New Precedent: Lawful Pursuit of Fleeing Suspects from Level Three Stops (People v. Cleveland)

Introduction

In People v. Cleveland (2025 NYSlipOp 02144), the New York Court of Appeals clarified when police may pursue individuals who flee from a lawful detention. The case arose after uniformed officers observed Kevin Cleveland exit his stopped vehicle in an aggressive manner, approach a bystander with clenched fists, and then run away when ordered to stop. During the chase, Cleveland discarded what appeared to be a bag of crack cocaine. He was arrested moments later and moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the pursuit was unlawful. The trial court denied suppression, the Appellate Division affirmed, and a dissent raised the question whether reasonable suspicion evaporated once Cleveland ceased his initial threatening conduct. The Court of Appeals resolved that issue by holding that flight from a lawful level three stop itself sustains reasonable suspicion for pursuit.

Summary of the Judgment

1. The Court reaffirmed the De Bour four‐tier framework for police‐citizen encounters:

Level 1: Voluntary approach for information (credible reason).
Level 2: Common‐law inquiry (founded suspicion).
Level 3: Stop and temporary detention (reasonable suspicion).
Level 4: Arrest (probable cause).

2. It distinguished flight from level 1 and level 2 encounters (insufficient for pursuit) from flight from a level 3 stop: because a level 3 stop authorizes forcible detention, flight frustrates the officers’ legal authority and thus counts as “additional specific circumstances” supporting a pursuit.

3. Applying these principles to Cleveland’s case, the Court held that the initial stop was supported by reasonable suspicion (aggressive approach, clenched fists, potential assault on a bystander) and that Cleveland’s flight sustained that suspicion. Consequently, the pursuit and subsequent recovery of the discarded drugs were lawful.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

People v. De Bour (40 NY2d 210 [1976]): Established the four‐tier framework governing police encounters.
People v. Holmes (81 NY2d 1056 [1993]) and People v. May (81 NY2d 725 [1992]): Held that flight alone from level 1 or level 2 encounters does not justify further police intrusion.
People v. Sierra (83 NY2d 928 [1994]): Recognized that flight plus other specific facts may justify a level 3 pursuit.
People v. Martinez (80 NY2d 444 [1992]) and People v. Leung (68 NY2d 734 [1986]): Clarified that pursuit of a fleeing suspect is treated as a level 3 stop requiring reasonable suspicion.
Other decisions (e.g., Moore, Howard, Battista, Brannon, Cantor, Barksdale, McIntosh) supplied principles on reasonable suspicion, mixed questions of law and fact, and the breadth of state constitutional protections.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in two stages:

Initial Reasonable Suspicion: The officers observed a woman hurling a bottle at Cleveland’s vehicle, defendant exit his car suddenly in the street, clench his fists, and advance aggressively toward the woman. These specific and articulable facts, viewed in context, gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that a crime (assault or menacing) was imminent.
Pursuit Justification: Under De Bour level 3, a suspect’s attempt to flee interferes with a lawful detention. Unlike level 1 or level 2 encounters—where flight alone cannot trigger pursuit—a level 3 stop inherently authorizes forcible detention. Flight from such a stop therefore supplies the “additional specific circumstances” necessary to maintain reasonable suspicion and validates pursuit.

3. Impact of the Decision

This ruling has several significant effects on New York criminal procedure:

It clarifies that once a level 3 stop is lawfully initiated, any flight by the suspect sustains reasonable suspicion for pursuit and seizure.
It draws a bright line distinguishing level 3 from lower tiers: police need not accumulate new facts beyond flight to justify continuing the stop.
It strengthens police authority to secure evidence discarded during a chase from a level 3 stop, reducing suppression challenges in drug and weapon‐related prosecutions.
It affirms that New York’s State Constitution affords greater protection than the Fourth Amendment by requiring reasonable suspicion for pursuit, but it does not require physical restraint or submission before a seizure is deemed to occur.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Reasonable Suspicion: A moderate level of belief, based on specific and articulable facts plus logical inferences, that a person is engaged in or about to commit a crime. It is less than probable cause but more than a mere hunch.

Four-Tiered Encounters (De Bour):

Level 1: Voluntary police approach to request information (“objective credible reason”).
Level 2: Common‐law inquiry when officers have “founded suspicion” of wrongdoing.
Level 3: Stop, detention, and limited search for weapons when officers have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Level 4: Full custodial arrest requiring probable cause.

Seizure: Under New York law, a person is “seized” when police conduct—such as pursuit—meaningfully restricts freedom of movement or coerces compliance, without needing physical force or formal arrest.

Conclusion

People v. Cleveland establishes a clear and important new principle: when police lawfully effect a level 3 stop based on reasonable suspicion, any flight by the suspect justifies pursuit and the ensuing detention. The Court’s careful delineation between levels of police encounters provides guidance to law enforcement and defense practitioners alike. By affirming that flight from a lawful stop is itself a continuing source of reasonable suspicion, the decision strengthens the State’s ability to prevent escape, recover evidence, and protect public safety, while preserving robust state-constitutional protections against unreasonable seizures.