No Automatic Attorney’s Fees on Rule 41(a)(2) Dismissal With Prejudice: Busby v. Lamar and the Limits of Curative Conditions in Mississippi

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Mississippi’s decision in Leonard Busby, III, et al. v. The Lamar Company, LLC (decided December 11, 2025) arose from a prolonged, hard-fought business dispute between competing outdoor advertising companies over a single electronic billboard in Gulfport. What began as a contest over zoning, permits, and a settlement-based city ordinance ultimately ended without a trial, after seven years of litigation, when the plaintiff The Lamar Company (“Lamar”) sought to voluntarily dismiss its own suit.

On appeal, however, the case is not about who was “right” about the billboard. The dispositive question is narrower: when a plaintiff moves under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) to voluntarily dismiss its case with prejudice, must the plaintiff pay the defendant’s substantial attorney’s fees as a “condition” of dismissal, especially where the defendant claims the suit was baseless and pursued in bad faith?

The Supreme Court holds that the answer is no—at least on these facts. The Court affirms the trial court’s refusal to condition Lamar’s voluntary dismissal with prejudice on payment of nearly half a million dollars in attorney’s fees and also affirms the denial of sanctions under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and the Mississippi Litigation Accountability Act (“MLAA”).

In doing so, the Court:

Reaffirms that the decision whether to condition a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal on payment of fees and costs lies squarely within the trial court’s broad discretion.
Clarifies that the usual rationale for conditioning voluntary dismissals on payment of fees—avoiding duplicative expense when a plaintiff can refile—does not apply where the dismissal is with prejudice.
Emphasizes that litigation costs, standing alone, do not constitute “legal prejudice” sufficient to deny a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal.
Holds that a suit repeatedly found to have standing and litigated over years cannot be deemed “frivolous” or “without substantial justification” for Rule 11/MLAA purposes merely because the defendant vehemently disagrees.
Applies the fundamental appellate principle that there can be no reversal without both error and harm: a party cannot win reversal by attacking the reason for dismissal when it concedes that dismissal of the case was the correct result.

The case thus sets an important practical marker for Mississippi litigators: aggressive motion practice and forum maneuvering by a defendant will not be rewarded with fee-shifting simply because the plaintiff ultimately elects to dismiss its claims with prejudice, particularly where the plaintiff’s suit had at least a plausible basis in fact and law.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Parties and the Billboard Dispute

Lamar and various Busby-controlled entities (“Busby”), along with the Harrison County School District (initially an intervenor, then a co-defendant, and later an appellant before settling), are competitors and stakeholders in the outdoor advertising market on the Mississippi Gulf Coast.

In 2016, Lamar filed suit in Harrison County Chancery Court seeking to enjoin the construction and operation of a Busby-controlled electronic billboard on property owned by the Harrison County School District in Gulfport. Lamar alleged, among other things, that:

The billboard violated a Gulfport city ordinance adopted as part of a settlement between Lamar and the City of Gulfport in prior federal litigation.
The sign’s location and permitting violated spacing and permitting requirements, including its proximity to an existing Lamar-operated billboard.
Certain tort claims also arose from Busby’s conduct.

Busby responded not only with defenses but with its own counterclaims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The School District, having leased its property to Busby for the sign, aligned with Busby in resisting Lamar’s challenge.

B. Early Motions, Removal, and Transfer Between Courts

Busby quickly moved to dismiss Lamar’s complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The chancellor treated the motion as one for summary judgment and—after a hearing—announced from the bench that summary judgment would be denied, including rejecting Busby’s argument that Lamar lacked standing.

Before the written order was entered:

Busby petitioned the Mississippi Supreme Court for an interlocutory appeal.
While that petition was pending, Busby removed the case to federal court.
The day after removal, the chancellor entered a written order denying summary judgment and expressly rejecting Busby’s standing challenge.
The federal court promptly remanded the case, finding no arguable basis for federal jurisdiction and awarding Lamar its costs for the improper removal.
Busby later withdrew its interlocutory appeal petition.

Upon remand, Busby sought and obtained a transfer from chancery to circuit court—ostensibly for reasons of law and forum, though Lamar agreed only to avoid more delay. The circuit court then refused to disturb the chancery court’s prior denial of summary judgment, adopting the chancellor’s “sound” reasoning, including on standing. Busby again sought interlocutory review from the Supreme Court, which was denied.

