Introduction

In this unpublished, per curiam decision from the Eleventh Circuit, the court affirms both the conviction and 63-month sentence of a defendant who pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The case squarely presents two issues that recur in the post-Bruen landscape and in federal sentencing practice:

• Whether Bruen and Rahimi abrogate Eleventh Circuit precedent upholding § 922(g)(1) against Second Amendment challenges; and
• Whether any potential error in applying a “firearm-in-connection” enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) requires remand when the district court announces it would impose the same sentence even without the enhancement and the sentence is substantively reasonable.

The panel holds that Rozier remains binding circuit law sustaining § 922(g)(1), and it applies the Eleventh Circuit’s harmless-error framework from United States v. Keene to uphold the sentence notwithstanding the disputed enhancement. Though unpublished, the opinion is a concise restatement of two controlling doctrines with significant practical consequences: the prior-panel-precedent rule and Keene’s two-part harmlessness inquiry for Guidelines errors.

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirms across the board. On the Second Amendment challenge, the panel concludes that United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010), which treats felon-in-possession prohibitions as “presumptively lawful” consistent with Heller, remains binding because neither New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen nor United States v. Rahimi “overrule[d] or abrogate[d]” Rozier. The court emphasizes the Eleventh Circuit’s strict prior-panel-precedent rule and relies on its recent published decision in United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025), which already rejected the argument that Bruen or Rahimi undermined Rozier to the point of abrogation.

On sentencing, although the defendant argued that Alabama “breaking and entering a vehicle” is not “burglary” for § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) purposes, the panel does not resolve that legal dispute. Instead, applying Keene, it holds that any Guidelines error was harmless because (1) the district court expressly stated it would have imposed the same 63-month sentence even if the enhancement did not apply, and (2) the alternative sentence would be substantively reasonable under the lower, defense-favored range (33–41 months), especially in light of the defendant’s extensive criminal history and the need for punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation.

Factual and Procedural Background

The facts are straightforward and undisputed. In Mobile, Alabama, Farrier broke into an unlocked, unoccupied car to steal items “because he needed the money.” He took a Glock 17 and a watch, later selling the watch but keeping the firearm. Police executing a search warrant the next day found the Glock and four loaded magazines in his bedroom. A grand jury indicted him on two counts under § 922(g)(1).

Farrier moved to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds. The district court denied the motion under Rozier. Farrier then pleaded guilty.

The presentence report applied a four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm “in connection with another felony offense”—here, identified as “burglary”—and calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 51–63 months. Farrier objected, arguing that “breaking and entering a vehicle” is not “burglary” under Alabama or federal law and that, without the enhancement, the proper range would be 33–41 months. The district court overruled the objection and imposed a 63-month sentence, emphasizing Farrier’s extensive criminal history, repeated vehicle break-ins, and the need for punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation. Crucially, the court stated it would impose the same sentence even if the Guidelines had been miscalculated.

Issues Presented

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under Bruen and Rahimi.
2. Whether the district court committed procedural error by applying the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement based on “burglary,” and, if so, whether the error affected the sentence.

Holdings

• Rozier remains binding precedent; Bruen and Rahimi do not abrogate it. Accordingly, § 922(g)(1) is constitutional in the Eleventh Circuit unless and until the Supreme Court or the en banc Eleventh Circuit says otherwise.
• Any error in applying § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) was harmless under Keene because the district court said it would impose the same sentence regardless, and that alternative sentence is substantively reasonable under the § 3553(a) factors even when using the defendant’s lower, preferred Guidelines range.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008): Heller recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms but noted that nothing in the opinion should be read to cast doubt on “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons,” describing such restrictions as “presumptively lawful.”
• United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010): The Eleventh Circuit relied on Heller to uphold § 922(g)(1) as constitutional, treating felon-in-possession bans as a permissible limit on the Second Amendment right for certain classes of people.
• New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): Bruen announced a text-and-history methodology for Second Amendment challenges. The government must justify modern firearms regulations by reference to the Nation’s historical tradition when the regulated conduct falls within the Amendment’s text.
• United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024): Applying Bruen’s framework to § 922(g)(8), the Court reiterated that analogical reasoning does not require a “dead ringer” historical twin to uphold modern regulations that comport with the underlying principles of the Second Amendment.
• United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025): Post-Bruen and post-Rahimi, Dubois held that neither decision abrogated Rozier; Rozier remains binding until the Supreme Court or the en banc court provides “clearer instruction.”
• United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2019); United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2008): These cases articulate the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule: a later Supreme Court or en banc Eleventh Circuit case must be “clearly on point” and directly conflict with the earlier panel decision to abrogate it. Mere tension is not enough.
• United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006): Establishes the Eleventh Circuit’s harmless-error approach to Guidelines mistakes. If the district court states it would impose the same sentence regardless, the appellate court assumes error, recomputes the range as the defendant argues, and then assesses whether the sentence would still be substantively reasonable.
• United States v. Grushko, 50 F.4th 1 (11th Cir. 2022): Reiterates the Keene methodology and the standard for substantive reasonableness review under § 3553(a).
• United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2020): Discusses deference to district courts’ weighing of § 3553(a) factors and the indicator of reasonableness when sentences are well below the statutory maximum.

