Nevada Supreme Court Rejects the Automatic Companion Rule: Individualized Reasonable Suspicion Required to Detain or Search a Suspect’s Companion

I. Introduction

In State v. Dubuc, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 67 (Dec. 23, 2025), the Supreme Court of Nevada addressed a recurring tension in Fourth Amendment law: how far may police go in detaining and searching a person who happens to be in the company of a suspect being arrested or investigated?

The case involved respondent Ricky Kevin Dubuc, who was charged with felony carrying a concealed weapon after police, while arresting his associate on an unrelated warrant, detained and searched Dubuc in a parking lot. The key question was whether officers needed individualized reasonable suspicion that Dubuc himself was involved in criminal activity before detaining and searching him, or whether generic concerns about officer safety and his mere association with a suspect were enough.

The court’s answer is clear and consequential: mere proximity to, or association with, a suspect does not justify detaining or searching a companion. Officer safety, while important, “does not provide a blank check” to override the constitutional requirement of individualized suspicion. The court expressly and affirmatively rejects the “automatic companion rule”, a doctrine recognized in some jurisdictions that allows officers to automatically pat down arrestees’ companions.

This opinion is a significant clarification of Nevada search-and-seizure law and places firm limits on police authority to detain and search non-suspect companions in the name of officer safety.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Surveillance and Parking-Lot Encounter

Police were conducting surveillance on an associate of Dubuc, who was a suspect in an unrelated crime. During this surveillance, officers:

Observed the associate and Dubuc together,
Watched them enter Dubuc’s vehicle, and
Later stopped them in a parking lot after they exited the vehicle and began walking toward a store.

In the parking lot:

Police arrested the associate based on an outstanding warrant.
They also detained Dubuc, who was merely accompanying the arrestee.
An officer asked Dubuc whether he had “anything on him that he shouldn’t.”
Dubuc responded that he had a handgun concealed in his waistband and, when asked, said he did not have a concealed weapons permit.
Officers then handcuffed Dubuc and removed the firearm from his waistband.

B. Lack of Prior Suspicion as to Dubuc

The record is notable for what it does not contain:

Dubuc had no outstanding warrants.
The arrest report did not indicate that officers suspected Dubuc had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime at the time of the detention.
The arresting officer testified at the preliminary hearing that:
- Dubuc was not being specifically watched during the surveillance, and
- The officer did not know of any prior criminal history of Dubuc at the time of the detention.

In short, the only apparent basis for stopping Dubuc was his association with the arrestee and the officers’ general concern for safety while making that arrest.

C. Charges and Motion to Suppress

Based on the seizure of the handgun and Dubuc’s statements, he was charged with illegally carrying a concealed weapon.

Dubuc filed a motion to suppress, arguing:

The stop and detention were unconstitutional because officers lacked reasonable suspicion that he had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.
The subsequent search and seizure of the firearm, and his statements, were fruits of that unconstitutional detention and therefore had to be suppressed.

The State responded that the search was permissible under reasoning analogous to traffic stop cases, where officers may detain and sometimes frisk a passenger for officer safety.

D. District Court Ruling

After a hearing, the district court found:

The facts known to officers at the time of the encounter “did not indicate criminal activity by Dubuc.”
The State had failed to establish reasonable suspicion to support detaining or searching Dubuc.

The district court therefore:

Held that Dubuc was illegally detained, and
Suppressed both the physical evidence (the firearm) and Dubuc’s statements made during the encounter.

The State appealed the suppression order to the Nevada Supreme Court.

III. Summary of the Opinion

Writing for a unanimous court (Herndon, C.J., and Bell, J., concurring), Justice Stiglich affirmed the district court’s suppression order. The court held:

Reasonable suspicion must be individualized. The State failed to demonstrate reasonable suspicion that Dubuc was involved in criminal activity. His mere association with a person under surveillance and later arrested on a warrant did not justify detaining or searching him.
Officer safety is not a “blank check.” While officer safety is an important consideration, it does not eliminate the constitutional requirement that a seizure or search be supported by individualized, articulable facts suggesting criminal involvement by the person detained.
Mere proximity is not enough. The court explicitly held that “mere proximity to a person who was under surveillance and then arrested does not, standing alone, support detaining and searching the arrestee’s companion.”
Nevada rejects the automatic companion rule. The court expressly refused to adopt and in fact affirmatively rejected the so-called “automatic companion rule,” which some jurisdictions use to allow officers to pat down any companion of an arrestee for weapons without individualized suspicion.
No evidentiary hearing was required. Because the State did not identify any material factual disputes that would be resolved by an evidentiary hearing, the district court acted within its discretion by deciding the motion to suppress on the existing record.

