Constraining Warrantless Container Searches Incident to Arrest in West Virginia:
A Commentary on State of West Virginia v. Michael Keith Allman

I. Introduction

In State of West Virginia v. Michael Keith Allman, No. 23-421 (Nov. 12, 2025), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed drug-related convictions that rested on evidence obtained from a warrantless search of a backpack carried by the defendant at the time of his arrest. The Court held that, on the record presented, the backpack search was not justified as a search incident to arrest, nor under any other exception to the warrant requirement, once the defendant was handcuffed and the scene stabilized.

The case sits at the intersection of several recurring Fourth Amendment and Article III, § 6 issues:

• When—and how—the State must raise “Fourth Amendment standing” (reasonable expectation of privacy).
• What actions constitute “abandonment” of personal property for search-and-seizure purposes.
• The limits of the search-incident-to-arrest exception when officers search containers such as backpacks after an arrestee has been handcuffed and secured.
• The State’s burden to prove that a warrantless search fits within a “jealously and carefully drawn” exception to the warrant requirement.

Justice Ewing, writing for the Court, declined to adopt or reject in the abstract the federal doctrine of Arizona v. Gant beyond the vehicular context, but reached a result largely consistent with Chimel v. California and Gant: officers may not search containers incident to arrest once the arrestee is secured and the container is no longer within the arrestee’s immediate control, and police cannot manufacture that proximity by placing the container near the suspect.

The decision reverses the circuit court’s denial of a suppression motion, vacates Allman’s drug convictions, and remands for further proceedings, leaving open the status of his firearm-related convictions (counts five and six).

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

On June 4, 2022, around 9:00 p.m., Parkersburg Police Sergeant Arnold McGary, on routine patrol, observed an open garage door at “Pro-Line Collision” after hours. Looking inside, he recognized Michael Keith Allman among a group of six to eight people and knew there was an outstanding warrant for Allman’s arrest.

Key facts from Sgt. McGary’s testimony at the suppression hearing:

• Allman initially had a shoulder bag/backpack with him inside the garage.
• As McGary approached, Allman moved between parked vehicles, appeared to remove an item from his waistband, crouched down, and discard it; McGary believed it to be a firearm.
• McGary called Allman by name; Allman approached. As he did so, he set the backpack on the ground behind a vehicle.
• McGary arrested and handcuffed Allman (behind his back) after some minor noncompliance. During the handcuffing, one bystander claimed that the backpack belonged to him.
• McGary ordered everyone away and, being the only officer initially present, then:
  • Retrieved the backpack Allman had set down;
  • Escorted Allman and the backpack out of the garage to his cruiser;
  • Placed the backpack on the hood or front of his police vehicle.
• Backup (including Patrolman Abraham) then arrived. Abraham:
  • Recovered a semi-automatic pistol with a chambered round from the area where Allman had appeared to discard an object;
  • Found a holster on Allman’s person.
• Only “once locating everything else” did the officers search the backpack, discovering narcotics, digital scales, and ammunition.
• McGary testified that the purpose of the backpack search was to locate any other weapons, noting that suspects can sometimes maneuver handcuffs.

The backpack was then placed on the front floorboard of McGary’s cruiser as evidence. Exactly when additional officers arrived relative to the backpack search was not clearly established in the record, but at least one backup officer (Abraham) was present before the search occurred.

B. Procedural History

• Indictment (Sept. 2022): A six-count indictment charged Allman with:
  • Three felony counts of possession with intent to deliver (fentanyl, heroin, morphine), second offense;
  • One misdemeanor count of marijuana possession;
  • Two felony counts relating to possession and concealed possession of a firearm by a prohibited person.
• Motion to Suppress (March 2023): Allman moved to suppress the backpack evidence as the product of an unlawful warrantless search, arguing that by the time the backpack was searched, he was handcuffed and not within reaching distance, so the exigencies justifying a search incident to arrest had ended.
• Suppression Hearing (March 28, 2023): The only witness was Sgt. McGary. The State did not file a written response, and did not meaningfully litigate “standing” or abandonment at that stage (beyond a brief remark in closing argument).
• Circuit Court Ruling (April 5, 2023): The court denied suppression, holding:
  • The backpack was in Allman’s “immediate possession” when first seen.
  • The backpack search was reasonable and lawful as incident to a valid arrest.
  • The search was conducted to prevent destruction of evidence, prevent escape, and/or to look for weapons, for the safety of officers, Allman, and others.
• Trial and Sentencing (May–Aug. 2023): A jury convicted Allman on all six counts. He received multiple consecutive and concurrent sentences on the drug and firearm counts.
• Appeal: Allman appealed, challenging only his drug-related convictions on the ground that the denial of suppression was error.

