Nexus, Not Speculation: Third‑Party Perpetrator Evidence, Hearsay, and Circumstantial Proof in United States v. Starr

I. Introduction

In United States v. Jason Starr & Darin Starr, Nos. 24‑10131 & 24‑11499 (11th Cir. Nov. 19, 2025), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and mandatory life sentences of two brothers for a murder‑for‑hire scheme that resulted in the killing of Jason Starr’s ex‑wife, Sara Starr, in Coffee County, Alabama. The case involves a classic federal murder‑for‑hire charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1958, but it is legally notable for several reasons.

First, the Court addresses the scope of a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to present a “complete defense,” particularly the right to introduce evidence suggesting that a third party—here, one Leonard Michalski—committed the crime. Applying Holmes v. South Carolina, the panel holds that such evidence may be excluded where it lacks a concrete nexus to the crime and is overly speculative, and that doing so does not violate the Constitution.

Second, the Court endorses two important evidentiary rulings by the district court:

Admitting the victim’s statement, “He’s going to kill me,” as an “excited utterance” under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2); and
Permitting an FBI agent to recount out‑of‑court statements from other witnesses to explain the course of the investigation, under the “effect on the listener” non‑hearsay doctrine.

Third, the Court upholds the sufficiency of a largely circumstantial case to sustain a murder‑for‑hire conviction under § 1958, emphasizing that circumstantial evidence is not disfavored in criminal trials.

Finally, in a separate concurrence, Judge Jordan questions the correctness of the Supreme Court’s doctrinal framework governing third‑party perpetrator evidence, suggesting that defendants should be allowed to present such evidence whenever it has a legitimate tendency to create reasonable doubt—even if it does not “sufficiently connect” the third party to the crime under Holmes.

Taken together, Starr is an important Eleventh Circuit decision clarifying: (1) the limits on speculative third‑party‑culpability theories; (2) the boundaries of key hearsay doctrines; and (3) how digital and circumstantial evidence can support murder‑for‑hire convictions.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Divorce, Motive, and Jason Starr’s Statements

Jason and Sara Starr went through an acrimonious divorce. The decree imposed heavy financial obligations on Jason:

About $3,500 per month (52% of his net income) in child and spousal support;
Responsibility for Sara’s health‑insurance premiums;
Maintenance of a life‑insurance policy for Sara’s benefit;
$10,000 for equity in the marital home; and
Approximately $55,000 of Jason’s inheritance from his grandmother’s estate.

Jason’s own writings, preserved on his laptop as part of a purported “book,” reflected significant rage at these obligations, particularly spousal support. In crude and misogynistic terms, he questioned what Sara would have to give him “for the rest of [his] life” and expressed fury about what he viewed as her “miserable, ... lying life.”

Evidence also showed Jason had floated murder as a solution to divorce woes. A friend, Christopher Riley, testified that Jason told him—half joking but also “not kidding”—that he “knows somebody that can take care of your problems for two to $3,000,” referring to his brother Darin.

After Sara secretly moved out of the marital home into a nearby church parsonage, with the help of her friend Lawrence Leuci, Jason appeared there unannounced. Leuci described Sara as “absolutely terrified beyond anything I had ever seen before”: pale, shaking, barely able to stand. When Jason left, Sara, still visibly distraught, said to Leuci, “He’s going to kill me.”

B. Darin Starr, the Motorcycle, and the Travel to Alabama

Darin Starr, Jason’s brother, was living in Texas. Two months before the murder, Darin bought a used Triumph motorcycle from a woman named Lilani Mahler for $300. He paid $40 up front; Jason sent Mahler the remaining $260 via Zelle. Jason continued to send Darin money through Mahler’s Zelle account—an additional $2,600 in seven installments—with seemingly benign memos such as “tire maintenance,” “clutch,” “tickets,” and “Phoenix.”

Mahler testified that the “Phoenix” payment was meant to fund a trip for Darin to visit his son in Arizona. But cell‑site data showed that the next day, Darin’s phone began traveling eastward from west of San Antonio towards Coffee County, Alabama—where Sara lived—rather than west to Arizona.

