Introduction

This unpublished per curiam decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit resolves four consolidated environmental actions between neighboring industrial landowners in South Charleston, West Virginia: The Courtland Company, Inc. (plaintiff–appellant) and Union Carbide Corporation (defendant–appellee). Over many years, both parties conducted industrial operations that left legacies of contamination on and around their properties.

Across a pair of trials in the district court (Phase I for liability; Phase II for remedies) culminating in nearly 500 pages of findings and conclusions, the court entered mixed judgments that, in aggregate, rejected many of Courtland’s claims while granting targeted relief on others. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in all respects.

The opinion clarifies several important points of environmental law and litigation practice:

• CERCLA recovery requires not only “necessary” and NCP-consistent costs but also proof linking the defendant’s facility to the release; a defendant can defeat recovery by proving the statutory third-party/causation defense.
• “Necessary” response costs are circumscribed: investigations must be relevant to the threatened release at issue; attenuated exploratory efforts may be non-recoverable.
• Under the Clean Water Act, civil penalties are assessed for actual unpermitted discharges—not for each day a permit is absent in the abstract.
• Standing for Clean Water Act citizen suits requires a concrete, personal stake in the affected water—not a generalized environmental interest—especially where alleged discharges occur downstream from the plaintiff’s property.
• RCRA injunctive relief remains discretionary and may be denied for lack of irreparable harm, even where regulatory violations (such as “open dumping”) are found.
• Courts may allocate CERCLA contribution equitably against a prevailing plaintiff for the plaintiff’s own commingled contamination.

Although unpublished and therefore not binding precedent in the Fourth Circuit, this opinion is a detailed, practical roadmap for litigants navigating multi-statute environmental disputes involving complex hydrogeology and overlapping sources of contamination.

Summary of the Opinion

Procedural Posture

Four suits were filed and consolidated:

• Courtland I (CERCLA/RCRA/state): Alleged groundwater migration from Union Carbide’s “Tech Park” (upgradient) onto Courtland’s property.
• Courtland II (CERCLA/RCRA/state): Alleged groundwater migration from Union Carbide’s Filmont/Massey property (northeast) to Courtland’s property; Union Carbide counterclaimed for contribution and its own response costs.
• Courtland III (CWA): Alleged unpermitted discharges at the north end of Filmont/Massey (downstream of Courtland).
• Courtland IV (CWA): Alleged unpermitted discharges at the south boundary ditch between Filmont/Massey and Courtland.

Holdings

• Courtland I: The district court found Union Carbide’s Tech Park was not the source of Courtland’s groundwater contamination and that Union Carbide proved the CERCLA causation defense (§ 107(b)(3)). All relief was denied. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, emphasizing the district court’s credibility determinations and hydrogeologic findings were not clearly erroneous.
• Courtland II: Union Carbide was liable under CERCLA regarding Filmont/Massey. Courtland recovered $27,142.50 for a preliminary groundwater investigation but not $7,802.50 for a kayak trip (deemed not “necessary”). The court also found RCRA “open dumping” but denied injunctive relief for lack of irreparable harm. Public nuisance claims failed. On Union Carbide’s counterclaims, the court denied its own response costs but awarded it 25% contribution ($6,785.63) against Courtland based on Courtland’s own contamination. The Fourth Circuit affirmed across the board.
• Courtland III: Dismissed for lack of standing. Alleged discharges were downstream; Courtland showed no concrete environmental interest in the affected area. Affirmed.
• Courtland IV: The district court found no liability for groundwater or surface water discharges (Courtland “very probably” polluted its own groundwater and was “at least as likely” to be the source of surface water pollutants). But it found three unpermitted stormwater discharges and imposed the maximum civil penalty available—$200,136. The court refused to allow new liability evidence in the remedies phase. The Fourth Circuit affirmed both the per-discharge penalty framework and the case management ruling.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Westfarm Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, 66 F.3d 669, 681–82 (4th Cir. 1995).
  The panel invoked Westfarm when affirming Union Carbide’s successful CERCLA causation defense in Courtland I. Westfarm underscores that although CERCLA imposes broad liability, the statute recognizes complete defenses—including the “third party” causation defense under § 107(b)(3)—where a defendant proves that a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance was caused solely by a third party. Here, the district court’s hydrogeologic findings (flow direction, bedrock structure) and credited expert testimony demonstrated that Tech Park was not the source of the contaminants in Courtland’s groundwater. That finding was dispositive of cost recovery despite Courtland’s otherwise “necessary” NCP-compliant investigative costs.
• Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183–84 (2000).
  Laidlaw is the seminal case on citizen-suit standing under the Clean Water Act, holding that plaintiffs must show a concrete and particularized injury (including reasonable concerns that affect recreational or aesthetic interests), traceability, and redressability. The Fourth Circuit referenced Laidlaw to affirm the district court’s holding in Courtland III that Courtland lacked standing because it failed to demonstrate a concrete environmental interest or specific activities affected in the area of the discharge, which was downstream from its property.
• Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 156–61 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
  Gaston Copper refines the standing analysis for environmental citizen suits in this Circuit, emphasizing the need for evidence that the plaintiff’s use or enjoyment of the affected waters is impaired. Applying that guidance, the court concluded Courtland’s assertion of a generalized environmental interest did not suffice, particularly given the downstream locus of the alleged discharges relative to Courtland’s property.

