Natural Lands, LLC v. City of Boca Raton: Florida Certiorari as an “Adequate State Remedy” Bars Federal Procedural Due Process Claims in Biased Land‑Use Hearings

I. Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision in Natural Lands, LLC v. City of Boca Raton, No. 23‑11323 (11th Cir. Nov. 17, 2025), fits squarely within a long line of circuit authority beginning with McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc). The case involves a familiar factual setting: a landowner seeks variances to develop oceanfront property; local officials, under intense political pressure, publicly commit to opposing the project; and the landowner alleges that bias has rendered the local hearing process fundamentally unfair.

The particular twist here is procedural, not factual. Natural Lands did not challenge the allegedly biased decision in Florida state court via a petition for writ of certiorari, although that remedy was available and had in fact been successfully pursued by the owner of a neighboring parcel (the “Sweetapple Lot”). Instead, Natural Lands litigated in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, obtaining a significant bench‑trial victory: a declaration that several City Council members were biased and an injunction barring them from future participation in variance proceedings concerning the parcel, plus attorney’s fees and costs under § 1988.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed. Reaffirming and applying McKinney, the panel held that because Florida provided an “available and adequate” post‑deprivation remedy—common‑law certiorari in state circuit court—Natural Lands could not establish a federal procedural due process violation. Consequently, the district court’s declaratory and injunctive relief, and its award of attorney’s fees and costs, were vacated.

While “not for publication” and therefore non‑precedential under Eleventh Circuit rules, the decision is a clear, tightly reasoned restatement of a critical doctrinal point: in the Eleventh Circuit, a federal procedural due process claim simply does not “arise” if the state offers an adequate means to correct the alleged procedural defect—even when the defect is as serious as demonstrated decisionmaker bias—and even if the plaintiff prefers the more robust remedies available in federal court.

II. Background of the Case

A. The Property and the Coastal Construction Control Line

Natural Lands, LLC owned an undeveloped beachfront parcel in Boca Raton, Florida, located seaward of the Coastal Construction Control Line (“CCCL”). The CCCL is a state‑level regulatory boundary established by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection and adopted by the City. It demarcates a particularly vulnerable coastal zone where construction is subject to heightened environmental and safety controls.

To build a single‑family residence east of the CCCL, Natural Lands needed approvals in two categories:

Traditional zoning‑style variances (lot width and setbacks), and
A CCCL variance to permit construction seaward of the line.

Natural Lands applied for the necessary variances in 2011. The review process was lengthy and technically demanding, involving multiple years and extensive architectural, engineering, and environmental submissions. In 2015, the City Council granted the lot width and setback variances. The pivotal CCCL variance, however, remained unresolved.

B. Political Opposition and Alleged Bias

Local residents strongly opposed development on the parcel and actively lobbied City Council members to deny the CCCL variance. Over time, several key elected officials made public statements that, in Natural Lands’ view, demonstrated irrevocable bias:

Council Member Andrea O’Rourke had earlier signed a petition opposing development on the parcel and, after election, publicly promised to do “everything within [her] power” to prevent construction.
Council Member Monica Mayotte stated she had “no intention” of granting the CCCL variance.
Mayor Scott Singer campaigned on protecting the area, recorded a campaign video in front of the parcel, and pledged to vote against the variance.

When the City Council scheduled a hearing on the CCCL variance in July 2019, Natural Lands requested the recusal of O’Rourke, Mayotte, and Mayor Singer, arguing they could not provide the impartial adjudication required by due process. The Council denied the recusal request. At the public hearing, the Council unanimously denied the CCCL variance, citing failure to meet the requirements of the governing ordinance.

C. The Federal Lawsuit and Bench Trial

In October 2019, Natural Lands sued the City (and the Greater Boca Raton Beach and Park District) in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The amended complaint asserted:

Three inverse condemnation (takings) claims:
- Under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause (via § 1983),
- Under the parallel provision of the Florida Constitution, and
- Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment framed as a taking.
A procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that prejudgment and bias by Council members deprived Natural Lands of a fair and impartial hearing.
A count for declaratory relief, focusing on the alleged bias and seeking forward‑looking relief.