Over the course of the next year or more, Busby continued to file multiple summary judgment motions, all unsuccessful, repeatedly reasserting the same essential themes—lack of standing, invalidity of Lamar’s claimed rights, and similar dispositive theories.

C. Lamar’s Settlement with a Third Party and Motion to Dismiss

By 2022, the posture of the dispute had materially changed. Lamar informed the circuit court that:

Busby had transferred its interest in the contested electronic billboard to a third party.
Lamar had resolved its dispute with that third party through a settlement agreement.

Lamar then moved under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) for voluntary dismissal of its suit against Busby. Rule 41(a)(2) provides that, once an answer or summary judgment motion has been filed, a plaintiff may only voluntarily dismiss by court order, “on such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.”

Busby opposed dismissal, not because it wanted to litigate the merits to trial, but because:

Busby contended Lamar had never had standing to sue and thus the court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction from the outset.
Busby insisted that the court should instead grant its pending summary judgment motion “for lack of standing,” thereby declaring Lamar the losing party on the merits (or jurisdiction) rather than allowing Lamar to exit via Rule 41(a)(2).
Busby sought more than $480,000 in attorney’s fees and costs, either:
- as a condition of voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2); or
- as sanctions under Rule 11 and the MLAA, on the theory that Lamar’s lawsuit was frivolous, baseless, and pursued in bad faith.

D. Trial Court Rulings

The circuit court:

Granted Lamar’s Rule 41(a)(2) motion and dismissed all claims with prejudice, without awarding any fees or costs to Busby.
Denied Busby’s then-pending summary judgment motion as moot.

Busby moved to vacate, alter, or amend the order. After roughly a year, the circuit court:

Granted the motion only to the extent of making more detailed factual findings under Rule 52.
Denied any change to the outcome of dismissal with prejudice and continued to decline to award fees or sanctions.

The court then issued a detailed, thirty-page order explaining:

Why it would not condition voluntary dismissal on Lamar’s payment of attorney’s fees and costs.
Why Lamar’s filings did not warrant Rule 11 or MLAA sanctions.
Why Busby’s own “aggressive motion practice” and litigation strategies—removal, interlocutory petitions, multiple dispositive motions—had substantially driven up costs and prolonged the case.

This order effectively ended seven years of litigation without a single claim being tried. Busby appealed the denial of attorney’s fees and sanctions; the School District initially joined but later settled and dismissed its own appeal.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirms across the board. Its key holdings are:

Scope of Appeal / Harmless Error: Because Busby does not seek a trial or any further litigation of Lamar’s claims—only attorney’s fees—the Court treats the only real issue on appeal as the denial of fees and sanctions. Even if the trial court arguably erred in granting Lamar’s Rule 41(a)(2) motion instead of Busby’s summary judgment motion, there is no reversible error because the end result (dismissal of Lamar’s claims with prejudice) is the same. Without harm, any such error would be harmless and not a ground for reversal.
Rule 41(a)(2) Dismissal and Attorney’s Fees: Under Carter v. Clegg and BellSouth Personal Communications, LLC v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, trial courts have considerable discretion to impose or decline “curative” conditions—such as attorney’s fees—when granting voluntary dismissal. Litigation costs alone do not constitute “legal prejudice” sufficient to deny dismissal. Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to condition dismissal on payment of Busby’s fees, in part because:
- The dismissal was with prejudice, so there was no risk Lamar would refile and subject Busby to duplicate expense.
- Much of Busby’s expenditures flowed from its own aggressive, ultimately unsuccessful procedural maneuvers.
- Granting Busby fees as a condition of dismissal would have placed it in a better position than if it had actually prevailed on summary judgment—where Mississippi Rule 56 does not authorize a moving party to recover its attorney’s fees.
Rule 11 and MLAA Sanctions: Sanctions under Rule 11 or the MLAA require a finding that the action is frivolous or “without substantial justification,” meaning that it has “no hope of success.” The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Lamar’s suit was not frivolous, given:
- Repeated trial-court rulings that Lamar did have standing.
- Substantial factual and legal arguments related to a prior settlement and ordinance.
- The absence of evidence that Lamar filed its claims purely to harass or delay, especially given Lamar’s dismissal only after Busby had sold its interest and Lamar settled with the new billboard owner.
The Supreme Court affirms the denial of sanctions under both Rule 11 and the MLAA.

In sum, Busby’s appeal fails because it cannot demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in denying fees and sanctions, nor that any procedural error caused it legally cognizable harm.

