Neutral COVID‑19 Reporting Duties After Religious Exemptions:
A Comprehensive Commentary on Kondilis v. City of Chicago

I. Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Kondilis v. City of Chicago addresses an increasingly common, but legally under‑analyzed, question that has emerged from COVID‑19 litigation: once an employer grants a religious exemption from a vaccine requirement, can it still compel the employee to comply with neutral, generally applicable health‑data reporting and testing rules on pain of discipline?

The plaintiffs—sixteen Chicago police officers and an employee of the City’s Office of Emergency Management—prevailed administratively in one sense: every plaintiff who properly requested a religious exemption from the City’s COVID‑19 vaccine mandate received one and was never required to be vaccinated. Yet they refused to enter their vaccination status and weekly testing information into the City’s employee portal, and some refused to comply even after direct orders. The City responded by placing them in non‑disciplinary, unpaid status.

Plaintiffs then sued under:

• the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause (via 42 U.S.C. § 1983),
• the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause (also via § 1983),
• Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (religious discrimination), and
• the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act (IRFRA), 775 ILCS 35/1 et seq.

The central legal question became: when a municipality both (a) grants religious exemptions from a vaccine mandate and (b) applies its residual reporting/testing rules neutrally and generally to all employees, does disciplining noncompliant religious objectors violate federal or state law?

The Seventh Circuit answered: no. The court held that neutral, generally applicable COVID‑19 data‑reporting and testing requirements—even imposed on religiously exempt employees—are subject only to rational‑basis review under the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses, and that the City’s pandemic‑era policy comfortably survives that deferential standard. The court additionally found the plaintiffs’ federal statutory (Title VII) arguments waived on appeal and treated the state IRFRA claims as rising and falling with the constitutional claims because plaintiffs failed to develop separate legal analysis.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

In October 2021, during the COVID‑19 pandemic, the City of Chicago adopted a workforce COVID‑19 vaccination policy (the “Policy”) that required:

• City employees must either:
  • be fully vaccinated against COVID‑19, or
  • undergo regular COVID‑19 testing,
• Employees had to:
  • report their vaccination status through an “employee portal”, and
  • if not vaccinated, submit weekly testing results through the same portal.
• Employees who refused to follow the testing and reporting requirements would be placed in “non‑disciplinary, no‑pay status” until they complied.
• The Policy permitted medical, religious, and other exemptions from the vaccination requirement.

Each plaintiff sought a religious exemption from the obligation to take the COVID‑19 vaccine. With the exception of one plaintiff (Toney, whose situation had a technical wrinkle but is not outcome‑determinative on appeal), all who complied with the exemption procedure were granted religious exemptions from vaccination. None was required to be vaccinated.

However:

• None of the plaintiffs articulated any specific religious objection to the mere act of reporting vaccination/test status in the portal.
• Some plaintiffs initially refused to enter any information in the portal, even after receiving exemptions from the shot itself.
• Supervisors issued direct orders to comply with the portal requirements.
• Those who continued to refuse were put on no‑pay status pursuant to the Policy; those who eventually complied returned to work.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint in the Northern District of Illinois, asserting:

• First Amendment Free Exercise claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
• Equal Protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment (also via § 1983);
• Title VII religious discrimination claims (three plaintiffs only);
• Claims under Illinois’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act (IRFRA); and
• Additional claims (substantive due process and state‑law indemnification), which they abandoned on appeal.

The City moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Judge Robert Gettleman granted the motion and entered final judgment for the City, holding that:

• The Title VII claims failed because plaintiffs did not allege a religious practice that conflicted with the testing/reporting requirements; their theory was factually implausible.
• The First Amendment, Equal Protection, and IRFRA claims failed because the City granted the only religious accommodation requested (exemption from vaccination), and plaintiffs had not articulated any religious objection to the neutral reporting duties they defied.

Plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit.