Upon arrival in Coffee County, a neighbor observed a “heav[y] cruiser style bike” parked facing Sara’s residence, leaving around 8–8:30 p.m. The neighbor found this so unusual that he called Sara about it. Around that time, Darin and Jason exchanged the following texts:

Darin: “I've been here at the deer stand for over an hour no show no deer know though I must pass out and dehydration I don't know what to do now”

Darin: “I know delete !!!”

Jason: “I think you sent this to the wrong person Maybe go get water, hahahaha”

Darin: “Your right, wrong person. I sorry”

Jason: “Hahahaha. Love you brother!”

Cell‑site data showed Darin’s phone near Sara’s residence almost every day leading up to the murder.

C. The Murder and Aftermath

On the morning of the murder, a neighbor heard two shotgun blasts in rapid succession shortly after 6:40 a.m. coming from the direction of the church/parsonage. Video from a nearby barn showed a motorcycle riding past at 6:49 a.m. A coworker, checking on Sara when she failed to arrive at work, found Sara dead in her carport around 8:25 a.m., with two shotgun wounds: one to the chest, one to the head. By 8:31 a.m., cell‑site data indicated that Darin’s phone was moving west, away from Coffee County; he reached San Antonio shortly after midnight.

Jason, meanwhile, was having breakfast at a local restaurant. Nonetheless, given the bitter divorce and Sara’s expressed fear, law enforcement quickly regarded him as a suspect.

Separately, some time later, Darin was arrested in Texas for stealing a different motorcycle. In recorded jail calls, he told his mother and others that Jason had the money to get him out and that Jason “owes me” and “owes me a big favor.”

D. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing

A federal grand jury charged Jason and Darin under 18 U.S.C. § 1958 with using interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder‑for‑hire. The government’s theory was that Jason paid Darin with money and the Triumph motorcycle to travel from Texas to Alabama to kill Sara.

A jury convicted both brothers. Because the murder‑for‑hire resulted in death, § 1958 mandated a sentence of life imprisonment, which the district court imposed.

E. Issues on Appeal

On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the Starrs sought acquittal or reversal of their convictions and sentences on four principal grounds:

The district court violated their constitutional right to present a complete defense by excluding evidence suggesting that another man, Leonard Michalski, may have been responsible for Sara’s death.
The district court erroneously admitted Sara’s statement “He’s going to kill me” as an excited utterance under Rule 803(2).
The district court erroneously admitted FBI Agent VanHoose’s testimony recounting out‑of‑court statements by other individuals to explain his investigative steps (the “effect on the listener” doctrine).
The evidence was insufficient to support their convictions for murder‑for‑hire beyond a reasonable doubt.

Judge Newsom wrote for the panel, joined by Judge Jordan and District Judge Honeywell (sitting by designation). Judge Jordan also wrote a separate concurrence focused on the third‑party‑perpetrator issue.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion

The Court affirmed across the board. In particular, it held:

No violation of the right to present a complete defense. The district court properly excluded the proposed third‑party‑culpability evidence about Michalski as too speculative, lacking a concrete nexus to Sara’s murder, and posing a substantial risk of jury confusion and misleading the jury under Rule 403.
Proper admission of Sara’s statement as an excited utterance. Sara’s “He’s going to kill me” statement, made while she was visibly terrified and immediately after Jason’s sudden appearance at her new residence, fit squarely within the excited‑utterance exception to the hearsay rule.
Proper admission of course‑of‑investigation testimony. Agent VanHoose’s testimony about what he learned from other witnesses was admitted not for its truth but to explain how those statements shaped the investigation, and therefore was non‑hearsay; the district court also gave an effective limiting instruction.
Sufficient evidence for murder‑for‑hire under § 1958. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Jason caused Darin to travel in interstate commerce with the intent to murder Sara in exchange for pecuniary value—namely, the motorcycle and the Zelle payments.

Judge Jordan’s concurrence emphasized that, under current Supreme Court precedent (Holmes), the exclusion of Michalski‑related evidence was likely correct, but he expressed serious doubts about the soundness of that precedent and suggested alternative, more defense‑protective standards for admitting third‑party‑perpetrator evidence.

