Introduction

In a consolidated, nonprecedential disposition, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed two district court orders arising from Barry J. Smith, Sr.’s long-running pattern of vexatious litigation and imposed enhanced appellate sanctions. The panel—Judges Hamilton, Pryor, and Kolar—decided the matter without oral argument on October 10, 2025.

The consolidated appeals involved:

• No. 25-1148: Smith v. United States Congress and Wisconsin Legislature (E.D. Wis. No. 19-cv-1001-pp), reviewing Chief Judge Pamela Pepper’s denial of Smith’s motion to rescind a previously imposed filing bar (with clarifications).
• No. 25-1540: Smith v. Community Care Inc. and Guardiantrac LLC d/b/a GT Independence (E.D. Wis. No. 20-CV-1482-JPS), reviewing Judge J.P. Stadtmueller’s denial of Smith’s motion to “reopen” a case dismissed years earlier pursuant to that filing bar.

The key issues were (1) whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to lift (and clarifying) the filing restriction on Smith, (2) whether a district court erred in refusing to reopen a case four years post-judgment where the plaintiff sought only leave to amend under Rule 15 without first vacating the judgment, (3) whether recusal of Judge Stadtmueller was warranted for alleged bias, and (4) whether appellate sanctions, including a circuit-wide “pay‑to‑file” bar until sanctions are paid, should be imposed for a frivolous appeal.

The opinion traces Smith’s litigation history following his 1990 conviction for threatening to kill a federal judge, including multiple lawsuits challenging restrictions premised on his status as a convicted felon and descendant of slaves, a 2019 district-wide filing bar with a three-year revisit mechanism, and prior Seventh Circuit sanctions ($2,000 in 2021 and $5,000 in 2023).

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed both district court orders:

• Chief Judge Pepper did not abuse her discretion by denying rescission of the 2019 filing bar. She appropriately clarified and tailored the restriction to bar only claims that had been repeatedly rejected (including those invoking the Bills of Attainder Clause, and the Second, Thirteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, or relying on Dred Scott), while permitting Smith to pursue other claims grounded in valid statutes or actionable constitutional provisions. The order also set a defined date—January 10, 2028—when Smith may again move to rescind or modify the bar.
• Judge Stadtmueller did not abuse his discretion in denying Smith’s attempt to “reopen” the case against Community Care and Guardiantrac. Because final judgment had entered years earlier, Rule 15 could not be invoked to amend absent first vacating the judgment under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). Smith never sought relief from judgment. Even if construed as a Rule 59/60 request, any such attempt would have been untimely or unsupported.
• Smith’s recusal claim against Judge Stadtmueller failed. Adverse rulings and knowledge gained in judicial proceedings do not constitute bias.
• Sanctions were granted for a frivolous appeal (rehashing previously rejected bias claims and ignoring settled post-judgment amendment procedure). The court imposed a $7,500 fine and ordered payment of the appellees’ reasonable attorney’s fees under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38. The court also directed the clerks of all federal courts within the Seventh Circuit to return unfiled any papers submitted by or on behalf of Smith until he pays the sanction in full, with exceptions for criminal cases and habeas applications. If unable to pay despite best efforts, Smith may move to modify or rescind the order after two years.

