No Automatic Vacatur of Domesticated Foreign Judgments Upon Reversal in the Rendering State: Commentary on Shumate v. Berry Contracting, L.P.

No Automatic Vacatur of Domesticated Foreign Judgments Upon Reversal in the Rendering State

Commentary on Shumate v. Berry Contracting, L.P., Supreme Court of Alabama (Dec. 12, 2025)

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Alabama’s decision in Shumate v. Berry Contracting, L.P. addresses a difficult and increasingly common problem in interstate judgment enforcement: what happens in Alabama when a judgment from another state, already domesticated here, is later reversed in the rendering state?

Jason Shumate, the judgment debtor, asked the Baldwin Circuit Court to relieve him from a Texas judgment that had been domesticated in Alabama under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (“UEFJA”) after the Supreme Court of Texas reversed that judgment and ordered a new one. He proceeded primarily under Rule 60(b)(5), Ala. R. Civ. P. The circuit court denied relief without a hearing, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.

The core holding is narrow but important: Rule 60(b)(5)’s “prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated” clause does not, on this record and under existing Alabama authority, clearly provide a vehicle to set aside a domesticated foreign judgment merely because the underlying foreign judgment has been reversed in the rendering state. The Court treats domestication as not creating a “second judgment” of the kind contemplated by Rule 60(b)(5), and it emphasizes procedural defaults by Shumate.

A forceful dissent (Cook, J., joined by Chief Justice Stewart) takes the opposite view, grounding its reasoning in the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the UEFJA’s purpose, Texas law on the effect of reversal, and the equity prong of Rule 60(b)(5). The dissent would require Alabama courts to cease enforcing a domesticated judgment once the underlying judgment is reversed in the rendering state.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Texas litigation

In 2012, Berry Contracting, L.P., d/b/a Bay, Ltd. (“Bay Ltd.”), sued Shumate in Texas, alleging fraud and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. After a jury trial, the Texas court entered a substantial judgment against Shumate:

  • $871,090.47 in actual damages;
  • $4,480,452.35 in punitive damages;
  • $602,253.60 in attorney’s fees;
  • prejudgment and postjudgment interest at 5.5% per annum.

Shumate appealed this “Texas judgment” and posted a $1,000,000 appeal bond as required under Texas law to stay enforcement in Texas.

B. Domestication of the Texas judgment in Alabama

While Shumate’s Texas appeal was pending, Bay Ltd. filed a notice of filing of foreign judgment in the Baldwin Circuit Court in January 2020, invoking Alabama’s version of the UEFJA, Ala. Code § 6-9-230 et seq. The Baldwin Circuit Clerk issued a certificate of judgment, and evidence of the domesticated judgment was recorded in the Baldwin Probate Court.

Shumate sought a stay of enforcement of the domesticated judgment in Alabama, pointing to his appeal bond in Texas. The circuit court denied a stay, apparently relying on § 6-9-234(b), which requires security equivalent to Alabama’s own supersedeas requirements. The majority notes, but does not decide, any issue concerning the correctness of that denial; there is no evidence of actual collection activity beyond domestication and related recordings.

C. The Texas Supreme Court’s reversal

The Texas intermediate appellate court initially affirmed. See Shumate v. Berry Contracting, L.P., 693 S.W.3d 23 (Tex. App. 2021). But in April 2024, the Supreme Court of Texas decided Shumate v. Berry Contracting, L.P., 688 S.W.3d 872 (Tex. 2024).

The Texas high court:

  • “reverse[d] the court of appeals’ judgment,”
  • held that Shumate was entitled to a “settlement credit” based on a settlement between Bay Ltd. and an alleged coconspirator, and
  • remanded to the trial court to determine the proper application of the settlement credit and to “render a new judgment.”

According to the Alabama record, as of the time of the Alabama decision, the Texas trial court had not yet entered this new judgment. Under Texas law (discussed in the dissent), the reversal rendered the original judgment “ineffective and unenforceable” in Texas.

D. The Rule 60(b)(5) motion in Alabama

In November 2024, after the Texas Supreme Court’s reversal, Shumate filed a motion in the Baldwin Circuit Court under Rule 60(b)(5), Ala. R. Civ. P., seeking relief from the domesticated Texas judgment. He invoked the text of Rule 60(b)(5) allowing relief when “a prior judgment upon which [the judgment] is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated.”