C. Holdings on Appeal

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal in full, holding:

1. Free Exercise (First Amendment)
   • The relevant portions of the Policy (portal reporting of vaccination status and test results, plus associated discipline) are neutral and generally applicable.
   • Accordingly, only rational‑basis review applies, not strict scrutiny.
   • The City’s interest in tracking vaccination/testing status and enforcing compliance to protect public and workplace health during a pandemic is rational.
   • The plaintiffs failed to allege facts that plausibly show a constitutional violation.
2. Equal Protection (Fourteenth Amendment)
   • The Policy, as applied, need only satisfy rational‑basis review.
   • The City’s differential treatment of employees (vaccinated vs unvaccinated; compliant vs non‑compliant) is rationally related to legitimate public‑health interests.
   • Court will not second‑guess the City’s judgment as to when pandemic‑era measures should end.
3. Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act (IRFRA)
   • On appeal, plaintiffs treated IRFRA as coextensive with their constitutional claims and did not develop distinct arguments.
   • Because the constitutional claims fail, the IRFRA claims fail on the same reasoning as presented.
4. Title VII
   • Although three plaintiffs asked, in the “statement of issues,” for reversal of the dismissal of their Title VII claims, they did not develop any separate argument on appeal.
   • Under Seventh Circuit practice, underdeveloped or cursory arguments are waived.
   • The court therefore declined to analyze Title VII further and treated those claims as waived.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1. Pleading Standard and Rule 12(b)(6)

• Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): cited for the principle that, at the pleading stage, courts accept well‑pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, but legal conclusions and bare assertions are insufficient.
• Ind. Land Tr. #3082 v. Hammond Redevelopment Comm’n, 107 F.4th 693 (7th Cir. 2024), and Gonzalez v. McHenry County, 40 F.4th 824 (7th Cir. 2022): invoked for the “facial plausibility” standard—complaints must contain sufficient factual matter to allow a reasonable inference of liability.
• Word v. City of Chicago, 946 F.3d 391 (7th Cir. 2020): cited for the de novo standard of review of a motion to dismiss.
• Dean v. Nat’l Prod. Workers Union Severance Tr. Plan, 46 F.4th 535 (7th Cir. 2022): provides the rule that documents referenced in and central to the complaint may be considered at the motion‑to‑dismiss stage.

These authorities frame the court’s insistence that plaintiffs move beyond conclusory statements (e.g., “entering status into the portal conflicts with our religious beliefs”) and allege concrete facts showing how the challenged policy actually burdens religious exercise.

2. Free Exercise Framework

• Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940): establishes that the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.
• Lukaszczyk v. Cook County, 47 F.4th 587 (7th Cir. 2022): a prior Seventh Circuit decision upholding this same Chicago COVID‑19 Policy on its face against Free Exercise and related challenges.
  • In Lukaszczyk, the court emphasized that the existence of religious exemptions to the vaccine mandate undercut facial Free Exercise objections.
  • The Kondilis court distinguishes that case by noting that this is an as‑applied challenge focused solely on reporting and testing obligations—not on the vaccine requirement itself.
• Mahmoud v. Taylor, 145 S. Ct. 2332 (2025): a recent Supreme Court decision (decided after oral argument in Kondilis), referenced for its discussion of when courts might depart from the “neutral and generally applicable” framework, based on the “character of the burden” imposed on religious exercise.
  • Mahmoud, read alongside Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), recognizes that some education‑related burdens on religious parents’ right to direct their children’s upbringing may justify heightened scrutiny outside the usual Smith/Fulton line.
  • The Seventh Circuit considers whether Kondilis fits within this special exception and concludes it does not.
• Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507 (2022): used for the definitions of neutrality and general applicability—laws are non‑neutral if specifically directed at religion; non‑generally applicable if they permit secular conduct undermining the same interests but restrict religious conduct, or if they include a regime of individualized exemptions.
• Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522 (2021): quoted (via Kennedy) for the principle that failure of either neutrality or general applicability triggers strict scrutiny.
• Illinois Bible Colleges Ass’n v. Anderson, 870 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2017): cited twice—first to illustrate a neutral regulatory regime that “does not target religion,” and again to define rational‑basis review in the Free Exercise context.
• Listecki v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015): used to clarify that showing a law is inconsistently applied to religious individuals in the abstract is not enough; one must plausibly allege that the inconsistency is religiously based or related to religion as such.