Natural Lands’ central theory was that the City Council had prejudged its application, such that the July 2019 hearing was a sham: the outcome was predetermined by political promises and anti‑development commitments, not by an impartial evaluation of the variance criteria. That, Natural Lands argued, both destroyed fair process and effectively deprived the parcel of economically viable use.

The City moved to dismiss, arguing in part that under McKinney v. Pate Natural Lands had no viable federal procedural due process claim because Florida provided an adequate state remedy. After Natural Lands voluntarily withdrew some claims, the district court denied the motion as moot.

The case proceeded to a five‑day bench trial. There, the City renewed its McKinney-based argument, now framed as a request that the district court simply disregard (or effectively dismiss) the procedural due process claim. The court refused.

In detailed findings, the district court:

Found Council Members O’Rourke and Mayotte and Mayor Singer biased,
Admonished them for lack of credibility and partiality,
Held that the City had denied Natural Lands a fair and impartial hearing, thereby violating procedural due process,
Issued a declaratory judgment labeling the named officials biased, and
Enjoined them from participating in any future variance processes involving the parcel.

Additionally, the district court:

Rejected the takings claim, ruling for the City on the ground that the denial of the CCCL variance did not constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. Neither party appealed that aspect of the judgment.
Awarded Natural Lands attorney’s fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) for litigating and prevailing on the procedural due process claim.

The City appealed the procedural due process ruling and the associated fee award. Natural Lands cross‑appealed on an evidentiary point related to the admission of bias evidence, but that issue became academic given the appellate disposition.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss the procedural due process claim. Its core holdings were:

Under McKinney v. Pate, a federal procedural due process claim under § 1983 does not arise unless and until the state fails to provide an adequate post‑deprivation remedy for the alleged procedural defect.
Florida’s common‑law certiorari remedy in state court, which both parties acknowledged was available, constitutes an adequate state remedy for alleged due process violations in local land‑use decisions, including claims of decisionmaker bias.
Because Natural Lands did not pursue certiorari in state court, and because that remedy was adequate, Natural Lands failed to establish the absence of an adequate state remedy—a necessary component of any federal procedural due process claim in this circuit.
As a result, the district court erred as a matter of law in granting declaratory and injunctive relief on the procedural due process theory, and in awarding attorney’s fees and costs under § 1988 premised on that claim.

The panel placed particular emphasis on the neighboring “Sweetapple Lot” litigation, in which the Palm Beach County Circuit Court had granted certiorari to quash a variance denial and had ordered the recusal of biased City Council members. The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal declined review, leaving that order intact. This, the Eleventh Circuit concluded, powerfully underscored both the availability and the adequacy of certiorari as a state‑law remedy.

Because the procedural due process claim failed as a matter of law under McKinney, the panel held that:

The district court’s reliance on evidence of bias, however factually well‑founded, could not sustain a federal cause of action.
The fee award was an abuse of discretion, since it rested on a legally invalid constitutional claim.

Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and remanded with explicit instructions to dismiss the procedural due process claim, and the attorney’s fee award was also reversed.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Doctrinal Framework: Procedural Due Process and McKinney v. Pate

The starting point for the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis is McKinney v. Pate, an en banc decision that has structured procedural due process litigation in this circuit for three decades. McKinney represents a distinctive elaboration of Supreme Court due process doctrine, especially the principles that emerged from Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), and then crystallized in Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990).

In McKinney, the Eleventh Circuit held:

A procedural due process violation is not complete at the moment of the deprivation. Rather, where the alleged wrong is a procedural defect by a state or local official, there is no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment unless and until the state fails to provide adequate process.
It follows that a § 1983 procedural due process claim in federal court requires a showing that the state’s available post‑deprivation remedies are constitutionally inadequate.
A litigant cannot complain in federal court of a procedural defect in a local proceeding if the state provides “a means by which to receive redress for the deprivation.” McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1557.