Legal Reasoning

1) CERCLA Cost Recovery Versus the § 107(b)(3) Causation Defense (Courtland I)

The district court accepted that Courtland’s preliminary groundwater investigation costs ($36,916.25) were “necessary” and consistent with the National Contingency Plan, satisfying § 107(a)’s cost-recovery criteria. But CERCLA’s liability scheme also authorizes defendants to avoid liability if they prove, by a preponderance, that the release was caused “solely” by a third party. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3). Relying on hydrogeologic flow patterns, bedrock structure, and the credited testimony of Union Carbide’s expert, the district court found Tech Park was not the source. Because Union Carbide carried its burden on the causation defense, the claim failed notwithstanding the “necessary” nature of Courtland’s costs. The Fourth Circuit rejected Courtland’s appellate focus on § 107(a) alone and affirmed, observing that the unchallenged factual findings sustained the defense.

Key takeaways:

• “Necessary” NCP-consistent costs are not self-executing for recovery; causation and defenses remain critical.
• Hydrogeologic evidence and expert credibility can be determinative on source identification.
• The burden of proof flips: plaintiffs carry § 107(a) elements; defendants bear the § 107(b)(3) burden.

2) CERCLA Liability, “Necessary” Costs, RCRA “Open Dump,” and Contribution Allocation (Courtland II)

For Filmont/Massey, the district court found Union Carbide liable under CERCLA and awarded Courtland $27,142.50 for a preliminary groundwater investigation, but denied $7,802.50 for a kayak-based sampling of surface water and sediments “significantly downstream” of the Courtland property. The court reasoned that the kayak study was not “necessary” within § 107(a) because it was too attenuated from the groundwater migration at issue. The Fourth Circuit upheld that tailoring, reinforcing a disciplined view of “necessity”: response activities must bear a meaningful nexus to the targeted release pathway.

On the RCRA claim, the court found the Filmont site to be an “open dump,” but denied injunctive relief for lack of irreparable harm, emphasizing:

• No known groundwater wells within a mile of Filmont;
• No evidence contaminated groundwater could reach residential areas;
• A local ordinance prohibits use of untreated groundwater; and
• No current or planned groundwater use on either site.

Those findings were undisputed on appeal. Equitable discretion therefore supported the denial of injunctive relief despite the regulatory infraction.

Regarding Union Carbide’s counterclaims, the court denied its own response costs ($199,942.52) but granted a 25% contribution against Courtland—$6,785.63—reflecting Courtland’s role as a contributing source to contamination on its property. The Fourth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in that equitable allocation under § 113(f)(1), reinforcing that:

• Equitable contribution can be awarded against a plaintiff who recovers § 107(a) costs, to account for the plaintiff’s share of responsibility.
• Allocation is fact-intensive; the court’s holistic view of historical uses and ongoing operations supported the 25% share.

3) Clean Water Act Standing and the Limits of “Generalized” Environmental Interests (Courtland III)

Courtland’s Clean Water Act claims related to alleged discharges at the northern boundary of Filmont/Massey failed for lack of standing. The district court found the discharges were downstream from Courtland’s property and that Courtland did not demonstrate any concrete use, aesthetic, or recreational interest in the affected area. The Fourth Circuit affirmed under Laidlaw and Gaston Copper, which require specific, credible evidence that the plaintiff’s interests are directly impacted. Directional hydrology mattered: in the absence of a link to Courtland’s property or activities, a “broader interest” in environmental quality did not establish injury-in-fact.

4) Clean Water Act Liability, Per-Discharge Penalties, and Case Management (Courtland IV)

At the southern boundary ditch shared by Filmont/Massey and Courtland, the court found no liability for groundwater or surface water discharges because Courtland “very probably” polluted its own groundwater and was “at least as likely” to be the source of surface pollutants. However, Courtland proved three stormwater discharges without a permit. The district court imposed the maximum penalty of $200,136 and refused to entertain additional liability evidence during the remedies phase.

On appeal, Courtland argued penalties should run for every day without a permit rather than each day of actual discharge. The Fourth Circuit rejected that reading, anchoring its analysis in the statutory text: the CWA prohibits the “discharge of any pollutant” without a permit (33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)) and requires permits “for the discharge of any pollutant” (33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)). The underlying violation is the unpermitted discharge itself. Thus, penalties properly accrue per discharge (or per day on which a discharge occurs), not per calendar day of lacking a permit in the abstract.