3. Equal Protection Framework

• St. Joan Antida High School Inc. v. Milwaukee Public School District, 919 F.3d 1003 (7th Cir. 2019): recites the canonical equal‑protection proposition that similarly situated persons should be treated alike.
• City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985): the landmark decision on equal protection and irrational discrimination, cited for the same core principle.
• Wisconsin Education Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2013): articulates the rational‑basis standard in Equal Protection: the law must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.
• St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2007), and Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1992): both reiterate that at the motion‑to‑dismiss stage, plaintiffs must plead facts sufficient to overcome the presumption of rationality that attaches to government classifications.
• FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993): quoted for the admonition that equal protection is not “a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.” This is the cornerstone of the court’s refusal to second‑guess the City’s timing and calibration of public‑health measures as the pandemic evolved.

4. Waiver and Appellate Practice

• Shipley v. Chicago Board of Election Commissioners, 947 F.3d 1056 (7th Cir. 2020), and Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59 F.4th 887 (7th Cir. 2023): both state the Seventh Circuit’s longstanding rule that undeveloped, cursory arguments lacking supporting authority are waived.

These cases justify the court’s refusal to delve into the Title VII claims on appeal, and, by extension, underscore the importance of fully briefing distinct legal theories rather than cross‑referring generally to constitutional arguments.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Free Exercise: Neutrality, General Applicability, and Rational Basis

(a) Threshold burden on religion

The court begins by asking whether the portal reporting and testing requirements “burden” religious exercise at all. It is strikingly skeptical: the complaint contains only a single, conclusory assertion that entering information into the portal “conflicts with plaintiffs’ religious beliefs,” and offers no explanation of:

• what the beliefs are,
• how reporting vaccination status or test results violates those beliefs, or
• why data entry, rather than the vaccination itself (which was exempted), is religiously problematic.

While the court could have dismissed the Free Exercise claim strictly for failure to plausibly allege a religious burden, it instead assumes for argument’s sake that a burden exists and proceeds to the more general doctrinal question: what level of scrutiny governs?

(b) Neutrality

Neutrality asks whether the regulation is “specifically directed at a religious practice” or evinces religious animus. The court looks to the text of the two challenged sections:

• Section V – requires all covered employees to report vaccination status in the portal or face discipline;
• Section VII – requires all covered employees who are not fully vaccinated by a certain date to submit testing information through the portal.

Both provisions:

• apply broadly to “all employees … who are covered” by the Policy;
• make no distinctions based on religion, denomination, or religious vs. secular status; and
• contain no language that could be read as hostile to religion or religious practices.

The court therefore finds the provisions facially neutral. Plaintiffs apparently did not press a serious neutrality argument, likely recognizing the unfavorable textual terrain.

(c) General applicability

A policy is not “generally applicable” if:

• it prohibits religious conduct while permitting “secular conduct that undermines the government’s asserted interests in a similar way,” or
• it includes a system of discretionary, individualized exemptions that can be used to favor or disfavor religious practices.

Plaintiffs argued that the City enforced the portal requirements inconsistently—some employees, both within and outside the plaintiff group, allegedly did not comply but were not disciplined, while others were. This, they contended, meant they were “selectively burdened,” especially as religiously accommodated employees.

The court rejects this characterization for two key reasons:

1. No connection to religion: It is not enough to allege any inconsistency in enforcement. Under Listecki, plaintiffs must plausibly allege that inconsistency is religiously based—i.e., that religious employees as such were singled out for more stringent enforcement. The complaint does not identify any pattern where a particular faith or religious status correlates with harsher treatment.
2. Evidence cuts against plaintiffs: The plaintiffs’ own chart, intended to show inconsistent enforcement, undermines their theory. It shows that some plaintiffs had not even requested religious exemptions at the time they were disciplined for portal noncompliance, undercutting the narrative that disciplinary measures were targeted at religiously exempt employees.

Finding no religiously oriented disparities in enforcement, the court concludes the Policy is generally applicable.

(d) The “Mahmoud/Yoder” exception and character of the burden

In a footnote, the court acknowledges the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor, which, following Wisconsin v. Yoder, suggests that when the government compels participation in certain school programs that directly infringe parents’ fundamental right to control their children’s education and religious upbringing, courts may deviate from the ordinary neutral/general applicability test.

The Seventh Circuit considers whether the “character of the burden” here justifies similar special treatment. It concludes that it does not because:

• The case does not involve compulsory education or parental rights, but rather employment and workplace safety rules.
• The burden is limited to reporting health information and complying with a testing regime—not removal from school or denial of parental authority.

Accordingly, Mahmoud and Yoder do not alter the standard analysis: neutrality and general applicability still govern, and they are satisfied.

