No Attenuation Without Preservation: Fourth Department Suppresses Station-House Statements After Unlawful Handcuffing During Traffic Stop

Introduction

In People v. Hernandez (2025 NY Slip Op 04315), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, issued a significant suppression ruling at the intersection of Fourth Amendment seizure law, the attenuation doctrine, and New York’s strict preservation rules. The case arises from a routine traffic stop in Rochester where two New York State Troopers, operating under a standard practice of handcuffing occupants before an inventory search, detained passenger Jesus Hernandez in handcuffs. Shortly thereafter, the driver disclosed the presence of a gun in the car, the gun was recovered, and Hernandez later made spontaneous and post-Miranda statements at the station claiming ownership.

On appeal from his conviction for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03[3]), Hernandez argued that the handcuffing converted the traffic stop into an unlawful forcible detention without the requisite reasonable suspicion, and that his statements should be suppressed as fruits of that illegality. The County Court had denied suppression; the Appellate Division reversed, ordered suppression of the statements, and granted a new trial.

The decision has two central holdings: first, a categorical handcuffing practice of vehicle occupants, without articulable officer-safety facts, unlawfully escalates a traffic stop into a forcible detention; and second, the People’s failure to argue attenuation at the suppression hearing—together with the suppression court’s failure to expressly decide that question—precludes salvaging the statements on attenuation grounds on appeal. A two-judge dissent would have held the case and remitted for a fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree ruling.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fourth Department held that placing Hernandez in handcuffs after ordering him out of the vehicle transformed a lawful traffic stop into a forcible detention requiring independent justification (e.g., articulable officer-safety concerns). None was shown; “high-crime area” alone is insufficient.
Because the detention was unlawful, Hernandez’s subsequent spontaneous and post-Miranda statements were subject to suppression unless the People established that they were sufficiently attenuated from the illegality. The People did not argue attenuation at the suppression hearing.
Under New York’s preservation rules, the appellate court could not uphold admission of the statements on an attenuation theory neither raised by the People nor expressly decided by the suppression court. The court reversed the conviction, granted suppression of the statements, and ordered a new trial.
Harmless error did not apply. The statements directly tied Hernandez to the gun and there was a reasonable possibility the error contributed to the verdict.
Dissent (Lindley, J.P., and Keane, J.): would hold the case, reserve decision, and remit for a determination of whether the statements were fruits of the unlawful detention, emphasizing that the unlawful handcuffing lasted “less than a minute” before the driver’s gun admission provided probable cause.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The court’s analysis draws on a well-established line of authority governing street encounters, seizures, and the fruits of illegality:

People v. De Bour, 40 NY2d 210 (1976): Establishes New York’s tiers of police-citizen encounters. The majority invokes De Bour to characterize the handcuffing as a “forcible stop and detention,” an elevated intrusion that must be supported by specific, articulable facts.
People v. Harrison, 57 NY2d 470 (1982): Recognizes that handcuffing and similar restraint measures escalate a stop and require commensurate justification. The majority relies on Harrison to underscore the need for additional circumstances beyond the traffic stop.
People v. Hernandez, 187 AD3d 1502 (4th Dept 2020); People v. Porter, 136 AD3d 1344 (4th Dept 2016); People v. Riddick, 70 AD3d 1421 (4th Dept 2010), lv denied 14 NY3d 844 (2010): These Fourth Department cases deny that presence in a high-crime area, without more, supplies reasonable suspicion or officer-safety justification for intrusive measures like handcuffing. The court synthesizes these authorities to reject the Troopers’ rationale.
Brown v. Illinois, 422 US 590 (1975); Dunaway v. New York, 442 US 200 (1979): Foundational U.S. Supreme Court precedents on the “fruit of the poisonous tree” and attenuation. The majority quotes and applies the Brown/Dunaway framework, emphasizing that voluntariness and Miranda compliance do not, by themselves, purge the taint of an illegal seizure.
People v. Bradford, 15 NY3d 329 (2010); People v. Butler, 80 AD2d 644 (2d Dept 1981): New York authorities adopting Brown/Dunaway attenuation factors: temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, and the purpose/flagrancy of misconduct.
People v. Clark, 149 AD2d 720 (2d Dept 1989): Attenuation must be argued and established by the People to admit statements after an illegality.
People v. Benbow, 193 AD3d 869 (2d Dept 2021): For preservation, the issue must be “expressly decided” by the lower court or properly raised by the party.
People v. Rollins, 125 AD3d 1540 (4th Dept 2015): “An appellate court may not uphold a police action on a theory not argued before the suppression court.” This principle anchors the majority’s refusal to reach attenuation sua sponte.
People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 (1975): Harmless error standard. The court finds a reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted statements contributed to the conviction.
Dissent’s authorities (contextual): Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471 (1963) (fruits analysis); People v. Turriago, 90 NY2d 77 (1997) (attenuation as an exception to the exclusionary rule); People v. Concepcion, 17 NY3d 192 (2011) and People v. LaFontaine, 92 NY2d 470 (1998) (limits on affirming on grounds not reached below); recent Appellate Division decisions (e.g., Crispell; Contreras) noting attenuation as an exception—but the dissent uses these to advocate remittal rather than outright suppression.

