No Bright-Line “Interior Access” Requirement: Colorado Clarifies Trunk Searches Under the Automobile Exception in People v. Furness

Introduction

In People v. Furness, 2025 CO 16, the Colorado Supreme Court resolved a recurrent suppression issue: when does probable cause justify a warrantless search of a vehicle’s trunk under the automobile exception? Reversing a district court’s suppression order, the Court held that officers had probable cause to search the trunk of a Lexus for a handgun used in a nearby shooting. Crucially, the Court rejected the district court’s bright-line focus on whether the trunk was accessible from the car’s passenger compartment. Instead, it reaffirmed that trunk searches turn on the totality of the circumstances and on whether there is a fair probability that evidence will be found there—even if access could have been achieved from outside the car (for example, through open windows), and even without definitive proof that the vehicle was unlocked at every moment.

The decision clarifies Colorado law in a practical way: the scope of a warrantless automobile search is defined by the object of the search and the places where evidence may reasonably be found, and courts must avoid mechanistic “accessibility” tests that slice facts into isolated components. The opinion will influence how trial courts evaluate trunk-specific probable cause and how officers document fact patterns surrounding urgent investigations, especially where firearms are involved.

Case Background and Procedural History

Late at night on August 26, 2022, Arapahoe County deputies responded to gunshots near the Green Tree Hotel in Centennial. Deputies encountered two men by a dark-colored Lexus sedan; one was identified as the defendant, Sheron Mario Furness. According to Furness, he observed a white male across the street fire a shot and flee. The deputies noted both front windows of the Lexus had been down when they first made contact, and that Furness said he could not find his keys. Keys were soon discovered in the grassy area where Furness said the shooter had been; the keys were confirmed to belong to the Lexus and returned to Furness. A flashlight scan of the vehicle revealed what appeared to be a gun case on the back seat and an empty Fireball whiskey bottle on the driver’s seat. Officers learned Furness was subject to a protection order that prohibited alcohol possession/consumption; they arrested him on that violation based on his admission that he had been drinking.

Meanwhile, a witness at the neighboring Quality Hotel described the shooter as a Black male wearing a black shirt who was associated with a dark Mercedes or Lexus with tinted windows and whose first name was “Sheron.” The witness positively identified Furness in a show-up as the shooter. Officers then searched the Lexus for evidence of the shooting and protection order violations. In the passenger area they recovered baggies containing 12.9 grams of cocaine and 0.8 grams of methamphetamine and found an empty magazine inside the gun case. In the trunk, they found a Taurus 9mm handgun, ammunition, cash, and a scale with white powder residue. The handgun had an 11/15 magazine with a round in the chamber and the hammer cocked back.

The State charged Furness with multiple offenses, including possession with intent to distribute, prohibited use of a weapon, disorderly conduct, and violation of a protection order. Furness moved to suppress all evidence found in the trunk, arguing officers lacked trunk-specific probable cause. The district court agreed in part: it allowed the passenger-compartment evidence (plain view of a gun case and alcohol supported some search), but suppressed the trunk evidence because there was no interior access to the trunk (the car was not a hatchback), and because the quantity of narcotics and presence of alcohol did not justify expanding the search to the trunk.

The People filed an interlocutory appeal under C.A.R. 4.1. The Colorado Supreme Court took the case en banc and reversed.

Summary of the Opinion

The Colorado Supreme Court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, officers had probable cause to believe the trunk contained evidence of a crime (the gun used in the shooting). The Court emphasized:

Probable cause is a practical, common-sense inquiry that rejects rigid rules and bright-line tests.
The automobile exception authorizes a warrantless search of any part of the vehicle—including the trunk—that may conceal the object of the search, if officers have probable cause.
Trunk-specific probable cause does not depend on interior access from the passenger compartment; access from outside the vehicle may be reasonably inferred from facts such as open windows and the suspect’s position at the trunk.

