No Advisory Opinions After Supervision Ends; PLRA Screenings Must Distinguish Absolute vs. Qualified Immunity and Substantive vs. Procedural Due Process (Crowder v. Herman)

No Advisory Opinions After Supervision Ends; PLRA Screenings Must Distinguish Absolute vs. Qualified Immunity and Substantive vs. Procedural Due Process

Crowder v. Herman, No. 24-6674 (4th Cir. Oct. 28, 2025) (unpublished)

Introduction

In this unpublished opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed as moot the appeal from the denial of injunctive relief brought by Daniel L. Crowder, a former North Carolina supervisee, challenging a no-contact condition barring him from living with or contacting his wife during his term of post-release supervision (PRS). The panel vacated the district court’s PLRA screening dismissal of Crowder’s damages claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and remanded for a clarified immunity analysis and separate consideration of the pleaded substantive and procedural due process claims.

The case centers on whether state parole officials and commission members are immune from damages for imposing and administering a PRS condition that limits spousal contact, and whether the district court properly abstained under Younger v. Harris from enjoining the condition. With Crowder’s PRS having ended, the Fourth Circuit held that his equitable claims are moot and refused to opine on the propriety of Younger in these circumstances. As to damages, the Fourth Circuit found the district court’s screening order insufficiently specific: it did not say whether it relied on absolute or qualified immunity, whether immunity varied by defendant function (commission members versus parole officer), or whether it evaluated substantive and procedural due process distinctly.

Parties:

  • Plaintiff–Appellant: Daniel L. Crowder
  • Defendants–Appellees: Members of the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission (Gregory Moss, Jr.; Graham Atkinson; Haley Phillips; Darren Jackson, Chair) and a parole officer (Bethany Herman)

Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit’s disposition is succinct:

  • Injunctive and declaratory relief claims: Dismissed as moot. Crowder’s PRS ended on May 7, 2025; the requested injunction against the no-contact condition could no longer afford relief. The court declined to issue an advisory opinion about Younger abstention.
  • Damages claims: Vacated and remanded. The district court’s PLRA screening dismissal did not specify whether it rested on absolute or qualified immunity, did not distinguish among defendants’ functions (imposition versus administration), and did not separately analyze substantive versus procedural due process. The Fourth Circuit instructed the district court to clarify its immunity rulings and to analyze Crowder’s substantive and procedural due process claims separately.

Bottom line: Dismissed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited and How They Matter

  • Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The district court abstained under Younger, reasoning that intervening in PRS administration would interfere with state proceedings. The Fourth Circuit did not reach the issue because the injunctive claims became moot once Crowder’s PRS ended. The opinion thus leaves unanswered whether Younger applies to challenges to PRS conditions in this context.
  • United States v. Batato, 833 F.3d 413, 422 (4th Cir. 2016), and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968). Cited for the prohibition on advisory opinions. Once the case became moot as to equitable relief, the court could not opine on the appropriateness of abstention.
  • Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993). Establishes the “functional approach” to immunity: absolute immunity attaches based on the nature of the function performed, not the actor’s identity. This is critical to remand—the district court referenced parole roles but did not perform a function-specific analysis (adjudicatory versus administrative/supervisory tasks).
  • Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). Reiterates qualified immunity’s two-prong inquiry: (1) whether a constitutional violation occurred, and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time. The panel noted that the district court’s order did not reveal which prong, if any, it resolved.
  • Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). Quoted for the “essence” of procedural due process—notice and an opportunity to be heard when serious interests are at stake. The panel read Crowder’s pro se allegations to include a procedural due process theory and instructed the district court to evaluate it separately.
  • Pope v. Chew, 521 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1975), and Douglas v. Muncy, 570 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 1978). These Fourth Circuit cases recognize absolute immunity for parole board members when performing quasi-judicial functions (e.g., deciding parole, revocation). The district court cited these cases to dismiss damages claims but without addressing whether the specific conduct at issue—imposing and administering a PRS no-contact condition—was quasi-judicial or instead administrative/prosecutorial in nature.
  • Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(3). Acknowledges that the district court is not required to issue findings or conclusions when ruling on a motion. The Fourth Circuit emphasized it did not fault the district court for brevity at the PLRA screening stage but needed clarity to facilitate appellate review.
  • 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Governs PLRA in forma pauperis screenings; permits sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim. The case highlights the challenge of adjudicating immunity sua sponte without adversarial briefing.
  • 28 U.S.C. § 2106. Authorizes appellate courts to vacate and remand for further proceedings as justice requires—used here to send the case back for a clarified immunity and due process analysis.
  • North Carolina PRS statutes: N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1368 et seq., including § 15A-1368.4(b)-(c) (mandatory and discretionary PRS conditions). These provisions frame the Commission’s authority to impose conditions “reasonably necessary” to promote law-abiding behavior, a backdrop for assessing the nature of the Commissioners’ functions.