(e) Rational‑basis review and its application

Because the Policy is neutral and generally applicable, the court applies rational‑basis review, the most deferential constitutional standard. Under this standard, the policy is valid if:

• it is rationally related to
• a legitimate governmental interest.

The court emphasizes the extremely light burden on the government and the heavy burden on plaintiffs in this posture.

The City’s articulated interests are straightforward:

• protecting the health of its workforce and the public during a pandemic,
• tracking vaccination and infection status to identify potential hotspots,
• shielding immunocompromised or other high‑risk individuals from close contact with infected or unvaccinated personnel, and
• ensuring compliance through a meaningful enforcement mechanism (no‑pay status for non‑compliance).

The court finds these goals plainly legitimate, and the reporting/testing requirements clearly rational means of furthering them. If the City cannot reliably know employees’ status or compliance, the policy becomes toothless. Thus, the City’s use of non‑disciplinary, no‑pay status as an enforcement mechanism is itself rationally related to promoting compliance.

Because rational basis is satisfied, the Free Exercise claim fails.

2. Equal Protection: Rational Basis Again

Plaintiffs also argued that the City violated the Equal Protection Clause by:

• treating unvaccinated, religiously accommodated employees differently from vaccinated employees, and
• (allegedly) treating them differently from some unvaccinated but non‑accommodated employees who were not disciplined for portal noncompliance.

Plaintiffs did not press a heightened standard of review (e.g., strict scrutiny for suspect classifications or fundamental rights) on appeal, so the court applied rational‑basis review, mirroring the Free Exercise analysis.

To state an equal‑protection claim under rational‑basis review at the pleading stage, plaintiffs must allege facts that plausibly overcome the presumption that the government’s classification is rational. This is a demanding bar, especially in areas—like public health—where legislatures and executives must draw practical lines.

The court reasons:

• Legitimate interest: The City’s interest in curbing the spread of COVID‑19 among employees and the public is legitimate.
• Rational classification: Differentiating between:
  • employees who comply with reporting/testing requirements and those who do not;
  • employees whose health status is known and monitored and those who refuse to provide that data;
  is rationally connected to the City’s health‑protection goals.

Plaintiffs’ chief argument was temporal: even if the policy was justified at the pandemic’s height, it allegedly became irrational once the pandemic “waned” in late 2021 and 2022. The court responds with the principle from FCC v. Beach Communications:

In other words, courts do not act as second‑guessers of line‑drawing in complex, evolving policy areas like public health. Under rational‑basis review, so long as there is any conceivable rational justification for the City’s continued policy, the classification stands.

As with the Free Exercise claim, the Equal Protection claim fails because the policy easily survives rational‑basis scrutiny.

3. IRFRA and the Shadow of Unraised Arguments

The Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act (IRFRA) is generally understood (under state law) to provide stricter protection of religious exercise than the federal Free Exercise Clause after Employment Division v. Smith. In particular, IRFRA typically requires:

• the government to show a compelling interest and
• use the least restrictive means

whenever it substantially burdens a person’s religious exercise, even with neutral and generally applicable rules.

However, in this case, the Seventh Circuit did not engage in a separate IRFRA analysis. The opinion notes:

• Plaintiffs “concede” that their IRFRA claim rises and falls with their constitutional claims.
• Their discussion of IRFRA on appeal is limited to four sentences that simply mirror their federal arguments.

Because the court has already rejected those constitutional arguments, and because plaintiffs did not articulate how IRFRA might require a different or higher level of scrutiny, the court summarily holds that:

It is important to note what this does not mean:

• It does not hold that IRFRA is substantively coextensive with the federal Free Exercise Clause.
• Rather, it reflects only that as framed and argued by these plaintiffs, the IRFRA claim added nothing beyond the failed federal claims.

Future litigants seeking to invoke IRFRA’s stricter standards will need to clearly plead and brief a separate IRFRA analysis, including substantial burden, compelling interest, and least‑restrictive‑means components.

4. Title VII: Waiver Through Underdevelopment

Three plaintiffs—Kondilis, Kazarnowicz, and Toney—asserted Title VII religious discrimination claims in the district court. The district court dismissed them, essentially on the same grounds as the constitutional claims: plaintiffs did not allege that their religious beliefs conflicted with the neutral testing and reporting obligations.