IV. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1. Harmless Error and the Need for Harm: Davis and Frierson

The Court grounds its discussion of the scope of appellate review in two classic Mississippi authorities:

Davis v. Agents Financial Corp., 249 Miss. 839, 164 So. 2d 449 (1964) – Quoted for the “universally recognized” principle that an appellate court will not reverse where there is no harm in the trial court’s decision, even if error occurred.
Frierson v. Sheppard Building Supply Co., 247 Miss. 157, 154 So. 2d 151 (1963) – Reinforces that both error and harm are required for reversal: “Before we can reverse a case we must find both error and harm therefrom.”

Here, any alleged error in choosing Lamar’s Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal over Busby’s summary judgment motion did not change the practical outcome: Lamar’s claims were dismissed with prejudice in any event. Busby never asked for a trial on the merits but only for a different path to the same end plus fees. The Court therefore treats those alleged errors as harmless for appellate purposes.

2. Voluntary Dismissal, “Legal Prejudice,” and Curative Conditions: Carter, BellSouth, and Federal Analogs

Mississippi’s Rule 41(a)(2) parallels Federal Rule 41(a)(2), and the Court, consistent with prior precedent, looks both to Mississippi cases and to federal authority interpreting the federal rule.

Carter v. Clegg, 557 So. 2d 1187 (Miss. 1990) – A foundational Mississippi case on Rule 41(a)(2).
- Establishes that voluntary dismissals under 41(a)(2) should generally be granted “unless some legal prejudice occurs” to the defendant.
- Emphasizes that “litigation costs, in and of itself, will not amount to legal prejudice,” citing Moore v. Interstate Fire Ins. Co., 717 F. Supp. 1193 (S.D. Miss. 1989).
- Recognizes that Rule 41(a)(2) allows “curative conditions” (like fees) to mitigate prejudice when appropriate.
BellSouth Personal Communications, LLC v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, 912 So. 2d 436 (Miss. 2005) – Clarifies that trial courts have “considerable discretion” in deciding whether to impose attorney’s fees and costs as conditions of dismissal.
Radiant Tech. Corp. v. Electrovert USA Corp., 122 F.R.D. 201 (N.D. Tex. 1988) – A federal district court decision relied on in Carter and again here. It highlights that conditions should “alleviat[e] the harm caused to the defendant,” focusing on:
- Defendant’s effort and expense in preparing for trial.
- Whether plaintiff caused excessive delay or failed to diligently prosecute.
Moore v. Interstate Fire Ins. Co., 717 F. Supp. 1193 (S.D. Miss. 1989) – Supports the principle that the expense of defending a lawsuit, by itself, does not constitute the type of “legal prejudice” justifying denial of voluntary dismissal.
Cauley v. Wilson, 754 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1985), and Taragan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 838 F.2d 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1988) – Stand for the widely accepted view that when dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) is without prejudice, a condition requiring payment of attorney’s fees may be appropriate to compensate defendants for “work product that will not be useful in subsequent litigation of the same claim.”

The Mississippi Supreme Court uses these authorities to draw an important distinction:

Where dismissal is without prejudice and refiling is possible, conditions such as paying the defendant’s fees serve an equitable, compensatory function.
Where dismissal is with prejudice, as in this case, the central rationale for imposing such a condition—avoiding duplicative expense in a future lawsuit—largely disappears.

This distinction is a key foundation for upholding the trial court’s refusal to impose a fee condition on Lamar’s dismissal.

3. Summary Judgment and Attorney’s Fees: Lawrence and Johnston

The Supreme Court also contrasts Rule 41(a)(2) with Rule 56(h), which deals specifically with summary judgment motions and fee-shifting in that context:

Southwest Mississippi Regional Medical Center v. Lawrence, 684 So. 2d 1257 (Miss. 1996), and Johnston v. Palmer, 963 So. 2d 586 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) – These cases explain that Rule 56(h) permits a non-moving party to recover fees and expenses when forced to respond to an unreasonable and unsuccessful summary judgment motion. However, Rule 56 does not allow a prevailing moving party to recover its fees merely because it won summary judgment.

The Supreme Court applies this framework to highlight a key inequity in Busby’s position:

If Busby had won summary judgment when it wanted to, Rule 56 would not have entitled it to recover its attorney’s fees. Yet Busby asked the court to award those same fees as a condition of Lamar’s voluntary dismissal. The trial court rightly noted that granting fees under Rule 41(a)(2) would place Busby in a better financial position than if its dispositive motions had been granted. This supported the trial court’s view that such a result would be “neither just nor proper.”