Natural Lands’ case falls squarely into this framework: the alleged wrong was not that the City lacked fair procedures on its books, but that particular City Council members were biased and had prejudged the variance application. Bias is a classic procedural due process concern—yet, under McKinney, proof of bias is not by itself proof of a federal violation. The critical question is whether the state had a mechanism to correct that alleged bias after the fact.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Court’s Reasoning

1. McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc)

McKinney is the lynchpin of the court’s reasoning. The opinion draws several key propositions from McKinney:

A federal procedural due process claim does not arise “unless and until the State fails to provide due process.” (quoting Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 126).
The “state fails to provide due process” only where it fails to offer an adequate post‑deprivation remedy to address the procedural defect.
The rationale is institutional: the state, as sovereign, must have an opportunity to cure or disavow the procedural missteps of its local subdivisions. Without that opportunity, one cannot say that the state itself has sanctioned the deprivation.
Most directly, “[a] demonstration that the decisionmaker was biased … is not tantamount to a demonstration that there has been a denial of [federal] procedural due process.” McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1562.

In Natural Lands, the district court focused heavily on the bias of individual City Council members. The Eleventh Circuit did not dispute the factual basis for finding bias; instead, it applied McKinney to hold that without a demonstration that the state lacked (or failed to provide) adequate corrective procedures, those bias findings do not amount to a federal constitutional violation.

2. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990)

The panel quotes Zinermon for the proposition that a procedural due process violation is incomplete “unless and until the state fails to provide due process.” In Zinermon, the Supreme Court clarified that in some contexts (especially where the state has delegated wide discretion to officials and the deprivation is foreseeable), post‑deprivation remedies may not be sufficient; in others, they may be.

In the Eleventh Circuit’s doctrinal synthesis, Zinermon supports a focus on the adequacy of state remedial mechanisms, not just on the defect itself. Thus, the panel uses Zinermon to reinforce McKinney’s core teaching: the availability of adequate state process can “cure” an otherwise serious procedural flaw for federal constitutional purposes.

3. Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2000)

The panel relies on Cotton to address two key points:

Certiorari as an adequate state remedy. In Cotton, the Eleventh Circuit characterized Florida’s certiorari procedure as “generally an adequate state remedy.” That statement is directly quoted in Natural Lands and applied to the land‑use context.
Scope of the adequacy inquiry. Cotton holds that the adequacy of the state remedy is not measured by whether it offers the same remedial relief as a § 1983 action. Rather, the question is whether the remedy can correct the alleged procedural shortcoming and thereby supply the process that was constitutionally required.

In § 1983 practice, plaintiffs often argue that state remedies are inferior because they do not provide damages, attorney’s fees, or other federal‑style relief. The panel, echoing Cotton and McKinney, repeatedly rejects this equivalence‑of‑relief standard, emphasizing that “[t]he state’s remedial procedure need not provide all relief available under section 1983.” McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1564.

4. Florida Cases on Certiorari Review

The opinion also cites Florida authorities clarifying the potency of common‑law certiorari as a mechanism for reviewing quasi‑judicial local decisions.

Miami-Dade County v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 305 So. 3d 668 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020), citing Fla. Power & Light Co. v. City of Dania, 761 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 2000): These cases articulate the standards for certiorari review of quasi‑judicial actions by local governments—typically limited to whether the agency afforded procedural due process, observed the essential requirements of law, and supported its decision with competent substantial evidence.
2600 N. Ocean LLC v. City of Boca Raton, No. 50‑2019‑CA‑004116‑XXXX‑MB (Palm Beach Cty. Cir. Ct. Sept. 16, 2020) (the “Sweetapple Lot” case): The Palm Beach County Circuit Court granted certiorari to a neighboring lot owner, quashed the City Council’s denial of a variance, found two Council members biased, and ordered their recusal from future proceedings on that variance.
City of Boca Raton v. 2600 Ocean, LLC, No. 4D20‑2505 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug. 18, 2021): The Fourth District Court of Appeal denied certiorari, thus declining to overturn the circuit court’s order, including its recusal directive.

Natural Lands’ own pleadings cited the Sweetapple Lot litigation to show that the same City Council members had been found biased in similar coastal development disputes. But on appeal, Natural Lands argued that Sweetapple could not demonstrate the adequacy of certiorari because the circuit court allegedly exceeded its authority in ordering recusal and that its order was likely reversible. The Eleventh Circuit rejected that argument on two levels:

As a matter of fact, Natural Lands’ prediction was wrong: the Fourth DCA declined to disturb the circuit court’s order.
More fundamentally, even if a state court could not order recusal as such, quashing a biased decision and remanding under the “essential requirements of law” standard would offer substantial protection against procedural bias—enough to qualify as an “adequate” remedy under McKinney.

