No Clearly Established Brady Duty for Lab Technicians in the Early 1980s; Successive Photo Arrays Not Per Se Unconstitutional: The Fifth Circuit’s Qualified Immunity Roadmap in Williams v. City of Baton Rouge

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Fifth Circuit’s unpublished, per curiam decision in Williams v. City of Baton Rouge (Nov. 4, 2025), affirming summary judgment for the City of Baton Rouge, three former detectives, and two former forensic scientists in a civil rights suit brought by Archie Williams, who was convicted in 1983 and later exonerated after approximately thirty-six years in prison. Williams sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging (1) that detectives violated due process by employing an impermissibly suggestive photographic identification procedure; (2) that forensic personnel violated due process by suppressing or mishandling exculpatory evidence; and (3) that the City was liable under Monell for failure to train or supervise.

The Fifth Circuit framed the appeal around qualified immunity, the standards for due process challenges to identification procedures, Brady obligations as applied to non-prosecutor forensic personnel in the early 1980s, and municipal liability. The court also addressed forfeiture of certain issues and the district court’s discretion regarding supplemental state-law claims. The decision is notable for two reinforcing propositions: (a) as of the early 1980s there was no clearly established Brady duty imposed on lab technicians and similar non-prosecutors in the Fifth Circuit; and (b) the mere repetition of a suspect’s photograph across multiple arrays does not, by itself, establish an impermissibly suggestive procedure where the totality of the circumstances reflects reliability under Neil v. Biggers.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on all claims and parties. The core rulings include:

Police Qualified Immunity: The detectives were entitled to qualified immunity on the due process claim regarding photographic arrays. Williams failed to show the procedure was so impermissibly suggestive and unreliable as to violate due process; even if suggestive, it was reliable under Biggers’s totality-of-the-circumstances factors. His evidentiary showing (including an expert report) was too speculative to create a genuine dispute of material fact.
State Law Claims Against Police: Williams forfeited these issues by inadequate briefing on appeal. In any event, after disposing of the federal claims, the district court acted within its discretion regarding supplemental jurisdiction and found insufficient evidentiary support.
Monell Claim: The City prevailed because there was no underlying constitutional violation and no evidence of deliberate indifference in training or supervision with respect to photographic identification procedures.
Forensic Qualified Immunity: Both Lane (crime scene evidence/photographs/prints) and Miller (serology) were entitled to qualified immunity. The court emphasized that, as of the relevant time period, Brady obligations were not clearly established for lab technicians. Even assuming Brady could apply, Williams did not show suppression or materiality (Lane) or a due process violation premised on the omission of population statistics or failure to conduct enzyme testing (Miller).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). The Supreme Court recognized the risks of eyewitness misidentification but declined to prohibit photographic arrays, holding that convictions based on identifications following photo arrays should be set aside only when the procedures were “so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” The Fifth Circuit used Simmons to underscore that photo arrays remain a legitimate tool and that cross-examination at trial can mitigate risk.
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). Biggers requires courts to evaluate reliability under the “totality of the circumstances,” focusing on five non-exclusive factors: (1) witness opportunity to view the perpetrator; (2) degree of attention; (3) accuracy of prior description; (4) level of certainty at confrontation; and (5) time between crime and confrontation. The Fifth Circuit applied these factors to determine that the identification here was sufficiently reliable.
Qualified Immunity Framework: Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Fifth Circuit decisions including Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2020), Orr v. Copeland, 844 F.3d 484 (5th Cir. 2016), Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2021), Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2019), Thompson v. Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2001), and Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc). These decisions provide the two-prong inquiry (constitutional violation and clearly established law) and stress the need for specificity and controlling or robust consensus authority.
Brady and Materiality Line: Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (materiality as reasonable probability of a different result); Miller v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Brown, 650 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 2011) (discoverability through due diligence defeats suppression). These cases set the basic elements of a Brady violation: suppression by the prosecution of favorable, material evidence.
Mowbray v. Cameron County, 274 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 2001). Central to the forensic qualified immunity analysis, Mowbray stated that neither police officers nor lab technicians have a Brady duty to disclose exculpatory information. The panel used Mowbray to conclude that, in 1982–83, it was not clearly established that non-prosecutor forensic personnel bore Brady disclosure obligations—and even discussed that an extension based on “bad faith” concealment was not supported by the evidence here (citing Mowbray’s footnote).
Limits on Brady’s Affirmative Duties: United States v. Aubin, 87 F.3d 141 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Marrero, 904 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1990) (Brady does not require the State to conduct the defense’s investigation); Kutzner v. Cockrell, 303 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2002); Rector v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 1997) (no obligation to provide evidence available through due diligence); United States v. Beaver, 524 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1975); Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1968) (no duty to discover information the State does not possess). These cases undercut claims premised on the failure to create, develop, or add context to evidence absent a request or statutory/constitutional requirement.
Monell and Failure to Train: Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 2001) (policymaker, official policy/custom, and “moving force”); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Board of County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997); Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011). These decisions set the high bar for municipal liability and “deliberate indifference” in failure-to-train claims.
Supplemental Jurisdiction and Forfeiture: Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635 (2009); Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1989); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (discretion in retaining state claims); Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393 (5th Cir. 2021) (forfeiture for inadequate briefing).