4. Sanctions and Frivolous Filings: Deakle, Tricon, Scruggs, and Choctaw

The Court’s analysis of sanctions under Rule 11 and the MLAA relies on longstanding Mississippi authority:

Leaf River Forest Products, Inc. v. Deakle, 661 So. 2d 188 (Miss. 1995) – Affirms that the standard for “frivolous” under Rule 11 and “without substantial justification” under the MLAA is essentially the same: a claim is frivolous when the pleader has “no hope of success.”
Tricon Metals & Services, Inc. v. Topp, 537 So. 2d 1331 (Miss. 1989) – Clarifies that, objectively, a claim is frivolous only if there is no realistic prospect it will succeed.
Scruggs v. Saterfiel, 693 So. 2d 924 (Miss. 1997) – Illustrates that mere unsuccessfulness of a claim does not equate to frivolity.
Choctaw, Inc. v. Campbell-Cherry-Harrison-Davis & Dove, 965 So. 2d 1041 (Miss. 2007) – Holds that the voluntary dismissal of claims does not, by itself, prove that those claims were interposed for delay or harassment.

Invoking these precedents, the Court rejects Busby’s contention that Lamar’s suit was frivolous merely because Busby believed Lamar lacked standing. Repeated trial court rulings recognizing Lamar’s standing and allowing the suit to proceed demonstrate that Lamar had, at a minimum, some “hope of success,” defeating any claim of frivolity.

5. Standing Doctrine and Its Evolution: Reeves, In re Initiative Measure 65, City of Picayune, and Kirk

An important substantive thread is the standing dispute. The Court references its own evolving standing jurisprudence:

Reeves v. Gunn, 307 So. 3d 436 (Miss. 2020) – The Court abandoned the broad “colorable interest” standard for standing and refocused on more concrete injury, i.e., an “adverse impact” different in kind or degree from the general public.
In re Initiative Measure No. 65, 338 So. 3d 599 (Miss. 2021) – Summarizes the new standing framework and distinguishes between the old “colorable interest” test and the retained “adverse impact” standard.
City of Picayune v. Southern Regional Corp., 916 So. 2d 510 (Miss. 2005) – Cited for the basic description of standing as the plaintiff’s right to enforcement of a legal duty and requirement of a “present, existent actionable title or interest.”
Kirk v. Pope, 973 So. 2d 981 (Miss. 2007) – Stands for the proposition that standing is jurisdictional; lack of standing is a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court explains:

When Lamar filed suit in 2016, the “colorable interest” standard still existed.
By the time the circuit court re-addressed standing, the standard had shifted; however, both the chancery and circuit courts grounded Lamar’s standing in the “adverse impact” standard, which survived the doctrinal shift.
The prior settlement between Lamar and the City of Gulfport, and the ordinance adopted pursuant to that settlement, at least created a factual dispute over Lamar’s unique, enforceable interest in the ordinance and sign spacing rules.

Against that background, the Court finds no merit in Busby’s argument that Lamar’s suit was jurisdictionally void and thus necessarily frivolous.

6. Dismissal With Prejudice and Standing: Williams v. Morris

Busby argued that, because dismissals for lack of standing must be without prejudice, the trial court erred by dismissing Lamar’s claims with prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2). Busby relied on:

Williams v. Morris, 614 F. App’x 773 (5th Cir. 2015) – A federal case holding that when a federal court dismisses for lack of standing, the dismissal must be without prejudice because the court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits.

The Supreme Court notes that this argument is largely rhetorical and internally inconsistent:

Busby does not actually want Lamar to be able to refile; indeed, Busby benefits from a dismissal with prejudice.
Rule 41(a)(2) expressly allows the trial court to specify that a dismissal is with prejudice, as the trial court did here.
There is therefore no real, appealable harm to Busby from the “with prejudice” formulation, and no reversible error.

The Court leaves undisturbed the trial court’s discretionary choice to dismiss with prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2).

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Narrowing the Real Issue on Appeal: Standing vs. Fees

The Court is careful to untangle what Busby actually seeks from what it merely complains about. Busby attacks:

Lamar’s standing to sue.
The trial court’s denial of Busby’s summary judgment motions.
The trial court’s grant of Lamar’s Rule 41(a)(2) motion.
Alleged “sword and shield” conduct by Lamar in discovery.

