify as the relevant “supervisor” for Title VII comparator purposes. The Department’s decisionmaker was Commissioner Harris.
Procedurally, Echols had not raised this cat’s paw framing in the district court, so it was forfeited on appeal (Bose v. Bea).

Finally, the court explained that even if Echols could persuade a factfinder that his conduct warranted less discipline, that would not carry his burden because the legally relevant question for a prima facie case is whether similarly situated non-protected employees were treated better. Here, they were not.

2) Retaliation: No knowledge, no temporal proximity, and forfeiture

Title VII retaliation requires proof that protected activity was the but-for cause of the adverse action, and that the employer (specifically, the decisionmaker) knew of the protected activity.

Echols identified a letter and phone call in 2017 protesting the first two IIB outcomes. The panel assumed arguendo that these were “protected activities,” but still affirmed summary judgment because:

No decisionmaker knowledge: There was no evidence that Commissioner Harris knew of the 2017 communications.
Temporal distance: The three-year gap between the 2017 communications and the 2020 termination foreclosed any causation inference based on timing (Nguyen). Temporal proximity must be close in time and accompanied by knowledge.
Forfeiture on appeal: Echols’ briefing did not engage with the district court’s causation analysis, which independently forfeited the argument (McPherson; Castellon-Vogel).
No preserved cat’s paw theory: To the extent Echols argued that IIB manager Jewell’s awareness should be imputed to Harris under a cat’s paw theory, that argument was not presented below and thus could not rescue the claim on appeal.

Impact and Practical Significance

While unpublished and nonbinding, the opinion crisply applies established Sixth Circuit doctrine in ways that carry practical lessons for litigants and employers:

Comparator discipline must be better, not worse: Plaintiffs relying on comparators must present non-protected colleagues who, under the same decisionmaker and standards, engaged in materially similar misconduct but were treated more leniently. If the best comparators were punished more harshly, the discrimination claim will fail at the threshold.
Same-supervisor requirement remains strict in discipline cases: The opinion reiterates Mitchell’s insistence on the same supervisor to ensure an apples-to-apples comparison in discretionary disciplinary judgments.
Do not reinvent “supervisor” via cat’s paw on appeal: Attempting to redefine the relevant supervisor as an investigator or recommender—especially a non-employee—will face skepticism and procedural hurdles if not preserved below.
Retaliation requires decisionmaker knowledge and causal nexus: Plaintiffs must marshal evidence that the decisionmaker knew of the protected activity and that such activity was the but-for cause of the adverse action. Multi-year gaps are ordinarily fatal absent additional proof.
Preserve theories early and brief them specifically: Cat’s paw, pretext, and causation arguments must be clearly presented in the district court and meaningfully developed on appeal. Failure to confront the district court’s reasoning is itself dispositive.
Individual liability under Title VII: The district court dismissed claims against individual defendants because Title VII does not provide for personal-capacity liability, and that ruling went unchallenged on appeal; practitioners should align pleadings accordingly.

For public-sector employers, the case also illustrates how an independent investigative arm (here, the IIB within the Cabinet) can help structure and document disciplinary decisions. But ultimate decision-making authority—and thus the relevant “supervisor” for comparator analysis—remains with the employing agency’s decisionmaker (here, the Department’s Commissioner).

Complex Concepts Simplified

Prima facie case (Title VII discrimination): The initial, minimal showing required to raise an inference of discrimination. One route is to show that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably.
“Similarly situated” comparators: In discipline cases, the Sixth Circuit requires a tight match—same supervisor, same standards, and similar conduct, without mitigating or differentiating circumstances.
Supervisor (for comparator analysis): The person with authority to set discipline and make the challenged decision—not simply anyone who investigated or provided input. The case rejects redefining a third-party investigator as the “supervisor.”
Cat’s paw theory: A doctrine in which a biased subordinate’s animus influences an unwitting decisionmaker, tainting the decision. It must be timely pleaded and supported by evidence that the biased actor’s input proximately caused the adverse action.
Pretext: In the McDonnell Douglas framework, after the employer gives a legitimate reason for its action, the plaintiff must show that reason is not the true reason but a cover for discrimination. Comparator evidence can support pretext if it shows better treatment for similarly situated employees outside the protected class.
But-for causation (retaliation): The protected activity must be the determinative reason for the adverse action; the action would not have occurred in the absence of the protected activity.
Temporal proximity: Close timing between protected activity and adverse action can support causation, but only when the decisionmaker knew about the protected activity and the timing is truly close; a years-long gap defeats the inference.
Forfeiture on appeal: Issues not raised in the district court, or arguments that fail to address the lower court’s specific reasoning, are typically deemed forfeited and will not be considered on appeal.
Summary judgment: A procedural mechanism to resolve cases when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
IIB and MCAR: The Internal Investigations Branch (IIB) independently investigates allegations; Major Corrective Action Requests (MCARs) are formal disciplinary proposals processed within the Department and presented to the Commissioner for decision.
Unpublished opinion: “Not recommended for publication” generally indicates the decision is nonprecedential, though it may be cited for its persuasive value.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Echols delivers a clear message about Title VII litigation in disciplinary contexts. To advance a discrimination claim past summary judgment on a comparators theory, a plaintiff must identify non-protected employees under the same decisionmaker who engaged in materially similar misconduct and received more favorable treatment. Where the only appropriate comparators were disciplined more harshly, the prima facie case collapses—and any pretext argument with it.

For retaliation, the opinion underscores the indispensable elements of decisionmaker knowledge and but-for causation, with temporal proximity providing only a narrow, timing-based inference that cannot bridge multi-year gaps or the absence of knowledge. Appellate courts will not rescue unpreserved theories or undeveloped arguments.

Though nonprecedential, Echols is a practical roadmap for employers and litigants: maintain consistent, well-documented disciplinary processes anchored in a clear chain of authority; for plaintiffs, select truly comparable colleagues and preserve causation and cat’s paw theories early, supporting them with evidence that reaches the decisionmaker. On these measures, Echols’ claims could not survive summary judgment, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.