No Clearly Established Right to Proximity-Based Religious Accommodation in Prison Laundry: Tripathy v. Lockwood (2d Cir. 2025 Summary Order)

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Second Circuit’s summary order in Tripathy v. Lockwood, No. 24-2324 (2d Cir. Oct. 3, 2025), affirming dismissal of a pro se prisoner’s First Amendment, RLUIPA, and related claims challenging New York’s prison laundry policies. Plaintiff-Appellant Sanjay Tripathy, a Hindu former inmate, alleged that Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) policies required his clothes to be laundered with those of inmates who consume beef and pork, thereby violating his religious beliefs. He sought injunctive and declaratory relief and money damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, RLUIPA, and the New York Constitution.

The court, in a non-precedential summary order, affirmed the Western District of New York’s dismissal, holding:

• Injunctive and declaratory relief were moot because Tripathy was released from custody in 2022.
• Eleventh Amendment immunity barred official-capacity damages claims under § 1983 and RLUIPA against DOCCS and state officials.
• Qualified immunity barred individual-capacity damages claims because no “clearly established” law recognized a right to the “proximity-based” religious accommodation at issue (i.e., separation of laundry based on others’ dietary practices).
• New York Correction Law § 24 deprived federal courts of jurisdiction over state-law claims against DOCCS employees; those must be brought in the New York Court of Claims.

While styled as a summary order and explicitly non-precedential, the decision is instructive. It underscores the high specificity required to overcome qualified immunity and delineates the limits of prisoner religious accommodation litigation, particularly when a plaintiff seeks damages rather than prospective relief.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit (Judges Walker, Carney, and Sullivan) affirmed a magistrate judge’s dismissal on four main grounds:

• Mootness: Because Tripathy left custody in 2022, his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot. The court cited Tripathy v. McKoy, 103 F.4th 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2024), for the general rule that transfer or release moots such claims against facility officials.
• Eleventh Amendment: Official-capacity damages claims under § 1983 and RLUIPA were foreclosed by state sovereign immunity. DOCCS and officials sued in their official capacity are arms of the state and thus immune absent consent.
• Qualified Immunity: Individual-capacity damages claims failed because, even assuming a cognizable free exercise or RLUIPA interest, it was not clearly established that prison laundry policies infringe religious exercise based on the dietary practices of other inmates.
• State-Law Claims: Under N.Y. Correction Law § 24 and Second Circuit precedent, state-law claims against DOCCS employees for acts within the scope of employment must be brought in the New York Court of Claims, depriving the federal court of jurisdiction.

The court emphasized that it did not reach the merits of whether the laundry policy actually violates the First Amendment or RLUIPA; it held only that no clearly established law put the alleged violation “beyond debate” for purposes of damages liability.

In a footnote, the court noted the Attorney General’s argument that certain defendants were never served and thus not subject to personal jurisdiction, but it declined to reach that issue because the claims failed on other grounds.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Standards of Review
  • Westchester v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 778 F.3d 412, 416 n.6 (2d Cir. 2015): De novo review for Rule 12(b)(1) dismissals.
  • Mazzei v. The Money Store, 62 F.4th 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2023): De novo review for Rule 12(b)(6), with liberal construction of complaints and favorable inferences to the plaintiff.
• Mootness of Prospective Relief
  • Tripathy v. McKoy, 103 F.4th 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2024): A person’s transfer from or release from a facility generally moots claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against officials of that facility.
• Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity
  • Leitner v. Westchester Community College, 779 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2015): States are generally immune from suits for damages in federal court absent consent.
  • Woods v. Rondout Valley Central School District Board of Education, 466 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 2006), citing Regents of the University of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997): Immunity extends to arms of the state and its instrumentalities.
  • Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2002): Damages claims against state officials in official capacity and against agencies/departments are barred.
• Qualified Immunity Framework
  • Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012): Officials are protected unless they violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.
  • Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741–42 (2011): The right must be clearly established with sufficient specificity; courts should not define rights at a high level of generality.
  • Matusick v. Erie County Water Authority, 757 F.3d 31, 60 (2d Cir. 2014): Three-factor inquiry for clearly established rights in this Circuit.
  • Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015): The violative nature of the particular conduct must be clearly established in a particularized sense.
  • Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014): Existing precedent must place the legal question “beyond debate.”
• Free Exercise and RLUIPA Baselines
  • Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 273–75 (2d Cir. 2006): Free Exercise and RLUIPA protect prisoners’ religious exercise.
  • Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 597 (2d Cir. 2003): Prisoners have a right to a diet consistent with religious scruples.
  • McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 2004): Denying food that satisfies faith dictates burdens free exercise.
  • Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 2014): Forcing a Muslim inmate to drink water during Ramadan substantially burdened religious rights.
  • Brandon v. Kinter, 938 F.3d 21, 26, 39 (2d Cir. 2019): Serving meals containing pork to a Muslim prisoner substantially burdened religious exercise.
• State-Law Claims and Jurisdiction
  • Baker v. Coughlin, 77 F.3d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1996): N.Y. Correction Law § 24 precludes state-law claims against corrections officers in courts other than the Court of Claims.
  • Moodie v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 58 F.3d 879, 884 (2d Cir. 1995): Where a state law deprives its courts of jurisdiction over a state-law claim, federal courts also lack jurisdiction over that claim.
• Footnote on Procedure
  • ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490, 498 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013): Personal jurisdiction is often treated as a threshold question, but addressing merits (or other dispositive grounds) first can be permissible as a prudential matter.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning tracks a familiar sequence in prisoner civil-rights litigation.