C. Holding

The Supreme Court reversed the denial of the motion to suppress, vacated the drug convictions (counts one through four), and remanded for further proceedings, holding in essence:

1. On the undeveloped record, the State could not newly argue on appeal that Allman lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the backpack (via non-ownership or abandonment) where it had effectively conceded his possession below and failed to develop evidence on standing.
2. Merely setting down a bag in the course of approaching law enforcement, without more, does not constitute “abandonment” of the bag.
3. The backpack search was not justified as a “search incident to arrest” (or under exigent circumstances) because:
   • Allman was handcuffed and secured when the backpack was searched;
   • The backpack had been removed from the garage and placed on the cruiser by officers;
   • Multiple officers were present and could have simply secured the bag and sought a warrant.
4. The State failed to carry its burden to show that any recognized exception to the warrant requirement applied; therefore, the warrantless search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article III, § 6.

Critically, the Court did not squarely adopt Arizona v. Gant’s vehicle-search rule for all container searches; instead, it resolved the case under the preexisting West Virginia standard, derived from Chimel, that limits search-incident-to-arrest to “the person and the immediate geographic area under his physical control.”

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Standard of Review: State v. Lacy

Syllabus Points 1 and 2 of State v. Lacy, 196 W. Va. 104, 468 S.E.2d 719 (1996), are restated as the governing standard:

• Factual findings on a motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error, with facts viewed in the light most favorable to the State as the prevailing party below.
• However, the ultimate determination of whether a search or seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article III, § 6 is reviewed de novo.
• A denial of suppression is affirmed unless unsupported by substantial evidence, based on erroneous law, or clearly mistaken on the record.

This framework allowed the Court to defer to the circuit court’s description of what physically occurred, while independently evaluating whether those facts satisfy the legal requisites of a valid search incident to arrest or another exception.

2. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: Peacher, Wagner, and Ward

The Court cites:

• State v. Peacher, 167 W. Va. 540, 280 S.E.2d 559 (1981), via:

  “‘The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article III, Section 6 of the West Virginia Constitution protect an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.’”

• Wagner v. Hedrick, 181 W. Va. 482, 383 S.E.2d 286 (1989) (reaffirming Peacher in Syllabus Point 1).
• State v. Ward, 249 W. Va. 347, 895 S.E.2d 202 (2023): clarifying that Fourth Amendment “standing” is a threshold but non-jurisdictional inquiry that can be forfeited or waived by the State if not properly raised.

These authorities underpin two moves in the opinion:

1. They reaffirm that Allman’s challenge turns first on whether he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the backpack.
2. They support the Court’s refusal to decide standing issues (privacy interest, abandonment) adversely to Allman on a barren record that the State itself failed to create—and in the face of the State’s own earlier concession that Allman was in possession of the bag.

In essence, Ward is used to say: if the State wants to challenge standing, it must actually litigate that point in the circuit court, not raise it superficially there and then vigorously on appeal.

3. Warrant Requirement and Exceptions: Moore, Ladd, Barefield, Julius

The Court relies on longstanding West Virginia authority that:

• Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless they fall within “a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions,” which are “jealously and carefully drawn.” (State v. Moore, 165 W. Va. 837, 272 S.E.2d 804 (1980), as quoted in Syllabus Point 20 of State v. Ladd, 210 W. Va. 413, 557 S.E.2d 820 (2001), and Syllabus Point 5 of State v. Barefield, 240 W. Va. 587, 814 S.E.2d 250 (2018)).
• One such exception is the search incident to arrest, authorized for “the person and the immediate geographic area under his physical control.” Syllabus Point 6 of Moore, repeatedly incorporated and reaffirmed in later decisions including Barefield and State v. Julius, 185 W. Va. 422, 408 S.E.2d 1 (1991).

The critical import of Moore and its progeny here is two-fold:

1. They furnish a state constitutional standard already grounded in the Chimel rationale, so the Allman Court could resolve the case without expressly adopting Gant outside the vehicle context.
2. They emphasize that the scope of a search incident to arrest is limited—it does not justify rummaging through containers that are no longer within the arrestee’s physical control at the time of the search.

