Narrowing Rooker-Feldman: Third-Party §1983 Claims for Misconduct in State Court Demolition Orders

1. Introduction

Almazon v. Town of Oyster Bay (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2025) presents a pro se challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Doina Rosu Almazon after her home was demolished under a state-court order. Almazon alleged violations of her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and various New York state laws. The Town of Oyster Bay moved to dismiss, and the district court granted dismissal in full—holding that the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine stripped federal courts of jurisdiction and that, even if jurisdiction existed, Almazon failed to state any viable claim. Almazon appealed both the jurisdictional ruling and the denial of leave to amend. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal but clarified the narrow boundaries of Rooker-Feldman and reaffirmed the stringent pleading standards for selective enforcement and due process claims against municipalities.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Almazon’s federal claims and the denial of leave to amend. Key holdings include:

Rooker-Feldman barred any claim seeking direct review of the state demolition order.
Claims against the Town based on selective enforcement and procedural due process did not directly attack the state judgment and thus survived Rooker-Feldman scrutiny.
Even so, Almazon failed to plausibly plead (a) selective enforcement—because she did not identify similarly situated comparators or show discriminatory intent; and (b) procedural due process—because she had full notice, an opportunity to be heard, and no factual basis to allege misleading conduct by the Town.
The district court properly refused further amendment given Almazon’s multiple failed attempts and lack of any proposed cure to her pleading deficiencies.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The court’s reasoning drew on an array of Supreme Court and Second Circuit authorities:

Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006): Defines the Rooker-Feldman prohibition on federal review of final state judgments.
Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2014): Articulates the four-part Rooker-Feldman test.
Hunter v. McMahon, 75 F.4th 62 (2d Cir. 2023): Reiterates Rooker-Feldman’s narrow scope.
Banyai v. Town of Pawlet, No. 23-1234, 2024 WL 1878742 (2d Cir. Apr. 30, 2024): Holds that selective enforcement claims against third parties occurring during state proceedings are not barred by Rooker-Feldman.
Hansen v. Miller, 52 F.4th 96 (2d Cir. 2022): Clarifies that misconduct in state proceedings by third parties does not require upsetting the state court judgment.
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978): Establishes municipal liability under § 1983 when an unconstitutional policy or custom is official.
Hu v. City of New York, 927 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2019): Defines the two-part test for selective enforcement—similarly situated comparators and discriminatory intent.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) & Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007): Set the plausibility standard for Rule 12(b)(6).
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976): Outlines the requirements for procedural due process—notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1988): Applies Mathews to municipal code enforcement proceedings.
TechnoMarine SA v. Giftports, Inc., 758 F.3d 493 (2d Cir. 2014) & Noto v. 22nd Century Grp., Inc., 35 F.4th 95 (2d Cir. 2022): Explain that a plaintiff must propose how amendment cures pleading defects to justify leave to amend.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: The court applied a de novo analysis under the four-pronged Rooker-Feldman test. It confirmed that any claim demanding invalidation of the state demolition order is barred. However, in line with Banyai and Hansen, claims for third-party misconduct—such as selective enforcement tactics and misleading presentations during the state proceeding—do not constitute an impermissible collateral attack.

(b) Failure to State a § 1983 Claim:

Selective Enforcement: Under Hu/Zahra, a plaintiff must plead that (1) similarly situated properties were treated differently, and (2) the municipal actor was motivated by an impermissible purpose. Almazon’s bare assertions of “singling out” and generalized policy allegations failed the plausibility threshold of Twombly/Iqbal.
Procedural Due Process: The Mathews balancing test requires notice and a meaningful hearing. Almazon received extensive state-court process, including months to remedy code violations. Her speculation about misleading statements to the state judge lacked concrete factual support to show a constitutional deprivation.

(c) Denial of Leave to Amend: The district court properly declined further amendment when Almazon, after multiple suits and dismissals since 2021, offered no blueprint for curing the pleaded deficiencies. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) and controlling Second Circuit precedent demand more than a promise of better facts.

3.3 Impact

This decision reinforces critical limits on jurisdiction and municipal liability:

It tightens Rooker-Feldman’s application: federal courts may hear § 1983 claims against third parties for misconduct in state prosecutions, provided they do not seek to reverse the underlying state judgment.
It underscores the rigorous pleading standards for selective enforcement under § 1983, reminding practitioners to identify real comparators and factual indicia of discriminatory animus.
It affirms that multiple failed attempts without a concrete amendment plan justify refusal to grant leave to amend, deterring repetitive, unmoored litigation.
Though issued as a summary order (non-precedential in the Second Circuit), it aligns with emerging circuit trends and will guide district courts in demolition-order and code-enforcement contexts nationwide.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: A federal court cannot act as an appellate body to overturn a state court’s final decision. If a federal claim effectively asks “Why shouldn’t the state judgment stand?” it must be dismissed under Rooker-Feldman.

Section 1983 & Monell Liability: Section 1983 allows suits against any person acting “under color of state law” for civil-rights violations. Municipalities are only liable when the unconstitutional act springs from an official policy or custom (Monell).

Selective Enforcement Claim: A challenge that a government selectively applied a law for an improper reason—e.g., race or personal animus. Success requires showing similarly situated individuals were treated differently and that the decision-makers harbored forbidden motives.

Procedural Due Process: The Constitution guarantees notice and a chance to contest before the government deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. The adequacy of process is measured by when and how the hearing occurs and whether it is meaningful.

5. Conclusion

Almazon v. Town of Oyster Bay marks an important clarification of Rooker-Feldman’s narrow scope and reaffirms the stringent pleading requirements for § 1983 claims against municipalities. While state-court demolition orders remain largely insulated from federal collateral attack, third-party misconduct in obtaining or enforcing such orders may still be actionable—so long as the federal suit does not invite reversal of the state judgment. Practitioners must therefore distinguish between “attacks” on the judgment itself and separate tortious or constitutional wrongdoing by municipal actors, and must plead factual specifics to survive a motion to dismiss.