No Automatic Cronic Presumption at Sentencing: Strickland Governs Counsel’s Duty and Prejudice in Baker v. Conway

Introduction

Baker v. Conway is a 2025 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that clarifies the standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing stage of a criminal case, and rejects an automatic presumption of prejudice under United States v. Cronic when counsel is merely unprepared. Petitioner‐appellant Sean Baker, convicted of second‐degree felony murder in New York state court, challenged his 20‐to‐life sentence on the ground that his court‐appointed lawyer did virtually nothing to prepare for sentencing or to advise him of the benefits of making a personal allocution. The district court and New York courts had denied relief under the two‐pronged test of Strickland v. Washington (performance and prejudice), applying deferential review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that (1) counsel’s failure to prepare and advocate could constitute deficient performance under Strickland, but (2) Baker failed to establish a “reasonable probability” of a more favorable sentence, and (3) circumstances did not warrant a Cronic presumption of prejudice.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit assumed without deciding that defendant’s sentencing counsel performed deficiently by failing to review the presentence report, to investigate or present mitigating evidence, and to advise Baker to speak on his own behalf.
Applying the Strickland prejudice prong, the court held Baker did not show a “substantial likelihood” the outcome would have been different. The sentencing judge had been present at trial, was aware of Baker’s youth and role in the underlying crime, and expressly invited Baker to speak (which he declined).
The court refused to apply the presumption of prejudice described in Cronic, noting that Baker’s counsel did not entirely fail to test the prosecution’s case, nor was counsel absent at a “critical stage.”
Under AEDPA’s doubly‐deferential standard, no fairminded jurist could conclude the state courts unreasonably applied federal law. The district court’s denial of habeas relief was therefore affirmed.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)) – Establishes the two‐pronged test for ineffective assistance (performance and prejudice).
Cronic (United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)) – Recognizes three rare scenarios warranting a presumption of prejudice without an inquiry into actual prejudice.
Glover v. United States (531 U.S. 198 (2001)) – Confirms the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel extends through sentencing.
Cullen v. Pinholster (563 U.S. 170 (2011)) and Burt v. Titlow (571 U.S. 12 (2013)) – Explain AEDPA deference and the “doubly‐deferential” standard when reviewing state decisions on counsel performance.
Gonzalez v. United States (722 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013)) – Previously held that counsel’s minimal sentencing preparation can be constitutionally deficient.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court divided its reasoning into the Strickland performance and prejudice prongs, then addressed Cronic:

Performance: Counsel “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” by never reviewing the PSR with Baker, failing to investigate or present mitigating evidence (such as his youth, difficult childhood, or remorse), and making no sentencing argument beyond a three‐sentence remark. The court stressed that strategic decisions are reasonable only after “thorough investigation.” A self-imposed refusal to develop mitigating material or prepare the client cannot plausibly be strategic.
Prejudice: Under Strickland’s second prong, Baker needed to show a “reasonable probability” his sentence would have been less severe absent counsel’s errors. The court found no such probability. The sentencing judge was fully aware of Baker’s personal history and role in the offense, had explicitly asked Baker if he wished to speak, and imposed a below‐maximum sentence (20-to-life instead of 25-to-life). A post‐conviction judge similarly found the facts “heinous” and not susceptible to mitigation.
Cronic: Baker argued that counsel’s near-total abandonment at sentencing warranted a presumption of prejudice. The Second Circuit declined, holding that Cronic’s presumption applies only in truly critical circumstances: denial of counsel at a critical stage, total failure to test the prosecution, or an actual conflict making effective advocacy impossible. Mere unpreparedness and failure to advise do not qualify.
AEDPA Deference: Even if counsel’s performance were deficient, the state courts’ application of Strickland was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. Under AEDPA, a federal court may grant relief only if the state court’s result was “so lacking in justification” that there is no “possibility for fairminded disagreement.”

3. Impact

Baker v. Conway reinforces several important principles in the law of post-conviction review:

Attorneys have an obligation to investigate and prepare mitigating evidence for sentencing. Courts will not easily excuse a lawyer’s inaction as “strategy” when no investigation occurred.
Deficient performance at sentencing does not automatically entitle a defendant to relief. The prejudice prong of Strickland remains the critical inquiry, even when counsel fails to advise the defendant about allocution or the PSR.
Cronic’s presumption of prejudice is confined to extreme cases—total counsel absence or an irreconcilable conflict—not a mere failure to prepare or advise.
AEDPA’s “doubly‐deferential” standard continues to shield state court decisions unless they are objectively unreasonable under clearly established Supreme Court precedent.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Strickland Test: A defendant claiming ineffective assistance must show (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective professional norm, and (2) a “reasonable probability” that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s errors.
Cronic Exception: In very rare situations—no counsel at a critical stage, complete failure to challenge the prosecution, or an irreconcilable conflict—courts presume prejudice without requiring a showing of outcome effect.
AEDPA Deference: Federal habeas review of state convictions is highly deferential. A federal court must uphold a state court’s decision unless it was not merely wrong, but “objectively unreasonable” in light of Supreme Court precedent.
Allocution: The defendant’s personal statement to the judge at sentencing. Courts treat allocution as a key opportunity to demonstrate remorse and personal context.

Conclusion

Baker v. Conway clarifies that while counsel’s complete failure to prepare for sentencing may satisfy Strickland’s deficient performance prong, a defendant still bears the burden of establishing a reasonable probability of prejudice. The decision underscores that Cronic’s presumption of prejudice applies only in truly extraordinary circumstances, not merely when counsel is unprepared or fails to advise a client about allocution or the PSR. Finally, under the stringent AEDPA framework, state court resolutions of ineffective‐assistance claims receive strong deference, and relief is available only where there is no “fairminded” basis for the state court’s ruling. This ruling will guide both defense counsel and future litigants on counsel’s sentencing‐stage duties and the narrow scope of automatic prejudice under Cronic.