No Bright-Line 30-Day Rule and Pre-Enforcement Standing for Training-Arrest Threats: The Second Circuit’s Post-Bruen Roadmap in Giambalvo v. Suffolk County

Introduction

In Giambalvo v. Suffolk County, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed, in the wake of Bruen, an array of facial Second Amendment challenges to New York’s Concealed Carry Improvement Act (CCIA) and to how the Suffolk County Police Department (SCPD) administers that licensing regime. The plaintiffs included four Suffolk County residents seeking handgun licenses (the “Applicants”), a licensee challenging restrictions (McGregor), and a firearms instructor and his company (the “Instructors”).

The case presents three clusters of issues:

Whether Applicants have standing to challenge CCIA application requirements without completing the process, and whether those provisions are likely unconstitutional on their face.
Whether Applicants can challenge SCPD’s multi-year delays in processing, and if the Second Amendment imposes a bright-line 30-day adjudication rule.
Whether plaintiffs can bring a pre-enforcement challenge to an alleged SCPD “Arrest Policy” threatening arrests of unlicensed trainees attending the CCIA-mandated live-fire training notwithstanding a state-law exemption.

The district court denied a preliminary injunction, mainly on standing grounds. The Second Circuit affirms in part, vacates in part, and remands, clarifying standing doctrines, rejecting a categorical 30-day constitutional deadline, treating the CCIA training requirement as presumptively valid at this stage, and recognizing pre-enforcement standing to challenge the alleged Arrest Policy based on statements attributed to the SCPD Pistol Licensing Bureau’s commanding officer.