The circuit court set a hearing for April 4, 2025, but on March 12, 2025, it denied the motion without holding the hearing. Shumate filed a post-judgment motion (styled as under Rule 59), which was not ruled upon. He then appealed.

On appeal, the parties agreed that the applicable standard of review was whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Rule 60(b)(5) relief. See Pollard v. Etowah Cnty. Comm’n, 539 So. 2d 225, 227 (Ala. 1989).

III. Summary of the Alabama Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Rule 60(b)(5) relief. The key conclusions of the majority are:

  1. Rule 60(b)(5)’s “prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated” clause is not clearly applicable to a domesticated foreign judgment. The Court accepts the view that this clause generally applies to situations where a judgment rests on the preclusive effect (res judicata or collateral estoppel) of an earlier, separate judgment that is later reversed, and that domestication does not create such a separate “second” judgment.
  2. Domestication under Alabama’s UEFJA does not, for these purposes, create a distinct “second judgment” in Alabama. Rather, the domesticated judgment is treated as the same judgment for enforcement purposes, not as a new, independent judgment “based on” a prior one.
  3. Shumate’s argument that the “proceeding” (the domestication and related filings) could be set aside under Rule 60(b)(5) was not properly preserved and not supported by authority. He advanced that theory only in a later motion and did not adequately develop it at the trial level.
  4. Alternative grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(4) (void judgment) and 60(b)(6) (catch-all equity) were not properly raised or developed below and thus do not establish an abuse of discretion. The Court also expresses skepticism that a domesticated judgment becomes “void” merely because the underlying foreign judgment is later reversed.
  5. The Full Faith and Credit Clause argument was not preserved. Because “full faith and credit” was never meaningfully presented to the circuit court, the Supreme Court declines to reach that constitutional issue.

Based on these points, the Court held that Shumate failed to show that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying Rule 60(b)(5) relief.

Two Justices concurred in the result without opinion; two Justices dissented, with Justice Cook’s dissent (joined by Chief Justice Stewart) providing a detailed contrary analysis.

IV. Legal Framework

A. The UEFJA and domestication of foreign judgments

Alabama’s UEFJA, Ala. Code § 6-9-230 et seq., governs how judgments from other states or federal courts are recognized and enforced in Alabama. Key provisions include:

  • § 6-9-231: “Foreign judgment” means any judgment, decree, or order entitled to full faith and credit in Alabama.
  • § 6-9-232: Once filed, a foreign judgment “has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a circuit court of this state and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.”
  • § 6-9-234(a): Requires a stay of enforcement in Alabama if an appeal is pending in the rendering state and the judgment debtor has posted the security required in that state.
  • § 6-9-234(b): Also allows a stay if the debtor shows any ground upon which an Alabama judgment would be stayed, provided the debtor posts the “same security” required in Alabama.

The statute’s purpose, as reiterated in this case, is to give the holder of a foreign judgment the same rights as the holder of a domestic Alabama judgment, not more or fewer. See Pope v. Gordon, 922 So. 2d 893, 897 (Ala. 2005).

B. Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.

Rule 60(b) allows a court, “upon such terms as are just,” to relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for specified reasons. Relevant here:

  • Rule 60(b)(4): The judgment is “void” (typically for lack of jurisdiction or fundamental due process defects).
  • Rule 60(b)(5):
    “the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.”
  • Rule 60(b)(6): “any other reason justifying relief.”

Rule 60(b) motions are addressed to the trial court’s discretion, and appellate review is limited: the question is whether the trial court abused that discretion.

C. Standard of review

The Court applies the well-established standard from Pollard v. Etowah Cnty. Comm’n, 539 So. 2d 225, 227 (Ala. 1989): decisions granting or denying Rule 60(b)(5) relief will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. This highly deferential lens is critical: the Supreme Court does not decide de novo whether it would have granted relief, but whether the circuit court’s decision was unreasonable or arbitrary in light of the law and arguments properly before it.

V. Analysis of the Majority Opinion

A. Does Rule 60(b)(5) apply when a foreign judgment is reversed?

The linchpin of Shumate’s argument was Rule 60(b)(5)’s clause allowing relief where “a prior judgment upon which [the judgment] is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated.” He contended:

  • The “prior judgment” was the Texas judgment.
  • The Alabama domesticated judgment was “based upon” that prior Texas judgment.
  • The Texas Supreme Court had “reversed” the Texas judgment.

