No Administrative Exhaustion Required for Estates of Deceased Inmates under NRS 41.0322 and NRS 209.243

No Administrative Exhaustion Required for Estates of Deceased Inmates under NRS 41.0322 and NRS 209.243

Introduction

In State, Department of Corrections v. Eighth Judicial District Court (Caperonis), 141 Nev., Advance Opinion 54 (Nov. 13, 2025), the Nevada Supreme Court squarely addressed a recurring and significant question at the intersection of sovereign immunity, statutory exhaustion, and inmate litigation: Must the estate of a deceased inmate exhaust the Nevada Department of Corrections’ (NDOC) grievance process under NRS 209.243, as incorporated by NRS 41.0322, before filing state tort claims against NDOC?

The case arose after Brian Caperonis was murdered by other inmates while incarcerated at High Desert State Prison. His father, William Joseph Caperonis, acting individually and as the special administrator of Brian’s estate, sued NDOC and several officials for negligence and other state-law claims (along with a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim). NDOC moved to dismiss the state-law tort claims, arguing sovereign immunity was not waived because the estate failed to exhaust NDOC’s administrative remedies under NRS 209.243 and Administrative Regulation (AR) 740. The district court denied the motion, concluding the exhaustion statutes apply only to current or former inmates—not to estates. NDOC petitioned for a writ of mandamus.

The Nevada Supreme Court denied mandamus relief, holding that the plain text of NRS 41.0322 and NRS 209.243 limits the exhaustion requirement to a “person who is or was in the custody” of NDOC, and that neither statute nor NDOC’s implementing regulations provide any mechanism for a decedent’s estate to exhaust. As a result, the administrative exhaustion precondition to Nevada’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to the estate of a deceased inmate.

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for a unanimous panel (Pickering, Cadish, and Lee, JJ.), Justice Cadish held:

  • The Court would entertain mandamus despite the general rule against reviewing denials of motions to dismiss because the petition raises an important, novel, and recurring legal question with implications for judicial economy.
  • The administrative exhaustion requirement in NRS 41.0322(1)—which requires “a person who is or was in the custody of the Department of Corrections” to exhaust remedies under NRS 209.243 before suing NDOC for tort damages—does not apply to an inmate’s estate. The statutory text speaks to “a person who is or was in custody,” not to estates or personal representatives.
  • NDOC’s AR 740 grievance process is available only to “offenders” and contains no mechanism that an estate could use. Requiring exhaustion by an estate would therefore be futile.
  • Legislative history confirms the exhaustion scheme was designed to curtail duplicative filings by incarcerated claimants, not to burden estates.
  • Out-of-state cases from Illinois and Iowa are inapposite because those jurisdictions do not share Nevada’s broad waiver of sovereign immunity and impose comprehensive, universal exhaustion prerequisites for all tort claims against the state.

Accordingly, the Court denied NDOC’s petition and left intact the district court’s refusal to dismiss the estate’s state-law tort claims for failure to exhaust.

Analysis

Statutory and Regulatory Framework

Nevada broadly waives sovereign immunity for tort suits against the State, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in NRS 41.032 to 41.038.” NRS 41.031(1). One such limitation, NRS 41.0322(1), states:

“A person who is or was in the custody of the Department of Corrections may not proceed with any action against the Department or any of its agents, former officers, employees or contractors to recover compensation for the loss of the person’s personal property, property damage, personal injuries or any other claim arising out of a tort pursuant to NRS 41.031 unless the person has exhausted the person’s administrative remedies provided by NRS 209.243 and the regulations adopted pursuant thereto.”

NRS 209.243(1) in turn provides that “a prisoner or former prisoner may file an administrative claim with the Department” for tort-based compensation, and must do so within six months of the alleged loss, damage, or injury. If a “prisoner or former prisoner” files a civil action before exhausting, the court must stay the action; if that person fails to timely file the administrative claim at all, the court must dismiss. NRS 41.0322(3).