4. Abandonment Cases: Payne, Angel, and Federal Comparators

The State argued on appeal that Allman had no reasonable expectation of privacy because he abandoned the backpack. The Court canvassed both state and federal authorities:

• State v. Payne, 239 W. Va. 247, 800 S.E.2d 833 (2016), and Syllabus Point 4 of State v. Angel, 154 W. Va. 615, 177 S.E.2d 562 (1970):
  • Abandoned property is outside the scope of constitutional protection.
  • However, Payne involved a defendant leaving a jacket and cell phone in someone else’s home with no indication of intent to retrieve them, after a serious crime; very different from simply setting a bag on the ground while approaching a police officer.
• Federal and sister-court cases:
  • United States v. Mayberry, 125 F.4th 132 (4th Cir. 2025): backpack left in a hotel stairwell, unattended and unhidden; abandonment cannot be “casually inferred.”
  • United States v. Small, 944 F.3d 490 (4th Cir. 2019): cell phone discarded during flight.
  • United States v. Frazer, 98 F.4th 102 (4th Cir. 2024): bag thrown more than 40 feet away while fleeing.
  • Brown v. United States, 97 A.3d 92 (D.C. 2014): property left behind while fleeing.
  • State v. Corbin, 957 N.E.2d 849 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011): bag left in a friend’s truck with no sign of retrieval intent.

These cases collectively underscore that “abandonment” requires voluntary relinquishment of possessory and privacy interests, typically evidenced by departure from the area, flight, or leaving property unattended in circumstances suggesting no intent to reclaim it. None of those hallmarks appeared in the sparse record here.

5. Search-Incident Doctrine: Chimel, Gant, Davis, and Robinson

The Court’s reasoning heavily references the familiar federal trilogy:

• Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969): The foundational case. Incident to a lawful arrest, officers may:
  • Search the arrestee’s person to remove weapons and prevent destruction of evidence;
  • Search the area “within his immediate control”—that is, from within which he might gain access to a weapon or destructible evidence.
• Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009): Recalibrated vehicle searches incident to arrest, limiting them to situations where:
  • the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search, or
  • it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.

  The Allman Court notes Gant’s insistence that the search-incident exception must remain tethered to the Chimel rationales (officer safety and evidence preservation).

• United States v. Davis, 997 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 2021): Extended Gant’s logic to non-vehicular containers (like backpacks) that are not on the arrestee’s person, holding that such containers may be searched incident to arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the container at the time of the search.
• United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973): Held that a full search of an arrestee’s person is automatically permitted incident to a lawful custodial arrest, without case-by-case proof of specific officer-safety or evidence-preservation needs.
  In Allman, the State tried—late in the game—to argue that Robinson’s broader “person search” rationale should control, relying on newer authorities like State v. Scullark (Iowa 2025) and United States v. Perez, 89 F.4th 247 (1st Cir. 2023) regarding items physically attached to the body at the moment of arrest (e.g. a fanny pack). But the West Virginia Court declined to rely on Robinson’s person-search rule here because:
  • The backpack was no longer on Allman’s person when searched;
  • The State failed to brief Robinson earlier and tried to pivot only at oral argument.

The key doctrinal move is that West Virginia resolves the case under the Moore/Chimel “immediate geographic area under [the arrestee’s] physical control” standard, without formally announcing whether it is adopting Gant and Davis statewide beyond vehicles. Practically, however, the result in Allman mirrors what Davis would have required.

6. Other Supporting Authorities

The Court also cites:

• United States v. Ferebee, 957 F.3d 406 (4th Cir. 2020): for the proposition that abandonment is determined by the defendant’s own statements and behavior, including express disclaimers of ownership. The Court distinguishes Ferebee because, unlike that case, Allman never disclaimed ownership; only a third party tried to claim the backpack.
• United States v. Rico, 51 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Johnson, 12 F.3d 760 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Mazzone, 782 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1986): for the principle that officers may not “manufacture” exigent circumstances or manipulate the location of property to create an apparent exception to the warrant requirement (e.g., by waiting until a container is placed in a vehicle to claim an automobile exception, or by creating the risk of evidence destruction through their investigative strategy).
• ID of State Law Cases: Ullom v. Miller, 227 W. Va. 1, 705 S.E.2d 111 (2010), Duvernoy, LaRock, Ladd, and others: to reaffirm that Article III, § 6 is generally construed in harmony with the Fourth Amendment, and to emphasize the “raise or waive” rule for issues not presented below.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Step One – Reasonable Expectation of Privacy (“Standing”)

The Court applies a two-step Fourth Amendment inquiry:

1. Does the defendant have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place or item searched?
2. If so, was the search reasonable (e.g., supported by a warrant or by a valid exception to the warrant requirement)?