Legal Reasoning

1) Police Qualified Immunity: Photo Arrays and Reliability

Williams argued that repeated photographic arrays, some including his image multiple times, created undue suggestiveness and a substantial risk of misidentification. The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the Simmons/Biggers framework:

Photographic arrays are not constitutionally prohibited; undue suggestiveness must rise to a “very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”
Even if a procedure is suggestive, the question becomes reliability under Biggers’s totality factors.

Applying those factors, the panel concluded reliability favored the State:

Opportunity to view: The victim, Anne Eaton, was face-to-face with the assailant multiple times during the assault.
Degree of attention: Eaton testified she resolved to closely observe and identify the perpetrator.
Accuracy of prior description: The distinctive right-arm scar she later identified on Williams aligned with her recollection.
Level of certainty: While initially cautious, Eaton “immediately” identified Williams on January 4, 1983, then again in a physical lineup, and at trial.
Time elapsed: Less than one month separated the crime and positive identification (shorter than the seven months in Biggers).

The court further noted that trial cross-examination of the victim and investigating officer could reduce the risk of misidentification (Simmons), and it found Williams’s expert submission speculative (e.g., positing unproven “verbal or non-verbal cues”). On this record, Williams failed to show a due process violation or create a triable fact dispute. The detectives were therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

2) State Law Claims Against Police

The court held that Williams forfeited his state-law arguments by failing to adequately brief them on appeal. In any event, the district court acted within its discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and ultimately found insufficient evidence to support those claims after rejecting the federal claims. Affirmance followed.

3) Monell Liability: Failure to Train on Photo Lineups

Williams’s Monell theory centered on an asserted lack of training protocols governing repeated photographic arrays featuring the same suspect. The court rejected this claim for two independent reasons:

No underlying constitutional violation: Absent a predicate violation, municipal liability generally fails.
No deliberate indifference or moving force: Williams offered no evidence that the City consciously disregarded a known or obvious risk of due process violations, nor proof of an official policy, custom, or pattern that was the moving force behind a violation. The City also argued there was no national standard on photo-lineup procedures at the time, underscoring the difficulty of establishing deliberate indifference for historical conduct.

4) Forensic Qualified Immunity: Brady Applied to Non-Prosecutor Forensic Personnel

As to Lane (crime scene photographs and lifted latent prints) and Miller (serology), the court grounded its analysis in the time-of-violation principle inherent in qualified immunity: was the relevant right clearly established then?

No clearly established Brady duty for lab technicians (circa 1982–83): Relying on Mowbray, the panel held that lab technicians were not understood to bear Brady disclosure obligations, thus defeating the “clearly established” prong.
Lane (Photograph 10-5): Even assuming Brady applied, Williams failed to show “suppression” or “materiality.” The photograph was available to the defense (the State offered crime-scene photos pretrial), and the defense’s fingerprint expert opined that the meaningful information in Photo 10-5 was better captured elsewhere in the record (Exhibit S-12/L6b). Both prosecution and defense told the jury that none of the latent prints matched Williams, further undercutting materiality.
Miller (serology): The court rejected two theories: (a) the failure to include population-level statistics showing that many people “could not be excluded” is not a Brady violation where the defense could elicit that information through due diligence (e.g., cross-examination); and (b) there was no constitutional duty to perform enzyme testing absent a request—Brady does not require the government to create new evidence or perform particular tests it does not possess. The court also found no evidence of “bad faith” that might otherwise support an extension.

