No Bright-Line Job Threshold: Sixth Circuit Reaffirms Fact-Specific Determination of “Significant Number” in Disability Benefits Analysis

Introduction

This commentary examines the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Jaime B. Norris v. Commissioner of Social Security (No. 24-3930, decided June 3, 2025). In this appeal, Jaime Norris challenged the denial of his application for Social Security Disability benefits and Supplemental Security Income. The key legal issue on appeal was whether the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) properly concluded at step five of the sequential evaluation that a “significant number” of jobs (18,800) exist in the national economy that Norris could perform. Norris contended that Sixth Circuit precedent misapplied the “significant number” inquiry and urged a percentage-based test or a bright-line job threshold. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, underscoring that (1) there is no categorical minimum number of jobs, (2) vocational expert testimony may constitute substantial evidence, and (3) panels may not overrule prior panel decisions absent en banc review or intervening Supreme Court authority.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion, authored by Judge Cole, affirmed the ALJ’s and district court’s decisions. Applying 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and the “substantial evidence” standard, the court held:

The fact-specific “significant number” inquiry under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)–404.1566(c) does not require a fixed numerical floor. Taskila v. Commissioner (819 F.3d 902) and Nejat v. Commissioner (359 F. App’x 574) did not announce any bright-line national job threshold.
Biestek v. Berryhill (587 U.S. 97) confirms that vocational expert testimony—as long as it is reliable and consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles—can amount to substantial evidence of job availability.
The ALJ properly relied on vocational expert testimony that 18,800 sedentary-level jobs exist nationally for a hypothetical person with Norris’s age, education, work history, and residual functional capacity (RFC).
Norris’s arguments to adopt a percentage-based test or to overrule Taskila were forfeited or barred by Sixth Circuit rule: published panel opinions are binding unless overturned en banc.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Taskila v. Commissioner (819 F.3d 902, 905–06): Emphasized that the “significant number” inquiry is fact-specific and reviewed for substantial evidence, without setting a numerical benchmark.
Nejat v. Commissioner (359 F. App’x 574): Similarly considered local and regional data but did not fix a national jobs floor.
Biestek v. Berryhill (587 U.S. 97): Held that reliable vocational expert testimony can constitute substantial evidence of job availability.
Hall v. Bowen (837 F.2d 272, 275): Formulated the principle that no one “magic number” defines a significant number of jobs; calls for a case-by-case inquiry.
Other Sixth Circuit precedents on standard of review and burden of proof, including Hargett v. Commissioner (964 F.3d 546), Wilson v. Commissioner (378 F.3d 541), Foster v. Halter (279 F.3d 348), and Elam ex rel. Golay v. Commissioner (348 F.3d 124).

2. Legal Reasoning

The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning unfolds in three steps:

No Categorical Threshold: The court reaffirmed that neither Taskila nor Nejat established a minimum national jobs figure. The “significant number” determination remains a fact-specific exercise, examining whether a reasonable mind would accept the vocational expert’s testimony as substantial evidence.
Burdens and Substantial Evidence: The Commissioner bears the burden at step five to show the claimant can adjust to other work. Vocational expert testimony that identifies specific jobs and quantifies their availability in the national economy can satisfy that burden if it is consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and credible.
Panel Precedent and Biestek: Norris may not overrule Taskila without en banc review or an intervening Supreme Court decision. Biestek did not impose a numerical floor; it simply confirmed that vocational expert evidence can be substantial.

3. Impact

Future Disabilities Claims: Claimants cannot challenge a “significant number” finding simply by arguing that the raw number of jobs is low—so long as vocational expert testimony is credible and tailored to the claimant’s RFC.
Pleadings and Advocacy: Appellants must timely raise all legal theories before the ALJ and Appeals Council. Arguments first raised on appeal or that seek to overrule binding panel precedent are unlikely to succeed.
Regulatory Clarity: This decision confirms the absence of regulatory or judicially mandated bright-line job totals, reinforcing the Supreme Court’s guidance that “substantial evidence” is evidence a reasonable mind might accept.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Step Five of the Sequential Evaluation: After determining that the claimant cannot perform past relevant work, the ALJ assesses whether the claimant can adjust to any other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy.
Residual Functional Capacity (RFC): An ALJ must formulate the claimant’s RFC—the most the claimant can do despite physical and mental limitations—and use that RFC to identify suitable jobs.
Substantial Evidence Standard: More than a “mere scintilla” of evidence; evidence a reasonable mind might accept in support of the ALJ’s conclusion.
Vocational Expert Testimony: A qualified professional may testify, based on training and experience, how many jobs a hypothetical person with a particular RFC could perform nationwide.
Panel Precedent Rule: Published Sixth Circuit panel decisions bind later panels unless overruled en banc or superseded by the Supreme Court.

Conclusion

Jaime Norris v. Commissioner reaffirms that at step five of the Social Security disability analysis, the determination of whether a “significant number” of jobs exists in the national economy is an inherently fact-specific inquiry. The decision clarifies that:

No fixed numerical threshold governs the “significant number” test.
Vocational expert testimony quantifying job availability—when reliable and consistent with standard references—can constitute substantial evidence.
Appellants must raise new legal theories before the ALJ or face forfeiture, and panels cannot overrule prior published decisions without en banc review.

This ruling provides practitioners and claimants with clarity on the bounds of step-five review, emphasizing reliance on vocational expert evidence and the continued vitality of fact-specific adjudication in the absence of any bright-line rule.