Bay Ltd. responded that Rule 60(b)(5) is not designed for this situation. Relying on treatises and case law, Bay argued that:

  • The clause is “especially rare” in use and applies primarily where:
    • a judgment in Case A is given res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in Case B; and
    • the prior judgment in Case A is later reversed.
  • Domestication is not a new, separate judgment in that sense; it is simply a procedural vehicle for enforcing the original judgment in another forum.

The majority accepts this understanding. It cites:

  • LexisNexis Practice Guide: Alabama Civil Procedure § 12.39 (Lathram & Mujumdar) for the proposition that this portion of Rule 60(b)(5) “refers principally, if not exclusively,” to judgments predetermined by the preclusive effect of a prior judgment;
  • Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2863, noting that the analogous federal provision “is limited to cases in which the present judgment is based on the prior judgment in the sense of claim or issue preclusion”; and
  • NHS Mgmt., LLC v. Wright, 24 So. 3d 1153 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009), which had quoted similar federal authority.

On that basis, the Court concludes:

  • Rule 60(b)(5) generally presupposes two judgments in distinct actions: an earlier judgment with preclusive effect and a later judgment that relies on that preclusion.
  • A domesticated foreign judgment does not represent a truly separate judgment, but rather the same judgment being recognized for enforcement in Alabama. Thus, there is no “prior judgment upon which [it] is based” in the required sense.

Crucially, the Court also emphasizes an evidentiary and briefing gap: Shumate “does not point to any authority, from Alabama or any other jurisdiction,” applying Rule 60(b)(5) in this kind of domestication context, and he offers no compelling doctrinal argument that domestication creates the kind of “second judgment” that Rule 60(b)(5) contemplates. The Court invokes Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248, 251 (Ala. 1994), to underscore that it will not develop or research undeveloped legal theories for a party.

This reasoning allows the Court to affirm without definitively ruling that Rule 60(b)(5) is never available in such circumstances; it suffices that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the argument as presented.

B. Treatment of the “proceedings” language in Rule 60(b)(5)

Rule 60(b) allows relief from a “final judgment, order, or proceeding.” Shumate later argued (on appeal and in his post-judgment filings) that:

  • “Proceeding” can include steps taken to enforce a judgment.
  • The Alabama domestication process, recordings, and related actions were “proceedings” in Alabama that were “based upon” the now-reversed Texas judgment.
  • Therefore, at minimum, those proceedings should be set aside under Rule 60(b)(5).

He relied in part on Black’s Law Dictionary and on Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 58 N.Y.2d 179, 446 N.E.2d 768, 460 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1983), where a New York court had vacated a domestication after a Texas intermediate appellate court reversed the underlying Texas judgment (although in Mansfield the vacatur had been done by agreement of the parties).

The majority rejects this line of argument primarily on procedural grounds:

  • Shumate’s original Rule 60(b)(5) motion sought relief from the domesticated “judgment,” not from “proceedings.”
  • His more developed “proceedings” argument appeared only in a later filing styled as a Rule 59 motion (which the trial court did not rule upon) after the 60(b) motion had already been denied.
  • Under Ex parte Keith, 771 So. 2d 1018 (Ala. 1998), and Ex parte Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 344 So. 3d 326 (Ala. 2021), a trial court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a second motion seeking reconsideration of a denied Rule 60(b) motion.
  • Even assuming the trial court could have considered the second motion, Shumate still failed to present supporting precedent, from Alabama or other jurisdictions, to justify relief on this basis.

In short, the Court does not decisively interpret the word “proceeding” in Rule 60(b)(5) in this context; instead, it holds that Shumate did not properly preserve or support this theory, so no abuse of discretion is shown.

C. Rejection of Rule 60(b)(4), 60(b)(6), and Full Faith and Credit arguments

On appeal, Shumate also urged the Court to consider Rule 60(b)(4) and 60(b)(6) as additional bases for relief, and he invoked the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The majority responds as follows:

1. Rule 60(b)(4) – void judgment

Rule 60(b)(4) allows relief when the judgment is “void.” Shumate gestured toward this provision, but:

  • His original motion below “relied exclusively” on the “prior judgment reversed” clause of Rule 60(b)(5).
  • Even in his post-judgment motion, he merely mentioned 60(b)(4) and (6) without substantive argument.
  • Alabama cases, as Shumate himself acknowledged, generally treat “void” judgments as those entered without jurisdiction or in violation of fundamental due process (e.g., lack of service), not those that later become inequitable or erroneous because of subsequent events.

