Necessary-Party Joinder in Article 78 Challenges to Village Fire Department Appointments: Appointee and Fire Department Council Must Be Joined Before Merits Are Reached

Case: Matter of Riverside Hose Co., Inc. v. Village of Tarrytown Village Board (2025 NY Slip Op 04793)

Court: Appellate Division, Second Department

Date: August 27, 2025

Introduction

This appellate decision addresses a threshold but critical procedural issue in CPLR Article 78 proceedings that challenge municipal actions concerning the leadership of volunteer fire departments operating under New York’s Village Law. In the wake of a tie vote at a “Chief’s Convention” for the position of second assistant chief engineer within the Tarrytown Fire Department, the Village Board appointed the sole candidate, Richard Tucci. Two fire companies—Riverside Hose Company, Inc. and Phenix Hose Company, Inc.—commenced an Article 78 proceeding to annul the appointment, arguing, among other things, that the Village Board improperly disregarded delegate votes and bypassed statutory procedures.

The Supreme Court (Westchester County) granted relief and annulled the appointment. On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department did not reach the merits. Instead, it reversed and remitted, holding that (1) the appointee (Tucci) and (2) the Board of Fire Wardens (the fire department council under Village Law § 10-1014) are necessary parties who must be joined—or their absence evaluated under CPLR 1001(b)—before any merits determination can stand. The decision reaffirmed—and operationalized in this specific municipal-fire governance context—the rule that nonjoinder can be raised at any stage and that dismissal is a last resort; courts must first attempt joinder and, only if joinder cannot be effectuated, apply the CPLR 1001(b) factors to decide whether to proceed without the absent party.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s judgment insofar as it annulled the appointment of Richard Tucci as second assistant chief engineer.
• The court held that both Tucci and the Board of Fire Wardens are necessary parties under CPLR 1001(a) because their interests could be inequitably affected by the judgment.
• The matter was remitted for the Supreme Court to:
  • Determine whether these necessary parties can be summoned (i.e., joined); and
  • If joinder cannot be achieved, decide whether the proceeding may nevertheless continue without them by applying the CPLR 1001(b) factors.
• The court expressly declined to address the respondents’ remaining arguments and the merits of the petition until after the joinder inquiry is completed.

Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory and Institutional Framework

The Tarrytown Fire Department is composed of six fire companies and governed by a fire department council known as the Board of Fire Wardens (Village Law §§ 10-1000, 10-1010, 10-1014). Under Village Law § 10-1010 and departmental governing documents, each company elects delegates who convene as the “Chief’s Convention” to nominate candidates for chief engineer and assistant chiefs (Village Law § 10-1012[1]). The Village Board then acts on these nominations.

Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the Village Board authorized a brief postponement of the required April 2020 meetings. The Chief’s Convention convened on May 7, 2020; it successfully nominated candidates for chief and first assistant chief, but a tie vote (9–9) for second assistant chief left no majority support for the sole candidate, Richard Tucci. The next day, the Village Board nevertheless appointed Tucci, reasoning that some delegates—at least those from one of the petitioner companies—were not qualified, thereby converting the tie into an effective majority.

The petitioners sought Article 78 relief to annul the appointment. The Supreme Court granted that relief; the Village Board and individual Village officials appealed. The Appellate Division’s intervention was grounded not in the substantive Village Law questions but in the procedural posture: indispensable parties had not been joined.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• City of New York v Long Island Airports Limousine Serv. Corp., 48 NY2d 469
  • Defines necessary parties as persons who ought to be parties to accord complete relief or who might be inequitably affected by a judgment (CPLR 1001[a]).
  • Underscores twin aims: judicial economy and fairness to absent third parties.
• Matter of Hofstra Univ. v Nassau County Planning Commn., 231 AD3d 1025
  • Nonjoinder may be raised at any stage—even for the first time on appeal.
  • Dismissal is a last resort; courts should first order joinder if the absent party is subject to jurisdiction.
• Matter of Supinsky v Town of Huntington, 234 AD3d 855 and Matter of Mulford Bay, LLC v Rocco, 186 AD3d 1520
  • Reinforce the procedural remedy: when a necessary party is subject to jurisdiction, the court should direct that they be summoned.
• Matter of Cuomo v East Williston UFSD, 227 AD3d 897 and U.S. Bank Trust N.A. v Germoso, 216 AD3d 1046
  • Lay out the two-step path: attempt joinder; if impossible, evaluate whether to proceed without the party under CPLR 1001(b).
• Matter of Lodge v D'Aliso, 2 AD3d 525; Sarva v Tura Assoc., 204 AD2d 422; Matter of Mount Pleasant Cottage School UFSD v Sobol, 163 AD2d 715, affd 78 NY2d 935
  • Stand for the commonsense proposition that the person whose appointment is at stake is a necessary party.
• Sacasa v David Trust, 197 AD3d 750 and Ji Juan Lin v Bo Jin Zhu, 191 AD3d 652
  • Illustrate when organizational entities implicated by the relief sought must be joined as necessary parties.