IV. Analysis of the Decision

A. The Right to Present a Complete Defense and Third‑Party Perpetrator Evidence

1. Legal Framework

The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense,” grounded in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. This encompasses the ability to introduce evidence that someone else committed the crime.

In Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006), the Court held that while a defendant has such a right, it is not unlimited. Trial judges may exclude defense evidence under “well‑established rules of evidence” (like Rule 403) if its probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, confusion, or misleading the jury. Specifically for third‑party‑perpetrator evidence, Holmes endorsed the principle that such evidence may be excluded if it:

“does not sufficiently connect the other person to the crime,”
is “speculative or remote,” or
“does not tend to prove or disprove a material fact in issue.”

The Eleventh Circuit has similarly required “some showing of a nexus between the [third party] and the particular crime with which a defendant is charged.” Cikora v. Dugger, 840 F.2d 893, 898 (11th Cir. 1988).

In Starr, the Court reviews de novo whether the exclusion of Michalski‑related evidence violated the defendants’ constitutional rights, citing United States v. Ifediba, 46 F.4th 1225, 1237 (11th Cir. 2022), and United States v. Machado, 886 F.3d 1070, 1085 (11th Cir. 2018).

2. The Proffered Evidence Concerning Leonard Michalski

The defendants tried to cast suspicion on Leonard Michalski as an alternative perpetrator. Their theory rested on several points:

An “unsettling” encounter between Sara and Michalski at a Wal‑Mart about nine days before the murder;
A remark by Michalski to Jason that if something happened to Sara, Jason would be the “prime suspect”;
A later suicide note from Michalski denying involvement in Sara’s murder;
Evidence that Michalski owned a Harley‑Davidson motorcycle, which the defense argued could match the “heavy cruiser style bike” seen near Sara’s residence; and
Evidence that Michalski had a car similar to one seen near Sara’s residence on video the morning of the murder.

The government moved in limine to exclude this evidence. The district court found that Michalski could not have been the shooter because multiple eyewitnesses placed him at Fort Novosel (an Army installation) preparing for or piloting a helicopter at the time of the murder. Thus, he could not have physically pulled the trigger.

The defense then shifted to a more attenuated theory: Michalski may have hired an unknown person to kill Sara. But, as the district court and the court of appeals both emphasized, they presented no evidence:

identifying who that hypothetical killer might be;
explaining how Michalski supposedly recruited such a person;
showing any link between that unknown killer and the crime scene; or
offering a plausible motive for this hypothetical accomplice.

When asked at the hearing who Michalski might have hired, defense counsel candidly responded: “Well, your Honor, I think only Leonard Michalski could answer that question.”

3. The Eleventh Circuit’s Application of Holmes and Rule 403

The panel agreed that the excluded evidence did not meet the required “nexus” standard. Even acknowledging that Michalski may have had a “complicated relationship” with Sara, the Court concluded:

There was definitive evidence that Michalski was elsewhere at the time of the murder;
The “hired accomplice” theory was entirely speculative; and
The defense had no non‑speculative link between Michalski (or any associate) and the actual killing.

The Court thus held that the evidence was too “speculative” to satisfy Holmes, would not “tend to prove or disprove a material fact,” and therefore could be excluded consistent with both Rule 403 and the Constitution. The risk of misleading the jury or confusing the issues by inviting them to chase an alternative theory with no evidentiary foundation outweighed any minimal probative value.

Consequently, the exclusion did not violate the defendants’ right to present a complete defense.

4. Judge Jordan’s Concurrence: Re‑thinking Third‑Party Perpetrator Doctrine

Judge Jordan joins the majority opinion in full, but writes separately to express “doubts” about the Supreme Court’s current standard in Holmes. His concurrence is doctrinally important, even though it is not itself binding law.

He begins by reiterating a fundamental point about burden of proof: in American criminal trials, defendants do not have to prove their innocence or identify the true perpetrator. The government bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant’s task, if any, is merely to raise a reasonable doubt—“actual and substantial” rather than “merely possible, fanciful, or conjectural,” borrowing from Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 20 (1994).

