No Collateral-Order Appeals from Denials of Maryland Public-Official Immunity; Jail Operations Are Governmental; Pleading Suicide-Risk Deliberate Indifference

Introduction

In Edward Gelin v. Baltimore County, Maryland, the Fourth Circuit issued a published decision that reshapes federal appellate practice for Maryland tort claims against local officials and clarifies several immunity and pleading doctrines in jail-suicide litigation. The tragic backdrop is the death by suicide of Ashleigh Gelin, a sentenced inmate at the Baltimore County Detention Center who allegedly did not receive her prescribed psychotropic medications despite intake documentation and a referral for mental health services. Her parents sued Baltimore County, correctional officers, and others under § 1983, the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and state tort law.

The appeal arrived in an interlocutory posture after the district court granted in part, and denied in part, a Rule 12(c) motion. The County and correctional officers pressed three strands of immunity—federal qualified immunity, Maryland common-law public official immunity, and Maryland governmental immunity—while the plaintiffs challenged appellate jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit dismissed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

This opinion does three especially important things:

• It establishes that Maryland common-law public official immunity is an immunity from liability, not from suit, and thus a denial of that immunity is not immediately appealable under the federal collateral order doctrine.
• It holds that the operation of a county detention center is a governmental function under Maryland law, conferring governmental immunity on the County as to negligent hiring/retention/supervision claims tied to jail operations.
• It grants qualified immunity to the correctional officers at the pleadings stage because the complaint did not plausibly allege that they knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of suicide, and the plaintiffs forfeited the “clearly established” prong.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit first sorted out jurisdiction. It reaffirmed that denials of federal qualified immunity at the pleadings stage are immediately appealable. It also reaffirmed that denials of Maryland governmental immunity are immediately appealable because that immunity is akin to sovereign immunity from suit. But it held—contrary to the logic some had drawn from earlier cases—that denials of Maryland common-law public official immunity are not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine because that immunity is only from liability, not from suit.

On the merits that were properly before it, the court:

• Reversed the denial of qualified immunity and directed entry of judgment for the correctional officers on the § 1983 Eighth Amendment claims (Counts I–III). It further held that the parallel state constitutional claim (Count VI) rises and falls with the Eighth Amendment and must be dismissed as well.
• Reversed the denial of governmental immunity and directed entry of judgment for Baltimore County on the negligent hiring/retention/supervision claim (Count X), holding that operating a jail is a governmental function.
• Dismissed the appeal to the extent it sought review of the district court’s denial of Maryland public official immunity on the remaining state tort claims (Counts VII–IX), for lack of collateral-order jurisdiction.

With all federal claims gone and diversity lacking, the panel instructed the district court to decide on remand whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims against the officers.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

• Collateral Order Doctrine and Qualified Immunity
  • Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. and Mitchell v. Forsyth set the framework: certain orders denying an “entitlement not to stand trial” are immediately appealable.
  • Behrens v. Pelletier and Ashcroft v. Iqbal confirm that denials of federal qualified immunity at the pleadings stage are reviewable because the immunity is from suit and the inquiry at that stage is legal, not evidentiary.
  • Johnson v. Jones limits interlocutory appeals when a denial of summary judgment turns on sufficiency of evidence, a constraint inapplicable at the Rule 12(b)(6)/12(c) stage.
• State-Law Immunities and the Collateral Order Doctrine
  • Gray-Hopkins v. Prince George’s County (4th Cir. 2002) had treated both Maryland governmental and public official immunity as appealable denials. This opinion reaffirms that holding only as to governmental immunity and departs as to public official immunity.
  • Dawkins v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t (Md. 2003) rejected reliance on federal qualified-immunity analogies for Maryland public official immunity and denied collateral-order appeals in Maryland courts from denials of that immunity. While state collateral-order doctrine is not binding in federal court, Dawkins undermined the doctrinal premise of Gray-Hopkins.
  • Nero v. Mosby (4th Cir. 2018) held Maryland prosecutorial immunity is from suit (and thus immediately appealable) because Maryland adopted the federal rule “without qualification” and a statute expressly confers immunity “from suit.” The panel here distinguishes Nero: the public official immunity statute for local officers, Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-507(a)(1), speaks only to “immunity from any civil liability.”
  • P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy confirms that sovereign-type immunities (from suit) are immediately appealable, bolstering the governmental immunity holding.
• Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference
  • Farmer v. Brennan sets the two-part test: an objectively serious risk and a subjective awareness by officials who disregard the risk.
  • Pressly v. Hutto and Fourth Circuit cases like Thorpe v. Clarke reiterate that officials must actually draw the inference of substantial risk.
  • City of Escondido v. Emmons and King v. Riley admonish courts not to define “clearly established” rights at a high level of generality; the right must be particularized to the facts.
• Governmental vs. Proprietary Functions
  • Rios v. Montgomery County articulates Maryland’s multi-factor test for distinguishing governmental from proprietary functions.
  • Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Whalen characterizes municipal governmental immunity as a limited species of state sovereign immunity.
  • Jones v. Montgomery County (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) persuasively concludes that operating a detention facility is governmental, even if services are contracted out. Although unpublished in Maryland, federal courts may consider it as “available data” on state law.
  • Historical Maryland cases—Clea v. Mayor of Baltimore, Cooper v. Rodriguez, D’Aoust v. Diamond, Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, James v. Prince George’s County, Houghton v. Forrest—map the contours and evolution of the public official immunity and public duty doctrines.

