No Clarification of the “Compelling Reason” Standard to Compel Complainant Psychological Exams; Cavanagh, C.J., Dissent Urges Doctor-Recommended MMPI as Adequate Nexus

Introduction

This commentary examines the Michigan Supreme Court’s May 9, 2025 order denying leave to appeal in People of the State of Michigan v. Jason Lee Fedewa (SC 167211), and Chief Justice Megan K. Cavanagh’s dissent from that denial. The underlying case stems from criminal sexual conduct charges against the defendant based on allegations by his 13-year-old child, AF. Before trial, the defense moved to compel AF to undergo a psychological evaluation—specifically the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI)—to assess alleged personality deficits that might bear on testimonial credibility. The trial court denied the motion, the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, and the Supreme Court declined review.

Although the Court did not set new precedent, the dissent highlights an unresolved and recurring issue in criminal practice: what constitutes a “compelling reason” to order a complaining witness to submit to a psychological examination, and how, as a practical matter, a defendant can “adequately demonstrate the need” for such intrusive discovery. The dissent suggests that a contemporaneous treating clinician’s recommendation for MMPI testing, tied to concerns about personality deficits and courtroom testimony, may satisfy the threshold showing. This commentary analyzes the order, the dissent, and the precedent it engages, and explores the implications for future cases at the intersection of the right to present a defense and the complainant’s privacy and dignity interests.

Summary of the Opinion

Holding/Disposition: The Michigan Supreme Court denied the defendant’s application for leave to appeal the Court of Appeals’ April 18, 2024 decision. The denial leaves intact the trial court’s refusal to order the complainant to undergo MMPI testing and the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of that refusal. The denial order sets no new rule of law.
Dissent (Cavanagh, C.J.): Chief Justice Cavanagh would have granted oral argument on the application to consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to compel. In her view, the defense’s showing—anchored by a doctor’s note from a prior psychological evaluation recommending MMPI and further testing given suspected “strong deficit” in AF’s personality relevant to courtroom testimony—was meaningfully stronger than the speculative assertions rejected in prior cases and sufficiently linked to credibility to warrant further consideration. The dissent emphasizes the need for Supreme Court guidance on what qualifies as a “compelling reason” and on how defendants may “adequately demonstrate the need” for such discovery while respecting complainant privacy.

Case Background and Procedural Posture

Charges: Three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(a), and three counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(a), based on allegations by AF, the defendant’s 13-year-old child.
Defense Motion: To compel AF to undergo a psychological exam (MMPI). The defense submitted a treating doctor’s note from approximately 11 months earlier recommending MMPI and a “full battery” of psychological and neuropsychological tests, citing a suspected “strong deficit” in AF’s personality and advising that such testing occur before AF’s testimony in court.
Trial Court Ruling: Denied the motion; cross-examination deemed sufficient to probe credibility and no compelling reason established to justify compelled testing.
Court of Appeals: Affirmed in an unpublished opinion (April 18, 2024, Docket No. 362396). The panel applied People v Freeman (After Remand) and People v Graham, characterized the defense request as insufficiently supported and akin to an impermissible fishing expedition, and held that cross-examination adequately protected the defense’s fair-trial rights.
Supreme Court: Denied leave to appeal. Chief Justice Cavanagh dissented.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

People v Freeman (After Remand), 406 Mich 514 (1979): Freeman establishes that a defendant who seeks to compel a complaining witness to submit to a psychological exam must “adequately demonstrate the need for the discovery he seeks.” The Court rejected “amorphous contentions” such as generalized descriptions of the complainant as “highly nervous” or intellectually disabled as insufficient. Notably, Freeman declined to articulate an exhaustive set of factors that would qualify as sufficient, leaving trial courts with broad discretion and little positive guidance. In Fedewa, both the Court of Appeals and the dissent use Freeman as the foundation for the threshold “adequate demonstration” requirement, but they diverge on whether the doctor’s note here satisfies it.
People v Graham, 173 Mich App 473 (1988): The Court of Appeals in Graham held that a psychological examination may be ordered if there is a “compelling reason to do so.” There, defense speculation about a witness’s alcoholism and motives was deemed an “unsupported argument,” not a compelling reason, and cross-examination was deemed adequate to explore credibility. In Fedewa, the Court of Appeals analogized the defense request to the speculative assertions in Graham. Chief Justice Cavanagh’s dissent agrees that “unsupported arguments” are insufficient but contends the defense showing here—rooted in a treating clinician’s specific recommendation tied to trial testimony—is “more compelling” than the assertions rejected in both Freeman and Graham.
People v Shahideh, 277 Mich App 111, 113 (2007), rev’d on other grounds, 482 Mich 1156 (2008): Shahideh provides the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing trial court decisions on requests for psychiatric examinations. In Fedewa, the dissent would have granted oral argument to evaluate whether the trial court abused its discretion given the record and the doctor’s note.
Additional citations in the dissent: The dissent engages the oft-used “fishing expedition” metaphor. It cites Creen v Mich Central R Co, 168 Mich 104, 108 (1911) for the proposition that “fishing is sometimes legitimate,” an EDNY decision observing that some fishing is targeted and appropriate (Walsh v Top Notch Home Designs Corp, No. 20-05087, E.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2022), and a scholarly critique urging abandonment of the metaphor (Thornburg, Just Say “No Fishing”: The Lure of Metaphor, 40 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 1 (2006)). These references reinforce the dissent’s point that trial courts should differentiate between untethered rummaging and targeted, evidence-based requests like the one presented.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s order itself offers no merits reasoning; the operative analysis comes from the Court of Appeals and the dissent.