I. Mootness (Injunctive and Declaratory Relief)

Tripathy’s release from custody mooted his claims for forward-looking relief. The court applied the Second Circuit’s recently reaffirmed rule that transfer or release generally moots such claims against facility officials. No exception was invoked or applied. The result is typical in prisoner suits where the plaintiff is no longer subject to the challenged policy.

II. Eleventh Amendment (Official-Capacity Damages)

The panel held that DOCCS and its officials, when sued for damages in their official capacities, are shielded by sovereign immunity. This foreclosed both § 1983 and RLUIPA damages claims in official capacity. The court emphasized that such claims must proceed, if at all, in individual capacity, which then triggers qualified immunity analysis.

III. Qualified Immunity (Individual-Capacity Damages)

The court assumed, without deciding, that the asserted religious burden could implicate the Free Exercise Clause or RLUIPA. But it concluded there was no clearly established right requiring DOCCS to accommodate alleged “contamination” of laundry based on other inmates’ consumption of forbidden foods. Critical to this conclusion:

• Existing Second Circuit free-exercise and RLUIPA precedents clearly protect diet-based accommodations, but they do not address prison laundry practices.
• Prison officials could reasonably rely on the absence of authority extending dietary accommodation principles to laundry, especially where DOCCS used detergent and bleach “at concentrations specified by the manufacturer ... to prevent contamination.”
• Tripathy’s argument analogized DOCCS’s pork-free and beef-free meal policies to laundry segregation. The court rejected this generalization, quoting al-Kidd’s admonition against defining clearly established law at a high level of generality.
• Because the right was not “beyond debate” at the time, qualified immunity barred damages.

Notably, the court expressly did not decide whether the laundry policy actually violates the First Amendment or RLUIPA. It resolved the case on the “clearly established” prong alone, leaving the substantive question open.

IV. State-Law Claims (Jurisdiction)

The court applied N.Y. Correction Law § 24 and binding Second Circuit precedent to hold that federal courts lack jurisdiction over state-law claims arising from acts within DOCCS employees’ scope of employment. Such claims must be brought in the Court of Claims against the State of New York. This jurisdictional rule applies regardless of the federal court’s supplemental jurisdiction.

“Proximity-Based Accommodations” and the Court’s Narrowing Move

Tripathy’s theory sought to extend established dietary accommodations to a “proximity-based” context—i.e., requiring the State to structure its laundry operations around other inmates’ dietary practices to avoid religious contamination of clothing. The court drew a line:

• Established: Rights protecting prisoners from being served or forced to ingest food contrary to their religious beliefs.
• Not clearly established: A right to accommodations based on indirect contact (laundry) arising from other inmates’ dietary choices.

This is a quintessential application of particularized qualified-immunity analysis. The court required a case (or set of cases) addressing sufficiently similar facts—here, laundry contamination—before exposing officials to damages. The DOCCS practice of laundering with appropriate detergents and bleach further supported a reasonable belief that no violation was occurring under existing law.

Doctrinal Posture: No Merits Ruling

The court underscored that it did not reach the constitutional or RLUIPA merits. This is a familiar path in qualified immunity cases: where the clearly-established prong disposes of the case, courts may decline to decide whether the underlying right exists or was violated. Thus, while damages claims fail, similar claims for prospective relief in an appropriate future case might be litigated on a full record while the plaintiff remains in custody.

Impact

On Prison Religious-Accommodation Litigation

• Damages suits face a high bar: Absent on-point precedent addressing the same type of accommodation (here, laundry), officials will typically be protected by qualified immunity.
• Diet vs. proximity: The Second Circuit has robust dietary-accommodation precedents. But this order signals that extending those rules to adjacent contexts (e.g., laundry practices, utensil handling, or other indirect-contact scenarios) will require either new merits rulings or materially similar precedent to avoid qualified immunity.
• Strategic timing: Plaintiffs seeking structural or practice changes should prioritize injunctive relief while in custody. Release moots forward-looking relief, leaving only damages and the qualified-immunity gauntlet.
• Record-building: Successful challenges to non-dietary “contamination” policies may require expert evidence and careful framing under RLUIPA’s “substantial burden” and least-restrictive-means tests—matters the court did not reach here.