The result: both district court orders are affirmed, and a new appellate sanction regime applies to Smith prospectively within the circuit until the monetary sanction is satisfied.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1): Provides appellate jurisdiction over orders granting or denying injunctions. The court used this to review the denial of the motion to lift the filing bar, treating it as an injunctive-type restriction.
• Martin v. Redden, 34 F.4th 564 (7th Cir. 2022): Confirms abuse-of-discretion review for orders addressing filing restrictions. Guided the standard of review for the denial of rescission.
• Support Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Mack”): Foundational authority recognizing courts’ “ample” power to curb abusive filings, including returning unfiled papers and imposing “pay‑to‑file” mechanisms, with customary exceptions for criminal/habeas filings. The panel’s circuit-wide filing ban pending payment and the exceptions track Mack.
• In re Sassower, 510 U.S. 4 (1993): Sanctions must be tailored to the abuse. This supports the district court’s careful clarification of the scope of Smith’s filer restriction and the appellate court’s escalation of sanctions calibrated to his continued conduct.
• Reed v. PF of Milwaukee Midtown, LLC, 16 F.4th 1229 (7th Cir. 2021): Litigants must demonstrate intent to desist from abusive filings before a restriction is lifted. Smith’s ongoing suits and appeals undermined any claim to rescission.
• In re Chapman, 328 F.3d 903 (7th Cir. 2003): Filing restrictions must preserve meaningful access while preventing abuse. The district court’s clarification—that Smith may bring other claims under valid statutes or actionable constitutional provisions—fits Chapman’s tailoring requirement.
• Foster v. DeLuca, 545 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2008) and Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2004): After final judgment, amendment under Rule 15 is permitted only after the judgment is vacated or set aside under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). These cases compelled denial of Smith’s motion to amend post-judgment.
• Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994): Judicial rulings and information acquired in prior proceedings do not establish bias. The panel relied on Liteky to reject Smith’s recusal theory.
• Mac Naughton v. Asher Ventures, LLC, 76 F.4th 539 (7th Cir. 2023): Sanctions are appropriate when an appeal is frivolous and sanctions are warranted. The panel applied this to award FRAP 38 sanctions.
• Upchurch v. O’Brien, 111 F.4th 805 (7th Cir. 2024): Addresses fee-shifting under FRAP 38 for frivolous appeals. The court ordered reasonable attorney’s fees for appellees defending against Smith’s appeal.
• In re City of Chicago, 500 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2007): Authorizes return‑unfiled directives and “pay‑to‑file” regimes pending satisfaction of sanctions. The panel’s directive to all federal court clerks in the circuit mirrors this precedent.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds along three well-settled tracks—standards for rescinding filer restrictions, the law governing post-judgment amendments, and the recusal standard—before turning to sanctions.

• Filing restriction and rescission (abuse-of-discretion review): The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed the judiciary’s authority to impose filing restrictions to halt abusive litigation, emphasizing that such measures must be tailored and revisit-able. While perpetual bars are disfavored, the controlling question is whether the litigant has demonstrated an intent to desist. Smith’s continued filings on theories already rejected (including litigation premised on his race, status as a descendant of slaves, and reliance on discredited constitutional theories) justified maintaining the bar. Chief Judge Pepper’s clarifications narrowly cabined the restriction to recycled, rejected claims while affirmatively preserving access for other claims. And the order sets a future date—January 10, 2028—when Smith can again seek modification or rescission, addressing concerns of indefiniteness.
• Post-judgment amendment procedure (Rule 15 vs. Rules 59/60): The court applied Foster and Dubicz to hold that a litigant cannot amend a complaint after final judgment simply by invoking Rule 15. A plaintiff must first obtain relief from the judgment under Rule 59(e) (28-day window) or Rule 60(b) (with strict time limits for 60(b)(1)-(3) and narrow grounds for 60(b)(4)-(6)). Because Smith never moved to vacate the judgment, Judge Stadtmueller was bound to deny leave to amend; indeed, even a generous construction would have rendered any Rule 59/60 effort untimely and unsupported, as the panel’s footnote explains.
• Recusal (28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and Liteky): The court rejected the bias claim against Judge Stadtmueller, noting that adverse rulings and knowledge gained from presiding over Smith’s past proceedings do not amount to personal bias. The panel also observed it had previously rejected this very argument by Smith.
• Sanctions and circuit-wide “pay‑to‑file” directive: Finding Smith’s appeal frivolous, the court imposed a $7,500 fine and awarded reasonable attorney’s fees to Community Care Inc. and Guardiantrac LLC under FRAP 38. To ensure compliance, and consistent with Mack and In re City of Chicago, the court directed the clerks of all federal courts within the Seventh Circuit to return unfiled any papers submitted by or on behalf of Smith until the sanctions are fully paid. This filing bar expressly excludes criminal matters and habeas petitions and allows Smith to move to modify or rescind after two years if, despite best efforts, he cannot pay. The panel noted that this appellate sanction does not alter the separate district-court filing restriction.

Impact

Although labeled “Nonprecedential” under Seventh Circuit practice, the disposition is instructive on several fronts and may influence future case-management decisions:

• Reaffirmation of post-judgment amendment protocol: Litigants—especially pro se parties—often conflate Rule 15’s liberal amendment standard with the post-judgment posture. This decision reinforces that after final judgment, a Rule 15 amendment is unavailable unless and until the judgment is vacated under Rules 59 or 60, which have strict timing and substantive requirements. District courts can rely on Foster and Dubicz to summarily deny Rule 15 motions made post-judgment without a companion vacatur motion.
• Tailored filer restrictions as a sustainable remedy: The court endorses carefully tailored filing bars that focus on specific, repeatedly rejected claim-sets, while emphasizing that access to raise other, new, or nonfrivolous claims must remain open. The opinion provides a workable template: articulate the barred claim categories, preserve room for legitimate filings, and provide a date-certain future review mechanism.
• Escalation of sanctions for recidivist filers: The opinion demonstrates an escalation path: warnings and fines proved insufficient ($2,000, then $5,000), prompting a higher fine ($7,500), fee shifting under FRAP 38, and a circuit-wide pay‑to‑file directive. Future panels may find this roadmap useful when earlier sanctions fail to deter abusive filings.
• Clarity on identity versus claim content: In response to Smith’s request for clarification, the district court made clear that the restriction is not identity-based (e.g., identifying as Black). It is claim-content based: it bars re-litigation of previously rejected legal theories. This precision mitigates concerns of viewpoint or identity discrimination and strengthens the restriction’s defensibility.
• Recusal reiteration: The panel’s reliance on Liteky underscores that litigants cannot bootstrap routine adverse rulings or judicial familiarity with a party’s history into judicial-disqualification claims. Failure to heed this settled rule can itself support sanctions when such arguments are repeatedly and frivolously reasserted.
• Administrative guidance to clerks and parties: The return‑unfiled directive, with explicit exceptions and a two-year modification window for inability to pay, is a practical management tool for the courts and a cautionary signal to litigants about the real consequences of persistent frivolous appeals.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Nonprecedential disposition: A decision designated “Nonprecedential” is not binding precedent but may be cited as permitted by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1. It often reflects settled law applied to specific facts, as here.
• Filing restriction (restricted filer order): A court order that limits a litigant’s ability to file certain kinds of cases or papers, usually aimed at stopping repetitive, frivolous, or harassing litigation. Tailored restrictions must leave room for legitimate filings and often include a future review date.
• “Pay‑to‑file” sanction and return‑unfiled directive: When a litigant accrues sanctions for frivolous filings and does not pay them, the court can direct clerks to return unfiled any new submissions until payment is made. Criminal cases and habeas petitions are typically exempt.
• Amendment after final judgment: After a case is closed with a final judgment, you cannot amend the complaint just by asking under Rule 15. You must first successfully ask the court to reopen the case by vacating the judgment under Rule 59(e) (within 28 days) or Rule 60(b) (narrow grounds; certain grounds have a one-year limit). Only if the judgment is set aside can you then seek leave to amend.
• Recusal for bias (28 U.S.C. § 455(a)): A judge must step aside if their impartiality might reasonably be questioned. However, adverse rulings or knowledge gained in the course of presiding over a case do not, without more, show bias. This comes from the Supreme Court’s decision in Liteky.
• FRAP 38 sanctions: If an appeal is frivolous, the court of appeals may impose monetary sanctions, including ordering the appellant to pay the appellee’s reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in the appeal. Courts often set deadlines for payment and for fee submissions.
• “Bills of Attainder” and other barred theories noted in the order: A bill of attainder is a legislative act that inflicts punishment without a judicial trial, which the Constitution forbids. The district court clarified that Smith’s restriction bars reassertion of specific constitutional theories previously rejected—including those invoking bills of attainder and certain amendments (Second, Thirteenth, Fifteenth), as well as reliance on the long‑overruled Dred Scott decision—while permitting other valid claims.

Conclusion

This Seventh Circuit disposition is a comprehensive application of established doctrine to a persistent pattern of vexatious litigation. It clarifies and reaffirms three core points of practice:

• Filing restrictions can and should be narrowly tailored, revisited over time, and focused on previously rejected claim-sets, preserving meaningful access for legitimate claims.
• After final judgment, Rule 15 is not a vehicle for amendment. A litigant must first obtain relief from the judgment under Rule 59(e) or 60(b); otherwise, amendment is categorically unavailable.
• Frivolous appellate litigation invites escalating sanctions, including fines, fee-shifting, and a circuit-wide “pay‑to‑file” regime until sanctions are paid, with limited exceptions for criminal and habeas matters and a defined path to seek modification upon demonstrated inability to pay.

While nonprecedential, the decision offers a crisp, practical synthesis of Seventh Circuit tools for managing abusive filings, a reminder of post‑judgment procedural guardrails, and a reaffirmation of the stringent standards for judicial recusal. For litigants and courts alike, it provides a clear blueprint: targeted restrictions, disciplined post‑judgment procedure, and measured but firm sanctions when deterrence is needed.