No Bona Fide Doubt, No Hearing: Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms Trial-Court Discretion to Decline Mid‑Trial Competency Re‑Evaluation and to Impose an Upward § 3553(a) Variance

Case: United States v. Xiaoqin Yan

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Date: November 7, 2025

Disposition: Affirmed (Non-Argument Calendar; Not for Publication)

Panel: Jordan, Luck, and Tjoflat, Circuit Judges (per curiam)

Note: Unpublished Eleventh Circuit decisions are not binding but may be cited as persuasive authority (see 11th Cir. R. 36-2).

Introduction

In this unpublished per curiam decision, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed two core rulings by the Middle District of Alabama in the prosecution of Xiaoqin Yan for arson and possession of a firearm by an unlawful alien. First, it upheld the district court’s refusal to revisit its pretrial competency finding or to halt the proceedings for a mid-trial mental evaluation despite the defendant’s disruptive conduct. Second, it sustained a significant upward variance—102 months’ imprisonment—above a Guidelines range of 60–71 months.

The case presents two recurrent trial and sentencing questions: (1) when must a trial court interrupt proceedings to reassess competency, particularly in the face of erratic courtroom behavior; and (2) how far may a sentencing court vary upward under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), especially where the defendant asserts serious mental illness. The opinion clarifies that absent a “bona fide doubt” concerning competence, a court may rely on its observations and prior forensic evaluations to proceed without a hearing; and that an upward variance is substantively reasonable when the district court adequately ties the sentence to the § 3553(a) factors and explains its emphasis (even if on a subset of those factors).

Background

The government charged Yan with arson after she set fire to the First Baptist Church of Montgomery during the early morning hours, using accelerants. A subsequent arrest at her apartment produced a pistol, giving rise to the firearm count. At arraignment, Yan exhibited disruptive behavior, prompting the government to seek a competency evaluation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241 and 4247. After Yan noticed an insanity defense, the court ordered an additional examination under § 4242.

Forensic psychologist Dr. Amor Correa concluded that Yan was competent and assessed her with “Malingering,” i.e., the intentional exaggeration of symptoms for external benefit. No party requested a competency hearing, and the court—finding no bona fide doubt—declared Yan competent without a hearing.

During trial, Yan engaged in repeated outbursts (yelling, crying, singing, speaking out of turn) leading to temporary removal from the courtroom with remote viewing, and readmission when she agreed to behave. Defense counsel repeatedly urged reassessment of competency; the court declined, again finding no bona fide doubt and referencing indications that Yan could and did consult with counsel and track exhibits and testimony.

The jury convicted on both counts. The Presentence Investigation Report set an adjusted offense level of 25, criminal history category I, and a Guidelines range of 60–71 months (reflecting a statutory minimum raising the low-end from 57 to 60). Before sentencing, the court permitted a defense evaluation by Dr. Ginny Chan, who found Bipolar Disorder (in remission) and untreated PTSD; she also noted that Yan had previously exaggerated or faked symptoms but did not overreport in the current evaluation.

The defense requested the statutory minimum based on diminished capacity and current serious mental illness. The government sought an upward departure under U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.5 (property damage) and 5K2.14 (endangerment), urging 175 months. The court denied departure but construed the motion to include an alternative request for a variance, and varied upward to 102 months. At sentencing, the court explicitly referenced § 3553(a), emphasizing the nature and circumstances of the offense, just punishment, respect for law, seriousness, deterrence, public protection, and avoiding unwarranted disparity. It also recommended placement at a facility able to provide mental-health treatment.

