Negligence Per Se Within the Texas Tort Claims Act’s Waiver of Immunity: Commentary on City of Houston v. Manning

Negligence Per Se Within the Texas Tort Claims Act’s Waiver of Immunity:
A Commentary on City of Houston v. Manning, Supreme Court of Texas (May 23, 2025)

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s per curiam decision in City of Houston, Texas v. Chelsea Manning resolves a long‑brewing conflict in the courts of appeals over a deceptively simple question: does the Texas Tort Claims Act’s waiver of governmental immunity for “the negligence of an employee” also encompass negligence per se?

The case arises from a collision between a Houston Fire Department engine responding to a dumpster fire and a private vehicle driven by Chelsea Manning with three passengers. Manning alleged that the fire truck operator, William Schmidt, not only acted negligently but was also negligent per se for violating specific provisions of the Texas Transportation Code governing emergency vehicle operation and reckless driving.

The City of Houston invoked governmental immunity and argued that the Texas Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”) waives immunity only for common‑law negligence, not for negligence per se. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals rejected that argument and allowed the negligence per se theory to proceed. Other courts of appeals, however, had taken the opposite view. The Texas Supreme Court stepped in to settle the split.

In doing so, the Court:

  • Holds that, under the text of the TTCA, the waiver of immunity does include negligence per se in this case, because the statutes invoked merely refine the common‑law standard of care rather than replacing it; and
  • Disapproves contrary courts of appeals decisions that categorically excluded negligence per se from the TTCA’s waiver.

The Court leaves unresolved, and remands, separate defenses related to official immunity, the TTCA’s emergency‑response exception, and the 9‑1‑1 emergency‑communications exception, to be reconsidered in light of its more recent decisions in City of Houston v. Rodriguez, City of Austin v. Powell, and City of Killeen–Killeen Police Dep’t v. Terry.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

A Houston Fire Department engine (Engine 82), driven by operator William Schmidt with a captain aboard, responded to a 9‑1‑1 dispatch for a dumpster fire at an apartment complex. Schmidt drove southbound on Fondren Road (posted speed limit 35 mph) at approximately 45 mph. The truck’s siren, emergency lights, and Opticom signal‑preemption transmitter were activated.

Chelsea Manning was driving westbound on Ludington Drive with three passengers. She stopped at a red light at the Fondren–Ludington intersection. When her light turned green, she proceeded into the intersection. As the fire truck entered the intersection (changing lanes as it did so), it struck Manning’s car. A Houston Police Department investigation concluded that Schmidt “failed to proceed with duty and care through the intersection.”

B. Procedural History

  • Manning sued the City of Houston under the TTCA, asserting negligence and negligence per se, relying on alleged violations of:
    • Texas Transportation Code § 545.401 (reckless driving);
    • § 546.001 (permitting emergency vehicles to run red lights after slowing as necessary for safe operation); and
    • § 546.005 (duty of appropriate regard for the safety of all persons).
  • The City initially moved for summary judgment on governmental‑immunity grounds; that motion was denied and the denial was affirmed on interlocutory appeal as to negligence and negligence per se.
  • The City filed a second summary‑judgment motion with new evidence, again invoking governmental immunity and arguing, among other things, that:
    • the TTCA does not waive immunity for negligence per se claims at all; and
    • official immunity, the TTCA’s emergency exception, and the 9‑1‑1 exception restored immunity.
  • The trial court again denied the motion; the City took another interlocutory appeal.
  • The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held:
    • TTCA’s waiver does extend to negligence per se because negligence per se is merely a way of proving the breach element in negligence;
    • fact issues precluded summary judgment on official immunity and the emergency and 9‑1‑1 exceptions; and
    • (in a separate issue not before the Supreme Court) the court partially reversed as to certain parents’ claims for medical expenses.

