Case Overview and Procedural Posture

Case: Bloom v. Rodgers (Civil)

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Date: September 29, 2025

Panel: Parraguirre, Bell, and Stiglich, JJ.

Disposition: Appeal dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Docket context: Appeal from a post‑judgment order denying a motion to seal an arbitration award. The district court’s earlier order denying a motion to vacate the arbitration award is already on appeal in docket no. 88520‑COA; the sealing denial was separately appealed under this docket.

Introduction

This order addresses a recurring but often misunderstood appellate jurisdiction question: when can a party directly appeal a post‑judgment order that denies a motion to seal court records? Appellants Jay and Sean Bloom sought review of a district court order denying their motion to seal an arbitration award. The Supreme Court of Nevada issued an order to show cause asking the parties to justify appellate jurisdiction under Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure (NRAP) 3A(b)(1) (final judgment) or NRAP 3A(b)(8) (special order after final judgment). Respondents Jody Rodgers and the Jody Rodgers Revocable Trust argued the order was not appealable because it did not affect rights incorporated into the final judgment. The Court agreed and dismissed the appeal.

At stake is the line between appealable “special orders after final judgment” and non‑appealable, stand‑alone administrative or collateral orders made after a case has concluded. The Court’s order clarifies how practitioners must tie a post‑judgment sealing decision to rights embedded in the final judgment to unlock appellate jurisdiction under NRAP 3A(b)(8), and it reinforces the “only one final judgment” rule under NRAP 3A(b)(1).

Summary of the Opinion

• The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
• The denial of a motion to seal an arbitration award is not appealable as a “special order after final judgment” under NRAP 3A(b)(8) unless it affects rights incorporated in the final judgment.
• The order was also not appealable as a “final judgment” under NRAP 3A(b)(1) because the final judgment in the case was the district court’s order denying appellants’ motion to vacate the arbitration award (already on appeal). There can be only one final judgment in an action.
• The Court distinguished prior non‑precedential decisions where sealing orders were reviewable because they directly affected rights embodied in a final judgment (e.g., settlement‑based confidentiality terms) or where the record‑sealing issue itself constituted the underlying proceeding (e.g., statutory criminal record‑sealing petitions).
• The Court reiterated it may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited

Gumm v. Mainor, 118 Nev. 912, 59 P.3d 1220 (2002). The Court quotes Gumm’s core test: “a special order made after final judgment must be an order affecting the rights of some party to the action, growing out of the judgment previously entered. It must be an order affecting rights incorporated in the judgment.” This standard supplies the jurisdictional gateway for post‑judgment orders under NRAP 3A(b)(8). If the order does not affect rights embedded in the final judgment, it is not appealable merely because of its timing.

Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 73 Nev. 143, 311 P.2d 735 (1957). Cited via Gumm to underscore that “the mere fact that the order in point of time is made after a final judgment has been entered does not render it appealable.” Temporal proximity to final judgment is not enough.

Alper v. Posin, 77 Nev. 328, 363 P.2d 502 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 996 P.2d 416 (2000). Reaffirms the “one final judgment” rule: only one final judgment exists in a given action. This forecloses re‑characterizing later collateral orders as “final judgments” unless a statute or rule expressly authorizes appeal.

Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC, 129 Nev. 343, 301 P.3d 850 (2013). The Court reiterates its fundamental jurisdictional limitation: Nevada appellate courts may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule. No residual, equitable, or inherent appellate jurisdiction exists to reach the merits of non‑appealable orders.

FTL Displays, LLC v. Blackout Inc., No. 82461‑COA, 2022 WL 1772544 (Nev. Ct. App. May 27, 2022) (unpublished). Appellants argued FTL “implicitly” shows jurisdiction for direct appeals from post‑judgment orders denying sealing. The Court rejects a categorical reading. In FTL, jurisdictional concerns were canvassed by order to show cause and the appellant articulated a specific nexus between the voluntary dismissal (the final judgment) and the sealing request. The relevance of FTL, therefore, lies in the presence of a demonstrated link between the final judgment and the sealing order—consistent with Gumm—not in any broad exception.

Hopkins v. Selznick, No. 49387, 2009 WL 3190347 (Nev. Sept. 28, 2009) (unpublished Order of Affirmance). There, a sealing order was reviewable because it directly arose from and affected rights embodied in the final judgment: the settlement and confidentiality terms were expressly contemplated in the dismissal with prejudice. The Court notes Hopkins also implicated privacy interests under the HIPAA Privacy Rule (45 C.F.R. § 164.508) and Nevada law. This is the archetype of a post‑judgment order that “affects rights incorporated in the judgment” under Gumm.

