Negligence Liability for Domestic Animal Injuries: Overruling Bard v. Jahnke

Introduction

This commentary examines the landmark decision in Flanders v. Goodfellow (2025 NYSlipOp 02261), in which the New York Court of Appeals addressed two core issues: (1) whether there was a triable issue of fact as to the Goodfellows’ knowledge of their dog’s vicious propensity, and (2) whether to maintain or overrule Bard v. Jahnke (6 NY3d 592 [2006]), which had barred negligence claims for injury caused by domestic animals. The case arises from a postal carrier’s serious dog‐bite injury and pits strict liability and common‐law negligence doctrines against one another. The Court’s ruling reinstates both causes of action and, significantly, overrules Bard’s blanket prohibition on negligence liability for animal‐caused harm.

Summary of the Judgment

In a unanimous opinion by Judge Halligan, the Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment for the dog‐owners and reinstated Rebecca Flanders’s strict liability and negligence claims. On strict liability, the Court held that reasonable jurors could infer constructive knowledge of the dog’s vicious propensity based on multiple affidavits from postal workers describing aggressive episodes. On negligence, the Court determined that Bard’s rule barring negligence causes of action for domestic animal injuries was unworkable, unfair, and out of step with general tort principles and almost every other jurisdiction. Consequently, Bard was overruled to the extent it foreclosed negligence liability, restoring the availability of ordinary tort claims under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Collier v. Zambito (1 NY3d 444 [2004]) – Established strict liability for domestic animals when the owner knows or should know of vicious propensities (Restatement § 509).
Bard v. Jahnke (6 NY3d 592 [2006]) – Held that no common‐law negligence action lies for harm caused by a domestic animal, limiting owners’ liability to strict liability only.
Hastings v. Sauve (21 NY3d 122 [2013]) – Carved out an exception to Bard for farm animals negligently allowed to stray, allowing ordinary negligence claims in limited circumstances.
Doerr v. Goldsmith (25 NY3d 1114 [2015]) – Clarified that Hastings’ “wandering animal” exception did not extend to household pets like dogs.
Other cases (e.g., Bernstein v. Penny Whistle Toys, Hewitt v. Palmer Veterinary Clinic) – Demonstrated incremental post‐Bard exceptions and tensions in the case law.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolds in two parts:

Strict Liability Claim: Viewing the record in Flanders’s favor, testimony showed a pattern of aggressive behavior—barking, snarling, slamming against glass—that any reasonable owner should have observed. The Goodfellows’ denials of notice raised credibility issues that precluded summary judgment under CPLR 3212(b).
Negligence Claim and Stare Decisis: The Court scrutinized Bard’s bright‐line ban on negligence liability, weighing the policy benefits of certainty against its misalignment with general tort principles. Recognizing that nearly every jurisdiction and the Restatement allow negligence claims (§ 518), and acknowledging Hastings and subsequent carve‐outs (wandering farm animals, veterinary clinics), the Court concluded Bard had become an “unworkable” anomaly. The nuances and exceptions that followed Bard showed its rule forced arbitrary distinctions, undermined fairness, and impaired predictability.

Impact

The decision has immediate and far‐reaching effects:

Plaintiffs’ Options: Victims of animal‐caused injuries may now choose either strict liability (Restatement § 509) or ordinary negligence (Restatement § 518) theories, or both, depending on the evidence of owner knowledge and due care.
Owner Obligations: Animal owners must be vigilant not only to vicious propensities but also to general safety precautions—fencing, warnings, restraint—under a negligence duty of care.
Jurisprudential Consistency: New York aligns with the majority of jurisdictions and the Restatement, promoting uniformity in tort law and providing juries with familiar negligence standards rather than a unique strict‐liability‐only regime.
Lower Court Practice: Courts will need to revisit pending and future animal‐bite or injury cases, applying negligence principles where applicable and carefully delineating the elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages in the animal context.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Strict Liability (§ 509): Liability without fault if an owner knows or should know the animal is dangerous. No proof of negligence required once knowledge of vicious propensity is shown.
Ordinary Negligence (§ 518): Liability based on failure to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. The owner’s knowledge of the animal’s general characteristics is relevant but not determinative; instead, the focus is on whether the owner acted as a reasonably careful person would have.
Constructive Knowledge: Knowledge that the owner “should have” had, inferred from reasonably observable signs—growling, lunging, repeated aggressive acts—even if the owner claims actual ignorance.
Stare Decisis: The principle that courts generally follow past decisions to ensure consistency, but which yields when precedent is unworkable, unjust, or contrary to sound reasoning and experience.

Conclusion

Flanders v. Goodfellow marks a pivotal shift in New York tort law. By reinstating strict liability and, critically, restoring a common‐law negligence cause of action for domestic‐animal injuries, the Court corrects an outlier rule that disadvantaged injured persons and resisted alignment with broader tort principles. Going forward, animal owners must exercise due care and heed any warning signs of aggression, while injured parties gain fuller access to the ordinary negligence framework. This decision underscores the ongoing need to balance fair compensation, predictability, and accountability in the law of animal‐caused harm.