On appeal, plaintiffs included the Title VII issue in their “statement of issues,” but critically:

• they did not offer any distinct legal argument or authority specific to Title VII in the body of their appellate brief, and
• they did not explain how Title VII’s framework for religious accommodation (e.g., “undue hardship” on the employer, “religious observance or practice” at issue) might produce a different result than their Free Exercise and Equal Protection theories.

Under Seventh Circuit practice, arguments that are:

• underdeveloped,
• cursory, and
• lacking supporting authority

are treated as waived. Relying on Shipley and Bradley, the court holds the Title VII issues waived and declines to address them on the merits.

This procedural holding is a sharp reminder that:

• Title VII is an independent statutory scheme with its own tests and standards; it cannot simply be “folded into” Free Exercise analysis by reference.
• Appellants must separately develop and support each theory they seek to preserve on appeal.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Clarifying the Scope of Religious Exemptions to Vaccine Policies

One of the most concrete contributions of Kondilis is doctrinal clarification about the boundaries of religious accommodations in the COVID‑19 employment context:

• Granting a religious exemption from vaccination does not automatically entitle an employee to refuse:
  • neutral, generally applicable testing obligations, or
  • neutral, generally applicable health‑data reporting requirements.
• Employers may, consistent with the First Amendment and Equal Protection, enforce those neutral obligations through meaningful, non‑punitive sanctions (here, non‑disciplinary no‑pay status) where they are rationally related to workplace and public safety.

This sets a clear precedent in the Seventh Circuit: a religious exemption from a substantive health intervention (a vaccine) does not, without more, legally invalidate procedural or administrative measures needed to make a health‑safety regime work.

2. Free Exercise After COVID and After Mahmoud

Kondilis operates in a post‑pandemic legal landscape where courts continue to refine the interface between public‑health measures and religious liberty. It does so with two important implications:

1. Continued vitality of the “neutral and generally applicable” framework:
   • Even after the Supreme Court’s decision in Mahmoud, which recognizes special concerns in the parental‑rights‑in‑education context, the Seventh Circuit reaffirms that most employment‑related religious liberty claims remain governed by the neutrality/general‑applicability test.
   • The “character‑of‑the‑burden” exception is carefully cabined to educational and parental‑rights contexts; pandemic workplace measures remain squarely within the standard Smith/Fulton/Kennedy mold.
2. Emphasis on pleading specificity:
   • Citing the lack of any explanation of how portal reporting conflicts with particular religious beliefs, the court signals that bare assertions of “religious conflict” with administrative requirements will not suffice to survive a motion to dismiss.
   • Future plaintiffs must articulate:
     • which religious tenet is at issue,
     • how exactly the contested requirement violates that tenet, and
     • why that conflict is not purely subjective or conclusory.

3. Rational‑Basis Deference in Public‑Health Policy

The court’s equal‑protection analysis emphasizes judicial deference to governmental line‑drawing in dynamic public‑health conditions. This has at least two effects:

• It cautions lower courts and litigants that:
  • claims premised on the idea that public‑health regulation lasted “too long” or was not wound down quickly enough rarely will state an equal‑protection claim under rational basis.
• It confirms that:
  • courts will not substitute their own epidemiological or policy judgments for those of local authorities, absent some suspect classification or fundamental‑rights trigger.

For public entities, Kondilis thus provides reassurance that well‑designed, even if imperfect, pandemic policies that are neutral and generally applicable will likely survive judicial scrutiny.

4. Lessons for Litigating IRFRA and Title VII Claims

The decision also carries procedural and strategic lessons:

• IRFRA must be argued distinctly:
  • If plaintiffs want the benefit of IRFRA’s stricter compelling‑interest/least‑restrictive‑means framework, they must plead and brief those elements, not simply restate federal Free Exercise arguments.
  • Failure to develop IRFRA‑specific reasoning can lead courts to resolve the state claim in lockstep with the federal claims, as happened here.
• Title VII issues cannot be “tag‑along” claims:
  • Citing Shipley and Bradley, the court reiterates that undeveloped arguments are waived.
  • Given that Title VII has its own tests for religious accommodation (sincerely held belief, conflict with job requirement, employer’s undue hardship, etc.), litigants must:
    • articulate a concrete religious practice or observance that conflicts with the specific workplace rule, and
    • address the employer’s claimed burdens separately from constitutional analysis.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Neutral and Generally Applicable” Laws

A law is:

• Neutral if it does not target religion or religious practices specifically. It applies for reasons independent of religion (e.g., public health, safety, etc.).
• Generally applicable if it applies across the board and does not single out religious conduct for worse treatment while allowing comparable secular conduct that undermines the same government interest.