Summary of the Opinion

Competency: Applying clear-error review and the “bona fide doubt” standard, the Eleventh Circuit held the district court did not err in declining to halt trial for a renewed competency evaluation. The court credited the pretrial forensic finding of competence and malingering, observed that the defendant could consult with counsel and track proceedings, and concluded the outbursts reflected volitional misconduct, not incompetence. No hearing was required absent bona fide doubt.
Sentencing: Applying abuse-of-discretion review to substantive reasonableness, the court affirmed the 102-month upward variance. It rejected the claim that the district court fixated on § 3553(a)(1) alone, noting the sentencing judge explicitly cited and discussed the § 3553(a) framework (including § 3553(a)(2) purposes). The court also found that the district judge considered Yan’s mental health but did not find her mitigation arguments compelling; it is not error to assign greater weight to some factors or to uphold a sentence even if another reasonable sentence could have been imposed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960): Establishes the competency test—sufficient present ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings. The panel applies this baseline to conclude the district court reasonably credited evidence showing Yan could communicate with counsel and understand the trial.
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966): Requires a competency hearing when there is a “bona fide doubt” regarding competence. The panel frames the question around whether the district court reasonably found no bona fide doubt, thereby justifying the decision not to order a hearing mid-trial.
United States v. Rahim, 431 F.3d 753 (11th Cir. 2005): Emphasizes competency as an “ongoing inquiry” at all trial stages. Yan relied on this principle to argue for continuous reassessment. The panel agreed with the principle but found the court had in fact continued to evaluate and found no new basis for doubt.
United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2011): Sets the clear-error standard for reviewing competency findings and accords deference to trial courts’ on-the-ground assessments.
United States v. Nickels, 324 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2003), and United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464 (11th Cir. 1986): Confirm that a district court need not order a clinical evaluation or hearing if it lacks a bona fide doubt about competence. The panel leans on this to reject the demand for a new mid-trial evaluation.
United States v. Dixon, 901 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2018), and United States v. Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2015): Recognize that evidence of calculating or volitional conduct (e.g., malingering) is a reason to deny a competency hearing. This is central to affirming the district court’s characterization of Yan’s outbursts as intentional misbehavior, not incompetency.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Provide the modern sentencing framework—advisory Guidelines, three-step process, and abuse-of-discretion review respecting district courts’ reasoned application of § 3553(a).
United States v. Jordi, 418 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2005): Clarifies that departures are part of Guidelines application, adjusting the range to address inadequately considered circumstances.
United States v. Rodriguez, 34 F.4th 961 (11th Cir. 2022); United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008): Define substantive reasonableness review, including the three ways a district court may abuse discretion and the “definite and firm conviction” threshold for reversal.
United States v. Grushko, 50 F.4th 1 (11th Cir. 2022); United States v. Sanchez, 586 F.3d 918 (11th Cir. 2009): Confirm that a district court may assign greater weight to some § 3553(a) factors and is not required to recite each factor, provided the record shows consideration of the statutory framework and the defendant’s arguments.
Statutes and Guidelines: 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241, 4242, 4247 (competency and insanity-related evaluations); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and (b) (sentencing factors and departures); 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2) (Commission’s mandate regarding sentencing purposes); and U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.5, 5K2.14 (departure bases the government invoked but the court declined).

Legal Reasoning

1) Competency as an Ongoing Obligation, But No Hearing Without Bona Fide Doubt

The court began by reaffirming the Dusky standard and Rahim’s “ongoing inquiry” obligation. The defendant argued the trial judge improperly relied on the pretrial finding of competence without real-time reassessment. The Eleventh Circuit rejected that reading of the record, noting that the district court explicitly addressed contemporary indicators of competence at trial—Yan’s ability to consult with counsel, request and review exhibits, and understand testimony—while characterizing the disruptive episodes as volitional.

Relying on Nickels and Cruz, the panel held no hearing or new evaluation is required unless the court harbors a bona fide doubt about competency. The district court credited Dr. Correa’s pretrial opinion diagnosing malingering and, applying Dixon and Perkins, inferred that the outbursts reflected a “competent, calculating mind,” i.e., deliberate disruption rather than a disabling mental defect. Given the trial court’s vantage point and the deferential clear-error standard, the panel found no reversible error.

2) Sentencing: Distinguishing Departures from Variances and Grounding the Upward Variance in § 3553(a)

The panel carefully recited the three-step sentencing framework: calculate the Guidelines range; consider departures (to adjust the range for inadequately considered circumstances); and then consider an upward or downward variance under § 3553(a). The district court denied the government’s requested departure under §§ 5K2.5 and 5K2.14 but construed the filing to include an alternative variance request and then varied upward.

On substantive reasonableness, the appellate court looked to the totality of the circumstances and whether the sentence advances § 3553(a)’s purposes. It rejected the argument that the district court “relied exclusively” on § 3553(a)(1). The record showed the judge expressly invoked the § 3553(a) framework and discussed core purposes: just punishment, respect for law, seriousness, deterrence, protection of the public, and avoiding disparity. The judge then emphasized the nature and circumstances of the offense, which is permissible; per Grushko, a court may attach great weight to a single factor.

As to mental-health mitigation, the panel noted the district court did consider the defense expert’s report but found the mitigation unpersuasive in light of the record (including malingering history). The court’s recommendation for treatment in custody further reflected consideration, not neglect, of mental-health needs. Finally, citing Gall, the panel underscored that an appellate court does not substitute its judgment simply because another sentence (e.g., 60 months) might also be reasonable.