Court of Appeals’ approach: Applying Freeman and Graham, the panel reasoned that:
- The defense acknowledged it did not know what the MMPI would reveal and sought to explore whether AF had personality issues affecting credibility—akin, in the panel’s view, to the exploratory purpose found insufficient in Graham.
- Although the doctor’s note was “more compelling” than the unsubstantiated allegations in Freeman and Graham, ordering MMPI without a demonstrated linkage to “determining an examinee’s credibility” would sanction an impermissible fishing expedition.
- Defense rights were adequately safeguarded by cross-examination, making compelled testing unnecessary.
Dissent’s counterpoints (Cavanagh, C.J.):
- Specificity and nexus: The defense request was not speculative: it sought a particular, mainstream psychological instrument (MMPI) based on a treating clinician’s contemporaneous recommendation, rooted in “suspected strong deficits” in AF’s personality and explicitly connected to courtroom testimony. That linkage, the dissent argues, suffices to tie the proposed examination to testimonial credibility.
- Practicality and adequacy of alternatives: Cross-examination cannot meaningfully probe a putative personality disorder or other psychological condition that has not been evaluated. Denying testing forecloses the very inquiry that might reveal the basis for targeted impeachment or necessary accommodations.
- Doctrinal clarity: If such a record is insufficient to establish a “compelling reason,” it is unclear what could ever suffice under Freeman and Graham. The Court should provide guidance on the contours of “compelling reason” and the defendant’s burden to “adequately demonstrate the need.”
- Balancing interests: The dissent expressly recognizes the need to weigh the defendant’s right to mount a defense against the complainant’s privacy rights, calling for standards that assist trial courts in tailoring relief.
- Fishing metaphor: Not all “fishing” is improper; courts should distinguish between scattershot demands and focused, evidence-backed discovery requests.

What This Order Does—and Does Not—Decide

No new precedent: A denial of leave to appeal is not a decision on the merits and does not create new law. The operative law remains Freeman’s “adequately demonstrate the need” requirement and Graham’s “compelling reason” threshold, applied through abuse-of-discretion review per Shahideh.
Unpublished COA opinion remains nonbinding: The Court of Appeals’ decision is unpublished and thus not binding precedent under Michigan court rules, though it may be persuasive.
Signal from the dissent: The dissent suggests that a clinician’s documented, pretrial recommendation for MMPI tied to testimony may meet the “compelling reason” threshold, highlighting a possible doctrinal direction should a future case secure plenary review.

Potential Frameworks and Factors (Implied by the Dissent and Existing Law)

Freeman and Graham identify the endpoints—unsupported speculation is insufficient; a “compelling reason” is required—without articulating a granular test. The dissent invites the Court to develop criteria that trial courts can apply consistently. Although not adopted here, the record and the cited cases suggest a workable set of considerations:

Specificity and evidentiary support: Is the request supported by concrete, contemporaneous evidence (e.g., treating clinician’s recommendation, documented symptoms, prior evaluations) rather than conjecture?
Nexus to testimonial capacity or credibility: Does the proffer explain how the proposed examination relates to memory, perception, suggestibility, response style, or other facets that bear on the reliability of testimony in this case, as opposed to general character?
Least intrusive means and tailoring: Are there less invasive alternatives (e.g., targeted records subpoenas, in camera review of existing treatment records under appropriate standards, limiting instructions, expert testimony) that could address the defense need without compelled testing? Is the requested test appropriately narrow (e.g., MMPI only vs. a “full battery”)?
Admissibility and utility: Would the requested testing likely produce information admissible under MRE 702 and MRE 403 or otherwise materially useful to the defense (for cross-examination preparation or expert consultation), recognizing that tests like MMPI are not direct “truth detectors”?
Timing and burden: Is the request made sufficiently in advance of trial? What is the burden on the complainant (time, trauma, privacy), particularly where the complainant is a child?
Protective measures: Can the court mitigate intrusiveness through orders governing scope, confidentiality, selection of examiner, and use of results?
Existing credibility access: Have the defense’s ordinary tools—robust discovery, cross-examination, and permissible expert testimony—been or can they be effectively used without compelled testing?