NDOC’s AR 740 implements this scheme, prescribing a three-step grievance process for “offenders” (informal, first-level, and second-level grievances). The NDOC Glossary defines “Offender” as an individual convicted or adjudicated of a criminal offense. AR 740.06 addresses what happens if an offender is released or the sentence expires, allowing only the finalization of existing grievances; it does not authorize initiating a new grievance after release, and it contains no path for estates or personal representatives to participate in the process.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Mandamus framework: The Court invoked Hawkins v. Eighth Judicial District Court, Walker v. Second Judicial District Court, State v. Eighth Judicial District Court (Anzalone), Chur v. Eighth Judicial District Court, and Buckwalter v. Eighth Judicial District Court to explain when mandamus review of a denial of a motion to dismiss is appropriate—i.e., to clarify an important, recurring legal question not contingent on disputed facts.
  • Statutory interpretation:
    • Martinez v. Maruszczak: Nevada’s broad waiver of sovereign immunity is the baseline; limitations on the waiver are strictly construed.
    • Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial District Court and Panik v. TMM, Inc.: Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo; plain language controls.
    • Barbara Ann Hollier Trust v. Shack and BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States: Courts enforce clear statutory text as written.
    • United States v. Johnson: Courts may not create exceptions or add words the legislature omitted.
    • Schwartz v. Wasserburger: While estates generally “stand in the shoes” of the decedent (and thus may face certain defenses), that principle does not overcome a statute that, by its plain terms, limits a defense to a different class of claimants.
    • Lofthouse v. State: Ordinary meanings control unless context dictates otherwise.
    • Abarra v. State: The exhaustion doctrine applies only when administrative remedies are “available”; it does not apply when pursuit would be futile.
  • Out-of-state law:
    • Illinois: Lathon v. Court of Claims; Illinois’ framework channels claims into the Court of Claims and generally requires exhaustion for all claims, reflecting a much narrower waiver.
    • Iowa: McGill v. Fish; under the Iowa Tort Claims Act, all claimants must exhaust administrative procedures before suit. Neither framework mirrors Nevada’s broad waiver and targeted exhaustion regime.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis proceeds from first principles of statutory construction and Nevada’s waiver architecture:

  • Plain text controls: NRS 41.0322(1) applies to “a person who is or was in the custody of the Department of Corrections.” An estate or personal representative is a legally distinct entity. The statutory words do not mention “estates,” “personal representatives,” or “successors,” and the Court refused to add such terms.
  • Strict construction of immunity limitations: Because Nevada’s default rule is broad tort liability for the State (NRS 41.031), any exception limiting that waiver (like an exhaustion prerequisite) must be strictly construed. Reading NRS 41.0322 expansively to reach estates would contradict this principle.
  • Regulatory context confirms unavailability: AR 740 creates a grievance process for “offenders” and provides no pathway for estates. Even for “former prisoners,” AR 740.06 allows only the closing out of active grievances—no initiation of new ones. Thus, even if an estate attempted to exhaust, the process is not available to it; requiring exhaustion would be futile.
  • Legislative history supports the narrow reading: The 1995 amendment to NRS 209.243 targeted administrative burdens caused by inmates filing grievances and court actions simultaneously. Extending exhaustion to estates would not alleviate that problem and is not indicated by the legislative record.
  • Out-of-state analogies are inapt: Illinois and Iowa impose universal or near-universal exhaustion prerequisites as conditions of their sovereign immunity waivers. Nevada’s structure is different: a broad waiver with discrete, narrowly construed exceptions targeted to a defined class—here, people currently or formerly in NDOC custody. That difference is outcome-determinative.

NDOC’s “standing in the shoes” argument—i.e., that estates inherit all defenses that would have applied to the decedent—could not overcome the plain statutory limitation. While estates often do face defenses that would have applied to the decedent, the Court emphasized that it cannot extend a statutorily defined defense beyond the terms the Legislature used, especially where the defense narrows the State’s general waiver of liability.

Impact

The decision sets a clear rule of statewide significance:

  • Estates of deceased inmates need not exhaust NDOC’s grievance process under NRS 209.243 before filing tort claims under NRS 41.031 against NDOC or its agents. The six-month administrative filing deadline in NRS 209.243(1) does not apply to estates.
  • Living inmates and former prisoners remain subject to exhaustion: The decision leaves intact the requirement that a claimant who “is or was” in NDOC custody must exhaust available administrative remedies before proceeding in court.
  • Wrongful death and survival actions:
    • Wrongful death claims belong to heirs, not to the decedent, and the heirs were not “persons who are or were” in NDOC custody; exhaustion does not apply to them.
    • Survival claims prosecuted by estates likewise are not subject to NRS 41.0322’s exhaustion requirement under this decision. The Court’s reasoning turns on the identity of the claimant, not the decedent’s prior custodial status.
  • Procedural economy: District courts need not stay or dismiss estate-filed tort actions for lack of NDOC exhaustion. Litigation can proceed without detours into an inapplicable grievance process.
  • Administrative and legislative responses: NDOC cannot, by regulation, expand the statutory exhaustion requirement to estates. If the Legislature wishes to require estate-level exhaustion, it must amend NRS 41.0322 and, likely, NRS 209.243, and provide an estate-accessible procedure.
  • Federal claims unaffected: The ruling interprets Nevada statutes governing state tort claims. Separate federal exhaustion regimes (e.g., the Prison Litigation Reform Act for federal claims) are not addressed and may impose different requirements in appropriate cases.