C. Holdings of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court of Texas holds:

  1. Negligence per se can fall within the TTCA’s waiver of immunity. Under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 101.021(1), a governmental unit is liable for “property damage, personal injury, and death proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an employee” operating a motor vehicle within the scope of employment. When the penal statute used in a negligence per se claim does not replace the common‑law negligence standard but simply “defines more precisely” what breaching the common‑law duty looks like, that claim is still a negligence claim for TTCA purposes. Manning’s negligence per se theories based on Transportation Code §§ 546.001 and 546.005 fall within the waiver.
  2. The Court disapproves contrary intermediate‑court authority. In particular, it disapproves the Waco Court of Appeals decisions in Thoele v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice and Texas Department of Criminal Justice v. Parker to the extent they held the TTCA does not waive immunity for negligence per se claims.
  3. Issues of official immunity and statutory emergency exceptions are remanded. The Court vacates the court of appeals’ judgment in part and remands for reconsideration of:
    • Official immunity / good‑faith emergency decision‑making;
    • The TTCA’s emergency‑response exception; and
    • The TTCA’s 9‑1‑1 emergency‑communications exception;
    in light of its recent decisions in Rodriguez, Powell, and Terry. The portion of the judgment regarding parents’ recovery of past medical expenses is not disturbed.

III. Analysis

A. Statutory and Doctrinal Background

1. Governmental Immunity and the TTCA

Under Texas law, sovereign immunity (for the State) and governmental immunity (for political subdivisions such as cities) generally bar suits for money damages unless the Legislature has clearly waived immunity. The TTCA, codified in Chapter 101 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, is a principal statute that waives immunity in limited circumstances, particularly for:

  • personal injury, property damage, or death caused by the “operation or use of a motor‑driven vehicle” by a government employee in the scope of employment; and
  • other specific circumstances set out in the Act.

Section 101.021(1) provides the key waiver here. It holds a governmental unit liable for such injuries when proximately caused by:

“the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an employee acting within his scope of employment”

and when the employee “would be personally liable to the claimant according to Texas law.”

Two textual elements are crucial in this case:

  • the phrase “wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an employee”; and
  • the condition that the employee “would be personally liable,” which incorporates doctrines like official immunity.

Interpretation of TTCA waivers is constrained by Texas Government Code § 311.034, which directs that statutes waiving immunity must be construed strictly in favor of retaining immunity unless the waiver is clear.

2. Negligence vs. Negligence Per Se

Common‑law negligence generally has four elements:

  1. A legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff;
  2. Breach of that duty;
  3. Proximate causation (cause‑in‑fact and foreseeability); and
  4. Damages.

Negligence per se is a common‑law doctrine that modifies how the duty and breach elements are established. As the Court quotes from Reeder v. Daniel, it:

“allows courts to rely on a penal statute to define a reasonably prudent person’s standard of care.”

In other words, if:

  • a statute sets a standard of conduct;
  • the plaintiff is within the class of persons the statute is designed to protect;
  • the harm is of the type the statute was designed to prevent; and
  • there is no valid excuse for violation,

then violating that statute can be treated as a conclusive or near‑conclusive breach of duty. The remaining negligence elements (causation and damages) must still be proved.

The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288B (cited with approval in Perry v. S.N.) explains that when a statute is adopted as the standard of conduct, an unexcused violation is “a clear departure” from the standard of a reasonable person and is conclusive on the issue of negligence.

3. Transportation Code Provisions at Issue

Manning’s negligence per se claims rest principally on:

  • § 546.001(2) – Emergency vehicles may:
    “proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, after slowing as necessary for safe operation”
  • § 546.005(1) – Emergency‑operation safety duty:
    “This chapter does not relieve the operator of an authorized emergency vehicle from … the duty to operate the vehicle with appropriate regard for the safety of all persons ….”
  • § 545.401(a) – Reckless driving:
    “A person commits an offense if the person drives a vehicle in wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.”

Sections 546.001 and 546.005 explicitly set a standard of careful emergency driving (slow “as necessary for safe operation,” act with “appropriate regard for the safety of all persons”). Section 545.401, by contrast, criminalizes reckless driving and has been interpreted by the Court (in Maspero, Green, Powell) as adopting a common‑law recklessness standard akin to “wilful or wanton” disregard.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Role

The Court’s analysis is heavily rooted in earlier decisions on negligence per se, the TTCA, and statutory standards of care.

1. Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. 1998)

Perry is central to the Court’s treatment of how statutes interact with common‑law negligence. There, the Court explained that when a statute criminalizes conduct that is already the subject of a common‑law duty (e.g., safe driving), use of negligence per se:

“causes no great change in the law because violating the statutory standard of conduct would usually also be negligence under a common law reasonableness standard.”

