No Advantage Through Threats: Kentucky Supreme Court Re-Affirms that Subjective Belief Cannot Excuse Violations of SCR 3.130(3.4)(f) and 8.2(a)

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Kentucky’s opinion in In Re: Brandy Kathleen Lawrence Barrett, 2025-SC-0184-KB (14 Aug 2025) provides an instructive illustration of the limits of “hard-nosed” advocacy. Attorney Brandy Kathleen Lawrence Barrett, co-counsel in a contentious child-custody case, filed a series of extraordinary motions accusing opposing counsel, court staff, and even the presiding judge of corruption and criminal conduct. Those filings, along with a motion that implicitly threatened criminal prosecution of opposing counsel, triggered disciplinary proceedings before the Kentucky Bar Association (KBA).

Relying on Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 3.480(2), Barrett and the Office of Bar Counsel (OBC) negotiated a resolution: a 30-day suspension, fully probated for one year on conditions. In approving that disposition, the Court clarified two recurring issues in lawyer discipline: (i) a lawyer’s subjective belief in the truth of her allegations does not shield her from liability when a pleading is used “solely to obtain an advantage,” and (ii) accusations against judges or court staff filed with “reckless disregard” for the truth violate the profession’s core duties of honesty and respect for the tribunal.

Parties and Key Players

Respondent: Brandy Kathleen Lawrence Barrett, admitted 2013, Bar No. 95762.
Complainant: Office of Bar Counsel, Kentucky Bar Association.
Underlying litigants: Benjamin Dusing (father/client) v. Jill Bakker (mother); custody case before Judge Christopher Mehling.
Third parties referenced in motions: Stephanie Dietz (opposing counsel) and Alice Keys (judge’s staff attorney).

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court accepted the negotiated plea in which Barrett admitted to:

Two counts of violating SCR 3.130(3.4)(f) – presenting or threatening criminal/disciplinary charges to gain a civil advantage, by:
- Filing a motion to disqualify opposing counsel that implied criminal misconduct.
- Including similar threats in three later disqualification motions aimed at the judge and his staff.
One count of violating SCR 3.130(8.2)(a) – making statements about a judge’s integrity with reckless disregard for their truth.

Sanction imposed:

30-day suspension, entirely probated for 12 months, conditioned on
- No new disciplinary charges during probation,
- Timely bar dues and CLE compliance, and
- Payment of $243.70 costs within 90 days.

The majority (6-1) approved the sanction, emphasizing Barrett’s contrition, limited record, and cooperation with OBC. Justice Bisig dissented without opinion; Justice Keller concurred in result only.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Waller, 929 S.W.2d 181 (Ky. 1996) – six-month suspension for scurrilous language (“lying incompetent ass-hole”) directed at a judge. The Court noted:
- Persistent abusive filings plus lack of remorse justified an upward departure from a public reprimand.
Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Blum, 404 S.W.3d 841 (Ky. 2013) – 181-day suspension for:
- Threatening opposing counsel and hearing officer with bar complaints (SCR 3.130(3.4)(f));
- Repeated, unsubstantiated allegations of conspiracy and bias against a judicial officer (SCR 8.2(a));
- Flooding the tribunal with disruptive motions (SCR 3.130(3.5)(c)).
Aggravating factors included multiple prior admonitions and no acceptance of fault.

By setting Barrett’s sanction below Waller and Blum, the Court implicitly adopted a graduated approach: (1) Nature of conduct, (2) mitigating/aggravating factors, and (3) attorney’s remorse now carry heavy weight in negotiated dispositions.

B. Legal Reasoning

Violation of SCR 3.130(3.4)(f)
The rule targets abuse of the criminal process as leverage in civil matters. Barrett’s February 19 motion and later filings threatened or referenced criminal prosecution of Stephanie Dietz, overtly to disqualify her and tilt the custody case. Under Blum, the Court reiterated that:
“The focal point is the purpose of the threat, not the accuracy of the underlying accusation.”
Barrett’s subjective belief, even if sincere, was therefore “only marginally consequential.”
Violation of SCR 3.130(8.2)(a)
A lawyer must not recklessly disparage the integrity of judicial officers. Barrett signed motions asserting: “Rank corruption has occurred… the trial was decided in advance… the staff attorney was ‘caught red-handed’ manipulating orders.” She later conceded she made no independent investigation and simply relied on her co-counsel’s narrative – classic “reckless disregard” for truth.
Sanction Selection
• The Court balanced:
- Nature and seriousness of conduct (threats + reckless accusations);
- Mitigation (contrition, cooperation, single prior private admonition);
- Comparison to Waller & Blum.
• Because Barrett accepted responsibility and agreed to conditions, a fully probated suspension was viewed as proportionate deterrence.
• The opinion implicitly endorses negotiated sanctions as an efficient alternative to protracted trials when the respondent is amenable and the public interest is protected.

C. Likely Impact on Future Practice

Reinforces a bright-line rule: any hint that a lawyer is using criminal accusations to gain civil leverage risks discipline regardless of evidentiary support.
Elevates duty of independent inquiry: attorneys may not rely on clients or co-counsel for explosive allegations against the judiciary; personal investigation is mandatory.
Encourages early resolution: demonstrates the Court’s willingness to entertain negotiated settlements under SCR 3.480(2), conserving disciplinary resources while maintaining accountability.
Probated suspensions can now be expected where (a) misconduct is serious but isolated, (b) the lawyer shows prompt remorse, and (c) public protection conditions are added.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

SCR 3.130(3.4)(f) – Think of it as the “no blackmail” rule for lawyers. You cannot hint “I’ll report you to the police/bar unless you give my client what she wants.”
SCR 3.130(8.2)(a) – Similar to defamation but stricter: lawyers must verify facts before accusing judges or court staff of wrongdoing.
Negotiated Sanction (SCR 3.480(2)) – Like a plea bargain in criminal law; the lawyer and bar counsel agree on facts, rule violations, and punishment. The Court can accept or send the case to trial.
Probated Suspension – The suspension is “hanging over” the lawyer’s head. If she stays out of trouble and meets conditions, she never actually stops practicing.

5. Conclusion

In Re: Brandy Kathleen Lawrence Barrett underscores that zealous advocacy has non-negotiable boundaries. Kentucky lawyers are now on clearer notice that:

Threatening or filing criminal accusations to influence a civil matter is professional misconduct, even when the lawyer thinks the allegations are true.
Before accusing judges or court employees of corruption, a lawyer must conduct a diligent, independent factual investigation; relying on rumor or a client’s fervor is insufficient.
Contrition and cooperation can significantly mitigate sanctions, but reckless filings will still draw formal discipline.

In the broader legal context, the decision harmonizes Kentucky discipline with national ABA standards, promotes respect for the judiciary, and provides a measured framework for probated suspensions through negotiated sanctions. Practitioners should view the opinion as both a cautionary tale and a roadmap for ethical course-correction when professional lines are crossed.