The court also upheld the district court’s firm adherence to its bifurcated trial structure, concluding there was no abuse of discretion in barring new liability evidence during Phase II, which was confined to remedies. The message is clear: litigants must fully present liability evidence in the liability phase; attempts to sandbag or supplement later will likely fail.

Impact and Practical Implications

• CERCLA causation truly matters: Even where plaintiffs incur “necessary” NCP-consistent investigative costs, defendants can defeat recovery by convincingly demonstrating they are not the source. Hydrogeology, flow direction, and expert credibility are often outcome-determinative.
• “Necessary” costs have a tight leash: Courts will weed out exploratory or tangential studies—especially those spatially or conceptually removed from the asserted pathway (e.g., downstream surface sampling in a groundwater-migration case).
• Contribution can offset a plaintiff’s win: Where a plaintiff’s own operations have contributed to contamination, defendants can obtain an equitable set-off under § 113(f)(1), reducing net recovery.
• RCRA injunctive relief remains equitable: A finding of “open dumping” under RCRA does not guarantee an injunction; absent irreparable harm (e.g., no exposure pathway, no potable use, and protective ordinances), injunctive relief may be denied.
• CWA standing demands concrete stakes: Plaintiffs must tie alleged discharges to specific, personal uses or interests in the affected waterbody. Downstream-only allegations without a demonstrated nexus are unlikely to confer standing.
• CWA penalties are per discharge: The opinion reinforces a text-based approach: no daily penalties merely for lacking a permit; penalties attach when discharges actually occur.
• Procedure matters: Courts may strictly enforce phased trial orders. Parties should assume Phase I is their sole opportunity to establish liability.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• CERCLA § 107(a) Cost Recovery: Allows a private party to recover “necessary costs of response” (investigation, cleanup) that are consistent with the National Contingency Plan (EPA’s cleanup playbook), from responsible parties.
• National Contingency Plan (NCP): A set of federal regulations guiding how hazardous releases should be investigated and cleaned up. Costs must adhere to these principles to be recoverable.
• CERCLA § 107(b)(3) Third-Party/Causation Defense: A complete defense if the defendant proves that a third party solely caused the release and the defendant exercised due care and took precautions. In practice, it often functions as a “not the source” defense, as here.
• CERCLA § 113(f)(1) Contribution: Even if a plaintiff recovers response costs, a defendant may seek equitable allocation of those costs based on relative responsibility, potentially shifting a percentage back to the plaintiff.
• RCRA “Open Dump”: RCRA prohibits “open dumping”—disposal sites that do not meet sanitary landfill criteria. A site can be in violation but, because injunctive relief is equitable, courts can deny an injunction absent irreparable harm.
• Clean Water Act (CWA) Discharge: The Act prohibits the addition of pollutants from a point source into navigable waters without a permit (NPDES). Liability hinges on actual discharges; penalties accrue per unpermitted discharge.
• Standing (CWA/RCRA citizen suits): Plaintiffs must show a concrete injury to their own interests (e.g., recreational use), traceable to the violation, and likely to be redressed by a court order.
• Upgradient/Downgradient Flow: Groundwater and surface water generally flow from higher to lower elevations. Upgradient sources are more likely to impact downgradient properties. Here, flow direction and bedrock structure were central to source determination.
• Phased bench trials: Courts often separate liability (Phase I) from remedies (Phase II). Liability proof must be presented in Phase I; remedies address penalties or cleanup after liability is established.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s affirmance in The Courtland Company, Inc. v. Union Carbide Corporation—though unpublished—provides clear, practical guidance across multiple environmental statutes. It underscores that CERCLA recovery turns not just on incurring “necessary” costs but on proving the defendant’s causal link, and that defendants can prevail with a well-supported § 107(b)(3) defense grounded in hydrogeology and credible expert analysis. It tightens the lens on what counts as “necessary” response work, endorses equitable contribution against plaintiffs who share responsibility, and reiterates that RCRA injunctions require true irreparable harm.

On the Clean Water Act front, the opinion reinforces two important principles: plaintiffs must demonstrate concrete, personal stakes to establish standing, and civil penalties accrue per unpermitted discharge—not per day a permit is absent. Finally, the decision validates rigorous case management in complex environmental litigation: present your liability case in the liability phase, or risk forfeiture.

For practitioners, the case speaks to preparation and precision: invest in high-quality hydrogeologic proof, tailor response activities closely to the alleged pathway, document concrete environmental interests for standing, and respect phased trial structures. For regulated entities, it is a reminder that stormwater discharges require permits—and that when discharges occur, the penalty meter runs on each event.

Unpublished though it is, the opinion will be persuasive reading in the Fourth Circuit and beyond for its meticulous synthesis of CERCLA causation, contribution, RCRA equitable relief, and CWA standing and penalty calculations.