Bottom line: the evidence (the firearm and Dubuc’s statements) was properly suppressed because the officers lacked lawful grounds to detain and search Dubuc under the United States and Nevada Constitutions.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Constitutional and Statutory Framework

The opinion is grounded in familiar search-and-seizure principles under:

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures), and
Article 1, Section 18 of the Nevada Constitution (Nevada’s counterpart to the Fourth Amendment).

Citing Grace v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 132 Nev. 511, 516, 375 P.3d 1017, 1020 (2016), the court reiterates:

Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable unless a well-established exception applies.

One such exception is the so-called “Terry stop” or investigative detention, codified in Nevada at NRS 171.123(1). Under that statute and its constitutional analog:

An officer may temporarily detain a person only if the officer has reasonable suspicion, based on specific, articulable facts, that the person “has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime.” Somee v. State, 124 Nev. 434, 442, 187 P.3d 152, 158 (2008).

That suspicion must be “individualized”—directed at the particular person subjected to the seizure or search—rather than inferred from mere association or generalized hunches.

B. Precedents and Authorities Considered

1. Core Fourth Amendment Cases

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
The foundational case for stop-and-frisk doctrine. Terry held that an officer may briefly detain and pat down a suspect if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in criminal activity and may be armed and dangerous. Nevada’s opinion quotes Terry’s definition of a “seizure”: whenever an officer restrains an individual’s freedom to walk away.
Arterburn v. State, 111 Nev. 1121, 901 P.2d 668 (1995)
Quoted for the proposition that when police accost an individual and restrain the person’s freedom to walk away, a “seizure” has occurred, invoking constitutional protections.
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000)
Cited for the principle that reasonable suspicion, in the ordinary law enforcement context, requires an “individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.” Edmond involved checkpoints and articulated that suspicionless stops are generally invalid absent special circumstances.
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997)
A traffic-stop case establishing that, once a vehicle is lawfully stopped, officers may order passengers to exit the vehicle for officer safety. The Nevada court cites Wilson for the broader idea that the reasonableness of a seizure turns on balancing public interest against individual liberty.
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009)
Johnson held that passengers in a lawfully stopped vehicle are “seized” for the duration of the stop and may be subjected to a frisk if the officer also has reasonable suspicion that the passenger is armed and dangerous. The State relied heavily on Johnson to analogize Dubuc’s situation to that of a vehicle passenger.
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001)
Cited in a footnoted discussion about exceptions to the individualized suspicion requirement—namely “special needs” searches (where the government pursues a policy goal other than ordinary law enforcement). The court emphasizes that this “special needs” doctrine is not applicable here because Dubuc’s case arises in the ordinary criminal law enforcement context.

2. Nevada Precedents

Grace v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 132 Nev. 511, 375 P.3d 1017 (2016)
Used to restate the general rule that warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable unless an exception applies.
Somee v. State, 124 Nev. 434, 187 P.3d 152 (2008)
Provides Nevada’s articulation of reasonable suspicion: it must be based on “specific articulable facts” and assessed under the totality of the circumstances. Also establishes standards for appellate review (de novo for legal conclusions; clear error for factual findings).
State v. Lisenbee, 116 Nev. 1124, 13 P.3d 947 (2000)
Emphasizes that reasonable suspicion requires more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” That language, borrowed from federal jurisprudence, underscores that vague, generalized concerns cannot justify a stop.
Proferes v. State, 116 Nev. 1136, 13 P.3d 955 (2000)
Cited for the requirement of “objective information to support a reasonable suspicion connecting the person to criminal activity.” The court notes that Proferes has been overruled on other grounds by Rosky v. State, but its core discussion of reasonable suspicion remains useful.
Cortes v. State, 127 Nev. 505, 260 P.3d 184 (2011)
A crucial Nevada case applying Arizona v. Johnson in the traffic context. Cortes allowed officers during a traffic stop to:
- Request passengers to exit the vehicle, and
- Frisk passengers when there is reasonable suspicion that the passenger is armed and dangerous or otherwise involved in criminal activity.
The State argued that Cortes supported extending similar logic to Dubuc as a “companion” of the arrestee. The Nevada Supreme Court distinguishes Cortes and stresses that even under Cortes, individualized suspicion of danger or criminal involvement is still required.