Applying these principles, the Court found that multiple facts—Furness’s presence at the scene, his proximity to the trunk, his missing keys found where he said he saw the shooter, his repeated insistence there was no gun in the car, the visible gun case, the absence of evidence the vehicle was locked (and the ability to unlock it by reaching through the open windows if it was), the witness identification, and the failure to find the gun elsewhere—together created a fair probability that the gun would be in the trunk. The suppression order was reversed and the case remanded.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities

The Court’s reasoning is grounded in a long line of federal and Colorado cases:

Katz v. United States: Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless an exception applies.
Mapp v. Ohio; Weeks; Wolf: Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is subject to exclusion.
United States v. Ross; California v. Acevedo: If probable cause justifies the search of a vehicle, officers may search “every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search,” including the trunk and containers within it.
Maryland v. Dyson; People v. Allen: The automobile exception has no separate exigency requirement; if a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists, a warrantless search is permitted.
Florida v. Harris; Illinois v. Gates; Brinegar v. United States: Probable cause is a practical, non-technical, totality-of-the-circumstances standard; it deals with probabilities, not certainties, and rejects rigid formulas.
Maryland v. Pringle; Grassi v. People: Courts err when they assess facts in isolation rather than in combination.
People v. Zuniga; People v. Cox; People v. Haggart: Colorado cases applying the automobile exception and approving trunk searches where probable cause supports them; Zuniga also underscores that probable cause is assessed by the totality of the circumstances and can overcome privacy expectations in areas like trunks and glove compartments.
People v. Bailey; Mendez v. People: Defining probable cause and reiterating the totality standard in Colorado.
People v. Brown; People v. Chavez-Barragan; People v. Kutlak; C.A.R. 4.1 and § 16-12-102(2), C.R.S.: Jurisdiction, standards of review, and the Court’s ability to independently review audiovisual records.

These authorities collectively answer two questions at the heart of Furness: (1) when officers may search trunks under the automobile exception; and (2) how courts should conceptualize “probable cause” in applying that exception. The Court’s citations to Ross and Acevedo are particularly significant because they eliminate any categorical line between cabin and trunk when the object of the search could reasonably be concealed there, while its citations to Harris and Gates repudiate the district court’s mechanistic “interior access” approach.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court followed a disciplined path:

Jurisdiction and Review. Under § 16-12-102(2) and C.A.R. 4.1, the State properly certified that the appeal was not for delay and that the suppressed evidence was substantial. Suppression orders present mixed questions; the Court accepts factual findings supported by competent evidence but reviews legal conclusions de novo.
Automobile Exception and Scope. The automobile exception permits warrantless searches when officers have probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of a crime; no separate exigency is required. The scope is defined by the object sought and where it may reasonably be found. Thus, when the object is a handgun, the trunk is plainly a place that can conceal it.
Probable Cause Standard. Probable cause turns on the totality of the circumstances; it is a practical assessment of probabilities, not certainties. Courts must avoid bright-line tests and refrain from evaluating facts in isolation.
Application to the Trunk. The district court erred by premising its analysis on interior inaccessibility and by assuming the car was locked. On this record, officers could reasonably infer trunk access from outside the car (through open windows to unlock the vehicle) and from Furness’s position at the trunk immediately following the shots. With the object of the search being the gun, the combination of facts yielded a fair probability that the gun would be in the trunk.

Application to the Facts: Why Probable Cause Extended to the Trunk

The Court enumerated the facts that, considered together, supported trunk-specific probable cause:

Furness was on scene moments after shots were heard.
He was standing near the trunk and said he could not find his keys.
His keys were recovered in the same grassy area where he said he saw the shooter.
He repeatedly asserted there was no gun in the car, while officers could see a gun case on the back seat.
There was no record evidence that the car was locked when officers first arrived; both front windows had been down. Even if locked, Furness could have reached in to unlock the door and access the trunk before officers arrived.
A witness identified Furness as the shooter based on matching first name, appearance, and vehicle description.
The gun was not found elsewhere in the car before the trunk search.

Given those facts, officers had a fair probability that the trunk would hold the handgun. The district court’s contrary conclusion—hinged on a lack of interior access—was contrary to the governing totality standard and to Ross’s scope rule.

Why the District Court’s Approach Misapplied the Law

The district court’s analysis turned on two premises that the Supreme Court rejected:

Interior-Access Premise. The lower court treated trunk access from the cabin (or the lack thereof) as dispositive. But under Ross and Acevedo, the question is whether the trunk is a place where the object of the search may reasonably be concealed, given the totality of the circumstances—not whether the occupant could move items into the trunk solely from within the cabin.
Locked-Vehicle Assumption. The district court assumed the vehicle was locked and that Furness therefore lacked access to the trunk before contact. The Supreme Court observed there was no evidence the car was locked when officers arrived; both front windows were down. Even if it had been locked, officers could reasonably infer access via the open windows before officers arrived. The later fact that the windows were up—after the keys were returned—did not negate earlier reasonable inferences.

