The case of John Doe & a. v. New Hampshire Attorney General & a. (2024 N.H. 50) represents a pivotal moment in New Hampshire’s legal landscape, particularly concerning law enforcement accountability and the rights of individuals listed on the Exculpatory Evidence Schedule (EES). The plaintiffs, three retired New Hampshire State Police troopers, challenged their inclusion on the EES, arguing that their placement was unwarranted and violated their due process rights.

This commentary delves into the Supreme Court of New Hampshire’s decision to reverse the Superior Court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint, analyzing the court’s reinterpretation of what constitutes "potentially exculpatory" evidence under RSA 105:13-d, and exploring the broader implications of this ruling.

The plaintiffs, retired state troopers, were placed on the EES after admitting to inflating their activity logs to meet mandated traffic stop quotas. They sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to have their names removed from the EES, asserting that their inclusion was based on outdated and misinterpreted conduct, thereby violating their constitutional rights.

The Superior Court dismissed their complaint, accepting that their conduct was potentially exculpatory and justified their placement on the EES. However, upon appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire found that the trial court had erred by not fully evaluating whether the plaintiffs' past conduct meets the criteria of being "potentially exculpatory." Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The judgment extensively cites and builds upon several key precedents:

• STATE v. LAURIE (1995): Established that the State must disclose exculpatory evidence that could impact the defendant’s case, emphasizing the integrity of law enforcement records.
• Automated Transactions v. American Bankers Association (2019): Affirmed that factual allegations in complaints should be accepted as true for appellate review.
• Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney (2015): Highlighted the stigma associated with being listed on the "Laurie List" (now EES) and the need for accurate and vetted information.
• BRADY v. MARYLAND (1963): Established the prosecution’s duty to disclose evidence favorable to the defense that is material to guilt or punishment.
• Bagley v. United States (1985): Clarified that the duty to disclose includes both exculpatory and impeachment evidence.

These precedents collectively underscore the court’s commitment to ensuring transparency and accountability within the criminal justice system, particularly regarding the disclosure of information that could influence legal outcomes.

The Supreme Court's analysis centered on interpreting RSA 105:13-d, particularly the term "potentially exculpatory." While the Superior Court had deemed the plaintiffs' conduct as such, the Supreme Court found that this determination required a more nuanced analysis.

The majority emphasized that "potentially exculpatory" should not be interpreted narrowly based solely on the statute's plain language. Instead, it should consider whether there is a "reasonably foreseeable case" where the information would be material to guilt or punishment, aligning with the standards set forth in Brady and Bagley.

The court highlighted that factors such as the age and nature of the conduct should influence whether information is deemed potentially exculpatory. This approach ensures that the EES remains accurate and that officers are not unjustly stigmatized for outdated or non-material actions.

In contrast, the dissent argued that the majority improperly narrowed the statutory definition, potentially undermining legislative intent and broad disclosure obligations.

This judgment significantly impacts how the EES is maintained and how officers are assessed for inclusion. By requiring a more detailed examination of whether past conduct is materially exculpatory, the court ensures that the EES remains a reliable tool for defense counsel, preventing undue harm to officers who may have past conduct that does not bear relevance to their credibility or current standing.

Future cases involving the EES will now necessitate a deeper analysis of the context and relevance of an officer’s past conduct, potentially reducing instances of erroneous or outdated inclusions. Additionally, law enforcement agencies may need to revisit their internal procedures for recommending officers for the EES to ensure compliance with the judiciary's refined standards.

Legally, this decision reinforces the principle that the rights of individuals listed on such schedules must be carefully balanced against the needs of the prosecution, promoting fairness and accuracy within the legal process.

Exculpatory Evidence

Exculpatory evidence refers to any information that can potentially exonerate a defendant, proving their innocence or reducing their culpability. Under BRADY v. MARYLAND, the prosecution is required to disclose such evidence to the defense.

Impeachment Evidence

Impeachment evidence is used to challenge the credibility of a witness, including law enforcement officers. It can involve past misconduct or dishonest behavior that may undermine the officer's reliability in court.

Exculpatory Evidence Schedule (EES)

The EES is a list maintained by the New Hampshire Department of Justice containing information about law enforcement officers that could be exculpatory or used to impeach their credibility. Inclusion on this list triggers disclosure obligations similar to those in criminal proceedings.

Potentially Exculpatory Evidence

In the context of RSA 105:13-d, "potentially exculpatory evidence" encompasses any officer personnel information that could reasonably impact a defendant's case, either by exonerating them or impeaching the officer's credibility as a witness.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire’s decision in John Doe & a. v. New Hampshire Attorney General & a. marks a critical reinterpretation of what constitutes "potentially exculpatory" evidence within the framework of RSA 105:13-d. By mandating a more thorough examination of the relevance and materiality of an officer’s past conduct, the court ensures that the EES remains a robust and fair mechanism for enhancing transparency in the criminal justice system.

This ruling balances the necessity of prosecutorial obligations under constitutional mandates with the imperative to protect the reputations and rights of law enforcement officers. Moving forward, both the Department of Justice and law enforcement agencies must align their procedures with this clarified standard, fostering a legal environment that upholds both accountability and fairness.

Ultimately, this judgment reinforces the judiciary’s role in safeguarding due process rights while maintaining the integrity of law enforcement information utilized in legal proceedings.