Narrow “Absurd Results” Exception Allows Reopening of Article 2413 Pro Confesso Garnishment Judgments When Material Facts Were Withheld

Introduction

In First Pay, Inc. v. Elton Dukes, No. 2024-C-01565 (La. Oct. 24, 2025), the Supreme Court of Louisiana addressed whether a trial court can reopen and reconsider a judgment pro confesso entered against a garnishee under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2413 in light of Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3923, as amended in 2022. The case arises from a garnishment proceeding initiated to satisfy a 2017 money judgment originally obtained by First Pay, Inc. and later owned by Richard D. Bankston Attorney at Law, Inc. The garnishee, Quantix, SCS, LLC, did not timely answer in the court record but sent sworn answers directly to the creditor denying any employment or indebtedness to the debtor, and provided the debtor’s actual employer information. The creditor did not disclose those answers to the trial court at the pro confesso hearing.

The narrow legal issue: Does La. R.S. 13:3923 permit the trial court to reopen a garnishment proceeding and set aside an Article 2413 pro confesso money judgment, particularly after the 2022 amendments and the statute’s express proviso that “Nothing in this Section is meant to affect judgments rendered pursuant to [Article] 2413”? The Louisiana Supreme Court held that even though La. R.S. 13:3923 is clear and unambiguous, applying it in this case to bar reopening would lead to “absurd results” under Civil Code article 9, given the omission of material facts at the pro confesso hearing. The Court therefore reinstated the city court’s judgment vacating its earlier pro confesso judgment and reopened proceedings to allow Quantix to prove it was never a proper garnishee.

Justice Hughes dissented, emphasizing statutory finality and warning that invoking “equity disguised as ‘absurdity’” threatens the certainty of collections law.

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for the Court, Justice Cole framed the dispute around statutory interpretation of La. R.S. 13:3923 (as amended by 2022 Acts No. 265) and its relationship to Article 2413’s pro confesso framework. The Court agreed the statute is “clear and unambiguous,” but held that refusing to reopen this garnishment judgment—where the creditor failed to inform the court that the garnishee had sent sworn answers showing it was not the debtor’s employer—would produce “demonstrably absurd” results. Relying on Civil Code article 9’s directive to avoid absurd consequences, the Court reversed the First Circuit and reinstated the city court’s September 27, 2023 judgment vacating its April 12, 2023 pro confesso judgment.

The Court underscored the limited, fact-specific nature of its ruling. It noted that the garnishment system is designed to seize a debtor’s property in a third party’s hands, not to “mulct” non-employers for debts they do not owe. On remand, the trial court must allow Quantix to prove that it was never the debtor’s employer, never owed him money, and held no property of his. If Quantix meets that burden, it should not owe any judgment. The Court also directed that the creditor be afforded appropriate time for discovery.

Justice Hughes dissented, asserting that nothing is “absurd” about entering judgment against a party who fails to answer in the record or appear for a duly noticed hearing. He stressed that La. R.S. 13:3923(B) expressly insulates Article 2413 judgments from being affected by the statute, and he would have affirmed the Court of Appeal.

Factual and Procedural Background

Underlying judgment: In 2017, First Pay, Inc. obtained a City Court of Baton Rouge judgment against Elton Dukes for $32,873.04 (including $20,338.04 interest), plus 33% annual interest from judicial demand (May 20, 2016), 25% attorney’s fees on principal and interest, and costs. The obligation originated from a modest car purchase (~$3,995 plus fees). As of the present, the sum exceeds $100,000 due to accruing interest and fees.
Garnishment: In September 2022, the judgment’s successor, Richard D. Bankston Attorney at Law, Inc. (the “garnisher”), filed a petition for garnishment against Quantix, SCS, LLC, alleging Quantix employed Dukes or held property or owed a debt to him. Quantix received service but did not timely file answers in the court record.
Sworn answers sent to creditor: On March 22, 2023—after the garnisher filed a Motion for Judgment Pro Confesso but before the April 12 hearing—Quantix sent the creditor sworn interrogatory answers (not filed into the record) stating it did not employ Dukes, was not indebted to him, held no property of his, and identifying Dukes’s true employer with contact information.
Pro confesso judgment: Quantix did not appear at the April 12 hearing. When the court asked whether any response had been received, the creditor’s associate did not disclose the sworn answers. The court entered a pro confesso money judgment against Quantix for the full amount of the underlying judgment, interest, costs, and $200 in attorney’s fees under Article 2413.
Reopening: In June 2023, Quantix moved to reopen and set aside the pro confesso judgment pursuant to La. R.S. 13:3923, attaching affidavits and its sworn answers. The city court granted the motion in September 2023, vacating the April 12 judgment, expressly noting that the court had not been told of Quantix’s sworn responses.
Appeal and certiorari: The First Circuit (3–2) reversed and reinstated the pro confesso judgment. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari and, on October 24, 2025, reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court’s order vacating the pro confesso judgment.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