Summary of the Opinion

Standing to challenge CCIA application requirements: The Applicants have standing to facially challenge components of the application process without completing it. Their injury flows from deterrence by the process itself, not only from ineligibility or refusal.
Merits of CCIA provisions: The court affirms denial of a preliminary injunction (no clear likelihood of success) for:
- Good moral character requirement (§ 400.00(1)(b));
- Family/cohabitant disclosure (§ 400.00(1)(o)(i));
- Catch-all disclosure (§ 400.00(1)(o)(v))—following Antonyuk II;
- Character references (§ 400.00(1)(o)(ii));
- In-person interview (§ 400.00(1)(o));
- 18-hour training, including 2 hours live fire (§ 400.00(1)(o)(iii)).
Social media disclosure (§ 400.00(1)(o)(iv)): Plaintiffs’ request is moot because the State is preliminarily enjoined from enforcing this provision in separate litigation (Antonyuk), and there is no indication Suffolk County is enforcing it. The SCPD’s current questionnaire no longer requests social media handles.
Processing delays: Applicants have standing to challenge SCPD’s lengthy timeline, but are unlikely to succeed on a facial theory that any process exceeding 30 days violates the Second Amendment. The court expressly declines to adopt a constitutional bright-line 30-day rule, though it flags multi-year waits as the kind of “lengthy wait times” Bruen warned could effectively deny the right.
Alleged Arrest Policy (training arrests): At least one plaintiff (Giambalvo) has pre-enforcement standing based on statements by the commanding officer of the SCPD Pistol Licensing Bureau that SCPD would arrest any unlicensed person handling a pistol during live-fire training despite the statutory exemption. The court vacates the denial of a preliminary injunction on standing grounds and remands, leaving merits for later development. County defendants are proper parties for injunctive relief against arrests (as distinct from prosecution by district attorneys).
Dispositive posture: AFFIRMED in part (denial of preliminary injunction as to CCIA provisions and 30-day rule), VACATED in part (Arrest Policy standing), and REMANDED.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (597 U.S. 1 (2022)): Supplies the controlling two-step framework: (1) whether the Second Amendment’s text covers the conduct; (2) if so, whether the regulation accords with the Nation’s historical tradition. Bruen also preserved the presumptive validity of non-discretionary “shall-issue” licensing regimes and cautioned that “lengthy wait times” and “exorbitant fees” could be abusive.
District of Columbia v. Heller (554 U.S. 570 (2008)): Recognized individual right; noted the presumptive lawfulness of certain regulatory conditions, including on commercial sale—cited to situate training and licensing conditions within permissible regulatory space.
United States v. Rahimi (602 U.S. 680 (2024)): Elaborates Bruen’s “how and why” analogical analysis; supports that close historical twins are not required, only regulations “relevantly similar.”
Antonyuk v. James (Antonyuk II) (120 F.4th 941 (2d Cir. 2024), cert. denied):
- Standing: A plaintiff challenging a component of the application process is injured by the application itself if reasonably deterred, even absent application completion. The panel applies that here to reverse the district court’s standing ruling.
- Merits: Antonyuk II rejected facial challenges to CCIA’s “good moral character,” cohabitant disclosure, and catch-all disclosure; found the social media disclosure likely unconstitutional and preliminarily enjoined the State. The panel adopts Antonyuk II’s merits assessments for identical provisions.
- Preliminary-injunction decisions: The panel notes that well-considered published appellate rulings on pure issues of law, even in the preliminary posture, are binding precedent.
Antonyuk v. Chiumento (Antonyuk I) (89 F.4th 271 (2d Cir. 2023), cert. granted, judgment vacated; reinstated in part by Antonyuk II): Skeptical that a 30-day review period is per se unconstitutional; aligns with Bruen’s focus on “lengthy” delays.
Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. v. Moore (116 F.4th 211 (4th Cir. 2024) (en banc)): Cited to note the general presumption that shall-issue laws are constitutional; also contrasts with a vacated panel view that 30-day delays are per se unconstitutional.
Kwong v. Bloomberg (723 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2013)): Upheld a $340 handgun licensing fee; used here to calibrate “exorbitant fees” and show that a $400 private training cost is unlikely facially unconstitutional.
TransUnion v. Ramirez (594 U.S. 413 (2021)); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (504 U.S. 555 (1992)): Core standing principles—concrete, particularized, actual or imminent injury; traceability; redressability.
Knife Rights, Inc. v. Vance (802 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 2015)); Cerame v. Slack (123 F.4th 72 (2d Cir. 2024)); Vitagliano v. County of Westchester (71 F.4th 130 (2d Cir. 2023)): Pre-enforcement standing and “credible threat” analysis—recent laws, absence of disavowal, and plaintiff’s intended conduct inform a low-threshold, forgiving standard.
Winter v. NRDC (555 U.S. 7 (2008)); Central Rabbinical (763 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2014)); Sussman v. Crawford (488 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007)): Preliminary injunction standards; heightened likelihood-of-success requirement for government action in the public interest.
Vives v. City of New York (524 F.3d 346 (2d Cir. 2008)); Los Angeles v. Humphries (562 U.S. 29 (2010)); Vincent v. Yelich (718 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2013)): Monell limits on municipal liability, including for prospective relief; qualified immunity does not bar declaratory or injunctive relief against individual officials.
We the Patriots, Inc. v. Grisham (119 F.4th 1253 (10th Cir. 2024)); Martin-Trigona v. Shiff (702 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1983)); United States v. Sanchez-Gomez (584 U.S. 381 (2018)): Mootness when identical relief has already issued elsewhere and no reasonable expectation of recurrence.
Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions (202 F.3d 573 (2d Cir. 2000)): Appellate court may affirm on any ground supported by the record, even if not relied on below.

Legal Reasoning by Issue

1) Standing to challenge CCIA application requirements without completing the process

The district court relied on Decastro to hold that failure to apply defeats standing. The Second Circuit explains Decastro governs challenges to rules limiting eligibility—not challenges to components of the application process. Applying Antonyuk II, the injury here “flows from the application itself” if the plaintiffs are reasonably deterred. Because the Applicants credibly alleged that the interview backlog and the challenged disclosures deterred them from proceeding, they have injury-in-fact traceable to the enforcement of those provisions, redressable by an injunction. Standing is established at the preliminary stage through affidavits taken as true.