The Court also states that it is “not convinced that a domesticated judgment automatically becomes ‘void’” within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(4) simply because the foreign judgment is reversed. This is a substantive hint: the Court is resistant to equating post-domestication changes in the foreign judgment with jurisdictional or structural defects that render a judgment void ab initio.

2. Rule 60(b)(6) – catch-all equity

Rule 60(b)(6) authorizes relief for “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Shumate did not meaningfully develop a 60(b)(6) argument at the trial level, and the majority declines to treat it as a preserved basis for relief. The Court therefore does not reach whether, in principle, 60(b)(6) might be available in a case like this.

3. Full Faith and Credit Clause

The dissent frames the Full Faith and Credit Clause as central, but the majority emphasizes that:

  • The phrase “full faith and credit” does not appear in the circuit court record.
  • No developed constitutional argument along these lines was presented below.

Accordingly, the Court treats the full faith and credit contention as unpreserved and declines to decide whether the Constitution would compel Alabama courts to cease enforcing a domesticated judgment once the rendering state has reversed it.

D. The Court’s narrow holding and what it does not decide

The majority opinion is deliberately narrow:

  • It does not categorically declare that Alabama courts can continue to enforce domesticated judgments forever, regardless of what happens in the rendering state.
  • It does not hold that Rule 60(b) relief is absolutely unavailable in this scenario; rather, it holds that Shumate’s particular Rule 60(b)(5) theory, as articulated and supported, was insufficient to show an abuse of discretion.
  • It leaves open whether other theories—properly preserved and supported (e.g., a fully developed 60(b)(6) or a direct full faith and credit argument)—might mandate relief in a future case.

The opinion thus functions more as a procedural and interpretive check than as a sweeping doctrinal statement, but in practice it sets a strong precedent that Rule 60(b)(5) will be read narrowly in the domestication context unless and until the rule is amended or stronger authority is presented.

VI. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Alabama UEFJA and domestication cases

  • Pope v. Gordon, 922 So. 2d 893 (Ala. 2005)

    Cited for the purpose of the UEFJA: to give holders of foreign judgments the same rights and remedies as holders of domestic judgments. This supports the idea that once domesticated, a foreign judgment is procedurally treated like an Alabama judgment, including with respect to post-judgment relief mechanisms.

  • Greene v. Connelly, 628 So. 2d 346 (Ala. 1993) (abrogated on other grounds)

    Held that once a foreign judgment is domesticated, the resisting party must use the same procedures available to challenge domestic judgments. It specifically identified Rule 60(b)(4) as the proper vehicle to attack a domesticated judgment on the ground that the foreign court lacked personal jurisdiction. This underpins the majority’s statement that Rule 60(b) motions are the usual tool for collaterally attacking domesticated judgments.

  • Ex parte Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc., 775 So. 2d 181 (Ala. 2000)

    Recognized that filing a Rule 60(b) motion is the proper procedure for challenging the validity of a domesticated foreign judgment. The majority quotes this to establish the general procedure, while noting that prior cases focused on Rule 60(b)(4), not (b)(5).

  • Afassco, Inc. v. Sanders, 142 So. 3d 1119 (Ala. 2013) and Ex parte Trinity Auto. Servs., Ltd., 974 So. 2d 1005 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006)

    Both affirm that Rule 60(b)(4) is the proper procedural mechanism to attack a domesticated foreign judgment as void for lack of jurisdiction in the rendering court. These cases help contrast the jurisdictional “voidness” attacks with the non-jurisdictional situation in Shumate.

B. Rule 60(b) interpretive authorities

  • Pollard v. Etowah Cnty. Comm’n, 539 So. 2d 225 (Ala. 1989)

    Provides the “abuse of discretion” standard of review for Rule 60(b)(5) rulings. This standard frames the entire appellate analysis.

  • NHS Mgmt., LLC v. Wright, 24 So. 3d 1153 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009)

    Cites federal authority (including Marshall v. Board of Educ. of Bergenfield, 575 F.2d 417 (3d Cir. 1978)) that interprets the “prior judgment upon which it is based” language as limited to preclusion-based situations. This authority is used to justify the majority’s narrow reading of Rule 60(b)(5).