Under that understanding, he questions whether a defendant’s third‑party‑culpability evidence should have to “sufficiently connect” the third party to the crime, as Holmes suggests. Instead, Judge Jordan points to a different line of authority:

19th‑century Supreme Court precedent. In Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353 (1891), the Court said third‑party evidence could be excluded only if it was “so remote or insignificant as to have no legitimate tendency to show that [the third party] could have committed the murder.” Judge Jordan suggests that this is a better articulation of the proper standard: relevance plus some minimal probative tendency, not proof or strong linkage.
Lower‑court precedents. He cites, for example, United States v. Moore, 590 F. Supp. 3d 277 (D.D.C. 2022), which held that third‑party evidence need not “prove or even raise a strong probability” that the other person committed the crime, so long as it “tend[s] to create a reasonable doubt” about the defendant’s guilt. He likewise invokes former Fifth Circuit precedent in United States v. Taglione, 546 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1977), noting that a defendant is entitled to have a supported theory of defense considered.

Judge Jordan further suggests an alternative doctrinal approach: use a probable‑cause standard as a threshold. If the defendant’s evidence against a third party would be strong enough that the government could lawfully initiate criminal proceedings against that person (i.e., it establishes probable cause), then the defendant should be permitted to present that story at trial. He notes that probable cause “is not a high bar,” citing District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2013).

Applying those more lenient standards, he hints that he might have allowed the Michalski evidence if he were not bound by Holmes. But because Holmes controls, and because under its framework the evidence was properly excluded as speculative and lacking nexus, he concurs in the judgment.

5. Likely Impact of the Third‑Party‑Perpetrator Ruling

In the Eleventh Circuit, Starr reinforces the following principles:

Defendants have a constitutional right to present third‑party‑perpetrator evidence, but it remains subject to ordinary evidentiary constraints such as relevance and Rule 403.
Evidence that a third party had some tension with the victim, owned a similar vehicle, or made cryptic comments—without more—will generally be too speculative if the person is concretely alibied at the time of the crime.
A bare suggestion that “he could have hired someone else” is insufficient without some evidence linking that hypothetical accomplice to the offense.
Trial courts retain considerable discretion to prevent “mini‑trials” on thinly supported alternate‑perpetrator theories.

At the same time, Judge Jordan’s concurrence effectively invites further Supreme Court or en banc review of the applicable standard. It underscores a tension between:

the defendant’s limited burden (to create reasonable doubt, not to prove alternative guilt); and
the evidentiary requirement, under Holmes, that third‑party‑perpetrator evidence “sufficiently connect” the third party to the crime.

Defense counsel going forward should anticipate courts in this Circuit applying Holmes and requiring a demonstrable nexus, but they may also find in Judge Jordan’s opinion a roadmap for arguing that more generous standards are constitutionally appropriate.

B. Hearsay and Evidence of the Victim’s Fear: The Excited Utterance Ruling

1. Governing Rules

“Hearsay” is an out‑of‑court statement offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Such statements are generally inadmissible unless a specific exception applies. Rule 803(2) provides one key exception: the “excited utterance,” defined as:

“A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.”

The rationale is that statements made in the immediate aftermath of a startling event are more reliable because there is little time for reflection, fabrication, or coaching. The Supreme Court described such statements as being given under circumstances that “eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation,” rendering cross‑examination “superfluous.” Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990).

The Eleventh Circuit has emphasized a “totality of the circumstances” test for excited utterances: the key is not just the clock but whether the declarant is still under the stress of the event. See United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 817 (11th Cir. 2010) (approving an excited utterance made four to five hours after an assault where distress remained evident).

2. Application to Sara’s Statement: “He’s Going to Kill Me.”

Sara’s statement was offered through her friend Leuci. He described:

Jason’s sudden, unannounced appearance at Sara’s new, supposedly secret residence;
Sara’s extreme fear response: pale, shaking, barely able to stand;
Her continued distress immediately after Jason left—“shaking, crying, not able to really say much,” and “completely broke down”; and
Her statement, “He’s going to kill me,” made both “the second he arrived” and “immediately” after he left.