On the first step:

• The State did not properly challenge Allman’s expectation of privacy in the backpack in the circuit court. It:
  • Filed no written response;
  • Presented no evidence about ownership or abandonment;
  • Stated affirmatively that Allman “clearly was in possession of the bag.”
• Only at the appellate stage did the State argue vigorously that Allman:
  • either did not own the bag, based on a bystander’s assertion, or
  • had abandoned it by setting it down.

The Court refuses to allow such a “gotcha” approach:

• Because Fourth Amendment “standing” is not jurisdictional (Ward), the State may forfeit it by not properly raising and developing the issue below.
• Had the State clearly raised standing, Allman would have borne the burden to show his privacy interest (Payne), but here he was lulled by the State’s concession regarding possession.
• The record is “completely void” of testimony, evidence, or argument directly addressing Allman’s expectation of privacy in the backpack.

On abandonment, the Court stresses:

• Abandonment requires voluntary relinquishment of a privacy interest, evidenced by the defendant’s own words and actions, such as:
  • fleeing and leaving items behind,
  • discarding items at a distance, or
  • explicitly disavowing ownership.
• Here:
  • Allman did not flee; he approached the officer.
  • He placed the bag on the ground within the same enclosed space.
  • Nothing indicates he did not intend to retrieve it after speaking with the officer.
  • He made no disclaimers of ownership; instead, a third party attempted to “claim” the bag.

Consequently, the Court:

• Rejects the argument that setting down the backpack before interacting with the officer constitutes abandonment.
• Declines to find, on such a thin record, that Allman lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy in the backpack.

2. Step Two – Reasonableness of the Search

Having concluded that Allman had at least a presumptive privacy interest in the backpack, the Court turns to whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article III, § 6.

Because the search was concededly warrantless, it is per se unreasonable unless the State proves an exception. The State bears the burden of proof (Lacy; Davis (4th Cir.)) to show:

• Why a warrant was not required in the circumstances, and
• How the search fits within a recognized exception (here, primarily the “search incident to arrest” doctrine).

a. Search Incident to Arrest – Application of Moore/Chimel

West Virginia law (Syllabus Point 6 of Moore) allows a warrantless search:

• of the arrested person, and
• of the “immediate geographic area under his physical control,”

to locate weapons or prevent the destruction of evidence, following Chimel.

Key facts as applied:

• Allman was lawfully arrested on a warrant—a point not in dispute.
• He was handcuffed (behind his back) at the time the backpack was searched.
• The backpack had been:
  • set down on the floor of the garage by Allman while approaching McGary;
  • then physically retrieved by McGary; and
  • moved outside and placed on the hood/front of the cruiser by the officer.
• Backup officers (including Abraham) were already on scene when the backpack was searched, and others may have arrived as well.

The Court reasons:

• When officers themselves move a container and place it near the arrestee, they cannot then claim that the container was within the arrestee’s “immediate control” in the Chimel sense. To allow that would let officers manufacture a search-incident exception by their own strategic choices—something federal courts have disapproved (Rico, Johnson, Mazzone).
• At the time of the search:
  • Allman was secured and outnumbered by officers;
  • He was at most near a backpack that officers had chosen to place on the cruiser;
  • Any realistic access to the backpack (particularly with hands cuffed behind his back) was implausible.
• Given these circumstances, the justifications for a search incident to arrest—officer safety and the prevention of evidence destruction—no longer genuinely applied.

Thus, even under a relatively traditional Chimel/Moore framing, the search exceeded the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest. The Court underscores that officers had a straightforward alternative:

• They could have placed Allman in a cruiser or moved the backpack out of his reach,
• Then obtained a warrant to open the bag, if they wished to search it.

Because they did not, and because the State did not prove that the backpack remained within Allman’s “immediate geographic area under his physical control” at the time of the search, the search incident to arrest exception does not apply.

b. Relation to Gant and Davis

The Court acknowledges that Davis (4th Cir.) reads Gant as extending to non-vehicular containers and would limit container searches to instances where the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the container at the time of the search. Allman invited the Court to adopt this rule statewide.