However, Busby does not seek a trial or further litigation of Lamar’s claims. It wants only a judgment that Lamar’s claims are dismissed for lack of standing (via Busby’s summary judgment) rather than dismissed on Lamar’s voluntary motion.

The Supreme Court thus recognizes that the only practical, outcome-changing issue is whether Busby is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs. Without a request for further proceedings on the merits, Busby cannot show harm from the correctness or incorrectness of the standing analysis itself. This framing dictates the Court’s application of the harmless error principle from Davis and Frierson.

2. Rule 41(a)(2): Discretion and the Absence of Legal Prejudice

The Court reiterates the Rule 41(a)(2) framework:

A plaintiff who has already been met with an answer or summary judgment motion may voluntarily dismiss only by court order.
The court “may” grant such dismissal “upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.”
Dismissal is ordinarily granted unless there is “legal prejudice” to the defendant beyond the ordinary costs of litigation.

Here, the trial court’s decision was driven by several findings, which the Supreme Court treats as supported by the record:

Busby’s own litigation strategy drove much of the cost and delay. The trial court emphasized Busby’s:
- Improper removal to federal court, which resulted in remand and an award of costs to Lamar.
- Abandoned and denied interlocutory appeals.
- Multiple, repetitive, unsuccessful summary judgment motions.
The trial court characterized this pattern as “aggressive motion practice” that created an “odyssey through the various courts.”
Dismissal with prejudice eliminates the usual concern about future, duplicative litigation. Because Lamar’s claims were extinguished with prejudice, Busby faced no risk of being hauled into court again on the same dispute. The standard justification for fee conditions—compensating defendants for work that will have to be repeated in a second suit—was therefore not present.
Granting fees would give Busby an unwarranted windfall compared to prevailing on summary judgment. Under Rule 56, even a prevailing movant generally cannot recover attorney’s fees simply for winning summary judgment. Conditioning dismissal on payment of Busby’s fees would have put Busby in a position better than if its dispositive motions had succeeded, contrary to equitable principles and the limited, curative purpose of Rule 41(a)(2) conditions.
Litigation costs alone do not equal “legal prejudice.” Echoing Carter and Moore, the Court notes that the expense of defending a lawsuit—even significant expense—does not, standing by itself, establish legal prejudice that would prevent a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal or require fee-shifting.

Given these factors, the Court holds that the trial court acted well within its “considerable discretion” in granting dismissal with prejudice, without conditioning it on payment of Busby’s attorney’s fees.

3. Rule 11 and MLAA: No “Frivolous” or “Without Substantial Justification” Filing

Turning to sanctions, the Court applies the well-settled Rule 11/MLAA standard:

A pleading is frivolous when, objectively, the party has “no hope of success.”
The MLAA’s “without substantial justification” standard is functionally identical: the claim must be frivolous, groundless in fact or law, or vexatious.

Busby’s central sanctions argument is that Lamar’s suit was frivolous from the outset because Lamar allegedly lacked standing, and standing is jurisdictional. Thus, says Busby, Lamar’s claims could never succeed.

The Court rejects this logic for two main reasons:

Repeated trial court rulings found that Lamar had standing. Both the chancery court and circuit court (after transfer) denied multiple Busby motions predicated on lack of standing. Even if those rulings were debatable, their consistent rejection of Busby’s standing arguments demonstrates that Lamar’s position was at least arguable—i.e., not devoid of hope.
Substantive standing analysis reveals at least a plausible basis for Lamar’s claim. Lamar alleged:
- A unique interest in the Gulfport sign ordinance, arising from a prior settlement agreement between Lamar and the City.
- Direct, adverse economic impact from the alleged violation of spacing and permitting rules—an impact different from that of the general public.
The Supreme Court agrees with the trial judge that the settlement agreement, on its own, “at a minimum created a factual dispute” about whether Lamar had an enforceable interest in the ordinance. That existence of a factual dispute is enough to defeat summary judgment and to show the claim was not frivolous.

Busby also alleged that Lamar had engaged in “sword and shield” tactics by relying on the settlement agreement while resisting disclosure based on a confidentiality clause. The Court notes that this, at most, raises a question about discovery conduct, which lies within the trial court’s sanctioning discretion. It does not, by itself, establish that the entire suit lacked any hope of success.