Impact and Practical Consequences

A. Trial Management and Competency Practice

Reinforces that trial courts have latitude to rely on pretrial evaluations, in-court observations, and counsel interactions to assess real-time competence without halting proceedings absent bona fide doubt. Erratic or disruptive behavior, particularly when consistent with malingering, does not itself mandate a hearing.
Defense strategy: to trigger a mandatory hearing, counsel should build a record demonstrating that the defendant cannot rationally consult with counsel or lacks a rational understanding of the proceedings—beyond disruptive acts—linking specific observed deficits to the Dusky standard. Where prior malingering is in the record, additional, credible, and contemporaneous clinical input may be necessary to overcome that inference.
Courtroom management: the opinion implicitly endorses iterative removal/readmission as a proportionate response to disruption, while continuing proceedings (with remote viewing) to protect trial integrity and the defendant’s rights.

B. Sentencing: Variances, Mental Health, and Explanation Duties

The opinion underscores that an upward variance above the advisory range can be substantively reasonable when the court articulates a nexus to § 3553(a) (seriousness, deterrence, just punishment, public protection) and explains why those considerations outweigh mitigation.
A court need not recite every § 3553(a) factor; it can assign greater weight to a subset. The appellate inquiry asks whether the court considered the framework and the arguments, not whether it gave equal weight to each factor.
Mental-health mitigation remains important but not dispositive. Where the record contains credible evidence of malingering or intentional misconduct, a court may discount mental-illness claims while still facilitating treatment in custody (as occurred here).
Practice note: Although the government sought departures under §§ 5K2.5 and 5K2.14, the district court instead varied upward under § 3553(a). District courts possess independent authority to vary without a party’s motion; this opinion illustrates how a court may deny departure yet still find a variance warranted on the same underlying facts when viewed through the § 3553(a) lenses.

C. Persuasive Value

As an unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision, this opinion is not binding precedent but is persuasive. Its careful articulation of the competency and sentencing frameworks, and its application to common trial/sentencing dynamics (malingering; disruptive behavior; upward variance for serious property and public-safety harms), make it a practically useful citation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Competency to stand trial vs. insanity defense:
- Competency addresses the defendant’s present ability to understand the proceedings and assist counsel (Dusky). It must exist at each stage of trial; if bona fide doubt arises, a hearing is required (Pate).
- Insanity defense concerns mental state at the time of the offense, not at trial. Different standards, procedures, and consequences apply (18 U.S.C. § 4242 evaluations).
Bona fide doubt: A reasonable question, based on credible evidence, that the defendant lacks current competence. Courts may consider clinical reports, courtroom behavior, counsel interactions, and their own observations. Absent bona fide doubt, no hearing is required.
Malingering: The intentional exaggeration or fabrication of symptoms for external gain. Evidence of malingering can indicate volitional conduct, undermining claims of incompetence and affecting the weight courts give to mental-health mitigation at sentencing.
Departures vs. variances:
- Departures adjust the Guidelines range based on factors the Sentencing Commission did not adequately consider (e.g., U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.5, 5K2.14), operating within the Guidelines framework.
- Variances depart from the Guidelines altogether based on the statutory purposes and factors in § 3553(a). Courts can vary upward or downward even if no party moves for it, so long as they adequately explain the decision under § 3553(a).
Standards of review:
- Competency findings: Clear error—substantial deference to trial court’s vantage point and credibility assessments.
- Substantive reasonableness of a sentence: Abuse of discretion—reversal only if the sentence reflects failure to consider key factors, consideration of improper factors, or a clear error in judgment under § 3553(a).

Conclusion

United States v. Yan reaffirms two important principles in federal criminal practice within the Eleventh Circuit. First, competency is a continuous obligation, but a trial court is not compelled to stop proceedings for a hearing or new evaluation absent a bona fide doubt of competence. Disruptive conduct that the court reasonably attributes to malingering or volitional choice does not, without more, trigger Pate’s mandatory hearing requirement. Second, an upward variance above the advisory Guidelines range is substantively reasonable where the district court grounds its decision in the § 3553(a) purposes, explains its weighting of factors, and addresses mitigation—including mental-health claims—even if it ultimately finds them unpersuasive.

Although unpublished and thus non-precedential, the opinion offers clear guidance for trial judges managing disruptive defendants, for counsel litigating competency and mitigation issues, and for sentencing courts balancing the seriousness of offense conduct against claimed mental-health conditions. The key takeaway is practical: no bona fide doubt, no hearing; and a well-explained § 3553(a) variance—especially one expressly tying the sentence to seriousness, deterrence, and public protection—will receive substantial deference on appeal.