The Court, however:

• Expressly does not decide whether to adopt Gant more broadly beyond vehicles.
• Instead, emphasizes that both Gant and West Virginia’s own Syllabus Point 6 of Moore are rooted in Chimel’s reasoning, so the same outcome follows under existing state-law doctrine.

Practically speaking, the analysis is highly consistent with Davis: once Allman was handcuffed and the backpack was removed and controlled by officers, he was not “unsecured and within reaching distance” of the container, so no search-incident justification remained.

c. Rejection of Exigent Circumstances

The State also mentioned exigent circumstances on appeal, but had not raised or developed this theory in the circuit court. The Court invokes the “raise or waive” rule (LaRock) and briefly notes:

• Even had exigent circumstances been timely argued, the record contains no evidence of the “sense of immediacy or urgency” that characterizes true exigencies.
• By the time of the backpack search:
  • Allman was secured;
  • At least one backup officer was present;
  • There was no imminent risk of flight, harm, or evidence destruction that could not be mitigated by simply securing the backpack and obtaining a warrant.

Therefore, exigent circumstances could not justify the search either.

3. The Court’s Emphasis on the Role of Warrants

In a particularly notable passage, the Court quotes the Fourth Circuit in Davis, which itself quotes Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Stewart:

“The warrant requirement is ‘an important working part of our machinery of government,’ not merely ‘an inconvenience to be somehow “weighed” against the claims of police efficiency.’”

By invoking Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (cell phone searches) and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Court sends a clear institutional message:

• Exceptions to the warrant requirement are not police entitlements; they are narrow carve-outs that must be “justified” case by case.
• Courts have a “crucial” role in ensuring that searches of personal effects occur only under a warrant or a properly proven exception.

As applied, once Allman and the scene were secure, the “machinery of government” required the officers to get a warrant if they wanted to look inside the backpack.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Practical Impact on Law Enforcement in West Virginia

The decision has concrete implications for how officers handle personal containers during custodial arrests:

• Seizure vs. Search:
  • Officers are free to seize bags, backpacks, and similar items incident to arrest to ensure officer safety and preserve evidence.
  • However, after the arrestee is handcuffed and the container is in police control (especially once removed from the immediate arrest scene), officers must generally obtain a warrant before opening the container—unless a recognized, factually supported exception applies.
• No Manufactured Proximity:
  • Police cannot create their own “immediate control” scenario by placing a container near a secured arrestee and then claim a search-incident privilege.
• Officer Safety Concerns must be Concrete:
  • Generalized statements about arrestees possibly manipulating handcuffs or about suspects often carrying multiple weapons will not, by themselves, satisfy the State’s burden to justify a warrantless search.
  • Courts will look for evidence that the specific arrestee could actually access the container or pose a real-time threat at the moment of the search.

2. Litigation Strategy and the State’s Burden

For prosecutors and defense counsel, Allman underscores several strategic points:

• The State must litigate standing and abandonment in the circuit court. Raising these theories only perfunctorily there and then vigorously on appeal, on a thin record, will not suffice.
• Defendants should be prepared to affirmatively demonstrate privacy interests in bags and containers (e.g., through testimony or circumstantial evidence of possession, control, or use), especially when the State disputes ownership or abandonment.
• Circuit courts should make fact-specific findings on:
  • Where exactly the defendant and container were at the time of the search;
  • Whether and when backup arrived;
  • What realistic access the defendant had to the container when it was opened;
  • What, if any, objective exigent factors existed.

Failure to develop this record invites reversal under the “highly fact-specific” nature of suppression rulings emphasized in Lacy.

3. Shaping West Virginia’s Search-Incident Doctrine for Containers

Although the Court did not explicitly adopt Gant and Davis as a statewide rule, Allman effectively moves West Virginia law in the same direction regarding containers:

• Warrantless searches of containers (e.g., backpacks, bags) incident to arrest are constitutionally suspect once:
  • the arrestee is handcuffed and secured, and
  • the container is in police possession, especially if moved away from the arrest location.
• The concept of “immediate geographic area under [the arrestee’s] physical control” is likely to be interpreted narrowly, focusing on:
  • the defendant’s realistic reach at the moment of the search, not at some earlier point in time, and
  • the objective safety and evidence-destruction risks at that specific moment.