Legal Reasoning

1) Mootness and the Prohibition on Advisory Opinions

Crowder’s appeal on injunctive relief was dismissed as moot because his PRS ended on May 7, 2025. Without an ongoing supervision term, the court could not grant the requested injunction invalidating the no-contact condition. The panel declined the appellant’s invitation to “clarify” Younger’s applicability as it would amount to an advisory opinion—impermissible under Article III.

The opinion does not explore mootness exceptions (e.g., “capable of repetition, yet evading review”), presumably because Crowder conceded mootness and did not argue an exception. Practitioners should note that completion of a fixed-term supervision often moots forward-looking equitable relief unless an exception is preserved and proved.

2) Immunity: Function Matters, Labels Don’t

The core of the remand is the court’s insistence on a function-based immunity analysis. While parole commissioners may have absolute immunity when performing quasi-judicial tasks (as in Pope and Douglas), that immunity does not extend wholesale to all actions undertaken by officials based simply on their titles. Buckley mandates examination of the “nature of the function performed.”

The district court’s PLRA screening order did not specify:

  • Whether it invoked absolute immunity, qualified immunity, or both;
  • Which functions were at issue for each defendant (Commission members who allegedly imposed the condition versus a parole officer who allegedly implemented it);
  • Under qualified immunity, whether dismissal rested on the absence of a constitutional violation or the absence of a clearly established right (al-Kidd).

The Fourth Circuit therefore vacated and remanded for a clarified immunity analysis distinguishing among defendants and functions:

  • Commission members: Was the imposition of a no-contact condition an adjudicatory, quasi-judicial function akin to a parole grant/denial (favoring absolute immunity), or a more administrative or supervisory function (favoring only qualified immunity)?
  • Parole officer: Implementing or enforcing an already-imposed condition typically sounds in administrative or supervisory conduct, which generally triggers qualified, not absolute, immunity—but the district court must decide based on function and facts.

3) Separate Analyses for Substantive and Procedural Due Process

The panel discerned that Crowder’s pro se complaint advanced both:

  • Substantive due process: a claim that the condition itself (barring spousal cohabitation/contact) impermissibly infringed a fundamental liberty interest without sufficient justification; and
  • Procedural due process: a claim that, given the gravity of the restriction, the state was required to afford him notice and an opportunity to be heard before, or at least promptly after, imposing the condition (Mathews v. Eldridge).

The district court did not differentiate these theories when dismissing on “immunity” grounds. On remand, the court must evaluate the viability of each claim and whether different immunities or qualified-immunity prongs apply to each.

Impact and Practical Implications

For District Courts Conducting PLRA Screenings

The opinion signals that even at the screening stage, when dismissing on immunity grounds, courts should:

  • Identify whether dismissal is based on absolute immunity, qualified immunity, or both;
  • Apply a function-based analysis to each defendant’s conduct, distinguishing adjudicatory/quasi-judicial functions from administrative or enforcement functions;
  • Clarify, for qualified immunity, whether the ruling rests on no constitutional violation or on the absence of clearly established law; and
  • Address distinct constitutional theories separately (e.g., substantive versus procedural due process).

For Litigants Challenging Supervision Conditions

  • Mootness trap: Equitable challenges to supervision conditions often become moot upon completion of the term. Consider seeking preliminary relief, expedited proceedings, or identifying and preserving a mootness exception (e.g., “capable of repetition, yet evading review”) where appropriate.
  • Plead with specificity: Identify who imposed a condition and who enforced it, and describe the function each defendant performed to inform the immunity analysis.
  • Preserve multiple theories: Plead both substantive and procedural due process theories (where supported), as different doctrines and immunities may apply differently to each.
  • Damages remain: Even if equitable relief moots out, damages claims can keep constitutional issues alive—subject to immunity defenses.