Decision Guide: When Does NRS 41.0322 Exhaustion Apply?

  • Is the plaintiff a “person who is or was in the custody of NDOC”?
    • Yes (e.g., a current prisoner or a former prisoner suing in their own name): Exhaustion under NRS 209.243/AR 740 is required.
    • No (e.g., an estate/personal representative, heirs in wrongful death): Exhaustion is not required.
  • Is an NDOC grievance mechanism actually available to the plaintiff?
    • If not available (as with estates), the futility principle confirms exhaustion does not apply.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Sovereign immunity and waiver: States are generally immune from suit unless they consent. Nevada has broadly consented to be sued in tort (NRS 41.031), but the Legislature also enacted targeted exceptions and prerequisites (NRS 41.032–41.038) that are strictly construed.
  • Administrative exhaustion: A legal requirement to pursue and complete a designated administrative complaint process before filing a lawsuit. In Nevada’s inmate context, NRS 41.0322 and NRS 209.243 require exhaustion only by people who are or were in NDOC custody, through NDOC’s AR 740 grievance system.
  • Estate “standing in the shoes”: As a default, an estate inherits the decedent’s legal rights and liabilities. But this principle does not expand statutory defenses beyond their text; if a statute limits a defense to a specific class of claimants, courts may not rewrite it to include estates.
  • Futility doctrine: Exhaustion is required only when remedies are available and capable of providing relief. If the administrative process does not exist for a particular claimant (like an estate), exhaustion is excused.
  • Mandamus: An extraordinary remedy used to correct a clear legal error or abuse of discretion or to compel performance of a legal duty, granted sparingly. The Court will sometimes use mandamus to resolve important and recurring legal questions.
  • Wrongful death vs. survival: Wrongful death creates a claim for heirs for their own losses due to a decedent’s death. Survival statutes allow the decedent’s own claims (e.g., for pre-death damages) to continue through the estate. Both may be pleaded in a single case, but they are distinct causes of action.

Unresolved or Peripheral Issues

  • Other pre-suit requirements or caps: The opinion focuses on NRS 41.0322 and NRS 209.243. It does not address other potential statutory limitations, notice provisions, or damages caps that may apply to state tort claims. Practitioners should independently assess all applicable statutory requirements.
  • Timing and limitations periods: Estates are not bound by the six-month administrative filing window in NRS 209.243, but ordinary statutes of limitations for tort, survival, and wrongful death claims continue to govern.
  • Scope beyond in-custody deaths: The logic of the decision—focusing on the identity of the claimant—suggests estates of decedents who “were” in NDOC custody at the time of the alleged tort likewise need not exhaust. The opinion resolves the question in the death-in-custody context presented.

Conclusion

The Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Caperonis establishes a straightforward, text-driven rule: The administrative exhaustion prerequisite in NRS 41.0322 and NRS 209.243 does not apply to an estate or personal representative bringing state tort claims against NDOC arising from an inmate’s death. The statutes and NDOC’s AR 740 grievance procedures target and apply only to a “person who is or was in the custody” of NDOC—i.e., current and former inmates—and provide no avenue for estates to exhaust. Because Nevada’s waiver of sovereign immunity is broad and limitations on that waiver are strictly construed, the Court declined to extend exhaustion to a class the Legislature did not name.

Practically, estates may proceed directly to court on tort claims against NDOC without first invoking AR 740, while living inmates and former prisoners must continue to exhaust. The ruling promotes clarity and efficiency in post-death litigation and leaves to the Legislature any policy choice to expand exhaustion to estates by explicit amendment. Until then, Nevada’s courts will not impose an exhaustion requirement the statutes do not contain.

Key Takeaways

  • Estates and personal representatives are not subject to NRS 41.0322/NRS 209.243 exhaustion.
  • Living inmates and former prisoners remain subject to exhaustion before suing NDOC under NRS 41.031.
  • NDOC’s AR 740 process is for “offenders” only and contains no mechanism for estates.
  • Legislative history and out-of-state regimes do not support expanding Nevada’s narrowly tailored exhaustion requirement.
  • Federal exhaustion requirements (like the PLRA) are separate and unaffected by this state-law ruling.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Comments