Future cases will likely grapple with:

• Containers physically attached to the body at the moment of arrest (fanny packs, purses slung over the shoulder, clothing pockets), where Robinson-style reasoning might have more force.
• Searches conducted in more volatile or chaotic circumstances, where courts may be more receptive to exigent-circumstance or safety-based justifications.

4. Interaction with Electronic-Device and Modern-Container Cases

Although Allman concerned drugs and a backpack rather than a digital device, its emphasis on the centrality of the warrant requirement—citing Riley—aligns West Virginia with broader trends that:

• View personal containers (physical or digital) as deserving heightened privacy protection.
• Require clear justification before permitting warrantless intrusions into such containers.

As courts confront issues involving laptops, phones, and other personal effects seized incident to arrest, Allman’s insistence that exceptions remain tethered to actual officer-safety or evidence-destruction needs will likely loom large.

IV. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

1. Fourth Amendment “Standing” / Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

To challenge a search, a defendant must show that the search invaded his privacy rights, not just that the police behaved improperly. This is often called “standing,” but more precisely it asks:

• Did the defendant have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place or item searched (here, the backpack)?

You can have a privacy interest even if you do not legally own something—for example, a borrowed car, or a shared bag—if you treat it as private and control access to it. Conversely, you can lose that protection if you truly abandon the item or disclaim any connection to it.

2. Abandonment

“Abandonment” in this context does not mean simply leaving something somewhere. It means giving up your expectation of privacy in it. Courts look at:

• Your actions: Did you throw it away? Leave it behind while fleeing? Walk away without any indication you would return?
• Your words: Did you tell officers, “That’s not my bag” or “That’s not my phone”?

If you voluntarily do those things, the police can usually pick up and search the item without a warrant, because the Constitution no longer treats it as “yours” in a privacy sense.

3. Search Incident to Arrest

When police make a lawful arrest, they usually may:

• Search the arrestee’s body, and
• Search the area from which the arrestee could immediately grab a weapon or destroy evidence.

This is the “search incident to arrest” exception. It is based on common sense: you do not want an arrestee pulling a gun or flushing drugs while officers are trying to put on handcuffs.

But this exception is limited:

• It does not permit police to search every container or area they can physically reach.
• It focuses on what the arrestee can reach at the time of the search, once we account for handcuffs, officers present, and whether the container has been moved.

4. Exigent Circumstances

“Exigent circumstances” exist when there is a real emergency that makes it unreasonable to wait for a warrant, such as:

• Immediate threat to life or safety;
• Imminent destruction of evidence (e.g., drugs being flushed);
• Hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect.

Courts require concrete, fact-based reasons to believe such an emergency exists. Mere convenience or speculative risks are not enough.

5. Standards of Review: “Clear Error” vs. “De Novo”

Appellate courts review different aspects of a lower court’s ruling under different standards:

• Clear error (for facts): The appeals court respects the trial judge’s role in listening to witnesses and will overturn factual findings only if they are clearly wrong.
• De novo (for law): The appeals court decides legal issues anew, without deferring to the lower court’s interpretation of the law.

In suppression cases, the facts (who stood where, what happened when) are usually reviewed for clear error, while the bottom-line conclusion (whether a search was “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment) is reviewed de novo.

V. Conclusion

State v. Allman is a significant reaffirmation and refinement of West Virginia search-and-seizure law. While it does not announce a brand-new doctrinal framework, it powerfully applies existing principles to modern policing practice and clarifies several key points:

• The State cannot sidestep its failure to litigate Fourth Amendment “standing” by attempting to recast the record on appeal; abandonment and lack of privacy interest must be grounded in the defendant’s words and actions and developed in the circuit court.
• Simply setting down a bag before speaking with an officer does not, without more, amount to abandonment.
• The search-incident-to-arrest exception is limited to the arrestee’s person and truly immediate control at the time of the search; it does not authorize warrantless container searches once the arrestee is handcuffed, secured, and the container is in police control.
• Police may not create the conditions for an exception—by moving a container close to a secured suspect—and then invoke that self-created risk to justify a search.
• Warrants remain the default and essential “working part” of constitutional governance; exceptions must remain narrow, rigorously justified, and demonstrably necessary.

By vacating Allman’s drug convictions and remanding, the Court sends a clear message: when officers want to look inside personal containers after an arrest, and the arrestee and scene are secure, the constitutionally sound path in West Virginia is straightforward—secure the item, and get a warrant.