3. Federal and State Cases on Companion Detentions

United States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978)
Quoted for the proposition that reasonable suspicion “must be specifically directed to the person to be searched.” This federal case reinforces the individualized-suspicion requirement.
Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 93 N.E.3d 864 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018)
Cited by the State to justify detaining a suspect’s companion during an arrest. The Nevada Supreme Court finds Ramirez “instructive” but ultimately distinguishes it:
- Ramirez permitted the temporary detention of a companion for purposes of safely conducting an arrest.
- However, the search of the companion in Ramirez was upheld only because there were additional individualized facts suggesting criminal activity (the companion fled and grabbed his waistband as if holding a weapon).
The Nevada court emphasizes that Ramirez carefully treats detention and search as separate analytical steps—an approach it endorses.
People v. Chestnut, 409 N.E.2d 958 (N.Y. 1980)
A New York decision in which a companion was searched only after the officer observed the suspect pass an object to the companion, believed to be a firearm used in a robbery. The Nevada Supreme Court uses Chestnut to illustrate how individualized suspicion can arise from specific observed conduct, as opposed to mere association.
State v. Kelly, 95 A.3d 1081 (Conn. 2014) and United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012)
Both are referenced as less instructive because they focus primarily on the legality of detentions rather than searches, and do not robustly address when it is permissible to frisk a non-suspect companion.

4. The “Automatic Companion Rule” and Its Rejection

A key doctrinal centerpiece is the automatic companion rule. Under that rule, some courts have allowed officers to conduct a pat-down search of any companion of an arrestee as a matter of course, for officer safety, without any individualized suspicion about that companion.

The State relies on an example from another jurisdiction:

In re D.S., 5 N.E.3d 1063 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013)
This case describes the automatic companion rule as permitting officers to pat down “any companion of an arrestee” to assure they are unarmed.

The Nevada Supreme Court responds unequivocally:

Nevada has not adopted the automatic companion rule, and the court “takes this opportunity to affirmatively reject that doctrine.”

This explicit rejection is one of the most important doctrinal outcomes of the opinion and sets Nevada apart from jurisdictions that still accept automatic pat-downs of companions solely based on their association with arrestees.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Was Dubuc Seized? Yes.

Drawing on Arterburn and Terry, the court begins by confirming that:

When officers stopped Dubuc, questioned him, handcuffed him, and searched his person, they plainly restrained his freedom to walk away. That restraint constituted a seizure within the meaning of the U.S. and Nevada Constitutions.

Once that is established, the central question becomes whether that seizure—and the subsequent search—were reasonable under the applicable exceptions to the warrant requirement.

2. The Requirement of Individualized Reasonable Suspicion

The court reiterates that to justify a temporary investigative stop under NRS 171.123 and the Fourth Amendment, officers must have:

“Specific articulable facts” that,
Viewed under the totality of the circumstances,
Support an individualized suspicion that the particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.

The court emphasizes:

Reasonable suspicion “requires more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch” and must be specifically directed to the person to be searched.

Applying this standard, the State could not identify:

Any suspicious conduct by Dubuc (no flight, no furtive movements, no apparent attempts to conceal contraband),
Any pre-existing knowledge of Dubuc’s criminal history, or
Any particularized facts suggesting he was armed or involved in criminal activity.

Dubuc’s only connection to the investigation was his association with the arrestee and his presence in the parking lot at the time of the arrest. The court holds that such association alone is constitutionally insufficient to justify detaining and searching him.

3. Distinguishing Traffic-Stop Cases: Arizona v. Johnson and Cortes

The State argued that Dubuc’s situation was analogous to a traffic stop, citing Arizona v. Johnson and Nevada’s Cortes v. State. Under Johnson and Cortes:

When a vehicle is lawfully stopped for a traffic violation, all occupants (driver and passengers) are considered lawfully “seized” for the duration of the stop.
Officers may conduct a frisk of a passenger if they have reasonable suspicion that the passenger is armed and dangerous or involved in criminal conduct.

The Nevada Supreme Court rejects the State’s attempt to treat a parking-lot pedestrian the same as a passenger in a lawfully stopped vehicle, for two main reasons:

In Johnson, the traffic violation justified the stop of both driver and passenger. By contrast, in Dubuc’s case, only the associate had an outstanding warrant; Dubuc was simply nearby and was otherwise free to leave.
Johnson itself reaffirms that an “on-the-street encounter” requires reasonable suspicion that the “person apprehended” has committed a criminal offense. The Nevada court underscores that Johnson does not authorize ignoring individualized suspicion.