C.C.P. art. 2411 and 2412(D): Govern service and the garnishee’s duty to answer interrogatories within specified delays.
C.C.P. art. 2413: Establishes the pro confesso mechanism. If a garnishee fails to answer timely, the creditor may proceed by contradictory motion for the full amount of the unpaid judgment, interest, and costs. The failure to answer before the motion’s filing is prima facie proof that the garnishee holds property of, or is indebted to, the debtor; judgment “shall be rendered” unless the garnishee proves otherwise at the hearing.
La. R.S. 13:3923 (2022 Act No. 265):
- Subsection A: Addresses continuing wage garnishments; authorizes the court, in its discretion, to reopen, amend, or set aside its garnishment judgment and to tailor periodic payments; allows reopening of default judgments against garnishees upon a proper showing.
- Subsection B: “Nothing in this Section is meant to affect judgments rendered pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Article 2413.”
Civil Code art. 9: If a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, it must be applied as written; if application would be absurd, interpretive principles guide courts to the meaning that best conforms to the law’s purpose.
McBride v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 2024-01519 (La. 6/27/25), 413 So.3d 452; Bergeron v. Richardson, 2020-01409 (La. 6/30/21), 320 So.3d 1109: Begin with statutory text.
Pumphrey v. City of New Orleans, 2005-0979 (La. 4/4/06), 925 So.2d 1202: Recognizes the “rare” use of the absurd-results doctrine.
Gulf Title Corp. v. Thomas, 2024-349 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/9/25), 413 So.3d 1233 (Windhorst, J., dissenting in part): Cautions against using “absurd consequences” as a pretext to override statutes.
Tower Credit, Inc. v. McGee, 2023-0787 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/6/24), 405 So.3d 612, writs denied, 394 So.3d 1287, 399 So.3d 418; Tower Credit, Inc. v. Williams, 2022-0106 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/16/22), 352 So.3d 1029 (Chutz, J., dissenting): Garnishment law should not “mulct” non-employers for debts they do not owe; the purpose is to reach a debtor’s property in a third party’s hands.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it accepts that La. R.S. 13:3923 is clear and unambiguous, including Subsection B’s admonition that the statute is not “meant to affect” Article 2413 judgments. Second, it invokes Civil Code article 9’s “absurd consequences” principle to avoid an outcome that would contradict the law’s purpose under the facts presented.

The dispositive fact was the creditor’s failure to disclose to the court that, three weeks before the pro confesso hearing, the creditor had received sworn answers from the garnishee stating that Quantix was not the debtor’s employer, held no property of the debtor, and was not indebted to him—and even provided the debtor’s true employer information. The trial court, relying on the representation that “no one has responded,” entered an Article 2413 money judgment for the full underlying debt (well over $100,000 with escalating 33% annual interest) against a company that consistently denied being a proper garnishee. The city court later vacated its judgment upon learning of these omissions.

While acknowledging the statutory clarity of Section 3923, the Supreme Court ruled that applying it in these circumstances to foreclose reopening would be absurd. It emphasized:

The purpose of garnishment is to seize a debtor’s property in the hands of a third party—typically an employer—not to penalize non-employers for tardiness with a windfall judgment. The Court quoted the Tower Credit line of cases warning that if the law were otherwise, garnishees could be “mulcted” for debts they do not owe.
Article 2413’s prima facie presumption exists to facilitate efficient enforcement when garnishees do not timely answer; but it does not license obtaining a money judgment while suppressing known, sworn information negating the garnishee’s status.
Civil Code article 9 allows courts to avoid an application of a clear statute that yields absurd consequences, though such occasions are “rare.” This case met that threshold.
The creditor here was also the judgment owner and counsel of record, amplifying the institutional concerns: the court’s inquiry at the hearing was directly frustrated by the omission of material facts that were already known and documented.

The Court therefore reinstated the trial court’s September 27, 2023 judgment vacating the April 12, 2023 pro confesso judgment and remanded with instructions: if, upon reopening, Quantix disproves the Article 2413 prima facie presumption—by proving it never employed the debtor, never owed him money, and held no property—then Quantix “should not owe this judgment.” The trial court should provide the creditor adequate time for discovery.

Notably, the Court expressly “pretermit[ted]” a comprehensive evaluation of whether La. R.S. 13:3923 independently authorizes reopening of Article 2413 judgments. Instead, it grounded relief in the Civil Code’s interpretive rule and the law’s purpose, emphasizing that its holding is driven by the unique facts and the risk of an absurd, punitive outcome.