Collectively, these precedents shaped two decisive conclusions: (1) the handcuffing, unsupported by articulable facts, rendered the detention unlawful; and (2) absent a preserved attenuation argument or an express lower court ruling on attenuation, the statements must be suppressed as fruits of that illegality.

Legal Reasoning

1) Unlawful escalation from a traffic stop to a forcible detention

The Troopers’ blanket policy—“every single time we have somebody exit the vehicle, we put them in handcuffs”—is incompatible with De Bour and Harrison. A traffic infraction authorizes a stop; it does not license categorical handcuffing. Forcible detention requires specific, articulable safety or flight concerns, or a comparable necessity (e.g., transportation for a show-up), none of which the People proved. The location (Rochester; GI-VE detail; a high-crime area) cannot, without more, supply reasonable suspicion or safety justification. The majority therefore finds the handcuffing unlawful.

2) Fruits of the poisonous tree and attenuation

The sequence matters: unlawful handcuffing precedes the driver’s disclosure about a gun, the gun’s recovery, and Hernandez’s station-house statements (both spontaneous and post-Miranda). Under Brown and Dunaway, even voluntary, Miranda-compliant statements must be suppressed if obtained by exploitation of an antecedent constitutional violation, unless the People carry their burden to show sufficient attenuation.

Here, the People did not argue attenuation at the suppression hearing. On appeal, they suggested the suppression court implicitly decided the issue when it found the statements voluntary. The majority rejects that view, explaining that voluntariness/Miranda and attenuation are distinct inquiries and that the court’s decision addressed only Miranda voluntariness, not attenuation. Without a preserved attenuation theory or an express attenuation ruling, the Appellate Division cannot affirm on that ground, per Rollins and CPL 470.05(2).

The dissent would have remitted for the lower court to decide the fruit/attenuation issue, emphasizing that only “less than a minute” elapsed before probable cause arose from the driver’s admission, and highlighting the spontaneous nature of the statements. The majority, however, treats attenuation as a prosecutorial burden that must be raised and developed at the hearing; failure to do so forecloses reliance on that saving doctrine on appeal.

3) Harmless error

The court applies Crimmins and finds the error non-harmless. Hernandez’s statements were the only direct evidence linking him to the gun; their admission could reasonably have influenced the jury’s verdict. That suffices to require reversal and a new trial.

Impact and Implications

A. Police practices: No categorical handcuffing during traffic stops or inventory preparations

Agencies using blanket handcuffing protocols when removing occupants for impound/inventory face suppression risks. Officer safety concerns must be case-specific and supported by articulable facts (e.g., observed furtive gestures, threats, known violent history, specific intelligence).
“High-crime area” remains a contextual factor, not a standalone justification for forceful restraints. Fourth Department cases (Porter, Riddick) continue to cabin its use.