The defense objected on hearsay grounds. The district court overruled the objection under Rule 803(2), and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Key points in the Court’s reasoning:

The “startling event” was Jason’s unexpected appearance at the parsonage immediately after Sara’s secret move, combined with the background of the bitter divorce and Jason’s prior conduct.
Sara remained clearly under the stress of that event while making the statement—her physical demeanor (shaking, crying, inability to speak properly) confirmed ongoing emotional shock.
The temporal proximity was extremely tight: the statement came essentially contemporaneously with the event and again just minutes after Jason departed, which strongly supports spontaneity.
Under Belfast, even statements made hours later can qualify; here the timing was much shorter.

The Court therefore held that “He’s going to kill me” was an excited utterance and admissible over the hearsay objection. There was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling.

3. Practical Significance

The ruling reinforces that:

Victims’ expressions of anticipatory fear (“he’s going to kill me”), when tied closely to a startling, fear‑inducing event and made under visible distress, can be admitted as excited utterances.
In domestic‑violence and domestic‑homicide cases, such statements often play a central role in establishing motive, intent, and context, and Starr confirms their admissibility under the right circumstances.

While the opinion does not address the Confrontation Clause (likely because the statement was non‑testimonial in nature under Crawford jurisprudence), it is a clear, precedential reaffirmation of the robust scope of Rule 803(2) in the Eleventh Circuit.

C. “Effect on the Listener” and Law‑Enforcement Testimony

1. The Non‑Hearsay “Effect on the Listener” Doctrine

Not every out‑of‑court statement mentioned at trial is hearsay. A statement is hearsay only when it is offered to prove the truth of what it asserts. If it is offered instead to show its effect on the person who heard it—e.g., to explain why a law‑enforcement officer took certain investigative steps—then, strictly speaking, it is not hearsay and no exception is required. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); United States v. Mateos, 623 F.3d 1350, 1364 (11th Cir. 2010).

This “course of investigation” or “effect on the listener” doctrine, however, carries a risk: juries may treat the statements as true even when told not to. Courts therefore must police the line carefully, limiting such testimony to what is genuinely necessary to explain subsequent actions and giving clear limiting instructions.

2. Agent VanHoose’s Testimony and the Court’s Approach

Agent VanHoose testified about what he learned from interviews conducted by local police and the FBI, and how that information drove further investigative steps. For example:

From interviews with Jason’s children, he learned that Darin had been in Alabama around Thanksgiving. That prompted him to contact Jason’s and Darin’s mother, Mary Starr.
From Mary, he learned that Darin had arrived in Alabama on a motorcycle—significant because a motorcycle was captured on video near the crime scene minutes after the shooting. This led him to focus on Darin as a suspect.
From an FBI interview of Mahler, he learned she had sold a motorcycle to Darin, which led him to subpoena Jason’s financial records and conduct forensic accounting to track payments.

The government expressly structured its questions to keep the testimony within non‑hearsay bounds. At the prosecutor’s prompting, VanHoose described his testimony in the format: “I learned this fact, which made me do the next thing.”

The district court:

Warned the government to be careful in phrasing questions;
Admitted the statements solely to show their effect on VanHoose’s investigative decisions; and
Issued a limiting instruction telling the jury that these statements could be considered only to explain the investigation, not as proof of their truth.

Citing its own recent decision in United States v. Kent, 93 F.4th 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2024), the Court held that such cautionary instructions “reduced the risk that the jury would improperly consider th[e] out‑of‑court statement for the truth of the matter asserted.”

Given that framework and the trial court’s careful management, the panel concluded there was no abuse of discretion in admitting VanHoose’s testimony.

3. Practical Impact and Risks

The decision solidifies the Eleventh Circuit’s acceptance of structured law‑enforcement testimony about out‑of‑court statements, as long as:

the testimony is narrowly framed to explain subsequent investigative steps;
it is not used as a conduit for otherwise inadmissible hearsay; and
jurors receive clear instructions limiting how they may use the information.

Defense lawyers should still be alert to the danger that “effect on the listener” can become a backdoor for hearsay accusations the declarants are never cross‑examined about. Starr suggests that the remedy is not categorical exclusion but careful trial‑level management and limiting instructions. Provided those safeguards are present, the Eleventh Circuit is unlikely to find reversible error in admitting such evidence.