The Dissent

Justice Hughes argued that:

There is “nothing absurd” about entering judgment against parties who fail to answer in the record or appear at a noticed hearing—this happens routinely across Louisiana dockets.
La. R.S. 13:3923(B) explicitly preserves Article 2413 judgments from being “affected” by the statute; the April 12 judgment was “legally required” and “unassailable” under that language.
The proper remedy for any complaint is appeal on legal error, not an “equity” overlay styled as the “absurdity” doctrine.
Introducing an “equity disguised as ‘absurdity’” theory threatens the certainty and finality of collections law.

Impact and Practical Consequences

The decision does not announce a general license to reopen Article 2413 judgments. Rather, it recognizes a narrow, fact-driven “absurd results” exception where material, exculpatory facts were withheld from the court and strict application of the statutory scheme would produce an outcome at odds with the purpose of garnishment law.

Expected effects:

Trial courts: The opinion confirms that, in rare and exceptional circumstances, courts may invoke Civil Code article 9 to prevent absurd consequences even where a statute is clear. In garnishment cases, judges may more pointedly inquire on the record about any out-of-record communications or sworn responses received by counsel.
Creditors and their counsel: A practical expectation emerges that creditors should disclose material sworn responses received from a garnishee before a pro confesso hearing. Proceeding while withholding such information risks vacatur and reputational or ethical scrutiny. Best practice: file any received sworn answers into the record promptly and affirmatively advise the court.
Garnishees: The case underscores the importance of timely filing answers in the court record, not just sending them to the creditor, and appearing at the pro confesso hearing. Nevertheless, when material sworn evidence negating garnishee liability exists but was not presented, a narrowly tailored motion to reopen may be viable.
Substantive law: The Court left unresolved the scope of La. R.S. 13:3923’s own authorization to reopen Article 2413 judgments, given Subsection B’s language. Future cases will likely test that interface; the Court’s reliance on article 9 suggests the legislature’s 2022 text remains intact but yields under rare, fact-specific absurdity.
Legislative dialogue: The tension between 13:3923(B)’s “no effect” clause and the equitable concerns on display may prompt legislative clarification regarding the handling of sworn answers transmitted outside the record and the duties of disclosure before a pro confesso hearing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Garnishment: A legal process allowing a judgment creditor to seize a debtor’s property, wages, or debts owed to the debtor that are in the hands of a third party (the garnishee).
Garnishee: The third party alleged to possess the debtor’s property or to owe the debtor money (often an employer in wage garnishments).
Judgment pro confesso (Article 2413): When a garnishee fails to timely answer, the creditor may seek a money judgment equal to the unpaid judgment, interest, and costs. The failure to answer before the motion is filed creates a prima facie presumption that the garnishee holds the debtor’s property or owes him a debt, but the garnishee can rebut this at the hearing by proving it holds nothing and owes nothing.
Prima facie proof: A presumption sufficient to support a finding unless rebutted. Under Article 2413, the garnishee’s failure to answer timely is prima facie proof of indebtedness or possession, but it can be overcome by contrary proof at the hearing.
Continuing wage garnishment vs. money judgment: La. R.S. 13:3923 primarily regulates ongoing wage garnishments (periodic payments from an employer), whereas an Article 2413 judgment is a money judgment entered upon failure to answer, potentially for the full amount of the underlying debt.
Absurd results doctrine (Civil Code art. 9): Even a clear statute is not applied literally if doing so would produce absurd consequences. The statute must then be interpreted to conform to the law’s purpose. This doctrine is to be used rarely and cautiously.

Conclusion

First Pay, Inc. v. Dukes establishes an important, but narrow, safety valve in Louisiana garnishment practice. The Supreme Court recognized that although La. R.S. 13:3923 is clear, applying its bar on affecting Article 2413 judgments to foreclose reopening in this case—where the creditor did not disclose sworn answers negating garnishee status—would produce an absurd and punitive outcome at odds with the purpose of garnishment law. Invoking Civil Code article 9, the Court reinstated the trial court’s vacatur of the pro confesso judgment and remanded for a merits determination of whether Quantix was ever a proper garnishee.

The decision does not rewrite the statutory scheme nor broadly authorize reopening Article 2413 judgments. Instead, it signals that courts retain a narrow reservoir of authority to prevent manifestly unjust results when material facts are withheld. For practitioners, the message is clear: ensure that sworn garnishee responses are promptly filed in the record and fully disclosed to the court before a pro confesso hearing. For garnishees, timely filing and appearance remain critical, but where exculpatory facts were not presented to the court, a limited reopening may be available. For future litigation, this case will stand as a leading example of the “rare” application of the absurd-results doctrine in the collections context—an exception calibrated to the unique facts before the Court.