In other words, the Sweetapple case—far from undermining the adequacy of certiorari—demonstrated that Florida courts are willing and able to police bias in quasi‑judicial land‑use decisions, and even to require recusal where appropriate.

5. Standard of Review Cases

The panel also briefly cites standard of review authorities:

A.I.G. Uruguay Compania de Seguros, S.A. v. AAA Cooper Transp., 334 F.3d 997 (11th Cir. 2003), for the proposition that conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and factual findings for clear error after a bench trial.
Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP, 846 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2017), and Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), for abuse‑of‑discretion review of attorney’s fee awards, and the notion that misapplication of law is itself an abuse of discretion.
Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Cedar Shipping Co., 320 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2003), for abuse‑of‑discretion review of evidentiary rulings—ultimately rendered irrelevant because the underlying claim was dismissed.

These citations mainly structure the appellate review framework and support the conclusion that once the district court misapplied McKinney, reversal of the merits and the fee award followed as a matter of law.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Natural Lands

1. Step One: Identifying the Nature of the Alleged Wrong

The Eleventh Circuit conceptualizes Natural Lands’ complaint as one alleging:

A biased and prejudged decision by a quasi‑judicial local body (the City Council),
Leading to a denial of a requested variance, and thereby
Inflicting economic harm and loss of beneficial use on the parcel.

The panel assumes, for purposes of analysis, that the bias findings by the district court are accurate. It does not revisit the factual determination that O’Rourke, Mayotte, and Singer were biased. Instead, it frames the legal question narrowly: even if the Council was biased, does that misconduct give rise to a federal procedural due process claim when an adequate state remedy existed but was not used?

2. Step Two: Applying McKinney—Is There an Adequate State Remedy?

Under McKinney, the answer depends on the existence and adequacy of a state corrective mechanism. The parties conceded that Natural Lands could have sought certiorari in Florida circuit court to challenge the variance denial. Thus, the central dispute was over adequacy.

The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis proceeds as follows:

General principle from prior Eleventh Circuit cases. The court reiterates that “certiorari is generally an adequate state remedy” (quoting Cotton, 216 F.3d at 1331).
Evidence of adequacy from Florida practice. It notes that Florida courts on certiorari review examine whether the local body provided procedural due process and followed the essential requirements of law—squarely covering the sorts of bias complaints Natural Lands raised.
The Sweetapple Lot as a concrete example. The Sweetapple litigation shows, in practice, that:
- Florida circuit courts do consider and remedy bias in City Council proceedings,
- They may order both quashal of a tainted decision and recusal of biased decisionmakers—precisely the type of relief Natural Lands sought in federal court, and
- The appellate court left such relief undisturbed, confirming its legitimacy within Florida law.
The “same relief” argument rejected. Even if state certiorari did not allow recusal (a premise belied by Sweetapple), the adequacy requirement is met so long as certiorari could “correct the precise harm” alleged—namely, the biased and procedurally defective hearing—by quashing the decision and mandating a new, fair hearing.

Thus, the panel concludes that Florida’s certiorari remedy:

Was available to Natural Lands;
Was adequate, in that it could address the core procedural injury of a biased hearing; and
Was in fact used successfully by a nearby landowner under nearly identical circumstances.

Under McKinney, that resolves the matter: if an adequate state remedy was available, then constitutional due process has not failed, and no federal procedural due process cause of action arises.