In Kondilis, the portal reporting requirements were neutral because they did not mention religion at all and applied to all covered employees. They were generally applicable because plaintiffs could not show that the City systematically excused non‑religious employees from compliance while strictly enforcing the policy against religious ones.

B. Rational‑Basis Review

Under rational‑basis review, courts ask two basic questions:

1. Is the government pursuing a legitimate objective (e.g., public health, safety, economic regulation)?
2. Is the law or policy rationally related to achieving that objective—i.e., does it make some logical sense as a means to that end?

The government does not have to show:

• that the law is perfect,
• that it is the best or least restrictive approach, or
• that it never results in unfair or harsh outcomes.

As long as there is any plausible logical connection between the policy and a legitimate goal, the law stands. In Kondilis, requiring employees to report health data and enforcing that rule with unpaid status was easily rational in light of the City’s pandemic‑related safety goals.

C. Waiver of Arguments on Appeal

“Waiver” in this context doesn’t mean the argument is frivolous; it means the party effectively abandoned it procedurally by not properly developing it. On appeal, a party cannot rely on:

• passing references to an issue in the table of contents or statement of issues, or
• general incorporation of arguments from other doctrines.

The party must:

• explain the legal standard,
• apply the facts to that standard, and
• support the argument with relevant authority.

Because the Kondilis plaintiffs did not do this for Title VII (and did very little for IRFRA), those claims were not meaningfully reviewed on appeal.

D. “As‑Applied” vs. “Facial” Constitutional Challenges

• Facial challenge: The plaintiff argues a law is unconstitutional in all (or almost all) of its applications. For example, “This vaccine policy is always unconstitutional because it lacks religious exemptions.”
• As‑applied challenge: The plaintiff accepts that the law might be constitutional in general, but claims that as applied to their specific circumstances it violates their rights.

In Lukaszczyk, the Seventh Circuit rejected a facial Free Exercise challenge to the same Chicago Policy, primarily because it did provide religious exemptions. In Kondilis, plaintiffs brought an as‑applied challenge, focusing not on the vaccine mandate itself, but on the reporting/testing and enforcement aspects as applied to religiously exempt employees. Even under this narrower, fact‑specific lens, the court still found no constitutional violation.

V. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and Broader Significance

Kondilis v. City of Chicago is a significant post‑pandemic Free Exercise and employment‑law decision with several lasting implications:

• Religious exemptions have limits: Obtaining an exemption from a vaccine does not confer a general immunity from neutral, generally applicable health‑safety rules that an employer rationally uses to protect its workforce and the public.
• Neutral data‑reporting requirements are constitutionally robust: The court confirms that requiring employees—religious and non‑religious alike—to report vaccination status and testing results during a pandemic is both neutral and generally applicable, and passes rational‑basis review with ease.
• Mahmoud’s “character‑of‑the‑burden” exception is narrow: The Seventh Circuit confines any departure from neutrality/general‑applicability analysis to education/parental‑rights contexts; COVID‑era workplace mandates remain under the traditional rational‑basis regime unless they target religion directly.
• Judicial deference in public‑health line‑drawing: Courts will not second‑guess when a pandemic has “waned” enough to end health measures; that is a policy judgment for elected or executive authorities, not a constitutional question under rational‑basis equal protection.
• Importance of careful pleading and briefing:
  • Plaintiffs must clearly articulate the specific religious beliefs and practices at stake, and explain how particular rules burden those beliefs.
  • IRFRA and Title VII claims require separate, fully developed legal arguments; otherwise, they may be treated as waived or coextensive with failed constitutional theories.

In the broader legal context, Kondilis strengthens the doctrinal footing for governmental and large‑employer systems that rely on transparent health‑status reporting and standardized testing during public‑health crises. It reassures public entities that, so long as such systems are facially neutral, generally applicable, and reasonably related to legitimate health objectives, they will withstand constitutional scrutiny—even when enforced against employees who have successfully obtained religious exemptions from the underlying substantive medical interventions.