The Court also emphasized that such statutes often:

“merely [] define more precisely what conduct breaches the common law duty.”

In Manning, this insight is deployed to show that traffic‑safety statutes like §§ 546.001 and 546.005 do not create wholly new duties; they articulate, in concrete terms, what “reasonably careful” emergency driving looks like. Thus, negligence per se based on these provisions still operates within the traditional negligence framework.

2. Reeder v. Daniel, 61 S.W.3d 359 (Tex. 2001)

Reeder provides the definition of negligence per se the Court uses:

“a common-law doctrine that allows courts to rely on a penal statute to define a reasonably prudent person’s standard of care.”

This reinforces that negligence per se is fundamentally about the standard of care, not about creating a separate cause of action detached from negligence.

3. VIA Metropolitan Transit v. Meck, 620 S.W.3d 356 (Tex. 2020)

VIA Metro interprets the word “negligence” in the TTCA broadly. The Court held that “negligence” in § 101.021 includes:

  • ordinary negligence,
  • slight negligence or failures to exercise a “high degree of care,” and
  • gross negligence.

This breadth is crucial to the Manning opinion. It allows the Court to say that even when a statute (like § 545.401’s reckless‑driving standard) requires proof of a degree of culpability more severe than ordinary negligence, that standard is still within the overall “negligence” umbrella for TTCA purposes.

4. Tenaris Bay City Inc. v. Ellisor, No. 23‑0808 (Tex. May 23, 2025)

Handed down the same day as Manning, Tenaris is cited for a crisp characterization:

“negligence per se is generally a species of negligence, in which the breach of duty element is established by showing the violation of a statute or regulation.”

This framing allows the Court to comfortably treat negligence per se claims as not separate from negligence, but as a doctrinal variant on how breach is proven. That doctrinal positioning is exactly what makes them fit within “the negligence of an employee” in § 101.021(1).

5. In re CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC, 629 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. 2021)

CenterPoint addresses statutes that require persons to act “safely” or “reasonably.” The Court reiterated that such statutes:

“generally requiring a party to act safely or reasonably do not substitute a legislatively imposed standard of conduct for the reasonable-person standard of common-law negligence.”

In Manning, the Court uses this to underscore that Transportation Code §§ 546.001 and 546.005, which require “safe operation” and “appropriate regard for the safety of all persons,” do not displace the common‑law negligence standard; they merely concretize it for emergency‑driving situations.

6. Decisions on Reckless Driving and § 545.401

The Court notes that § 545.401(a) (reckless driving) adopts a common‑law recklessness standard. It cites:

  • City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. 2022);
  • City of Houston v. Green, 672 S.W.3d 27 (Tex. 2023);
  • City of Austin v. Powell, 704 S.W.3d 437 (Tex. 2024).

These cases establish that § 545.401 requires proof of “wilful or wanton disregard” for safety—i.e., reckless conduct, not mere inadvertence. The Manning Court notes that if Manning continues to rely on § 545.401 as a negligence per se predicate, she must meet that higher recklessness standard:

“Its standard subsumes the meaning of the term ‘negligence’ used in the waiver statute … meaning she must necessarily meet that standard for liability to attach.”

This harmonizes the TTCA’s broad concept of “negligence” with statutory standards that demand heightened culpability: the TTCA’s waiver is not expanded, but plaintiffs must satisfy whatever heightened standard the predicate statute imposes.

7. Conflicting Courts of Appeals: Cruz, McDonald, Thoele, and Parker

The Court acknowledges a split:

  • The Fourteenth Court of Appeals (including in this case and in City of Houston v. Cruz) and the Fort Worth Court of Appeals (in McDonald v. City of The Colony) held that negligence per se claims are within the TTCA waiver because negligence per se is simply another way to prove breach in a negligence action.
  • The Waco Court of Appeals, in Thoele v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice and Texas Department of Criminal Justice v. Parker, took the opposite view, excluding negligence per se claims from the TTCA’s waiver.

By explicitly “disapproving” the latter line of cases, the Supreme Court settles the question statewide: government defendants cannot escape TTCA liability merely because the negligence claim is styled as negligence per se. What matters is whether the statutory standard fits within the TTCA’s reference to “wrongful act or omission or … negligence.”