UnitedHealthCare Ins. Co. v. Fremont Emergency Services (Mandavia), Ltd., 141 Nev. Adv. Op. 29, 570 P.3d 107 (2025). Cited not for appealability, but for two substantive sealing propositions: (i) there is no per se rule requiring an evidentiary hearing before a sealing decision; and (ii) a district court generally has discretion on its initial sealing decision. The Court highlights that UnitedHealthCare does not support a jurisdictional shortcut for appeals from sealing decisions.

In re Duong, 118 Nev. 920, 59 P.3d 1210 (2002); Matter of Aragon v. State, 136 Nev. 647, 476 P.3d 465 (2020); Matter of Finley v. City of Henderson, 135 Nev. 474, 457 P.3d 263 (Nev. Ct. App. 2019). These cases involved criminal‑record sealing under NRS 179.245. Because the sealing question was the underlying proceeding, orders resolving those petitions were final, appealable judgments under NRAP 3A(b)(1), or they affected statutory rights arising from a judgment of conviction. The Court distinguishes them as categorically different from a collateral sealing motion in a civil action.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Framing the jurisdictional inquiry. The Court began by scrutinizing whether the order denying sealing is appealable either as a final judgment (NRAP 3A(b)(1)) or as a special order after final judgment (NRAP 3A(b)(8)). It found neither pathway available.

Why NRAP 3A(b)(8) does not apply. Invoking Gumm v. Mainor, the Court explained that a post‑judgment order is appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(8) only if it affects rights of a party and those rights are “incorporated in the judgment.” Appellants did not articulate how the denial of the motion to seal affected any right grounded in the final judgment here—namely, the district court’s order denying the motion to vacate the arbitration award. In other words, the sealing dispute did not “grow out of” or alter rights established by that final judgment. Timing alone is insufficient to render the order appealable.

Why NRAP 3A(b)(1) does not apply. There can be only one final judgment in an action or proceeding. The final judgment here is the order denying the motion to vacate (already on appeal in docket no. 88520‑COA). The post‑judgment sealing order is not a new final judgment, and no other statute or rule confers independent appellate jurisdiction over such an order. Brown v. MHC Stagecoach reinforces that the Court cannot entertain appeals absent an express statutory or rule‑based authorization.

Distinguishing appellants’ authorities. The Court rejected appellants’ reliance on FTL Displays and Hopkins. Both involved sealing orders post‑judgment, but in those cases the orders clearly affected rights embedded in the final judgment—e.g., settlement‑based confidentiality terms in Hopkins or rights traced to a voluntary dismissal in FTL. By contrast, appellants here did not show how the sealing denial impaired any right that the final judgment (denial of vacatur) created or preserved. The Court likewise distinguished criminal‑record sealing cases because those proceedings are, by design, about sealing and thus culminate in appealable final judgments or affect statutory rights deriving from the judgment of conviction.

Consequence: dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Because the challenged order did not fit within NRAP 3A(b)(1) or (b)(8), the Court lacked appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

3) What This Decision Does—and Does Not—Hold

• Affirmative holding: A post‑judgment order denying a motion to seal is not appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(8) unless it affects rights incorporated in the final judgment. Simply being “after” the final judgment does not suffice.
• Affirmative holding: The denial of sealing in this civil action is not itself a “final judgment” under NRAP 3A(b)(1); the single final judgment was the order denying the motion to vacate the arbitration award.
• Clarification: The Court did not decide the merits of sealing standards. Its citations to UnitedHealthCare were only to clarify that those standards (e.g., no per se evidentiary‑hearing requirement) do not bear on appealability.
• Clarification: The decision does not create a blanket rule that sealing orders are never appealable. Rather, they may be appealable when tied to rights embedded in the final judgment (e.g., where a judgment incorporates confidentiality terms) or when the sealing matter is the underlying proceeding itself (e.g., statutory record‑sealing petitions).

4) Practical Impact

For civil litigants seeking sealing post‑judgment: This order sets a clear jurisdictional predicate: to directly appeal a post‑judgment sealing order, you must show a concrete nexus to the rights the final judgment embedded. Absent that nexus, a direct appeal will be dismissed.

Arbitration award contexts: Parties often seek to keep arbitration awards confidential. If the final judgment in the judicial confirmation/vacatur proceeding does not itself incorporate confidentiality provisions or adjudicate rights that include confidentiality, a later denial of a sealing motion will generally be non‑appealable. Parties concerned about confidentiality should consider seeking protection earlier, structuring settlements and judgments to expressly incorporate confidentiality, or preserving issues for extraordinary writ review when appropriate.

Doctrinal consistency and docket management: The decision reinforces Nevada’s longstanding approach against piecemeal appeals and upholds the integrity of NRAP 3A’s limited categories. It cabined reliance on unpublished orders (FTL, Hopkins) to their facts and the Gumm framework, limiting overbroad readings that could otherwise expand appealability of collateral orders.

