Nevada Supreme Court Requires Express Reservation to Seek Post‑Offer Interest on Punitive Damages in Stipulated Judgments

Nevada Supreme Court Requires Express Reservation to Seek Post‑Offer Interest on Punitive Damages in Stipulated Judgments

Introduction

In CWIK v. BEARDSLEY (Supreme Court of Nevada, Nov. 10, 2025), the court addressed whether a plaintiff can amend a stipulated judgment to add post‑offer interest to the punitive-damages component where the settlement agreement did not expressly reserve that issue. The case arose out of an automobile collision in which plaintiff Cassandra Cwik sued defendant Mark Beardsley for failing to yield at a stop sign. Before trial, Cwik served an offer of judgment under NRCP 68 and NRS 17.117 for a lump sum of $250,000 inclusive of interest, costs, and attorney fees. Beardsley let the offer lapse. The parties later settled and submitted a stipulated judgment totaling approximately $674,000, which itemized compensatory damages, punitive damages, and a fixed amount of prejudgment interest on past compensatory damages. The judgment also contained a clause referencing “any costs, post-offer interest and attorney fees to be subsequently adjudicated by the Court” and provided for postjudgment interest on the total.

After entry of the stipulated judgment, Cwik moved for attorney fees, costs, and to amend the judgment to add post‑offer interest on the $250,000 punitive damages award. The district court denied the request for post‑offer interest on punitive damages, relying on Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Sharp (1985), which held that punitive damages do not bear prejudgment interest under NRS 17.130. On appeal, a divided Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The majority did not decide the open question whether NRCP 68/NRS 17.117 permit post‑offer interest on punitive damages. Instead, it held that the stipulated judgment failed to expressly reserve that issue and any ambiguity must be construed against the drafter. A three‑justice dissent would have reversed, both because the judgment expressly contemplated subsequent litigation over post‑offer interest and because post‑offer interest under NRCP 68 is distinct from prejudgment interest under NRS 17.130.

Summary of the Opinion

  • The court affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to amend a stipulated judgment to add post‑offer interest to the punitive-damages component.
  • Holding: A stipulated judgment is presumptively final and resolves all issues in the case unless it specifically and precisely reserves particular issues for further litigation. A general reference to “post‑offer interest” embedded in a sentence about postjudgment interest, alongside costs and attorney fees, did not adequately reserve the entitlement to post‑offer interest on punitive damages.
  • The court expressly did not decide the underlying legal question of whether punitive damages can bear post‑offer interest under NRCP 68/NRS 17.117, describing that question as open in Nevada.
  • Key interpretive principles applied: settlement agreements are contracts; contractual language controls; ambiguities are construed against the drafter; missing portions of the appellate record are presumed to support the district court’s ruling.
  • Practical result: Because the stipulation did not clearly reserve the right to seek post‑offer (prejudgment) interest on punitive damages, the plaintiff could not obtain that interest post‑judgment by motion to amend.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

  • Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Sharp, 101 Nev. 824, 711 P.2d 1 (1985) — Held that punitive damages do not bear prejudgment interest under NRS 17.130 because such damages punish rather than compensate. The district court relied on Ramada. The majority acknowledged Ramada but emphasized the court was not deciding whether post‑offer interest (a different concept) may attach to punitive damages. The dissent stressed that Ramada’s rule for prejudgment interest does not control post‑offer interest under NRCP 68.
  • Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Mercer, 111 Nev. 318, 890 P.2d 785 (1995) — Approved adding post‑offer interest to future damages even though future damages do not bear prejudgment interest, signaling that post‑offer interest functions differently from standard prejudgment interest.
  • Olson v. Mid‑Century Ins. Co., Docket No. 86892 (Nev. Sept. 4, 2025) (unpublished, rehearing pending) — An unpublished order, endorsed by six justices, permitting post‑offer interest on a verdict that included punitive damages and clarifying that Ramada (prejudgment interest) does not control NRCP 68 post‑offer interest. The majority here notes Olson but treats the ultimate legal question as open; the dissent relies on Olson’s reasoning and outcome.
  • Contract Interpretation and Settlement Principles:
    • MMAWC, LLC v. Zion Wood Obi Wan Tr., 135 Nev. 275, 448 P.3d 568 (2019) — Settlements are contracts; contract language controls; ambiguities are construed against the drafter (contra proferentem).
    • Nev. State Educ. Ass’n v. Clark Cnty. Educ. Ass’n, 137 Nev. 76, 482 P.3d 665 (2021) — Contract interpretation is reviewed de novo.
    • Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212, 163 P.3d 405 (2007) — Ambiguities construed against the drafter.
  • Finality and Reservations in Stipulated Judgments:
    • 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §§ 173–187 — A stipulated judgment generally ends the controversy; issues must be precisely reserved to remain open; absent express reservation, it is presumed all contested issues are resolved.
    • Richard v. Innovative Tech. & Consult. Ltd. Corp., 399 So.3d 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2024) — Persuasive authority: a court retains jurisdiction only to the extent specifically reserved in the agreed judgment.
    • Przekopski v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Colchester, 26 A.3d 657 (Conn. App. 2011) — Absent language reserving specified issues, a stipulated judgment resolves all contested matters.
    • Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 130 Nev. 22, 317 P.3d 828 (2014) — Parties can, and did there, preserve a right to seek compound interest by agreement, underscoring the need to articulate reservations explicitly.
  • Collateral matters and timing:
    • Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169 (1989) — A request for discretionary prejudgment interest is not wholly collateral to the merits, unlike costs and attorney fees. The majority analogized from Osterneck to explain why entitlement to pre‑judgment monetary add‑ons (like post‑offer interest) can implicate merits and finality absent a clear reservation.
    • NRCP 54(d)(2)(A) and NRCP 58(c) — Costs and fees may be decided post‑judgment and do not delay entry of judgment; they are “collateral.”
  • Offer‑of‑Judgment Framework:
    • NRCP 68(a) — An offer of judgment is, unless otherwise specified, an offer to resolve all claims “including costs, expenses, interest, and … attorney fees.” This underscores that interest-related issues are ordinarily resolved by the judgment unless carved out.
    • NRS 17.117 — Nevada’s companion statute for offers of judgment.
  • Record on Appeal:
    • Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 172 P.3d 131 (2007) — Missing portions of the record are presumed to support the district court’s ruling. The stipulated judgment referenced separate stipulations and orders not in the appellate record; that absence weighed against the appellant’s position.
  • Standards of Review:
    • N. Las Vegas Infrastructure Inv. & Constr., LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 139 Nev. 46, 525 P.3d 836 (2023) and M.C. Multi‑Family Dev., LLC v. Crestdale Assocs., Ltd., 124 Nev. 901, 193 P.3d 536 (2008) — Fees, costs, and interest awards are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
    • Jones v. Ghadiri, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 27, 546 P.3d 831 (2024) — Purely legal issues are reviewed de novo.

Legal Reasoning

The majority approached the dispute through contract law, treating the stipulated judgment as a settlement agreement whose terms govern. The core rule applied was the finality of stipulated judgments: they resolve all issues and end the controversy unless the parties precisely reserve a specific issue or claim for further litigation. The court identified several features of the stipulation and record that, in combination, defeated Cwik’s request.

  • Textual structure of the stipulated judgment: The judgment itemized discrete components—past pain and suffering, past medical expenses, a fixed sum of prejudgment interest on past compensatory damages, and punitive damages—and then calculated a “total judgment.” The clause at issue stated that the total “plus any costs, post‑offer interest and attorney fees to be subsequently adjudicated by the Court, shall incur postjudgment interest at the legal rate.” The court read this clause as a three‑item list of collateral matters (costs, post‑offer interest, and fees) introduced in a sentence whose primary function was to impose postjudgment interest on the entire judgment. In that context, the reference to “post‑offer interest” did not clearly signal a reserved entitlement to post‑offer interest specifically on the punitive-damages component.
  • Collateral versus merits‑adjacent issues: While costs and attorney fees are classically collateral and may be quantified post‑judgment without undermining finality, entitlement to additional monetary amounts that precede judgment—and especially where availability is legally disputed—is not purely collateral. Drawing on Osterneck, the majority reasoned that if the parties intended to litigate the entitlement to post‑offer (pre‑judgment) interest on punitive damages, they needed to state that intent explicitly.
  • Ambiguity and contra proferentem: At best, the stipulation was ambiguous. It listed a fixed amount for punitive damages with no mention of interest attaching to that component beyond the generalized sentence for postjudgment interest on the total. The court noted the judgment appeared to be drafted by plaintiff’s counsel (based on the firm’s letterhead) and therefore construed the ambiguity against the drafter.
  • Incomplete record: The stipulated judgment referenced separate stipulations and orders not included in the record on appeal. Under Cuzze, gaps in the record are presumed to support the district court’s ruling, further undermining the appellant’s position.
  • Open question preserved—substantive entitlement not decided: The court deliberately did not answer whether punitive damages may bear post‑offer interest under NRCP 68/NRS 17.117. It instead grounded its affirmance in the failure to reserve the issue with the requisite specificity.

The dissent took a different view on both text and law. It read the stipulation’s express reference to “costs, post‑offer interest and attorney fees to be subsequently adjudicated by the Court” as a clear reservation of the post‑offer interest issue—especially because the offer‑of‑judgment rule itself lists costs, interest, and fees in similar sequence (NRCP 68(f)(1)(B)). The dissent also emphasized that the defense did not claim surprise or argue lack of reservation in the district court or on appeal; the majority, in the dissent’s view, resolved the case on a ground not advanced by the respondent. On the merits, the dissent invoked Olson—a six‑justice unpublished order—to underscore that post‑offer interest is distinct from prejudgment interest under NRS 17.130 and can attach to punitive‑damages awards as part of NRCP 68’s sanctioning regime.