Thus, even if Cortes were read more broadly than the traffic context (a proposition the Dubuc court does not endorse), Cortes still obliges officers to have reasonable suspicion that the passenger frisked is personally dangerous or involved in criminal activity. That prerequisite was not satisfied in Dubuc’s case.

4. Officer Safety vs. Constitutional Limits

The State framed its argument heavily around officer safety—the notion that when officers arrest a potentially dangerous person, they should be able to control and ensure the safety of any nearby companions, including by detaining and frisking them.

The Nevada Supreme Court accepts that officer safety is a legitimate and weighty interest but refuses to allow it to erase constitutional constraints. The court states:

“Officer safety does not provide a blank check to search a person who is not individually suspected of involvement in a crime.”

At the same time, the court offers practical guidance:

“Clearly, when executing a lawful arrest, police may direct the arrestee’s companion or companions to step away and not interfere.”
However, they may not elevate such control to a full-blown investigative stop or frisk without specific, articulable facts linking the companion to criminal activity.

This preserves the ability of officers to manage the scene for safety (commands like “stand back,” “do not approach,” etc.) while firmly drawing the line at detentions and searches without individualized suspicion.

5. Detention vs. Search: Lessons from Ramirez and Chestnut

The court carefully distinguishes between:

Detaining a companion briefly to facilitate a safe arrest, and
Searching that companion’s person for weapons or contraband.

From Commonwealth v. Ramirez, the Nevada court draws two lessons:

Temporary detention of a companion may sometimes be justified to secure the scene.
A search, by contrast, requires more—individualized suspicion based on specific conduct (in Ramirez, flight and grabbing the waistband as if holding a firearm).

The same pattern appears in People v. Chestnut, where the search of a companion was upheld only after the officer saw an object (believed to be the gun used in a recent robbery) passed to the companion. Again, the court emphasizes that individualized, observed behavior—not mere companionship—justified the search.

By highlighting these cases, the Nevada Supreme Court signals that:

Association plus additional specific behavior may support reasonable suspicion; association alone does not.

6. Express Rejection of the Automatic Companion Rule

The court’s most doctrinally clear statement is its treatment of the automatic companion rule. After acknowledging that some courts have adopted that rule, the court concludes:

“Nevada, however, has not adopted the automatic companion rule, and we take this opportunity to affirmatively reject that doctrine.”

This explicit rejection means:

Nevada law does not allow officers to automatically pat down companions simply because someone next to them is under arrest.
Officers must have specific, articulable facts creating individualized suspicion that the companion is armed and dangerous or engaged in criminal activity before conducting a frisk.

The court thereby aligns Nevada with jurisdictions that interpret the Fourth Amendment and analogous state constitutional provisions to prohibit guilt by association and suspicionless pat-downs of companions.

7. No Need for an Evidentiary Hearing

Finally, the State argued that the district court should have granted an evidentiary hearing before suppressing the evidence. The Nevada Supreme Court rejects this, relying on Cortes for the proposition that:

When there are no disputed material facts relevant to the motion to suppress, a court may decide the motion on the existing record without taking additional live testimony.

Because the State did not point to any contested factual issues that could change the legal analysis, no evidentiary hearing was required, and the suppression ruling stands.

D. Doctrinal Impact and Future Consequences

1. Clarifying the Limits of Officer-Safety-Based Detentions

Dubuc sends a strong signal to law enforcement agencies in Nevada:

Officer safety is a legitimate concern, but it is not a free-standing justification to detain and search persons who are not particularized suspects.
Mere presence with or proximity to a suspect does not alone justify an investigative stop or frisk.

Practically, this means officers must:

Differentiate between scene-control commands (e.g., “stand back,” “stay where you are,” “do not interfere”) and a full investigative detention, and
Be able to articulate specific facts—beyond association—that led them to suspect criminal activity by a companion before detaining or searching that companion.

2. Training and Policy Implications for Police

Nevada law enforcement training curricula and internal policies will likely need to reflect:

The express rejection of the automatic companion rule.
The distinction between:
- Permissible, brief safety measures affecting companions (e.g., “move over there and keep your hands visible”), and
- Constitutionally significant seizures and searches, which require individualized reasonable suspicion.
The need to document, in reports and testimony, specific facts indicating why a given companion was suspected of criminal activity or of being armed and dangerous.