Legal Reasoning

1) Appellate Jurisdiction: What’s Immediately Appealable?

The panel draws a sharp line between doctrines that confer an immunity from suit and those that confer only an immunity from liability:

• Federal qualified immunity is immunity from suit. At the pleadings stage, the analysis is legal and appropriate for interlocutory review. Jurisdiction affirmed.
• Maryland governmental immunity is the municipal analogue of sovereign immunity—an immunity from suit in tort when acting in a governmental capacity. Denials are immediately appealable. Jurisdiction affirmed.
• Maryland public official immunity is not immunity from suit. The court reaches this conclusion by:
  • Credit­ing Dawkins, which rejects treating Maryland public official immunity like federal qualified immunity.
  • Observing that § 5-507(a)(1) speaks only to immunity “from any civil liability,” not from suit, unlike the prosecutorial immunity statute construed in Nero.
  • Emphasizing the doctrine’s malice/gross negligence carve-outs—a subjective, fact-intensive inquiry that typically requires discovery—rendering it ill-suited to function as a shield from the burdens of litigation. This contrasts with Harlow’s transformation of federal qualified immunity into an objective inquiry precisely to avoid discovery.

Consequently, the Fourth Circuit dismisses the appeal to the extent it challenges the district court’s refusal to grant public official immunity on the state tort claims.

2) Qualified Immunity and the Eighth Amendment Claim

On the merits of the § 1983 claims, the court reverses, holding the officers are entitled to qualified immunity for two independent reasons:

• Forfeiture of the clearly established prong. The plaintiffs failed to articulate in their appellate briefing a clearly established right particularized to the facts of the case at the time of the 2013 events. That forfeiture alone compels reversal under circuit precedent.
• Pleading deficiency on the constitutional violation. The complaint does not plausibly allege that the correctional officers actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk that Ashleigh would commit suicide. Allegations that:
  • other inmates had “screamed” and “banged on cell walls” do not suffice without nonconclusory facts that officers heard and ignored those calls;
  • officers knew of a prior inmate-on-inmate assault and that Ashleigh was “crying, screaming and complaining of hearing voices” do not, without more, permit the inference that officers subjectively recognized a suicide risk; and
  • medical and mental health contractors failed to deliver or continue Ashleigh’s medications and failed to escalate her care implicate those contractors (who are no longer parties), not the correctional officers, in the deliberate-indifference inquiry.

The court also cautions that the district court defined the clearly established right at too high a level of generality (“deliberate indifference to an inmate’s safety”), contrary to Emmons and King. Proper framing requires case law that would have put officers on notice that the specific conduct alleged here violated the Eighth Amendment.

3) Maryland Governmental Immunity: Operating a Jail Is a Governmental Function

Applying Maryland’s multi-factor test from Rios, the court holds that running a county jail is a governmental activity:

• It is legislatively sanctioned and statutorily grounded;
• It is performed solely for public benefit with no municipal profit motive;
• It advances public health and safety writ large; and
• It lacks any private-interest element in the County’s operation of the facility.