2) Merits of specific CCIA provisions

Good moral character (§ 400.00(1)(b)); cohabitant disclosure (§ 400.00(1)(o)(i)); catch-all disclosure (§ 400.00(1)(o)(v)): Plaintiffs did not augment the historical record beyond that analyzed in Antonyuk II. The court adopts Antonyuk II’s thorough evaluation and holds plaintiffs have not shown a clear or substantial likelihood of success on their facial challenges at this stage.
Character references (§ 400.00(1)(o)(ii)): Requiring references is “tantamount” to cohabitant disclosure—both modest disclosures aiding the permissible investigation of dangerousness. The State offered historical analogues including reputation-based restrictions and reference requirements. Plaintiffs’ underdeveloped attempt to attack the specific attestation language was forfeited (raised only in a footnote). No preliminary injunction.
In-person interview (§ 400.00(1)(o)): Historically analogous measures existed where individuals had to appear to take loyalty oaths or to permit officials to assess dangerousness. The “how and why” of the interview—face-to-face assessment for safety—aligns with those analogues. No preliminary injunction.
Social media disclosure (§ 400.00(1)(o)(iv)): Antonyuk II affirmed a preliminary injunction against the State enforcing this requirement, rendering the same request here moot. There is no indication Suffolk is enforcing it; the SCPD questionnaire omits social media fields. Any injunction here would have no real-world effect.
18-hour training (including 2 hours live-fire) (§ 400.00(1)(o)(iii)): Bruen and Heller contemplate training as a feature of presumptively constitutional shall-issue regimes designed to ensure that carriers are law-abiding and responsible. Plaintiffs offered no persuasive basis to overcome this presumption on a facial basis. Their principal cost argument fails at this stage: a $400 course (often privately priced) is not facially “exorbitant,” and Kwong’s approval of a $340 license fee (inflation-adjusted) undercuts that claim. Plaintiffs have not shown that all training options impose unconstitutional burdens, so a facial challenge fails.

3) Licensing delays: standing and merits

Standing exists: multi-year delays themselves can be concrete injuries under Bruen because they can effectively deny public carry. The injury is traceable to SCPD’s scheduling and intake practices, which, according to affidavits, entail 1–3 year waits before even starting the state PPB-3 clock. Redressability follows from potential injunctive relief directing faster processing.

On the merits, however, plaintiffs sought a categorical order mandating decisions within 30 days. The Second Circuit rejects any bright-line 30-day constitutional rule. Bruen speaks to “lengthy” waits; short administrative delays are compatible with presumptively valid shall-issue regimes. The court flags that 2–3 years likely qualify as “lengthy,” leaving room for future as-applied challenges. But the facial claim that anything beyond 30 days is unconstitutional is unlikely to succeed. Thus, no preliminary injunction in the categorical form plaintiffs requested.

4) The alleged SCPD “Arrest Policy” and pre-enforcement standing

State law exempts unlicensed applicants from criminal liability while undergoing CCIA live-fire training under a duly authorized instructor (Penal Law § 265.20(a)(3-a)). Plaintiffs alleged that the SCPD Pistol Licensing Bureau’s commanding officer told the Instructor that SCPD would arrest anyone handling a pistol without a pistol permit and would not honor the statutory training exception.

Taking uncontroverted affidavits as true at this stage, and considering the low-threshold “credible threat” standard, the court holds at least one plaintiff (Giambalvo) has standing: he intends to take the course as an unlicensed applicant, and a senior official’s statements create a credible threat of arrest. The district court erred by discounting those sworn statements as “stray comments”; their source and specificity support the threat’s credibility. The record lacks any disavowal of enforcement. The panel vacates the standing ruling and remands for further proceedings; with a fuller record, the district court may reassess standing and then the merits.

Importantly, the County defendants are proper parties for injunctive relief against arrests (distinct from prosecutions by state-acting district attorneys). The panel also reiterates that qualified immunity does not bar injunctive relief against individual officials.

A Note on Preliminary Appellate Holdings as Binding Law

The court underscores that while preliminary injunction decisions generally do not fix facts for trial, a “fully considered appellate ruling on an issue of law” announced in a published preliminary-injunction opinion can bind subsequent proceedings on that legal point. This gives Antonyuk II’s legal conclusions real precedential force within the Circuit on pure questions of law.