Pathways that may remain open: While not addressed in this order, practitioners commonly consider extraordinary writ petitions (e.g., mandamus) to seek review of non‑appealable interlocutory or collateral orders that present urgency or a lack of adequate legal remedy. Whether writ relief is appropriate depends on factors beyond the scope of this order, including the availability of an adequate remedy and the presence of clear legal error or important issues of statewide importance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Final judgment (NRAP 3A(b)(1)): The court’s last word on the merits of an action or proceeding. In most cases, there can be only one final judgment. Later orders are not “final judgments” unless a rule or statute says so.
• Special order after final judgment (NRAP 3A(b)(8)): A narrow category of appealable orders entered after final judgment that affect rights arising from—i.e., incorporated in—the final judgment. The order must “grow out of” the judgment’s rights, not merely come after it in time.
• Sealing order: A judicial order restricting public access to court records. Nevada law recognizes a presumption of openness with defined procedures governing sealing and redaction. The availability of appeal from sealing orders depends on NRAP 3A, not on the substantive sealing standard.
• Arbitration award vacatur/confirmation: When parties take an arbitration award to court, one party may move to confirm the award and another may move to vacate it. The court’s ruling—here, the denial of a motion to vacate—can constitute the final judgment in the judicial phase of the arbitration dispute.
• HIPAA privacy interests: The federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Privacy Rule (e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.508) governs disclosures of protected health information. In some cases (like Hopkins), privacy obligations intertwined with settlement terms embedded in a final judgment can anchor appealability of related sealing orders.
• Statutory criminal record sealing (NRS 179.245): A standalone proceeding in which a petitioner seeks to seal criminal records. Orders granting or denying such petitions typically are appealable final judgments because the sealing question is the core of the case.
• Appellate jurisdiction: The power of an appellate court to hear a case. In Nevada, this power is strictly limited to appeals authorized by statute or court rule; absent authorization, the appeal must be dismissed.

Guidance for Practitioners

• Anchor confidentiality in the judgment: If confidentiality is a material right, incorporate it expressly into a settlement agreement and ensure the final judgment recognizes and enforces that right. This can satisfy the Gumm test if later sealing disputes arise post‑judgment.
• Build the record on “rights affected”: If appealing a post‑judgment sealing decision, clearly articulate how the sealing ruling affects rights incorporated in the final judgment (e.g., stipulated protective orders merged into judgment, confidentiality clauses referenced in dismissal orders).
• Consider timing: Seek sealing or protective relief before final judgment where feasible, and create a record linking sealing to adjudicated rights.
• Choose the right vehicle: If a direct appeal is foreclosed under NRAP 3A, evaluate whether extraordinary writ relief is warranted and timely.
• Distinguish substantive standards from jurisdiction: Even if you can show an abuse of discretion under substantive sealing law, appellate courts cannot reach the merits without jurisdiction. Address NRAP 3A explicitly.

Conclusion

Bloom v. Rodgers clarifies an important jurisdictional boundary in Nevada appellate practice: a post‑judgment order denying a motion to seal is not directly appealable unless the order affects rights embedded in the final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(8), and it is not itself a second “final judgment” under NRAP 3A(b)(1). The decision harmonizes the treatment of collateral sealing orders with Gumm’s framework, distinguishes unpublished authorities often cited for broader propositions, and reinforces the core premise that appellate jurisdiction is strictly conferred by rule or statute.

The practical message is straightforward: litigants who anticipate confidentiality needs must connect those rights to the final judgment—through settlement terms, protective orders, or other adjudicated rights—if they seek to preserve a direct appellate path for post‑judgment sealing disputes. Otherwise, absent a specific jurisdictional grant, they should expect that a direct appeal will be dismissed and consider alternative avenues, such as timely petitions for extraordinary writs, where appropriate.

Key Citations

• NRAP 3A(b)(1) (final judgment) and NRAP 3A(b)(8) (special order after final judgment)
• Gumm v. Mainor, 118 Nev. 912, 59 P.3d 1220 (2002)
• Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 73 Nev. 143, 311 P.2d 735 (1957)
• Alper v. Posin, 77 Nev. 328, 363 P.2d 502 (1961), overruled on other grounds
• Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC, 129 Nev. 343, 301 P.3d 850 (2013)
• FTL Displays, LLC v. Blackout Inc., No. 82461‑COA, 2022 WL 1772544 (Nev. Ct. App. 2022) (unpublished)
• Hopkins v. Selznick, No. 49387, 2009 WL 3190347 (Nev. 2009) (unpublished)
• UnitedHealthCare Ins. Co. v. Fremont Emergency Services (Mandavia), Ltd., 141 Nev. Adv. Op. 29, 570 P.3d 107 (2025)
• In re Duong, 118 Nev. 920, 59 P.3d 1210 (2002); Matter of Aragon v. State, 136 Nev. 647, 476 P.3d 465 (2020); Matter of Finley v. City of Henderson, 135 Nev. 474, 457 P.3d 263 (Nev. Ct. App. 2019)