Finally, the Court notes that Lamar’s voluntary dismissal followed Busby’s transfer of its billboard interest and Lamar’s settlement with the new sign owner. This sequence does not support an inference that the suit was filed purely for delay or harassment. Citing Choctaw, Inc. v. Campbell-Cherry-Harrison-Davis & Dove, the Court reiterates that dismissal of claims does not automatically prove improper motive.

Given the trial court’s “extremely thorough review” and reasoned decision that Lamar’s complaint was not frivolous or without substantial justification, the Supreme Court finds no abuse of discretion in the denial of sanctions.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Clarifying the Role of Attorney’s Fees in Rule 41(a)(2) Dismissals With Prejudice

The most notable doctrinal contribution of the decision is its clear signal that attorney’s fees are not the default or automatic “price” of a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal with prejudice. The decision refines the use of fee conditions in three ways:

With-prejudice dismissals differ materially from without-prejudice dismissals. Where the plaintiff is permanently barred from refiling, the principal policy reason for awarding fees—to prevent duplication of defense effort in a second case—largely evaporates.
Conditions must be genuinely “curative,” not punitive or outcome-enhancing. A defendant should not be placed in a better position than it would have occupied had it prevailed on the merits. Using Rule 41(a)(2) to do what Rule 56(h) forbids—award fees to a prevailing movant—would distort the purpose of the rules.
Defendant-driven cost escalation can undermine claims of prejudice. If a substantial portion of the defense’s expense is self-generated by aggressive or unsuccessful defensive tactics (removals, interlocutory appeals, repetitive motions), a court may reasonably conclude that requiring the plaintiff to reimburse those costs is not “proper.”

Future litigants in Mississippi should thus be cautious in assuming that a large defense bill, without more, will justify conditioning dismissal on fee payment—especially where the dismissal is with prejudice and where the defendant’s own tactics contributed significantly to the litigation’s length and cost.

2. Reaffirming the High Bar for Sanctions

The decision strongly reinforces Mississippi’s relatively high threshold for sanctions under Rule 11 and the MLAA:

“No hope of success” is a stringent standard. Where trial courts repeatedly reject dispositive motions and find that a claim survives summary judgment, it is very difficult to call that claim frivolous in hindsight.
Merely losing—or even ultimately dismissing—does not equal frivolity. The Court’s reliance on Scruggs and Choctaw confirms that attorney discipline by fee-shifting is reserved for truly groundless or abusive filings, not simply for losing or abandoned claims.
Standing disputes are especially ill-suited for sanctions, absent clear bad faith. Because standing often turns on nuanced factual and legal questions—such as the existence and legal effect of prior settlements or specific injuries—it rarely meets the “no hope of success” standard.

The decision thus counsels that sanctions motions should be reserved for clear-cut cases of abuse, not simply as a back-end attempt to recoup defense costs in contentious but plausible litigation.

3. Appellate Strategy: Relief Sought vs. Rhetoric

The case also offers a cautionary lesson about appellate framing. Busby’s briefs deployed strong rhetoric about standing, alleged due process violations, and supposed judicial error, but Busby did not ask for remand for trial or any continuation of Lamar’s claims. It sought only a different formal basis for dismissal and an award of fees.

The Court’s reliance on the “no harm, no reversal” rule suggests that:

Appeals that complain about reasoning but concede the correctness of the outcome face a steep uphill climb.
To achieve reversal, appellants must articulate a concrete remedial interest—what outcome they want instead—not merely a desire to be “vindicated” in principle.

4. Standing Doctrine: Stability Amid Evolution

Although the main holding is procedural, the Court’s brief standing discussion is noteworthy. It confirms that, even after abandoning the broad “colorable interest” standard, Mississippi still recognizes standing based on “adverse impact” distinct from the public at large. Where a party has negotiated a settlement that produces a regulatory scheme (such as a billboard ordinance) and can show a special economic impact from its violation, standing can exist under the “adverse impact” theory.

This provides some doctrinal stability for litigants who rely on consent judgments or settlements that shape local regulatory frameworks. They are not necessarily stripped of standing by the broad reworking of standing doctrine in Reeves and In re Initiative Measure 65.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Voluntary Dismissal Under Rule 41(a)(2)

When a plaintiff wants to drop a lawsuit after the defendant has responded, it cannot simply file a notice of dismissal. Instead, under Rule 41(a)(2):

The plaintiff must ask the court for permission to dismiss the case.
The court may grant dismissal “on such terms and conditions as it deems proper.” These “terms” can include paying the defendant’s fees or costs in appropriate cases.
Unless the order says otherwise, the dismissal is “without prejudice,” meaning the plaintiff could theoretically file the same lawsuit again later.
If the court specifies “with prejudice,” the claims are permanently dismissed and cannot be refiled.