On the Scope of Absolute Immunity for Parole Decisionmakers

The opinion does not resolve whether imposing or tailoring supervision conditions is a quasi-judicial function protected by absolute immunity. Pope and Douglas support absolute immunity for core adjudicatory acts (parole grant/denial/revocation). Whether condition-setting during PRS qualifies as quasi-judicial may depend on factors such as:

  • Whether the Commission engaged in a hearing-like process with factfinding and adjudication;
  • Whether the act mirrors judicial decisionmaking (impartial adjudication of contested facts) rather than policy or enforcement work; and
  • Whether other safeguards (appeal, review) exist akin to judicial process (per Butz/Buckley functional factors).

Unresolved Younger Questions in the PRS Context

By dismissing the equitable claims as moot, the panel avoided deciding whether federal injunctions against PRS conditions categorically trigger Younger abstention. Post-Sprint Communications, Younger is limited to three “exceptional” categories of state proceedings. Whether PRS administration fits within those categories remains an open question in this case. Thus, future litigants will need to brief:

  • Whether PRS administration is an ongoing judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding under Younger;
  • Whether adequate state forums exist to raise federal constitutional challenges; and
  • Whether extraordinary circumstances or bad faith exceptions to Younger apply.

Qualified Immunity and “Clearly Established” Law for Spousal-Contact Restrictions

If the district court reaches qualified immunity, it will need to determine:

  • Violation: Whether a no-contact-with-spouse condition violates substantive due process (intimate association/marriage) or procedural due process in the manner imposed; and
  • Clearly established: Whether, at the time of imposition, governing precedent put the unlawfulness of such a restriction “beyond debate,” especially in the supervised-release or parole context.

While Supreme Court decisions recognize a fundamental right to marry and intimate association, conditions on supervisees’ liberty are judged in light of correctional interests. The lack of clear, controlling precedent specific to PRS spousal-contact bans may weigh heavily at the “clearly established” prong, but that is a fact- and jurisdiction-specific inquiry the district court must undertake.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Post-Release Supervision (PRS): A period after incarceration during which an individual is conditionally released to the community under supervision and must comply with conditions set by a parole or supervision authority. Violations can lead to sanctions or re-incarceration.
  • Younger Abstention: A doctrine counseling federal courts to refrain from interfering in certain ongoing state proceedings that implicate important state interests and provide an adequate opportunity to raise federal challenges. It is not a jurisdictional bar but a prudential limit, now narrowly confined to specified categories of proceedings.
  • Mootness: A case becomes moot when events make it impossible for a court to grant effective relief. Federal courts cannot issue advisory opinions on moot issues.
  • Absolute vs. Qualified Immunity:
    • Absolute immunity fully shields certain officials for specific functions (e.g., judges for judicial acts, parole board members for quasi-judicial decisions). It turns on the function performed, not the job title.
    • Qualified immunity protects government officials from damages unless they violate a constitutional right that was “clearly established” at the time. Courts ask (1) whether there was a violation; and (2) whether the right was clearly established.
  • Functional Approach to Immunity: Courts examine the nature of the act (adjudication, advocacy, investigation, administration), not the actor’s identity, to determine the type of immunity.
  • Substantive vs. Procedural Due Process:
    • Substantive due process protects fundamental rights from arbitrary government interference, requiring strong justification for burdens on those rights.
    • Procedural due process requires fair procedures—notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard—before the state deprives a person of significant liberty or property interests. The Mathews v. Eldridge test balances private interests, risk of error, value of additional safeguards, and government burdens.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Crowder v. Herman offers two practical directives for federal litigation at the intersection of parole supervision and constitutional rights:

  • No advisory opinions: Once a supervisee’s term ends, injunction claims aimed at supervision conditions are ordinarily moot. Courts will not opine on abstention or other merits-based questions without a live controversy.
  • Clarity in immunity and due process analyses at the PLRA screening stage: When dismissing damages claims based on immunity, district courts should specify whether dismissal rests on absolute or qualified immunity, apply a function-based analysis to each defendant’s conduct, and separately address substantive and procedural due process claims.

Although nonprecedential, the opinion underscores the importance of precision in early-stage immunity rulings and careful pleading in constitutional challenges to supervision conditions. It leaves open significant questions—especially the applicability of Younger abstention to PRS condition challenges and the extent to which imposing a particular PRS condition is a quasi-judicial act conferring absolute immunity. On remand, the district court’s analysis of function, the distinct due process theories, and any clearly established-law inquiry will shape not only the fate of Crowder’s damages claims but also the practical boundaries of § 1983 liability for officials who craft and enforce community-supervision conditions.

Note: This decision is unpublished and therefore not binding precedent in the Fourth Circuit. It may, however, be cited for its persuasive reasoning.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

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