B. Prosecutorial strategy: Preserve attenuation—or lose it

Attenuation is not self-executing. The People must plead and prove it at the suppression hearing by developing a record addressing Brown/Dunaway factors: temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, purpose/flagrancy.
Miranda compliance and “spontaneity” are not substitutes for attenuation. Prosecutors should build a robust factual record (timelines, intervening events, any independent cause) and request explicit findings.
Failure to do so can lead to outright suppression on appeal rather than remittal, at least in the Fourth Department.

C. Defense practice: Distinguish Miranda from fruits; insist on findings

Emphasize that voluntary/Miranda-complaint statements can still be fruits of unlawful seizures.
Press for express rulings on illegality and attenuation; object to handcuffing as escalation absent articulable facts; highlight blanket policies.
On appeal, invoke preservation principles where the People failed to raise attenuation below.

D. Judicial administration: Clarity in suppression rulings

Suppression courts should separately address (i) legality of the stop/detention, (ii) Miranda voluntariness, and (iii) fruits/attenuation. Conflating these issues risks reversible error or necessitates remittal.
The decision may produce an interdepartmental tension about whether to remit when the People did not argue attenuation. The dissent’s approach invites remittal; the majority’s approach enforces strict preservation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Forcible stop and detention: A heightened seizure beyond a mere traffic stop, often indicated by handcuffing or comparable restraint. It must be justified by specific, articulable facts suggesting danger, flight risk, or comparable necessity.
High-crime area: A factor that can inform officer perceptions but does not, by itself, justify a forcible detention or handcuffing.
Fruit of the poisonous tree: Evidence (including statements) derived from a prior constitutional violation may be excluded to deter unlawful police conduct.
Attenuation doctrine: An exception to the exclusionary rule. Even if there was an initial illegality, evidence can be admitted if the connection has become sufficiently weak due to intervening events and other factors (e.g., passage of time, independent cause).
Miranda vs. attenuation: Miranda warnings address the Fifth Amendment voluntariness of statements. They do not automatically erase a prior Fourth Amendment violation. A statement can be voluntary yet still suppressed as the fruit of an illegal detention.
Preservation: To rely on a legal theory on appeal, the party must have raised it at the suppression hearing, or the court must have expressly decided it. Appellate courts generally cannot affirm based on a ground not argued or expressly ruled upon below.
Harmless error: Even if a legal error occurred, a conviction stands if there is no reasonable possibility the error affected the verdict. Here, the error was not harmless because the statements were central.
Inventory search and impound: A standardized, non-investigatory procedure to catalog property in an impounded vehicle. Although present in the background here, the ruling focuses on the seizure of the person (handcuffing), not the legality of the inventory search or the physical evidence.

Conclusion

People v. Hernandez crystallizes two powerful messages in New York suppression law. First, categorical officer-safety practices—such as always handcuffing occupants before an inventory search—cannot substitute for articulable facts justifying a forcible detention during a traffic stop. Location in a “high-crime area” does not fill the gap. Second, the People must preserve attenuation at the suppression hearing. Miranda compliance and voluntariness will not rescue statements tainted by an unlawful seizure unless the prosecution affirmatively proves that the taint has dissipated under Brown/Dunaway.

Practically, the decision will push law enforcement agencies to revise blanket handcuffing procedures, prompt prosecutors to litigate attenuation explicitly and early, and encourage suppression courts to issue discrete, comprehensive rulings on illegality, voluntariness, and fruits. The dissent’s call for remittal underscores a live procedural debate; but the controlling majority in the Fourth Department draws a clear line: no attenuation without preservation. In cases where statements directly tie a defendant to contraband, that line can determine the outcome.

Note: This slip opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. Parties and practitioners should monitor any subsequent history or related developments.