Because Williams neither showed a clearly established right at the time nor a substantive Brady violation on the merits, the forensic defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

Impact

Historical civil-rights litigation over 1980s investigations: The decision underscores the formidable barrier posed by the “clearly established” requirement when conduct occurred decades earlier. Plaintiffs must identify controlling or robust consensus authority defining the right with specificity as of the time of the investigation.
Eyewitness identification challenges post-exoneration: Successive use of the same suspect’s photograph across arrays is not per se unconstitutional. Plaintiffs must demonstrate both impermissible suggestiveness and unreliability under the Biggers factors. Evidence of distinctive features (e.g., scars), short time intervals, and strong witness attention and certainty can tilt reliability against a due process claim.
Forensic obligations under Brady for non-prosecutors: In the Fifth Circuit, as of the early 1980s (and still as articulated in Mowbray), Brady duties are prosecution-centered; lab technicians and officers were not clearly on notice that they themselves bore Brady obligations. Even where plaintiffs allege concealment, they must substantiate suppression, favorability, and materiality. Non-disclosure claims that boil down to “you should have provided more context” (e.g., population statistics) or “you should have run additional tests” typically fail absent requests, statutory duties, or proof of bad faith.
Municipal liability and training protocols: Failure-to-train claims are difficult to sustain without (1) an underlying constitutional violation and (2) proof of deliberate indifference—often shown through a pattern of similar constitutional violations or obviousness in the face of an established legal standard. The City’s argument that there was no national standard on photo arrays in the period at issue illustrates the evidentiary challenges in historical Monell claims.
Litigation strategy lessons: The opinion highlights the importance of:
- Preserving and adequately briefing all issues on appeal (several of Williams’s arguments were deemed forfeited).
- Providing non-speculative, concrete evidence to survive summary judgment—expert opinions must connect facts to legal standards with specificity.
- Proving “suppression” and “materiality” under Brady with more than conjecture, especially when the record shows the defense had access to the information or could have obtained it with diligence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity: A defense for government officials sued personally for damages. Plaintiffs must show (1) a constitutional violation and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time, meaning a reasonable official would have known the conduct was unlawful in the specific context. If either prong fails, the official is immune.
Brady Obligations: The prosecution must disclose favorable, material evidence to the defense. “Favorable” includes exculpatory or impeaching evidence. “Material” means a reasonable probability of a different outcome if disclosed. In the Fifth Circuit, as of the early 1980s, Brady obligations were not clearly imposed on lab technicians; the duty lies with prosecutors, though information known to “the prosecution team” is often imputed to prosecutors in criminal proceedings. In civil § 1983 suits for damages, however, the “clearly established” inquiry controls.
Biggers Reliability Factors: To determine whether an identification procedure violated due process, courts consider: (1) the witness’s opportunity to observe the offender; (2) the witness’s attentiveness; (3) the accuracy of prior descriptions; (4) certainty at the identification; and (5) the time between crime and identification. An identification can be admissible if it is reliable overall, even when some aspects of the procedure are suggestive.
Monell Liability and Failure to Train: Municipalities are not vicariously liable for employees’ acts. A plaintiff must show an official policy or custom attributable to a policymaker that was the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation. Failure-to-train liability requires proof of deliberate indifference, typically through a pattern of similar violations or an obvious need for training in the face of known risks.
Summary Judgment: Granted when there is no genuine dispute about any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Conclusory assertions or speculative expert opinions are insufficient to create a triable issue.
Forfeiture on Appeal: Arguments not adequately briefed on appeal are forfeited and will not be considered by the appellate court.

Conclusion

Williams v. City of Baton Rouge reaffirms several key constraints in civil rights litigation arising from decades-old investigations. First, the Fifth Circuit held that, as of the early 1980s, there was no clearly established Brady duty imposed on non-prosecutor forensic personnel—foreclosing qualified immunity for such claims in this historical context absent compelling evidence of bad faith or other specific legal hooks. Second, the court reiterated that repeated photographic arrays featuring the same suspect do not by themselves violate due process; the Biggers reliability factors remain central, and on these facts the identification was sufficiently reliable. Third, without an underlying constitutional violation or proof of deliberate indifference, Monell failure-to-train claims cannot succeed. Finally, the decision underscores the procedural rigor required on appeal and at summary judgment—speculative expert opinions and underdeveloped briefing will not carry the day.

Although unpublished and thus non-precedential under Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, the opinion is an instructive roadmap on how courts apply qualified immunity to historical investigative practices, evaluate due process challenges to eyewitness identifications, police the boundaries of Brady in civil suits against non-prosecutor forensic actors, and rigorously enforce Monell’s demanding standards. For practitioners, it highlights the necessity of precise, time-specific authority for “clearly established” law, concrete evidentiary showings on suggestiveness and materiality, and well-supported municipal liability theories.