3. Step Three: Consequences for the Federal Litigation

Having held that Natural Lands lacked a viable federal procedural due process claim as a matter of law, the Eleventh Circuit’s next steps follow inexorably:

Merits relief disappears. Because the claim never “ripened” into a federal constitutional violation, the district court had no proper basis to grant declaratory and injunctive relief under § 1983 grounded in procedural due process. The bias finding, however persuasive, becomes legally irrelevant for § 1983 purposes once the state remedy is deemed adequate.
Attorney’s fees must be reversed. The district court’s § 1988 fee award depended on Natural Lands having “prevailed” on a constitutional claim. If there is no valid constitutional claim, there is no § 1988 “prevailing party” status. Moreover, the erroneous application of law—misreading McKinney—constitutes an abuse of discretion in the fee context.
Evidentiary rulings become moot. Natural Lands’ cross‑appeal challenging the admission of bias evidence is rendered academic by dismissal of the only claim to which that evidence was relevant. Even if the district court erred in admitting or weighing such evidence, the ultimate federal disposition—dismissal of the procedural due process claim—fully cures any prejudice.

The court therefore:

Reverses the judgment on the procedural due process claim;
Reverses the associated attorney’s fees and costs award; and
Remands with instructions to dismiss the procedural due process claim.

D. The Effect of the Decision on the District Court’s Bias Findings

A notable feature of this case is the disconnect between the district court’s extensive factual findings and the ultimate federal disposition. The district court undertook a searching examination of council members’ conduct and credibility. It found pre‑commitment, public promises, and a lack of open‑mindedness inconsistent with a fair quasi‑judicial proceeding.

The Eleventh Circuit does not disturb those factual determinations. Instead, it treats them as legally insufficient to support a federal claim in light of McKinney. In effect, the district court may have correctly diagnosed a serious fairness problem at the local level, but under Eleventh Circuit doctrine, that problem was meant to be addressed through Florida’s state courts, not federal court.

This may seem counterintuitive: if bias is present and due process is violated at the local hearing, why is there no federal remedy? The doctrinal answer is that:

A federal procedural due process claim is about the overall process the state affords, not just the initial local decision. If the state provides a meaningful avenue to correct local procedural errors (including bias), then the state has not violated the Fourteenth Amendment—even though the initial local proceeding was unfair.

E. Attorney’s Fees and the Importance of the Underlying Federal Right

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a district court may award attorney’s fees to the “prevailing party” in an action to enforce § 1983 and certain other civil rights statutes. But “prevailing” status requires success on a claim that actually vindicates a federal right.

Here:

The only federal constitutional right on which Natural Lands ostensibly prevailed was the procedural due process claim.
Once the Eleventh Circuit concluded that no such right was violated—because the claim fails under McKinney—Natural Lands cannot be deemed a prevailing party for federal fee‑shifting purposes.

The court explicitly holds that the district court “necessarily abused its discretion” by awarding fees and costs based on a claim that was not properly before it. This underscores a crucial point for litigators: before investing heavily in federal § 1983 litigation predicated on procedural due process, one must carefully assess whether state post‑deprivation remedies will foreclose the federal claim entirely.

V. Impact and Implications

A. Implications for Land‑Use and Zoning Litigation in Florida

For landowners and municipalities in Florida, Natural Lands sends a sharp, practical message:

Allegations of bias, prejudgment, or procedural irregularities in City Council or board hearings are primarily state‑court matters, to be raised via petitions for writ of certiorari in Florida circuit court.
Attempting to bypass the state remedial structure by going directly to federal court under § 1983 will likely fail under McKinney, at least in the Eleventh Circuit, where certiorari is recognized as a generally adequate remedy.
Plaintiffs who ignore available certiorari remedies risk not only losing in federal court but also forfeiting the opportunity to use state‑court tools that have proven effective (as in the Sweetapple Lot case).

Moreover, the opinion implicitly:

Validates Florida circuit courts as the primary guardians against bias in local land‑use proceedings; and
Signals to municipalities that biased conduct by individual officials can still result in state‑court orders quashing their decisions and, in some instances, compelling recusal.

The result is a kind of functional division of labor:

State courts provide process‑correction and structural remedies (quashing decisions, remanding, and sometimes ordering recusal).
Federal courts remain largely closed to procedural due process claims in this sphere when such state remedies exist and are adequate.