D. Sufficiency of the Evidence in a Circumstantial Murder‑for‑Hire Case

1. Elements of 18 U.S.C. § 1958 and Standard of Review

Section 1958(a) makes it a federal crime to:

“travel[] in or cause[] another (including the intended victim) to travel in interstate or foreign commerce ... with intent that a murder be committed ... as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value.”

Under United States v. Buselli, 106 F.4th 1273, 1282–83 (11th Cir. 2024), the government therefore had to prove:

Interstate travel (or causing another to travel between states);
Specific intent that a murder be committed, in violation of state or federal law; and
A promise or agreement to pay “anything of pecuniary value” in exchange.

On sufficiency challenges, appellate courts view all evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution” and ask whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 7 (2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). The Eleventh Circuit must draw “all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in the Government’s favor,” and a verdict need only be “reasonable, not inevitable.” United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1253 (11th Cir. 2007).

The Court also reiterates that circumstantial evidence is not inherently weaker than direct evidence. As the Supreme Court recognized in Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954), and as the Eleventh Circuit has underscored in United States v. Henderson, 693 F.2d 1028, 1030 (11th Cir. 1982), circumstantial and direct evidence are evaluated under the same standard.

2. Evidence Against Jason Starr (the Alleged Hirer)

The key question as to Jason was whether he “caused” Darin to travel interstate with the intent that Darin kill Sara in exchange for pecuniary value. The Court pointed to several strands of evidence:

Motive and animus. Jason’s heavy financial obligations to Sara—support payments, insurance, property distributions—combined with his vitriolic writings about her, supported a strong inference of motive.
Prior suggestion of murder‑for‑hire. Jason had previously suggested to his friend Riley that he knew someone (Darin) who could “take care of” divorce‑related “problems” for $2,000–$3,000.
Payments to Darin. Jason paid $260 for Darin’s Triumph motorcycle and then sent an additional $2,600 through Mahler’s Zelle account, using coded or benign‑sounding transaction descriptions (“tire maintenance,” “Phoenix,” etc.).
Temporal connection. Darin’s eastward travel from Texas to Alabama followed closely on the heels of the last payment; the payment labeled “Phoenix” was immediately followed by travel in the opposite direction (towards Alabama) rather than towards Phoenix, Arizona.

Taken together, these facts allowed a rational jury to find that Jason funded Darin’s motorcycle and travel with the intent that Darin murder Sara, satisfying both the “causation of interstate travel” and “pecuniary value” elements.

3. Evidence Against Darin Starr (the Alleged Hitman)

For Darin, the government’s case rested heavily on circumstantial but interconnected evidence:

Interstate travel. Cell‑site data established that Darin’s phone moved from west of San Antonio to Coffee County, Alabama, in the two days preceding the murder.
Presence near the victim. The data showed his phone near Sara’s residence almost every day after his arrival, consistent with surveillance or stalking patterns.
Suspicious texts. The “deer stand” text, followed immediately by “I know delete !!!,” and Jason’s joking suggestion about getting water, reasonably supported an inference that Darin was not actually at a deer stand but close to Sara and aware of the incriminating nature of his message.
Motorcycle evidence. A neighbor saw a “heavy cruiser style bike” near Sara’s home. Video showed a motorcycle passing shortly after the shots were fired. Darin had a recently purchased motorcycle, funded in part by Jason.
Flight. Within minutes of Sara being found dead (based on discovery time and shot timing), Darin’s phone began moving westward, and he reached San Antonio the same day.
Jail calls. In later jail calls about an unrelated motorcycle theft, Darin said Jason “has the money” to get him out and that Jason “owes me” and “owes me a big favor,” language the jury could reasonably interpret as referencing payment for the murder.

Although there was no single “smoking gun” (no eyewitness placing Darin at the trigger, no confession, no murder weapon directly tied to him), the Court emphasized that circumstantial evidence can suffice. The totality of these circumstances supported a reasonable finding that Darin traveled interstate to Alabama, lay in wait for Sara, shot her, and fled back to Texas—all as part of a murder‑for‑hire arrangement.