Impact

This decision meaningfully recalibrates settlement drafting and post‑judgment motion practice in Nevada:

  • Precision in reservations is mandatory: Generic references to “post‑offer interest” in a stipulation, particularly within a clause primarily dealing with postjudgment interest, are insufficient to preserve an entitlement to post‑offer interest on a particular damages component such as punitive damages. Parties must draft explicit reservations.
  • Drafting against interest: Because ambiguities are construed against the drafter, plaintiff‑side counsel who typically prepare proposed stipulations must state reservations clearly and specifically, or risk losing them.
  • Record completeness matters: If a stipulated judgment cross‑references other stipulations or orders, those documents must be included in the appellate record; omissions will presumptively favor affirmance.
  • Substantive question remains open: Whether NRCP 68/NRS 17.117 allow post‑offer interest to be calculated on punitive damages remains unresolved by a published decision. The dissent and the unpublished Olson order suggest significant support for allowing it when properly preserved, but absent a clear reservation in a stipulated judgment, parties may be foreclosed from seeking it after entry of judgment.
  • Settlement and offer‑of‑judgment strategy: Plaintiffs should either (a) negotiate punitive‑damages figures that already internalize the time value and NRCP 68 exposure, or (b) expressly reserve the right to seek post‑offer interest on punitive damages, tying the reservation to NRCP 68/NRS 17.117. Defendants can point to this decision to resist post‑judgment efforts to expand stipulated awards without a specific reservation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Stipulated judgment: A final judgment entered by consent of the parties, usually reflecting a settlement. It ordinarily ends the case and resolves all issues, unless it expressly reserves named issues for later resolution.
  • Prejudgment interest: Interest that accrues before judgment, typically to compensate a plaintiff for the lost use of money owed (e.g., on past compensatory damages). In Nevada, punitive damages do not bear prejudgment interest under NRS 17.130 because they serve to punish, not compensate.
  • Postjudgment interest: Interest that accrues on the judgment after entry until paid, at the legal rate under NRS 17.130.
  • Post‑offer interest (NRCP 68/NRS 17.117): A sanction that applies from the date an offer of judgment is served until the judgment is entered if the offeree fails to obtain a more favorable result. It is distinct in purpose from compensatory prejudgment interest and is designed to encourage settlement.
  • Collateral matters: Issues like costs and attorney fees that can be decided after the judgment without affecting the judgment’s finality. By contrast, entitlement to additional pre‑judgment monetary amounts (like some forms of interest) may not be wholly collateral.
  • Contra proferentem: A contract‑interpretation rule that resolves ambiguity against the party who drafted the language.

Practical Drafting Guidance

To preserve the right to seek post‑offer interest on punitive damages following a stipulated judgment, consider:

  • Expressly identify the reserved issue by name and component, e.g., “the parties expressly reserve for post‑judgment motion practice and appellate review the entitlement to and calculation of post‑offer interest under NRCP 68/NRS 17.117 on the punitive‑damages component of this judgment from the date of the NRCP 68 offer to the date of entry.”
  • Separate the reservation from any postjudgment interest clause. Do not bury the reservation in a sentence whose primary topic is postjudgment interest.
  • Clarify whether the reservation concerns entitlement, calculation, or both, and specify the applicable period and legal basis (NRCP 68/NRS 17.117).
  • Ensure any cross‑referenced stipulations or orders are filed and included in any appellate record.
  • State whether the reservation includes the right to seek appellate review if the post‑offer interest request is denied.

Conclusion

CWIK v. BEARDSLEY offers an important, and practical, lesson: a stipulated judgment will be read as the parties’ final word on all contested issues unless a reservation is drafted with precision. A generalized reference to “post‑offer interest” does not preserve the entitlement to seek that interest on a particular damages component—here, punitive damages—especially when the stipulation otherwise sets fixed figures and addresses postjudgment interest globally. The court left open the substantive question whether punitive damages may bear post‑offer interest under NRCP 68/NRS 17.117, a question the dissent would answer affirmatively and that an unpublished order (Olson) has recently suggested is proper. Until the Supreme Court provides a definitive published answer, practitioners should assume that preservation will be outcome‑determinative: say exactly what is being reserved, or risk losing it.

Beyond the immediate dispute over post‑offer interest on punitive damages, the decision underscores familiar but often overlooked settlement rules: stipulated judgments function as contracts; ambiguity is perilous and will be construed against the drafter; and the completeness of the record on appeal can be decisive. The safest path is clarity—a carefully drafted, explicit reservation tied to the precise legal entitlement at issue.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

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