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Starting with the Text: “Wrongful Act or Omission or the Negligence”

Applying its usual textualist approach, the Court begins with TTCA § 101.021(1), which waives immunity for injuries proximately caused by:

“the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an employee acting within his scope of employment if … [the injury] arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle.”

The City’s textual argument was straightforward: the statute mentions “negligence” but not negligence per se; under strict‑construction principles (Gov’t Code § 311.034), anything not expressly waived remains immune.

The Court rejects this narrow parsing for several reasons:

  • The phrase “wrongful act or omission” is broad; it can encompass many forms of unlawful conduct, including violations of penal statutes that undergird negligence per se.
  • “Negligence” itself is defined in prior Supreme Court precedent (VIA Metro) to include all degrees or grades of negligence, making it an expansive concept rather than a term of art limited to ordinary negligence.
  • Negligence per se, as clarified in Reeder and Tenaris, is not a separate tort; it is “a species of negligence,” specifically regarding how breach is established.

Because negligence per se is, doctrinally, still negligence, and because it often involves a “wrongful act or omission” (violating a criminal or regulatory provision), there is no textual basis to carve it out of the waiver.

2. The Perry Framework: When Statutes “Define More Precisely” the Common‑Law Duty

The Court leans heavily on Perry for the proposition that many penal statutes simply refine or particularize pre‑existing common‑law duties. For example, motorists already owe a duty of reasonable care to others on the road; traffic statutes typically specify how that duty is to be exercised in concrete settings (e.g., speed limits, right‑of‑way rules).

The Court notes:

“the overwhelming majority of this Court’s negligence per se cases have involved violations of traffic statutes by drivers and train operators—actors who already owed a common law duty to exercise reasonable care toward others on the road or track.”

In such situations, using negligence per se:

  • does not create new liability;
  • does not alter the fundamental negligence framework; and
  • simply supplies a clearer benchmark for deciding when the reasonable‑care standard has been breached.

The Transportation Code sections at issue here fit squarely within that category: they instruct emergency vehicle operators to slow “as necessary for safe operation” and to operate with “appropriate regard for the safety of all persons.” These are essentially statutory restatements of the reasonable‑care duty tailored to emergency driving.

3. Application to §§ 546.001 and 546.005

The Court characterizes:

  • § 546.001(2)’s “as necessary for safe operation” standard; and
  • § 546.005(1)’s “appropriate regard for the safety of all persons” standard

as:

“simply ‘more precise[]’ articulations of what conduct breaches the common-law standard of reasonable care in a particular factual context.”

Citing CenterPoint, the Court underscores that statutes requiring generally safe or reasonable conduct do not supplant the common‑law reasonable‑person standard; they align with it. Therefore:

  • A claim that Schmidt violated those statutory requirements is conceptually still a negligence claim; and
  • Such a claim falls within the TTCA’s waiver for injuries caused by “the negligence of an employee.”

4. Treatment of § 545.401 (Reckless Driving)

The Court treats § 545.401 somewhat differently because it codifies a recklessness standard higher than ordinary negligence. It notes its own prior holdings that § 545.401 adopts a “wilful or wanton disregard” (recklessness) standard.

Yet, rather than excluding a negligence per se theory premised on § 545.401 from the TTCA’s waiver, the Court harmonizes the statute and TTCA:

  • The TTCA’s use of “negligence” (per VIA Metro) includes higher degrees or grades of negligence and related culpability concepts.
  • Thus, if Manning relies on § 545.401, she must prove that Schmidt’s conduct met the statutory recklessness threshold, which is folded into the TTCA’s broad conception of “negligence.”

In the Court’s words:

“If Manning pursues this section as a predicate for her negligence per se claims, its standard subsumes the meaning of the term ‘negligence’ used in the waiver statute … meaning she must necessarily meet that standard for liability to attach.”

This avoids both extremes:

  • It does not narrow the TTCA’s waiver by forbidding negligence per se based on higher‑standard statutes; but
  • It does not expand governmental liability beyond what the statute and TTCA together allow—plaintiffs cannot dilute the recklessness requirement by characterizing the claim as ordinary negligence.

5. Disapproval of Contrary Authority

Having anchored its reasoning in statutory text and long‑standing doctrinal principles, the Court explicitly disapproves the Waco decisions in Thoele and Parker “to the extent” they hold that the TTCA does not waive immunity for negligence per se claims.