Legal Reasoning

On the Second Amendment question, the court does not revisit the historical inquiry required by Bruen because it is constrained by the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule. Under that rule, Rozier remains binding unless a subsequent Supreme Court or en banc Eleventh Circuit decision is “clearly on point” and “actually abrogate[s] or directly conflict[s] with” Rozier. Bruen and Rahimi did not specifically address § 922(g)(1) or otherwise “demolish” Rozier’s foundations. Indeed, in Dubois the Eleventh Circuit already held that Rozier remains good law post-Bruen and post-Rahimi. That resolves Farrier’s constitutional challenge.

On sentencing, the panel eschews resolving the contested legal question whether Alabama “breaking and entering a vehicle” constitutes “burglary” for purposes of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Instead, it deploys Keene’s two-part harmlessness framework:

1. First, the district court made a clear statement that it would impose the same sentence “even if the guidelines were incorrectly calculated,” based on Farrier’s repeated criminal conduct. That satisfies Keene’s first component—knowledge that the outcome would be the same even assuming error.
2. Second, the panel assumes error, lowers the range to the defense-favored 33–41 months, and asks whether the 63-month sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors. It concludes that it is. The district court emphasized the seriousness of the offense, Farrier’s extensive and repetitive theft-related criminal history at a young age, and the goals of punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation. The court’s 22‑month upward variance was explained, and the sentence sits far below the statutory maximum term for § 922(g)(1).

Impact

The opinion reinforces two practical realities for litigants in the Eleventh Circuit:

• Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) remain foreclosed. Until the Supreme Court or the en banc Eleventh Circuit directly addresses the validity of felon-in-possession statutes under Bruen’s text-and-history test, Rozier and Dubois bind panels and district courts. Defendants cannot obtain relief by arguing that Bruen and Rahimi implicitly abrogate Rozier.
• Guidelines disputes may be rendered harmless by a properly articulated Keene statement and a record-supported explanation under § 3553(a). Sentencing judges who identify alternative outcomes and tether their reasoning to statutory factors place their sentences on substantially firmer appellate footing, even when a Guidelines enhancement is debatable.

The opinion does not decide whether “breaking and entering a vehicle” under Alabama law qualifies as “burglary” for § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), leaving that question for a future case in which harmlessness cannot carry the day. Still, the panel’s approach signals that defense challenges to enhancements should be coupled with robust substantive reasonableness arguments; otherwise, Keene often moots the asserted Guidelines error on appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Prior-panel-precedent rule: In the Eleventh Circuit, once a three-judge panel decides a legal question, later panels must follow it unless the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc issues a decision that directly contradicts and effectively overrules the earlier holding. It is not enough that later Supreme Court reasoning “undermines” or creates tension; the later case must be “clearly on point” and in direct conflict.
• Bruen’s test in brief: Courts first ask whether the regulated conduct falls within the Second Amendment’s text (“keep and bear Arms”). If it does, the government must justify the regulation by pointing to a relevant historical tradition of firearm regulation; a historically grounded analogue is sufficient even if not perfectly identical, per Rahimi.
• “Presumptively lawful”: Heller used this formulation to describe certain longstanding firearm restrictions—like felon-in-possession bans—that courts have generally understood to be compatible with the Second Amendment absent contrary Supreme Court instruction.
• Keene harmless-error framework: When a district court clearly states it would impose the same sentence even if a disputed Guidelines issue were resolved in the defendant’s favor, an appellate court can assume an error occurred, recalculate the range as the defendant urges, and then uphold the sentence if it is substantively reasonable under § 3553(a). This avoids unnecessary remands for Guidelines issues that did not affect the bottom-line sentence.
• Substantive reasonableness: Appellate review is deferential. The question is whether the sentence falls within the range of reasonable outcomes based on the statutory factors—such as offense seriousness, deterrence, protection of the public, and the defendant’s history and characteristics. A sentence substantially below the statutory maximum is an indicator (not a rule) of reasonableness.
• U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (“in connection with another felony offense”): This enhancement adds four levels if the firearm or ammunition was used or possessed in connection with another felony offense, including—under certain application notes—burglary. Whether a particular state offense qualifies as “burglary” or otherwise satisfies the “in connection with” requirement can be contested. The court did not reach that legal question here because of harmlessness.
• Statutory maximum context: For § 922(g)(1), Congress has set a maximum term of imprisonment; the panel notes the 63‑month sentence was well below the maximum. The gap between the imposed sentence and the statutory cap is a data point that can support substantive reasonableness.