Impact

Standing landscape clarified: Applicants deterred by licensing process components need not complete the process to sue; credible pre-enforcement threats can arise from senior officials’ statements, especially absent any disavowal.
Licensing timelines: The Second Amendment does not impose a categorical 30-day adjudication rule. Agencies should nevertheless expect scrutiny of multi-year waits as potentially “lengthy” under Bruen. Plaintiffs are likely to shift to targeted as-applied challenges supported by concrete processing records.
Training and instruction: The CCIA’s training mandate remains in effect pending further litigation. The opinion affirms training as a presumptively valid feature of shall-issue regimes. Instructors and applicants should monitor the remand on the Arrest Policy; an injunction could clarify that unlicensed trainees cannot be arrested for supervised live-fire training protected by statute.
Disclosure requirements: Character references and in-person interviews remain enforceable, reinforcing a view that modest disclosures facilitating evaluations of dangerousness comport with historical analogues.
Social media disclosure: The Second Circuit treats statewide preliminary injunctions as mooting duplicative relief in other cases when nothing suggests local enforcement continues. Parties should assess whether an existing injunction elsewhere obviates the need for parallel relief.
Proper defendants and remedies: Municipalities may be constrained by Monell when implementing mandatory state laws; however, individual local officials can be enjoined from enforcing unconstitutional statutes, and qualified immunity does not bar injunctive relief. For arrest-focused relief (as opposed to prosecution), county police officials are proper defendants.
Historical-method guidance: The panel reiterates Antonyuk II’s cautions: do not overread “historical silence,” do not demand numerosity of analogues, and consider both 1791 and 1868 as focal points for state-law tradition, with attention to “how and why” the regulation burdens the right.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Facial vs. as-applied challenge: A facial challenge argues a law is unconstitutional in all its applications; it is harder to win. An as-applied challenge targets the law’s operation under specific facts or to specific plaintiffs.
Standing: To sue, plaintiffs must show a concrete, imminent injury caused by the defendant and likely redressable by the court. In licensing, deterrence by the process itself can be an injury. In pre-enforcement suits, a “credible threat” of enforcement suffices.
Pre-enforcement “credible threat”: Courts ask: Does the plaintiff plan to engage in arguably protected conduct, does the law prohibit it, and is there a realistic threat of enforcement? Recent laws, official statements, lack of disavowal, and targeted locations matter; prior prosecutions are not required.
Mootness: Courts cannot issue relief that has no real-world effect. If another binding injunction already prevents enforcement, a duplicative injunction may be moot absent a concrete prospect of renewed enforcement against the plaintiff.
Shall-issue regimes and training: Non-discretionary licensing systems that confirm objective qualifications (e.g., background checks, training) are presumptively constitutional. Plaintiffs must show abusive features, like truly “exorbitant” fees or “lengthy” waits.
“Lengthy wait times” (Bruen): The Constitution does not forbid all delay. “Lengthy” waits that effectively deny the right are suspect. Short or reasonable administrative timeframes are generally permissible.
Monell and qualified immunity (remedies): Municipal liability for damages or injunctions requires a municipal policy/custom. Even if municipalities are constrained, individual officials can be enjoined, and qualified immunity does not shield against injunctive or declaratory relief.
Binding effect of preliminary appellate decisions: A published, well-reasoned appellate decision on a pure question of law can bind later stages, even if issued at the preliminary injunction stage.

Conclusion

Giambalvo charts a careful, post-Bruen path through licensing challenges. The Second Circuit holds that applicants deterred by the application process can sue, but their facial attacks on core CCIA requirements—good moral character, modest disclosures, interviews, and training—are unlikely to succeed on the present record. The court refuses to constitutionalize a 30-day adjudication rule while admonishing that multi-year delays may be actionable as applied. It treats an existing statewide injunction as mooting duplicative social-media disclosure relief. And it recognizes pre-enforcement standing against the SCPD’s alleged Arrest Policy where a commanding officer’s statements plausibly forecast arrests contrary to the training exemption.

For litigants, the opinion delivers practical guidance: pick the right defendants; develop proof of actual processing timelines and costs; expect courts to respect training and objective screening in shall-issue systems; and build credible-threat records using authoritative statements or the absence of disavowal. For licensing authorities, it affirms the constitutionality of modest, relevance-based vetting, but signals that extraordinary administrative backlogs and enforcement positions that ignore statutory exemptions will invite—and may sustain—constitutional scrutiny.