The Court’s resolution implies a general rule:

  • Labeling a claim “negligence per se” does not, by itself, place it outside the TTCA’s waiver.
  • What matters is whether the underlying statutory standard is consistent with—and fits within—the statutory phrase “wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an employee.”

For most traffic‑related penal statutes, especially those that track or sharpen the common‑law duty of reasonable care, the answer will be “yes.”

D. Issues on Remand: Official Immunity, Emergency Exception, and 9‑1‑1 Exception

The Court does not decide whether the City is ultimately entitled to immunity in this specific case. Instead, it remands for reconsideration of three distinct but related issues:

  1. Official Immunity: Whether Schmidt is personally immune from suit under the doctrine of official immunity (which would mean the City is immune because the employee would not be “personally liable”).
  2. TTCA Emergency‑Response Exception: Whether the claims are barred by the emergency‑response exception, which generally preserves immunity for certain emergency actions unless the employee acts with “reckless disregard” for others’ safety.
  3. TTCA 9‑1‑1 Emergency‑Communications Exception: Whether claims are barred by provisions relating to emergency‑communications systems (such as 9‑1‑1 dispatch), which can shield governmental units from certain liability arising from emergency‑call handling.

The Court specifically instructs the court of appeals to reconsider these issues in light of:

  • City of Houston v. Rodriguez, 704 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. 2024);
  • City of Austin v. Powell, 704 S.W.3d 437 (Tex. 2024); and
  • City of Killeen–Killeen Police Dep’t v. Terry, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. Apr. 25, 2025).

These recent decisions refine:

  • the standard for “good faith” in official‑immunity analysis in emergency responses;
  • how to evaluate “reckless disregard” under the TTCA’s emergency‑response exception; and
  • the proper framework for analyzing 9‑1‑1‑related immunity.

By remanding, the Court signals that while Manning settles the negligence per se / TTCA waiver question, the ultimate immunity analysis for this incident must conform to these updated doctrines.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Governmental Immunity vs. Official Immunity

  • Governmental immunity protects cities and other governmental units from being sued or from liability unless the Legislature has clearly waived that protection (as in the TTCA).
  • Official immunity protects individual government employees from personal liability when they:
    • perform discretionary duties,
    • within the scope of their authority,
    • in good faith.
    If the employee is officially immune, the TTCA’s requirement that the employee “would be personally liable” is not met, and the governmental unit retains immunity.

2. Negligence, Negligence Per Se, and Recklessness

  • Negligence: Failing to use reasonable care—what a reasonably prudent person would do under similar circumstances.
  • Negligence per se: A form of negligence where a statute or regulation defines the standard of care; violating the statute (without excuse) conclusively establishes breach of duty.
  • Recklessness / “wilful or wanton disregard”: Conduct that is significantly more blameworthy than ordinary negligence—knowing or having reason to know that one’s conduct poses a high risk of serious harm and proceeding anyway. Section 545.401’s reckless‑driving standard fits here.

3. “Wrongful Act or Omission” Under the TTCA

The TTCA’s phrase “wrongful act or omission” is broad. While the Court does not fully define it in this opinion, it clearly includes:

  • unlawful acts that are not necessarily negligent (e.g., certain statutory violations); and
  • acts that could form the basis for common‑law tort claims (subject to separate statutory exclusions like intentional torts, which § 101.057 often preserves immunity for).

Negligence per se, which involves violating penal statutes designed to protect against certain harms, naturally fits within this concept of a “wrongful act or omission.”

4. Emergency‑Response and 9‑1‑1 Exceptions

The TTCA contains exceptions that “take back” certain waivers in high‑risk governmental activities:

  • Emergency‑response exception: Generally maintains immunity for actions arising from the operation of emergency vehicles responding to emergencies unless the employee acts with “reckless disregard for the safety of others.” This sets a high bar for plaintiffs.
  • 9‑1‑1 emergency‑communications exception: Protects governmental units from many claims arising out of providing or operating 9‑1‑1 systems, reflecting legislative concern about crippling liability for emergency‑call handling.

These exceptions operate even when the basic TTCA waiver might otherwise apply, and they are among the issues to be revisited on remand.