  • Ex parte Huntingdon Coll., 386 So. 3d 28 (Ala. 2023) and Satterfield v. Winston Indus., Inc., 553 So. 2d 61 (Ala. 1989) (cited in the dissent)

    Explain that Rule 60(b)(5) permits relief when “new facts or new law” arise after judgment, making its prospective application inequitable. The dissent uses these cases to support applying the “no longer equitable” prong of 60(b)(5) to the reversal of the Texas judgment.

  • Practice guides and treatises

    • LexisNexis Practice Guide: Alabama Civil Procedure § 12.39 (Lathram & Mujumdar), and
    • Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2863.

    Both guide the Court toward a preclusion-centric reading of Rule 60(b)(5)’s “prior judgment” clause.

C. Other jurisdictions

  • Everson v. Everson, 494 Pa. 348, 431 A.2d 889 (1981)

    Referenced in a footnote for Bay Ltd.’s argument that the Texas judgment may not have been “reversed” in the sense of Rule 60(b)(5) because liability was not disturbed, only potential damages. The Alabama Court notes this argument but finds it unnecessary to resolve in light of its other reasoning.

  • Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 58 N.Y.2d 179 (N.Y. 1983)

    Relied on by Shumate in arguing that the Alabama domestication should be vacated once the Texas judgment was reversed. The majority distinguishes it: in Mansfield, the creditor itself moved to vacate the domestication after the Texas reversal, and the New York Court of Appeals focused on priority issues after the Texas Supreme Court later reinstated the judgment. The Alabama Court notes that Mansfield does not address the proper construction of Rule 60(b)(5).

VII. The Dissent: A Competing Vision of Full Faith and Credit and Equity

Justice Cook’s dissent, joined by Chief Justice Stewart, offers a markedly different analysis grounded in constitutional structure and equity. It can be summarized in three main strands.

A. Full Faith and Credit and the effect of reversal under Texas law

The dissent starts from first principles: the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires Alabama to give effect to the judicial proceedings of sister states as they are understood in those states. The validity and effect of a foreign judgment are determined by the law of the state in which it was rendered. See Orix Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Murphy, 9 So. 3d 1241, 1244 (Ala. 2008).

Under Texas law, the Supreme Court of Texas has clearly stated:

“When we have reversed a trial court’s original judgment, that judgment is ineffective and unenforceable; this is no more or less true whether we then render judgment ourselves or remand the case to the trial court to render judgment in accordance with our opinion. It is the reversing of the judgment, rather than the rendering of a new judgment or the remanding of the case, that makes the original judgment ineffective.”
— Phillips v. Bramlett, 407 S.W.3d 229, 240 (Tex. 2013)

The dissent also cites Min v. H & S Crane Sales, Inc., 472 S.W.3d 773, 777 (Tex. App. 2015), and analogizes to older Alabama authority (Dupuy v. Roebuck, 7 Ala. 484 (1845); Barringer v. Burke, 21 Ala. 765 (1852); Birmingham Elec. Co. v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 254 Ala. 119 (1950)) for the proposition that a reversed judgment is a “mere nullity.”

From this, the dissent reasons:

  • Once the Texas Supreme Court reversed the Texas judgment, there was, in legal effect, no longer a valid foreign judgment in Texas.
  • Without a valid foreign judgment, there is nothing for Alabama to “recognize and enforce” under the UEFJA.
  • Enforcing in Alabama a judgment that is unenforceable in Texas grants the judgment creditor greater rights than it has in the rendering state, contrary to the UEFJA’s purpose of parity.

B. Rule 60(b)(5): both the “prior judgment” and “no longer equitable” prongs

The dissent reads Rule 60(b)(5) more broadly.

1. “A prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed”

Justice Cook emphasizes the plain language:

  • The “prior judgment” is the Texas judgment.
  • The Alabama domesticated judgment is “based upon” that Texas judgment.
  • The Texas judgment “has been reversed.”

He criticizes the majority’s insistence on two completely separate judgments as:

  • textually unwarranted—nothing in the rule expressly limits the clause to res judicata/collateral estoppel settings;
  • illogical—Alabama has two distinct proceedings with separate case numbers; if they were literally the same case, Rule 60(b) relief would be unnecessary; and
  • doctrinally unsound—Rule 60(b) ought to contain some mechanism to address the situation where a rendered-state judgment, already domesticated, is later reversed. This language fits that need.