4. The Defendants’ Alternative Explanations and the Court’s Response

The defendants offered benign explanations:

The Zelle payments were for legitimate motorcycle repairs and expenses, not murder‑for‑hire;
Darin came to Alabama to visit his mother for Thanksgiving, not to kill Sara;
The “deer stand” text was literal—he was at a hunting location, not surveilling Sara;
His return to Texas the day of the murder was just coincidental timing.

But the Court did not need to decide whether these explanations might also be possible. Under the sufficiency standard, it need only determine whether a rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the prosecution’s favor, and drawing all reasonable inferences in that direction.

Finding that standard easily met, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the sufficiency of the evidence as to both Jason and Darin.

V. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

1. Right to Present a Complete Defense & Third‑Party Perpetrator Evidence

A criminal defendant is allowed to argue that “someone else did it.” To support that claim, the defendant may try to introduce evidence about another suspect—a “third‑party perpetrator.”

But the law does not allow the defense to throw out wild speculation or finger random people without a factual basis. Courts require some nexus—some real link—between that third party and the crime. If the best the defense can say is “this person disliked the victim” or “owned a similar car,” but there is solid evidence the person was elsewhere at the time, a judge can keep that evidence out as too speculative and confusing for the jury.

2. Hearsay

Hearsay is any statement made outside the courtroom that is offered to prove that what it says is true. For example, if a witness says, “Sara told me, ‘Jason hit me,’” to prove that Jason did hit Sara, that is hearsay. Hearsay is usually not allowed because the original speaker (Sara) cannot be cross‑examined.

However, there are many exceptions where hearsay is considered reliable enough—such as when someone blurts out something immediately after a shocking event (an excited utterance).

3. Excited Utterance (Rule 803(2))

An “excited utterance” is a statement that:

relates to a startling event (like an attack or shocking encounter), and
is made while the person is still under the stress or shock of that event.

The idea is that someone who just experienced a frightening event and is still shaken is unlikely to calmly invent a story. That makes such statements reasonably reliable even if the speaker cannot testify in court.

In Starr, Sara’s “He’s going to kill me” statement qualified because:

Jason’s sudden appearance at her secret new home was startling, given their history;
She was visibly terrified and shaking; and
She made the statement immediately during and after that encounter.

4. “Effect on the Listener” / Course‑of‑Investigation Testimony

Sometimes, a witness (especially a police officer) testifies about what someone told them, not to prove that the content is true but to explain why they did something next.

For example: “I received a tip that Darin was in town, so I started looking for him.” The point is not to prove Darin was in fact in town, but to explain why the officer shifted focus to Darin.

Because the testimony is not offered for its truth, it is technically not hearsay. But courts must guard against abuse—otherwise, prosecutors could smuggle in lots of accusatory hearsay under the label of “effect on the listener.” Starr shows that trial judges must:

keep the testimony narrowly focused on explaining investigative steps; and
instruct the jury not to treat those statements as true.

5. Sufficiency of the Evidence (the “Rational Jury” Test)

On appeal, the question is not whether the judges personally believe the defendant is guilty, or whether there might be any innocent explanation of the evidence. Instead, the question is:

Could a reasonable jury, looking at the evidence in the way most favorable to the prosecution, have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?

If the answer is “yes,” the conviction stands—even if another jury might have acquitted, and even if the appellate judges might have weighed the evidence differently themselves.

6. Circumstantial vs. Direct Evidence

“Direct” evidence is evidence that, if believed, directly proves a fact (e.g., an eyewitness saying, “I saw Darin pull the trigger”). “Circumstantial” evidence proves a fact indirectly, by inference (e.g., phone records showing Darin near the victim at the time, combined with his rapid departure afterwards).

The law does not favor one type over the other. Juries can convict based solely on circumstantial evidence, as long as it is strong enough to convince them beyond a reasonable doubt.

7. Murder‑for‑Hire Under 18 U.S.C. § 1958

This federal statute applies when someone uses interstate facilities (like travel between states, the mail, or other means of interstate commerce) in a murder‑for‑hire arrangement. The key elements are:

Interstate travel (or causing someone to travel across state lines);
Intent that a murder be committed; and
A promise of payment or something of value in exchange (money, property, etc.).