3. Litigation Strategy in Suppression Motions

For defense counsel, Dubuc provides:

A clear doctrinal basis to challenge detentions and searches of clients who were merely “with” someone else arrested or investigated.
Citations and language emphasizing that suspicion must be individualized and cannot rest on “inchoate” or “unparticularized” hunches.
A Nevada Supreme Court precedent explicitly rejecting the automatic companion rule, which can be invoked whenever the State relies on officer safety without specific facts about the client.

For prosecutors, the case underscores the importance of:

Developing the factual record to show individualized suspicion when companions are detained or searched, and
Recognizing that many automatic or categorical officer-safety rationales will not survive judicial scrutiny absent case-specific detail.

4. Harmonization with Federal Law and Other States

Dubuc aligns Nevada with a substantial body of federal and state case law that:

Rejects suspicionless searches based purely on association with a suspect, and
Insists on individual-level justification for seizures and frisks under the Fourth Amendment.

While some jurisdictions still recognize variants of the automatic companion rule, Nevada now clearly stakes out a position that:

Fourth Amendment and Nevada constitutional protections extend fully to bystanders and companions unless and until specific facts justify treating them as suspects.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Seizure” of a Person

A person is “seized” under the Fourth Amendment when a reasonable person in that situation would feel that they are not free to leave or ignore the officer’s commands. Examples include:

Being physically restrained (e.g., handcuffed),
Being ordered to stay in place under threat of physical force, or
Being subjected to persistent questioning while surrounded by officers such that leaving is not realistic.

In Dubuc’s case, the seizure was clear once officers stopped him, questioned him, and then handcuffed him.

2. Reasonable Suspicion

“Reasonable suspicion” is:

A lower standard than “probable cause,”
Based on specific, articulable facts and rational inferences from those facts,
Judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer under the “totality of the circumstances,” and
Directed at the particular person being stopped or searched.

Pure guesses, generalized fears, or hunches do not count. There must be concrete observations or information that support a belief that the person is engaged in criminal activity.

3. Individualized Suspicion vs. Guilt by Association

“Individualized suspicion” means the officer’s suspicion focuses on that specific person, not just the group they are with or the area they are in. It rejects “guilt by association,” that is:

You cannot be lawfully detained or searched merely because:
- You are standing near someone under arrest, or
- You are friends, relatives, or associates of a suspected offender.

There must be something about your own conduct, appearance, information known about you, or your interaction with the suspect that gives rise to suspicion.

4. The Automatic Companion Rule

The “automatic companion rule” is a doctrine (adopted in some jurisdictions) that allows officers to automatically pat down anyone accompanying an arrestee, solely for officer safety, without needing individualized suspicion that the companion is armed or involved in a crime.

Nevada has now expressly rejected this rule. Officers in Nevada must meet the standard Terry/stop-and-frisk requirements for each individual they frisk, including companions.

5. Special Needs Searches

The court briefly mentions “special needs” searches, which are exceptions to the usual requirement of individualized suspicion. These occur when:

The search or seizure is conducted for a purpose other than ordinary criminal law enforcement, such as:
- Airport security screenings,
- Border searches, or
- Certain administrative or regulatory inspections.

In those contexts, individualized suspicion can sometimes be dispensed with. But the court makes clear that Dubuc’s case does not involve such “special needs”; it is a standard criminal investigation scenario and thus fully subject to the ordinary individualized-suspicion requirement.

6. Suppression of Evidence

“Suppression” means that evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights is excluded from use in the prosecution’s case-in-chief at trial. This is part of the “exclusionary rule,” designed to deter unlawful police conduct.

In Dubuc, both:

The handgun seized from Dubuc’s waistband, and
His incriminating statements about possessing the gun without a permit,

were suppressed as fruits of an unconstitutional seizure and search. Without that evidence, the State’s case on the conceal-carry charge is severely weakened or potentially unsustainable.

VI. Conclusion

State v. Dubuc is an important clarification and strengthening of search-and-seizure protections in Nevada. The opinion firmly establishes that:

Reasonable suspicion to detain or search must be individualized.
Mere association with a suspect or arrestee does not justify stopping or frisking a companion.
Officer safety, while critical, does not override the constitutional requirement for specific, articulable facts linking the particular person to criminal activity or danger.
Nevada rejects the automatic companion rule; officers may not automatically pat down companions of arrestees.
Courts should distinguish between permissible safety-based scene control and constitutionally significant seizures and searches.

By affirming suppression of the evidence in Dubuc’s case, the Nevada Supreme Court underscores that constitutional protections apply not only to primary suspects but also to those who happen to be in their company. This decision will shape police practices, litigation strategies, and the everyday balance between public safety and individual rights in Nevada’s criminal justice system.