    2. “It is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application”

    Even if the “prior judgment” clause were deemed inapplicable, the dissent argues that the equity prong of Rule 60(b)(5) squarely covers the situation. Citing Ex parte Huntingdon Coll. and Satterfield, the dissent notes that:

    • Rule 60(b)(5) is designed to address “new facts or new law” arising after the original judgment that make its continued application inequitable.
    • The Texas Supreme Court’s reversal is exactly such a new development: the judgment Alabama is enforcing no longer exists as a valid, enforceable judgment in Texas.
    • To allow continued enforcement of the Alabama domestication in that circumstance is “inequitable” in Rule 60(b)(5)’s sense.

    The dissent also notes potential practical injustices: if Bay Ltd. were to collect in Alabama based on the unrevised Texas judgment, but the Texas trial court later reduces the award by, say, 50% or even to zero, numerous complications would arise (whether Bay must refund, whether interest is owed on improperly seized funds, etc.). These concerns underscore, in the dissent’s view, the inequity of allowing the domesticated judgment to stand after reversal.

    C. Equity, discharge, and broader implications

    The dissent hints at yet another textual hook in Rule 60(b)(5): that the judgment has been “satisfied, released, or discharged.” It suggests that the reversal of the Texas judgment may have “discharged” the legal duty it created, with any new duty arising only from a new Texas judgment on remand. Because the dissent already finds relief warranted under the “prior judgment reversed” and “no longer equitable” prongs, it does not fully develop this argument.

    Finally, Justice Cook stresses that the denial of this particular 60(b) motion does not bar Shumate from seeking further relief (including a future Rule 60(b) motion or an independent collateral action) if Bay attempts to enforce the domesticated judgment or if Texas proceedings change the damages award. But he maintains that the Constitution, the UEFJA, and Rule 60(b)(5) already require relief now.

    VIII. Complex Concepts Simplified

    A. “Domestication” of a foreign judgment

    When a court in State A (here, Texas) enters a money judgment, that judgment does not automatically become enforceable in State B (Alabama). The creditor must take steps under State B’s law to have it recognized and enforced there. This process is called domestication:

    • The creditor files an authenticated copy of the foreign judgment in an Alabama circuit court.
    • After certain procedural requirements are met, that judgment is treated—procedurally—like an Alabama judgment for purposes of enforcement (garnishments, liens, etc.).

    Domestication does not relitigate the case; it simply opens Alabama’s enforcement machinery to the out-of-state judgment.

    B. Full Faith and Credit Clause

    The U.S. Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause (Art. IV, § 1) requires each state to honor the judicial proceedings of other states, subject to certain narrow exceptions (e.g., when the rendering court lacked jurisdiction). In the judgment context, this means:

    • An Alabama court must normally give a final judgment from Texas the same preclusive and enforceable effect as Texas would give it.
    • But if Texas itself would treat the judgment as void, reversed, or otherwise unenforceable, Alabama need not (and typically must not) treat it as valid.

    C. Rule 60(b) in plain terms

    Rule 60(b) is a post-judgment “safety valve” allowing a party to ask the court to undo or modify a final judgment in limited circumstances, such as:

    • newly discovered evidence,
    • fraud,
    • lack of jurisdiction (void judgment),
    • a prior underpinning judgment being reversed, or
    • changed circumstances making continued enforcement unfair.

    It is not a substitute for appeal; it addresses special situations that arise after judgment or that affect its fundamental validity.

    D. Res judicata and collateral estoppel

    These doctrines prevent parties from relitigating matters that have already been decided:

    • Res judicata (claim preclusion): You cannot bring a new lawsuit on the same claim once it has been finally decided.
    • Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion): You cannot dispute an issue of fact or law that was actually litigated and decided in a prior case, in a later case between (usually) the same parties.

    Rule 60(b)(5)’s “prior judgment upon which it is based” language was historically designed for cases where Judgment B is based on the preclusive effect of Judgment A, and Judgment A is later reversed.

    E. “Void” judgments

    A judgment is “void” (for 60(b)(4) purposes) when the court had no power to enter it—for example:

    • the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter,
    • the court lacked personal jurisdiction over a party (e.g., no proper service), or
    • some fundamental due process defect rendered the proceedings a nullity.

    A judgment that later becomes erroneous or inequitable because of new developments is ordinarily not “void”; it may or may not be subject to other forms of relief (such as 60(b)(5) or (6)).