These authorities collectively supported the Second Department’s conclusion that Tucci—whose appointment would be nullified by the judgment—and the Board of Fire Wardens—whose governance and leadership structure could be altered—were necessary parties whose absence had to be addressed before any merits determination.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Nonjoinder is a threshold issue. The court reaffirmed that nonjoinder of necessary parties may be raised at any stage, including for the first time on appeal. Thus, the respondents’ joinder objection could not be deemed waived.
2. Who is a necessary party here?
   • Richard Tucci is necessary because he is directly and inequitably affected by any judgment annulling his appointment (CPLR 1001[a]).
   • Board of Fire Wardens is necessary because relief could change leadership and governance within the fire department—matters squarely within the council’s statutory responsibilities.
3. Dismissal is not the first remedy. Rather than dismiss, the proper course under CPLR 1001(b) is for the Supreme Court to determine whether the absent necessary parties are subject to the court’s jurisdiction and order that they be summoned.
4. If joinder cannot be effected, apply the CPLR 1001(b) balancing test. Only if joinder proves impossible should the court evaluate whether to proceed without the absent parties after considering:
   • Potential prejudice to the absent party or existing parties;
   • Whether protective provisions can mitigate prejudice;
   • Whether an effective judgment can be rendered without the absent party; and
   • Whether the petitioner has an adequate remedy if the proceeding is dismissed for nonjoinder.
5. No merits until proper parties are present (or excusably absent). Because necessary-party issues were unresolved, it was premature for the Supreme Court to annul the appointment on the merits.

D. What the Court Did Not Decide

Importantly, the Second Department did not reach the underlying merits concerning:

• Whether the Village Board lawfully appointed Tucci after the tie vote at the Chief’s Convention;
• Whether delegates opposing the nomination were actually unqualified;
• How Village Law §§ 10-1010 and 10-1012 should operate amid pandemic postponements; or
• Any remedy beyond the joinder directive.

Those substantive issues remain open for the Supreme Court following joinder (or a CPLR 1001[b] analysis of excusable nonjoinder).

E. Practical Impact and Prospective Significance

1) For Article 78 Litigants and Counsel

• Appointees are almost always necessary parties when their appointment, tenure, or rights are at stake. Failing to name them invites reversal or remittal.
• Include institutional bodies (here, the Board of Fire Wardens) whose statutory powers or governance will be altered by the relief sought.
• Expect nonjoinder to surface late. Because it can be raised for the first time on appeal, parties should proactively address joinder at the pleading stage to avoid delay and inefficiency.
• Relief may be delayed, not defeated. The remedy for nonjoinder is typically joinder or a CPLR 1001(b) analysis—not immediate dismissal—preserving access to a merits determination where feasible.

2) For Municipal Boards and Volunteer Fire Departments

• Record-building matters. If a board acts on nominations from a Chief’s Convention, especially in atypical circumstances (e.g., pandemic postponements, tie votes, delegate qualification disputes), it should compile a clear record supporting its conclusions.
• Anticipate necessary-party alignment. If an appointment is likely to be challenged, ensure the appointee and the department’s governing council are prepared to be joined so that any court can reach the merits efficiently.
• Clarity on Village Law interactions. The case spotlights the practical interfaces among Village Law §§ 10-1010, 10-1012, and 10-1014 regarding nominations, appointments, and departmental councils. Substantive questions remain to be clarified in future merits rulings.

3) Broader Procedural Signal

The decision strengthens a consistent procedural message: in disputes that may unsettle public appointments or governance structures, courts require the presence (or excusable absence under CPLR 1001[b]) of all stakeholders before adjudicating rights. This fosters judicial economy, fair process, and durable outcomes, and it curbs the risk of inconsistent or unenforceable judgments.

F. Likely Next Steps on Remand

1. The Supreme Court will determine whether Tucci and the Board of Fire Wardens can be summoned and joined. Given their direct connection to the Village and the department, jurisdiction will likely be available.
2. If joined, the court can proceed to decide the merits, including the legality of the Village Board’s appointment and any remedy.
3. If joinder is not feasible, the court must apply CPLR 1001(b) to decide whether to proceed without them or dismiss as a last resort.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• CPLR Article 78: A streamlined mechanism to challenge actions by state and local bodies or officers as unlawful, arbitrary, or beyond jurisdiction.
• Necessary Party (CPLR 1001[a]): A person or entity that must be part of the case because:
  • Complete relief cannot be granted without them; or
  • They may be inequitably affected by the judgment (their rights or interests are at stake).
• Nonjoinder: Failure to include a necessary party in the litigation.
• CPLR 1001(b) Factors: If a necessary party cannot be joined, the court considers whether to continue without them by weighing:
  • Prejudice to absent and existing parties;
  • Whether protective measures can reduce prejudice;
  • Whether a judgment would be effective without the party; and
  • Whether the petitioner has another remedy if the case is dismissed.
• Board of Fire Wardens / Fire Department Council (Village Law § 10-1014): The governing council that manages many aspects of a village fire department’s internal affairs and leadership processes.
• Chief’s Convention: A convention of elected delegates from each company in the department that nominates candidates for chief and assistant chief positions (Village Law § 10-1012[1] and departmental bylaws).

Conclusion

The Second Department’s decision in Matter of Riverside Hose Co., Inc. v. Village of Tarrytown Village Board does not resolve the substantive dispute over whether the Village Board lawfully appointed a second assistant chief engineer after a tie at the Chief’s Convention. Instead, it establishes and applies a controlling procedural directive: before a court can annul such an appointment or otherwise alter a department’s leadership structure, it must ensure that all necessary parties—including the appointee and the fire department’s governing council—are before the court, or that their absence is excused after a CPLR 1001(b) analysis.

By reversing and remitting for joinder, the court reinforces core values of New York civil procedure: fairness to those whose rights will be affected, avoidance of fragmented litigation, and the rendering of effective and durable judgments. For practitioners, the message is clear—identify and join all indispensable stakeholders at the outset of Article 78 challenges to municipal appointments, particularly within the nuanced framework of Village Law governance of volunteer fire departments. Only then can the courts properly and efficiently reach, and resolve, the merits.