In short, the district court evaluated individual facts in isolation and adopted a mechanistic test that the Supreme Court’s precedents reject.

Impact and Future Application

This opinion meaningfully guides Colorado courts and law enforcement:

No “interior access” prerequisite. Trial courts should not condition trunk searches on proof that an occupant could access the trunk from inside the car. Reasonable inferences about exterior access matter.
Trunk-specific probable cause remains required. The decision does not authorize automatic trunk searches. Officers must articulate facts—considered together—that make it fairly probable evidence will be in the trunk. The object of the search must be capable of being concealed there.
Documentation of circumstantial access facts. Officers should carefully document details such as window position, suspect location in relation to the trunk, key possession or recovery, statements about weapons, witness identifications, and unsuccessful searches of other areas. Such facts, in aggregate, may support trunk probable cause.
Defense strategy. Defendants will focus on undercutting inferences of access (e.g., locked vehicle with no means to unlock, lack of proximity to trunk, unreliable or non-specific identifications) and distinguishing visible items (e.g., an empty gun case) that do not reasonably imply a weapon in the trunk.
Alignment with federal doctrine. The opinion aligns Colorado practice with Ross and Acevedo’s scope rules and Harris/Gates’s totality standard, reinforcing that state doctrine tracks federal constitutional law in this domain.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Automobile exception. A rule that lets police search a vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe it contains evidence of a crime. The car’s mobility and reduced privacy expectations justify the exception.
Probable cause. Not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It’s a common-sense judgment that there’s a fair chance evidence is in a particular place, based on all relevant facts taken together.
Scope of the search. The “where” of a vehicle search depends on the “what” officers are looking for. If searching for a gun, places that could hide a gun—including the trunk—are in play when probable cause exists.
Totality of the circumstances. Courts consider the whole picture, not isolated facts. No single fact must carry the day; the cumulative weight of multiple facts can establish probable cause.
Show-up identification. A witness is asked to identify a suspect shortly after an event, often at or near the scene. While not always as reliable as formal lineups, a prompt, specific show-up can support probable cause.
Plain view. If officers lawfully observe incriminating items in plain view (like a gun case on a back seat), those observations can contribute to probable cause for a broader search consistent with the object sought.

What the Decision Does and Does Not Do

It does confirm that a trunk can be searched without a warrant when the totality of circumstances indicates a fair probability that evidence (here, a gun) is inside.
It does reject any rigid requirement that officers prove interior access in order to justify a trunk search.
It does not authorize routine trunk searches anytime contraband is found in the passenger compartment; there must still be trunk-specific probable cause tied to the object of the search.
It does not create a new exception to the warrant requirement; it clarifies application of the existing automobile exception.

Key Takeaways

Under Ross and Acevedo, once probable cause exists to search for a specific item, officers may search every part of the vehicle that can conceal it—including the trunk.
Probable cause is assessed by the totality of the circumstances; courts should avoid bright-line tests such as an “interior access” prerequisite.
Facts supporting exterior access (open windows, suspect near trunk, keys recovered nearby) can reasonably support trunk-specific probable cause.
Witness identifications, visible containers (e.g., gun cases), suspect statements, and the absence of evidence elsewhere in the car can collectively establish a fair probability that evidence is in the trunk.
The decision strengthens the practical application of the automobile exception in Colorado and guides both officers and courts to articulate and assess cumulative facts, not isolated details.

Conclusion

People v. Furness solidifies two connected principles in Colorado search-and-seizure law. First, the object of the search defines its scope for purposes of the automobile exception, and when the object could be concealed in the trunk, the trunk is search-eligible if probable cause exists. Second, probable cause is a holistic, common-sense judgment that rejects rigid “interior access” rules. By reversing the suppression order, the Colorado Supreme Court refocused trunk-search analysis where it belongs: on the totality of the circumstances and on whether those circumstances make it fairly probable that evidence will be found in the trunk. The opinion thus aligns state practice with enduring federal precedents and provides concrete guidance for the inevitable, fast-moving fact patterns that arise in vehicle-based investigations.