Further Discussion

Why Bruen and Rahimi Don’t Abrogate Rozier in the Eleventh Circuit

Bruen altered the analytical framework for Second Amendment challenges but did not directly address the constitutionality of felon-in-possession laws. Rahimi addressed § 922(g)(8) and clarified how analogical reasoning operates under Bruen, but again did not take up § 922(g)(1). Under the Eleventh Circuit’s stringent prior-panel-precedent rule, the absence of direct Supreme Court conflict means Rozier remains binding. The panel underscores this by citing Dubois, a published decision that already resolved the precise abrogation argument advanced here, and by quoting Dubois’s insistence that later Supreme Court decisions must “demolish” and “eviscerate” each fundamental prop of the earlier case to dislodge it.

The upshot: As a matter of Eleventh Circuit law, district courts must deny Bruen-based challenges to § 922(g)(1) unless and until the Supreme Court or the en banc circuit says otherwise. Appellate panels are bound the same way.

Keene’s Two-Part Test Applied

The panel carefully walks through Keene’s dual inquiry:

• Knowledge prong: The district court’s express statement—“to the extent the guidelines were incorrectly calculated, [the court] would have departed or varied upwardly” and “would have imposed [the same] sentence”—is the paradigmatic Keene statement. It makes clear the sentencing outcome was not dependent on the enhancement dispute.
• Reasonableness prong: Assuming the defendant’s lower range (33–41 months), the court then reviews the 63-month upward variance for substantive reasonableness. The district court weighed the § 3553(a) factors, emphasized a troubling pattern of theft-related offenses at age 24, and explained why an elevated sentence was needed for punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation. The panel gives “due deference” to that weighing and notes the sentence sits far below the statutory maximum.

Importantly, the panel observes that district courts need not discuss every § 3553(a) factor individually; an acknowledgment of consideration suffices, provided the record shows a reasoned basis for the variance. That is consistent with Goldman and standard Eleventh Circuit practice.

What the Court Did Not Decide

The panel expressly avoided determining whether Alabama “breaking and entering a vehicle” counts as “burglary” for purposes of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Nor did it decide whether the enhancement could apply on some other “in connection with another felony offense” theory apart from “burglary.” Those legal questions remain open for future litigation where the sentencing outcome is not insulated by a Keene statement and a substantively reasonable alternative sentence.

Practical Implications

• For defendants: In the Eleventh Circuit, Bruen- and Rahimi-based challenges to § 922(g)(1) will be rejected under Rozier and Dubois. Preservation remains important for potential Supreme Court review, but relief in the Eleventh Circuit is unlikely absent en banc or Supreme Court action.
• For district judges: If a Guidelines enhancement is contested, consider articulating an alternative, identical sentence with clear § 3553(a) reasoning. A robust Keene statement, tied to the defendant’s history and the statutory purposes of sentencing, can render potential Guidelines errors harmless on appeal.
• For defense counsel at sentencing: Do not rely solely on technical Guidelines objections. Develop a comprehensive § 3553(a) presentation and preemptively challenge the sufficiency of any prospective alternative-sentence explanation. If a Keene statement is made, the battleground shifts to substantive reasonableness.
• For the government: Emphasize the defendant’s criminal history, offense pattern, and risk of recidivism when urging an alternative sentence. Demonstrate why the same sentence would be imposed even under the defense’s preferred range.
• For future cases: The unresolved scope of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) in the vehicle break-in context may return in a case where the alternative sentence is absent or inadequately justified. Parties should be prepared to brief both the “burglary” question and the broader “in connection with another felony offense” standard.

Conclusion

United States v. Farrier reinforces two settled pillars of Eleventh Circuit law. First, Rozier’s validation of § 922(g)(1) survives Bruen and Rahimi; absent controlling abrogation by the Supreme Court or the en banc Eleventh Circuit, felon-in-possession convictions remain constitutional within this circuit. Second, Keene’s harmless-error framework continues to play a decisive role in sentencing appeals: when a district court explicitly announces it would impose the same sentence even if a disputed enhancement were disallowed, and adequately explains that sentence under § 3553(a), appellate courts will affirm without resolving the underlying Guidelines question.

The opinion thus offers clear guidance: litigants should calibrate their Second Amendment and sentencing strategies accordingly, and district courts should anchor any alternative sentencing rationales in the statutory factors to withstand appellate scrutiny. While unpublished, the decision faithfully applies—and thereby underscores—the binding, published doctrines that govern these recurring issues.