Here, Lamar requested dismissal, and the court allowed it, specifying “with prejudice.” The Supreme Court confirms that this is within the trial court’s discretion, and that there is no automatic requirement to impose fee conditions.

2. “Legal Prejudice” vs. Ordinary Litigation Burdens

Courts usually allow voluntary dismissal unless it would cause “legal prejudice” to the defendant. Legal prejudice means some harm beyond what is inherent in being sued, such as:

Losing a key legal advantage gained during the case.
Being forced to duplicate expensive work in a future refiled suit.

Simply having to pay lawyers and incur costs defending the original suit, by itself, is not “legal prejudice.” This is important because many defendants assume that “we spent a lot of money defending this” equates to legal prejudice; the Court reiterates that it does not.

3. “With Prejudice” vs. “Without Prejudice”

With prejudice: The case is over permanently. The plaintiff cannot file the same claims again. This finality often weighs against imposing fee conditions because there is no risk of duplicative litigation.
Without prejudice: The plaintiff is free to file the same case again later, often after correcting some problem. Here, courts are more likely to require the plaintiff to pay some of the defendant’s costs, particularly where refiling is anticipated.

4. Sanctions Under Rule 11 and the MLAA

Both Rule 11 and the MLAA allow courts to punish litigants who abuse the legal process. The key concept is frivolousness:

A filing is frivolous if, objectively, there is no reasonable chance it could succeed—“no hope of success.”
It can also be sanctionable if made solely to harass, delay, or needlessly complicate the case.

Sanctions can include ordering the offending party (and sometimes their lawyer) to pay the other side’s attorney’s fees and costs. But given the severe nature of this penalty, courts apply the standard strictly. The decision in Busby v. Lamar underscores that close or debatable issues—such as standing in a complex regulatory setting—are not sanctionable merely because one side ultimately loses or dismisses the case.

5. Standing

Standing is the legal requirement that a plaintiff have a sufficient connection to the dispute to bring a lawsuit. Generally, the plaintiff must show:

An injury—actual or imminent harm.
Traceability—the harm is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct.
Redressability—a court decision could meaningfully address the harm.

Mississippi’s more recent decisions emphasize that a plaintiff must show an “adverse impact” different from what the public at large experiences. In this case, Lamar claimed a special contractual and economic interest in how Gulfport’s billboard ordinance was enforced, arguing that a competitor’s violation near Lamar’s own sign directly harmed its business. Both trial courts accepted that Lamar had at least a plausible basis for standing.

VI. Conclusion

Busby v. Lamar is not a merits decision about who “owned” the right to erect or enforce rights in Gulfport’s contested billboard. Instead, it is a procedural and remedial decision that clarifies the boundaries of fee-shifting and sanctions in Mississippi civil practice.

Key takeaways include:

Trial courts retain broad discretion under Rule 41(a)(2) to grant voluntary dismissals and to decide whether to impose fee conditions. A dismissal with prejudice will rarely justify, and often cut against, conditioning dismissal on payment of the defendant’s attorney’s fees, especially where the defendant has substantially driven the case’s cost and complexity.
Litigation costs alone do not amount to “legal prejudice,” and Rule 41(a)(2) should not be re-purposed to create fee entitlements that are unavailable under Rule 56.
Sanctions under Rule 11 and the MLAA remain reserved for genuinely frivolous or abusive litigation—claims with no hope of success or filed purely to harass or delay—not for hard-fought, complex disputes where the plaintiff’s position is repeatedly accepted as legally sufficient to proceed.
On appeal, a party seeking reversal must demonstrate not only alleged errors below but also concrete harm and a meaningful alternative remedy. Attacking the reasoning without seeking a materially different result will generally not suffice.
Finally, the decision offers quiet reassurance that Mississippi’s evolving standing doctrine still protects plaintiffs with specific, adverse impacts arising from settlements and regulatory schemes, provided their claims present at least arguable legal and factual bases.

In the larger landscape of Mississippi law, Busby v. Lamar reinforces judicial restraint in fee-shifting and sanctioning, promotes careful use of voluntary dismissal conditions, and underscores the importance of measured, realistic appellate advocacy.