The panel draws persuasive support from the Maryland Court of Special Appeals’ analysis in Jones v. Montgomery County, concluding that whether a county operates the facility itself or through contractors, the function remains governmental. As a result, Baltimore County is entitled to governmental immunity on the negligent hiring/retention/supervision claim (Count X), and judgment should be entered in its favor.

Impact

A. Appellate Practice in Maryland Officer Tort Cases

• No immediate appeals from denials of Maryland public official immunity. This opinion closes a perceived pathway for defendants to obtain early appellate review of public official immunity denials on state tort claims in federal court. Litigants must await final judgment (or seek discretionary mechanisms not typically available) for appellate review on that issue.
• Continued immediate appeals for governmental immunity and federal qualified immunity. Defendants can still pursue interlocutory review when a district court denies Maryland governmental immunity or federal qualified immunity at the pleadings stage.
• Strategic sequencing. Where suits combine federal § 1983 claims and Maryland tort claims against officers, defendants may secure dismissal of federal claims on qualified immunity while remaining state claims proceed in district court (absent dismissal or remand), potentially altering settlement dynamics and litigation costs.

B. Substantive Jail-Suicide Litigation

• Pleading standards tightened. Plaintiffs must plead nonconclusory facts showing that correctional officers actually knew of a substantial risk of suicide and consciously disregarded it. Knowledge that an inmate experienced assault, suffered withdrawal, or exhibited distress does not, without additional factual context, suffice to infer awareness of suicide risk.
• Particularized “clearly established” law is essential. Plaintiffs should identify precedent that, at the relevant time, clearly established the unconstitutionality of the precise conduct alleged—e.g., failure to place a detainee on special watch in the face of explicit suicide threats known to the specific officers.
• Contractor-versus-corrections liability delineated. The opinion underscores that failures in medication management and clinical decision-making gravitate toward health contractors; correctional officers’ liability turns on what they knew and did from a custodial perspective.

C. Municipal Liability in Jail Operations

• Counties are broadly insulated by governmental immunity for jail operations. Negligent hiring/retention/supervision claims tied to operating a detention center will generally be barred, steering plaintiffs toward other theories (e.g., claims against private medical contractors or properly pleaded constitutional claims against policymakers under Monell, where viable).
• Contracting does not privatize the function. The governmental character of detention operations persists regardless of outsourcing, limiting end-runs around immunity.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Collateral Order Doctrine: A narrow exception to the “final judgment” rule that allows immediate appeal of certain orders—most notably those denying an immunity from suit—because the right would be lost if the party had to endure trial.
• Immunity from Suit vs. Immunity from Liability: Immunity from suit blocks the litigation itself and is typically immediately appealable when denied; immunity from liability is a defense to being held liable, usually reviewable only after final judgment.
• Qualified Immunity (Federal § 1983): Shields government officials from civil damages unless (1) their conduct violated a constitutional right and (2) the right was clearly established (with factual specificity) at the time.
• Deliberate Indifference (Eighth Amendment): Requires proof that officials actually knew about and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm; negligence or even gross negligence is not enough.
• Governmental vs. Proprietary Functions (Maryland): A municipality enjoys immunity when performing core governmental functions (e.g., operating a jail), but not when engaging in proprietary, profit-like activities.
• Maryland Public Official Immunity: A common-law defense protecting public officials from tort liability for negligent acts in discretionary functions, unless they acted with malice or gross negligence. It does not prevent being sued; it prevents being held liable if the elements are satisfied.

Conclusion

Gelin delivers three lasting messages. First, as a matter of federal appellate procedure informed by current Maryland law, denials of Maryland common-law public official immunity are not immediately appealable because that doctrine confers immunity from liability only. Second, counties are immune from tort liability arising from the operation of detention centers, which Maryland law treats as governmental functions. Third, in jail-suicide litigation, pleading deliberate indifference demands concrete facts showing officers’ subjective awareness of suicide risk; generalized distress or contractor missteps will not suffice, and plaintiffs must articulate clearly established law at the appropriate level of specificity.

Collectively, these holdings narrow interlocutory appellate pathways for Maryland officer tort defenses, fortify counties’ immunity in the jail context, and sharpen the pleading and briefing obligations for plaintiffs aiming to survive qualified immunity at the earliest stages. The ruling will influence how civil rights and state tort claims against correctional actors are framed, litigated, and appealed in the Fourth Circuit going forward.