If death results, the statute requires a sentence of life imprisonment or death. In Starr, the “pecuniary value” consisted of the motorcycle and the cash payments, and the “interstate” element was Darin’s travel from Texas to Alabama.

VI. Broader Impact and Significance

1. For Criminal Defense: Raising Third‑Party‑Culpability Theories

Starr underscores that in the Eleventh Circuit, defense attempts to blame a third party will face close scrutiny. To introduce such evidence successfully, defense counsel should:

Identify concrete connections between the third party and the crime (presence near the scene, communications with the victim or co‑defendant, physical evidence, etc.);
Be prepared to counter arguments that the theory is “speculative” or “remote”; and
Anticipate Rule 403 challenges and be ready to show that the evidence’s probative value is not substantially outweighed by risks of confusing or misleading the jury.

Merely demonstrating that someone else had motive or a strained relationship with the victim, without more, will generally not suffice.

2. For Prosecutors: Leveraging Circumstantial and Digital Evidence

The decision demonstrates how a modern homicide case can be built and upheld almost entirely on circumstantial evidence:

Digital payments (Zelle) and their timing;
Cell‑site location data showing interstate and local movements;
Surveillance video of vehicles near the crime scene;
Jail calls showing financial expectations and coded references to “favors.”

Starr affirms that when these pieces fit together in a coherent narrative, they can easily meet the “rational jury” standard on appeal.

3. For Evidence Law: Hearsay Boundaries Clarified

The case also provides clear guidance on:

Excited utterances. Victim statements predicting their own death can be admissible when linked to a startling event and accompanied by observable distress.
Course‑of‑investigation testimony. Properly framed, limited, and accompanied by instructions, officers may describe what they learned from others to explain their investigative decisions.

This reinforces trends in federal evidence law that are relatively friendly to admitting certain types of hearsay‑adjacent testimony when it is procedurally safeguarded.

4. Doctrinal Pressure on Holmes and Future Supreme Court Review

Judge Jordan’s concurrence is an important signal in the broader national debate over third‑party‑perpetrator evidence. His doubts about Holmes’ “sufficient connection” language echo academic critiques and some lower‑court decisions that argue for more generous admission standards.

By pointing to:

Alexander’s “no legitimate tendency” test;
the “tend to create a reasonable doubt” formulation in cases like Moore;
and the probable‑cause benchmark suggested in scholarship by Blume, Johnson, and Paavola;

the concurrence contributes to a growing body of authority urging that defendants should be able to present third‑party‑guilt evidence whenever it has a meaningful capacity to create reasonable doubt—even if it falls short of strongly “connecting” the third party to the crime.

If the Supreme Court revisits Holmes or the contours of the right to present a complete defense, opinions like Judge Jordan’s may play a significant role in shaping the debate.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Starr is a significant Eleventh Circuit decision at the intersection of constitutional criminal procedure and evidentiary law. It:

Reaffirms that defendants have a constitutional right to present a complete defense, but that speculative third‑party‑perpetrator theories without a concrete nexus to the offense can be excluded under Holmes and Rule 403;
Clarifies the robust scope of the excited‑utterance exception in admitting a victim’s fearful statement about future harm immediately following a startling encounter;
Endorses careful, limited use of “effect on the listener” testimony by law‑enforcement officers to explain investigative steps without violating the hearsay rule;
Confirms that circumstantial digital and forensic evidence can be fully sufficient to sustain a murder‑for‑hire conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1958; and
Through Judge Jordan’s concurrence, highlights unresolved tensions in Supreme Court doctrine regarding how much proof a defendant must offer before presenting evidence that someone else committed the crime.

For practitioners in the Eleventh Circuit, Starr provides a detailed roadmap of how courts will handle alternate‑perpetrator theories, victim fear statements, investigative hearsay, and circumstantial murder‑for‑hire prosecutions. In the broader legal landscape, it contributes to an ongoing, and increasingly pointed, conversation about the balance between evidentiary gatekeeping and the defendant’s fundamental right to tell a complete story of innocence.