While these factors are not mandated by the order, they align with the dissent’s concerns, Michigan’s broad discovery-discretion jurisprudence, and the balancing of defense rights with complainant privacy grounded in crime victim protections.

Impact

Status quo maintained: Absent Supreme Court guidance, trial courts are likely to continue treating compelled psychological examinations of complaining witnesses as extraordinary and to deny them without very particularized showings.
Heightened value of concrete clinical support: The dissent underscores that contemporaneous, treating-clinician recommendations tied to courtroom testimony may be a materially stronger showing than speculative allegations. Defense counsel seeking such relief may look to obtain specific clinical documentation showing a nexus between the proposed test and testimonial reliability.
Cross-examination remains central: Courts may continue to prefer cross-examination as the default method to probe credibility. The unresolved question is when cross-examination is an inadequate substitute for targeted psychological testing, especially where no prior testing exists.
Privacy and dignity interests of complainants: Particularly with child complainants, courts will likely weigh the intrusiveness of compelled testing against the Michigan Constitution’s victims’ rights provisions and related statutes that safeguard dignity and privacy, reinforcing the need for narrow tailoring and protective orders where any such relief is considered.
Strategic litigation posture: Litigants may analogize to frameworks governing intrusive discovery in sexual assault cases (for example, the standards for in camera review of privileged counseling records), even though those standards were not addressed here. The dissent’s call for guidance may spur future cases to present fuller records and narrowly tailored requests suitable for plenary review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Compelled psychological examination: A court order requiring a witness (here, the complainant) to undergo psychological testing before testifying. It is an extraordinary remedy because it intrudes on privacy and bodily integrity.
MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory): A widely used personality assessment tool with validity scales that can indicate response styles (for example, defensiveness), but it is not a lie detector. Whether and how MMPI results bear on credibility in a particular case depends on expert interpretation and evidentiary rules.
“Compelling reason” standard: Under Graham, a defendant seeking to compel a psychological exam must offer compelling, concrete reasons beyond speculation—typically facts showing a specific, case-linked need.
“Adequately demonstrate the need” (Freeman): The defense must present more than vague assertions; it must show why an exam is needed for this witness, in this case, for issues that matter at trial.
Abuse of discretion: A deferential appellate standard. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes based on the record and applicable law.
“Fishing expedition”: A pejorative label for discovery requests seeking unspecified information without a focused basis. The dissent notes courts should distinguish between truly speculative “fishing” and targeted, evidence-based requests; “fishing is sometimes legitimate” when appropriately focused and justified.
Cross-examination as an alternative: Courts often rely on cross-examination—the questioning of a witness by the opposing party at trial—to test credibility instead of intrusive pretrial discovery into mental health.
Balancing test: Even if a need is shown, courts weigh it against countervailing interests, including the complainant’s privacy, the scope and intrusiveness of the testing, and the availability of less burdensome alternatives.

Conclusion

People v. Fedewa does not change Michigan law. By denying leave, the Supreme Court left intact the Court of Appeals’ unpublished affirmance of a trial court’s refusal to compel MMPI testing of a child complainant. But Chief Justice Cavanagh’s dissent is noteworthy: it frames a concrete, clinician-supported request as crossing the line from speculation into a “compelling” and credibility-linked showing—precisely the kind of record that should, at a minimum, warrant serious consideration and doctrinal guidance.

The dissent underscores a persistent gap in Michigan jurisprudence: Freeman and Graham reject amorphous assertions yet offer little positive guidance on what will suffice. The proposed path forward is a calibrated, factor-based approach that:

Demands specificity and a clear nexus to testimonial reliability;
Requires narrow tailoring and consideration of less intrusive alternatives;
Accounts for admissibility and practical utility;
Protects complainant privacy through protective measures when appropriate.

Until the Supreme Court takes up a case to articulate those contours, litigants and trial courts must navigate using Freeman’s “adequate demonstration” and Graham’s “compelling reason” standards, applying abuse-of-discretion review, and carefully balancing defense rights with the complainant’s dignity and privacy. The dissent in Fedewa signals that a well-documented, clinician-recommended, test-specific request tied to courtroom testimony may be a promising vehicle for the Court to finally clarify this important area of law.