    F. “Abuse of discretion” standard

    When appellate courts review decisions under a discretionary standard:

    • They do not ask, “Would we have done the same thing?”
    • They ask, “Was the trial court’s decision so unreasonable or arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds of its lawful discretion?”

    This deference often means that even questionable or debatable trial-level decisions will be affirmed unless they clearly depart from legal norms.

    IX. Practical and Doctrinal Implications

    A. For judgment debtors

    • Stays are critical. When a foreign judgment is being domesticated while an appeal is pending in the rendering state, debtors should:
      • seek an automatic stay in Alabama under § 6-9-234(a) if they have posted the required security in the rendering state; and
      • be prepared to comply with any additional Alabama security requirements if they must invoke § 6-9-234(b).
    • Preserve multiple Rule 60(b) theories. If the foreign judgment is reversed, debtors should consider:
      • explicitly invoking both aspects of Rule 60(b)(5): “prior judgment reversed” and “no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application,”
      • raising, and developing, a Rule 60(b)(6) “extraordinary circumstances” theory, and
      • squarely presenting a Full Faith and Credit argument at the trial level.
    • Recognize that Shumate does not foreclose all relief. The majority leaves room for future arguments, especially under the equity prong of Rule 60(b)(5) or Rule 60(b)(6), if properly preserved and supported.

    B. For judgment creditors

    • Domestication retains significant value. Even if the underlying judgment is under appeal, domestication can position a creditor to enforce promptly if the foreign appellate process ends favorably, subject to statutory stays.
    • But enforcement after reversal is risky. If the rendering state reverses or substantially modifies the judgment, attempting to collect on a domesticated judgment in another state may invite further litigation, potential restitution obligations, and negative precedent.
    • Cooperation can avoid complexity. Cases like Mansfield show that creditors sometimes choose voluntarily to vacate domestication after a reversal, then re-domesticate if and when a new judgment issues. This may be more efficient than litigating the kind of issues raised in Shumate.

    C. For Alabama courts and the development of law

    • Text and history vs. practical equity. The majority leans heavily on treatise-driven, preclusion-focused interpretations of Rule 60(b)(5), while the dissent emphasizes the rule’s broader equitable function and the demands of full faith and credit. Future cases will likely test which approach prevails when arguments are more thoroughly preserved.
    • Possible need for rule amendment. The dissent explicitly suggests that, if Rule 60(b) is interpreted as offering no mechanism to vacate a domesticated judgment after the rendering state has reversed it, the rule should be amended. The decision may spur the rules committee or legislature to consider clarifying language regarding domesticated judgments.
    • Full Faith and Credit questions remain open. Because the majority found the constitutional argument unpreserved, the question whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause itself requires Alabama to halt enforcement of a domesticated judgment after its reversal in the rendering state remains unresolved at the state’s highest court.

    X. Conclusion

    Shumate v. Berry Contracting, L.P. establishes a significant, if narrowly framed, precedent on the interplay between Alabama’s enforcement of foreign judgments and post-domestication developments in the rendering state.

    The majority holds that Rule 60(b)(5)’s “prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed” clause does not, on the arguments and authorities presented, compel relief from a domesticated foreign judgment when the underlying judgment is reversed. Domestication is treated as procedural recognition of the original judgment, not as the creation of a second, dependent judgment of the kind contemplated by that clause. Alternative theories—relief as to “proceedings,” voidness under Rule 60(b)(4), catch-all equity under Rule 60(b)(6), and Full Faith and Credit—were either not preserved or not sufficiently developed to show an abuse of discretion.

    In contrast, the dissent forcefully contends that the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Texas law on the effect of reversal, the UEFJA’s parity purpose, and the equity prong of Rule 60(b)(5) all collectively require Alabama to vacate or suspend enforcement of the domesticated judgment once the Texas Supreme Court reversed it.

    The decision thus leaves Alabama with a cautious, procedurally focused precedent: there is no automatic vacatur of a domesticated foreign judgment upon reversal in the rendering state, and Rule 60(b)(5) will be applied narrowly unless a party clearly preserves and supports broader theories of relief. At the same time, unresolved constitutional and equitable questions ensure that this area of law remains open to further development, both in Alabama and in other jurisdictions grappling with similar cross-border judgment issues.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Comments