B. Consolidation and Clarification of the McKinney Doctrine

Although unpublished, Natural Lands reinforces and clarifies several important aspects of McKinney doctrine:

Bias is not self‑executing as a federal violation. Evidence that a decisionmaker was biased or had prejudged a case does not, standing alone, establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation. There must also be a failure of the state’s corrective machinery.
State remedies need not match federal remedies. Adequacy is satisfied if the remedy can cure the procedural harm, not if it replicates federal damages, injunctions, or fee‑shifting.
Certiorari is “generally” adequate—and this case makes that very concrete. The Sweetapple litigation demonstrates that certiorari can address precisely the kind of bias and structural unfairness Natural Lands alleged.
Non‑use of the state remedy is fatal. It does not help a plaintiff to say, “I had a remedy, but I chose not to use it because I preferred federal court.” Under McKinney, that choice simply means the federal claim never accrues.

C. Strategic Consequences for § 1983 Litigants

For civil rights practitioners in the Eleventh Circuit, Natural Lands illustrates several strategic considerations:

Before filing a § 1983 procedural due process claim, counsel must:
- Identify any available state post‑deprivation remedies (e.g., administrative appeals, certiorari, judicial review), and
- Assess whether they are likely to be deemed “adequate” under circuit law.
If an adequate remedy exists:
- Ignoring it will likely doom the federal claim,
- Exhausting it may be necessary to show that the state’s process failed in practice (e.g., if the state courts systematically refuse to correct obvious constitutional violations).
Attorneys should be cautious about promising § 1983 remedies and federal fee‑shifting in cases that fundamentally challenge procedural fairness in local administrative or quasi‑judicial settings, especially when meaningful state review is on the books.

D. Implications for Local Government Conduct and Recusal Practices

From the municipal perspective, Natural Lands is a mixed signal:

On one hand, it mitigates the risk of federal § 1983 liability and associated attorney’s fees for procedural due process violations, so long as state courts remain willing to review and correct local decisions on certiorari.
On the other hand, the decision highlights state‑level tools that can embarrass or restrain local officials, including:
- Judicial findings of bias in Florida circuit court,
- Quashal of land‑use decisions, and
- Orders compelling recusal from future proceedings.

This incentivizes municipalities to:

Train officials on quasi‑judicial roles and the importance of avoiding prejudgment;
Develop transparent recusal procedures and guidance regarding campaign statements, public advocacy, and conflicts of interest; and
Recognize that while federal court may be foreclosed, state courts will police bias and may impose meaningful remedies.

E. Non‑precedential but Persuasive Authority

Though designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the opinion may still be cited as persuasive authority under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1. Within the Eleventh Circuit, unpublished decisions do not bind future panels, but they often signal how the court is likely to apply existing precedent in similar factual settings.

Natural Lands thus:

Confirms that McKinney remains robust and controlling in the procedural due process context;
Provides a recent, factually rich application of McKinney to coastal land‑use disputes in Florida; and
Offers a roadmap for lower federal courts facing similar § 1983 challenges to local quasi‑judicial decisions.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Procedural vs. Substantive Due Process

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects against deprivations of “life, liberty, or property” without “due process of law.” Courts distinguish:

Procedural due process – the right to fair procedures when the government deprives you of a protected interest. Typical procedural protections include:
- Notice of the proposed action,
- An opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, and
- Decisionmakers who are neutral and not biased or pre‑committed.
Substantive due process – protection against certain government actions regardless of the procedures used, usually when the action is so arbitrary or unjustified as to violate “fundamental rights” or “shocks the conscience.”

Natural Lands is purely a procedural due process case. The claim is that the hearing process was unfair because of decisionmaker bias, not that the denial of the CCCL variance was substantively irrational in a constitutional sense.

2. The McKinney / Post‑Deprivation Remedy Doctrine

Why does the adequacy of state remedies matter at all? The answer lies in how the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit conceptualize certain due process claims:

If the state provides a robust framework to correct errors after they happen—whether through administrative appeals, judicial review, or post‑deprivation hearings—then the overall process may satisfy the Constitution even if individual officials occasionally act incorrectly or unfairly.
McKinney extends this principle to many kinds of local government decisions, including employment terminations and land‑use decisions: the question is not just “Was there bias or procedural error?” but also “Did the state give you a meaningful way to fix that?”

Under this approach, a plaintiff must show not just a flawed initial decision, but also a systemic failure of the state’s corrective apparatus. In Natural Lands, the existence of Florida certiorari review meant there was no such systemic failure.