V. Impact and Implications

1. Resolution of the Negligence Per Se Question Under the TTCA

The primary and immediate impact of City of Houston v. Manning is to:

  • Eliminate the argument that the TTCA’s waiver never applies to negligence per se claims; and
  • Standardize the law across all courts of appeals: negligence per se is, in principle, covered by the TTCA’s waiver insofar as it is a “species of negligence.”

Government defendants can no longer rely on the mere presence of a negligence per se label to claim immunity. They must attack:

  • whether the statutory elements of negligence per se are met (class of persons, type of harm, unexcused violation, etc.);
  • whether the statute alters the underlying duty or simply defines its contours; and
  • other defenses, such as official immunity, TTCA exceptions, or lack of proximate cause.

2. Practical Effects on Pleadings and Litigation Strategy

For plaintiffs:

  • Negligence complaints against governmental units involving motor vehicles can safely include negligence per se theories without risking dismissal based solely on the form of the claim.
  • Where statutes impose heightened standards (like reckless driving), plaintiffs must be prepared to prove that higher mental state; they cannot re‑characterize the claim as mere ordinary negligence to lower their burden.

For governmental units and their insurers:

  • Early‑stage motions to dismiss or summary‑judgment motions must engage with the content of the statutory standard, not just its label.
  • Defenses will often focus more on:
    • whether the statutory duty derives from or is consistent with common‑law negligence principles;
    • whether an exception (emergency response, 9‑1‑1, discretionary function, etc.) applies; and
    • whether the employee is protected by official immunity.

3. Clarifying the Relationship Between Penal Statutes and Civil Liability

The decision reinforces an important conceptual point:

  • Penal statutes that track or clarify existing common‑law duties (especially traffic‑safety laws) can be used to define breach in negligence cases, including against governmental defendants, without being seen as creating new, non‑waived causes of action.
  • Statutes that expressly adopt different fault standards (like recklessness) are still compatible with the TTCA, but plaintiffs must satisfy the heightened standard those statutes impose.

The Court leaves open more complex questions about statutes that might create completely novel duties or strictly liable offenses not easily mapped onto negligence concepts. But its emphasis on common‑law continuity, and on the breadth of “wrongful act or omission or the negligence,” strongly suggests that many such claims will also be analyzed within the TTCA framework rather than categorically excluded.

4. Broader Doctrinal Coherence

Manning fits into a broader trend in Texas Supreme Court jurisprudence:

  • Interpreting immunity waivers textually but not hyper‑technically;
  • Maintaining the integrity of long‑standing tort doctrines (like negligence per se) rather than multiplying distinct “causes of action” based on doctrinal labels;
  • Integrating statutory standards (traffic laws, safety regulations) into negligence analysis in a way that preserves continuity with common‑law principles.

By explicitly linking the TTCA’s concept of negligence to common‑law doctrine and Restatement principles, the Court ensures that governmental liability in traffic‑collision cases remains grounded in a familiar and predictable negligence framework.

VI. Conclusion

City of Houston v. Manning establishes a clear and important rule in Texas governmental‑immunity law: the TTCA’s waiver of immunity for injuries caused by “the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an employee” encompasses negligence per se claims where the underlying statute merely refines, rather than replaces, the common‑law standard of care.

Drawing on Perry, Reeder, VIA Metro, Tenaris, and related cases, the Court holds that negligence per se is a “species of negligence” and thus fits comfortably within § 101.021(1). Transportation Code provisions that require “safe operation” and “appropriate regard for the safety of all persons” are viewed as statutory refinements of the reasonable‑person standard, and violations of those provisions can thus support TTCA liability on a negligence per se theory.

At the same time, the Court preserves the rigor of statutory standards that demand more than ordinary negligence, such as the reckless‑driving standard in § 545.401. Plaintiffs invoking such statutes must satisfy those heightened fault requirements; the TTCA does not dilute them.

By disapproving contrary intermediate‑court decisions and remanding for application of updated doctrines on official immunity and emergency exceptions, the Court provides both a more coherent doctrinal map and a more predictable framework for litigating governmental liability in emergency‑vehicle collision cases. The decision will influence how lawyers plead, defend, and adjudicate TTCA motor‑vehicle claims across Texas, embedding negligence per se firmly within the TTCA’s waiver while preserving robust protections for governmental entities through other statutory and common‑law doctrines.

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