On Correctional Administration

• Operational reassurance for damages exposure: In the absence of clearly established law, administrators following neutral, sanitation-focused policies (e.g., manufacturer-specified bleach/detergent protocols) are unlikely to face damages liability for indirect-contact claims.
• Prospective-relief risk remains: While damages may be barred, prisons could still face injunctions or declaratory judgments in live cases if courts later find a substantial burden and inadequate justification under RLUIPA.
• Policy design: Clear, documented sanitation protocols and evidence-based risk mitigation (detergent strength, machine protocols) can be pivotal in demonstrating reasonableness and avoiding liability.

On New York State-Law Claims

• Forum selection: N.Y. Correction Law § 24 channels virtually all state-law tort or constitutional claims against DOCCS employees acting within scope to the New York Court of Claims. Attempting to litigate those claims in federal court will result in dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
• Pleading implications: Plaintiffs must plan parallel or alternative state-court filings where appropriate and be mindful of limitations periods and Court of Claims practice.

Unresolved Questions

• Merits of non-dietary contamination claims: The court did not decide whether mixing laundry can substantially burden religious exercise under the First Amendment or RLUIPA. That question remains open for a properly framed, live injunctive case with a developed record.
• Scope of “proximity-based” accommodations: Future cases may test other indirect-contact contexts (e.g., kitchen utensils, storage, or cleaning protocols) and whether they trigger accommodation requirements under RLUIPA’s strict standard.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Summary Order (Non-Precedential): A decision that resolves the appeal but does not create binding precedent. Parties may cite it under FRAP 32.1 and the Second Circuit’s Local Rule 32.1.1, but courts are not bound to follow it.
• Mootness: Courts only decide live controversies. When an inmate is released, requests for injunctive or declaratory relief about prison conditions typically become moot because the court’s order would no longer affect the plaintiff.
• Eleventh Amendment Immunity: States and their agencies are generally immune from suits for damages in federal court unless the state consents or Congress validly abrogates immunity. Suing a state official in official capacity for damages is treated as suing the state itself.
• Official vs. Individual Capacity:
  • Official capacity = lawsuit against the government entity; damages are barred by sovereign immunity (with limited exceptions).
  • Individual capacity = lawsuit against the official personally; damages may be available unless qualified immunity applies.
• Qualified Immunity: Shields officials from damages unless they violated a right that was “clearly established” at the time in a particularized way. It is not enough to state a broad right; there must be precedent making the unlawfulness of the specific conduct clear “beyond debate.”
• Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA:
  • Free Exercise protects religious practice but allows reasonable prison regulations that are neutral and reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
  • RLUIPA provides stronger protection: the government may not impose a “substantial burden” on religious exercise in institutions unless it uses the least restrictive means to further a compelling interest. Remedies against states for damages are limited, and prospective relief is often the primary avenue.
• New York Correction Law § 24 and the Court of Claims: State-law claims for acts within DOCCS employees’ scope must be brought in the New York Court of Claims against the State, not in federal district court. This is a jurisdictional bar enforced by Second Circuit precedent.
• Personal Jurisdiction vs. Merits: Courts often address personal jurisdiction first, but they may resolve a case on other dispositive grounds without reaching personal jurisdiction when appropriate.

Conclusion

Tripathy v. Lockwood solidifies several important—and recurring—features of prisoner civil-rights litigation in the Second Circuit:

• Prospective relief claims typically become moot upon release.
• Eleventh Amendment immunity bars official-capacity damages claims against DOCCS and its officials under § 1983 and RLUIPA.
• Qualified immunity will defeat individual-capacity damages claims where no prior authority puts the alleged violation “beyond debate”—here, claims seeking “proximity-based” accommodations in prison laundry based on other inmates’ diets.
• New York’s § 24 channels state-law damages claims to the Court of Claims, depriving federal courts of jurisdiction.

Although non-precedential, the order provides a clear roadmap for courts and litigants. It draws a careful doctrinal line: diet-specific accommodations are well recognized; however, extending those principles to indirect-contact settings like laundry is not clearly established for damages purposes. The question whether such practices substantially burden religious exercise remains open on the merits for live injunctive disputes. Until controlling precedent addresses that question, qualified immunity will likely continue to foreclose damages liability for officials in analogous proximity-based accommodation cases.