3. Florida Common‑Law Certiorari

In Florida, “common‑law certiorari” is a limited form of judicial review in the circuit courts used to examine quasi‑judicial actions by local governments and agencies. It is not a full appeal, but it does provide a mechanism to correct serious legal or procedural errors.

When reviewing a local government decision on certiorari, a Florida circuit court generally asks:

Did the local body afford procedural due process?
Did it observe the essential requirements of law?
Is the decision supported by competent substantial evidence?

If the answer to any of these questions is “no,” the circuit court may quash (invalidate) the decision and remand the matter for reconsideration in accordance with law. As Sweetapple illustrates, at least some Florida courts view their powers as extending to ordering recusal of biased decisionmakers, where necessary to protect due process.

4. Variances and the Coastal Construction Control Line

A few land‑use terms in this case bear clarification:

Variance: An exemption from the strict application of zoning or development rules, typically granted where strict enforcement would create “unnecessary hardship” and where the variance is consistent with the overall purposes of the regulation.
Coastal Construction Control Line (CCCL): A boundary set along Florida’s coastline to protect dunes and beaches from erosion and storm damage. Construction seaward of the line is tightly controlled due to environmental and safety concerns.

In Boca Raton, building east of the CCCL requires a specific CCCL variance, in addition to standard zoning variances. Because of the environmental and political sensitivity of such development, CCCL variance requests often generate intense public opposition—setting the stage for claims of political bias and prejudgment, as in this case.

5. Attorney’s Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988

Section 1988 allows courts to award a “reasonable attorney’s fee” to the “prevailing party” in actions to enforce certain civil rights statutes, including § 1983. Key points:

A party “prevails” if it obtains a judicially sanctioned change in the parties’ legal relationship—e.g., a judgment or injunction on a federal claim.
Merely winning on a state‑law issue or a claim that ultimately proves non‑cognizable under federal law is insufficient.

In Natural Lands, the only federal victory at the district court level was the procedural due process claim. Once that claim was held invalid as a matter of law, the foundation for any § 1988 fee award disappeared. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the fee award as an abuse of discretion.

VII. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and Broader Significance

Natural Lands, LLC v. City of Boca Raton is a clear application—and reinforcement—of the Eleventh Circuit’s McKinney doctrine in the land‑use context. Its principal messages can be summed up as follows:

Procedural due process claims under § 1983 in this circuit are tightly bound to the existence and adequacy of state remedies. Bias, prejudgment, or serious procedural flaws at the local level do not, standing alone, create a federal constitutional claim if the state offers an adequate opportunity to correct them.
Florida’s common‑law certiorari process is an “adequate” state remedy for challenging biased or unfair quasi‑judicial land‑use decisions. The Sweetapple Lot litigation, recognized and relied upon in this opinion, confirms that certiorari can address exactly the sort of procedural harms Natural Lands alleged.
The availability—but non‑use—of such state remedies is fatal to federal procedural due process actions. Plaintiffs cannot circumvent state review mechanisms by choosing federal court instead; in the Eleventh Circuit, that choice often means there is no federal claim at all.
Attorney’s fees under § 1988 depend on the presence of a valid federal right. Where the underlying federal claim fails as a matter of law, any fee award premised on that claim must be reversed.
State courts remain the primary venue for correcting local procedural unfairness in Florida land‑use disputes. While federal court may be closed to many procedural due process theories, state courts can and do police bias and other due process concerns through certiorari, potentially including recusal orders.

In the broader legal landscape, Natural Lands is a reminder that:

The Due Process Clause does not constitutionalize perfection in local governance; it requires that the state, as a whole, provide meaningful avenues to challenge and correct governmental errors.
For practitioners, careful attention to state remedial structures is not just a matter of good practice—it is often dispositive of whether a federal cause of action exists at all.

Even as an unpublished decision, Natural Lands provides a detailed, contemporary illustration of how the Eleventh Circuit expects lower federal courts to apply McKinney to procedural due process claims arising from controversial, politically charged land‑use decisions. The court’s message is straightforward: take the state’s corrective processes seriously, because if they are adequate and available, federal procedural due process litigation will not lie.