Mutual Waivers as Consideration and Limits on Separate‑Property Clauses in Wyoming Postnuptial Agreements
Commentary on Jeremy D. Jones v. Bethany D. Young, 2025 WY 130 (Wyo. Dec. 10, 2025)

I. Introduction

The Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Young, 2025 WY 130, addresses three significant questions in Wyoming family and contract law:

• When and how postnuptial agreements will be enforced on summary judgment, including what suffices as evidence to resist such a motion.
• How to interpret key clauses in postnuptial agreements that attempt to preserve “separate property,” especially as to:
  • Income generated from a premarital business; and
  • Property acquired during the marriage with those earnings.
• How trial courts may value and distribute major marital assets (here, the marital residence), including choice of valuation date.

The parties, Jeremy D. Jones (“Husband”) and Bethany D. Young (“Wife”), married in 2014 and executed a postnuptial agreement two days after their wedding. Each brought significant separate assets into the marriage—particularly Husband’s chiropractic practice and premarital home proceeds, and Wife’s cash contribution to land on which the marital residence was later built. During the marriage, they acquired a valuable home and several vehicles, mostly with Husband’s earnings from his chiropractic business.

After the parties separated in 2020, Husband filed for divorce and sought summary judgment enforcing the postnuptial agreement. Wife argued the agreement was unconscionable, unenforceable due to unilateral mistake, and unsupported by consideration. The district court upheld the agreement’s enforceability but concluded that certain property acquired during the marriage—most notably the marital home and six vehicles—remained subject to equitable division under the agreement’s terms.

In the first appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed for lack of a final order because the district court had not fixed a final value for the marital residence. After a revised decree set the home’s value and equity, Husband appealed, and Wife cross‑appealed, leading to the present decision.

This commentary analyzes the Court’s reasoning, the precedents relied upon, and the broader implications for postnuptial agreements, summary judgment practice, and property division in Wyoming divorces.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court on all issues, holding:

1. Enforceability of the postnuptial agreement.
   • The agreement was not substantively or procedurally unconscionable as a matter of law.
   • Wife’s “verified” summary judgment brief, even if treated as an affidavit, did not create any genuine dispute of material fact on unconscionability or unilateral mistake.
   • There was adequate consideration for the postnuptial agreement:
     • Not only the recited $100 exchange, but, more importantly,
     • The parties’ mutual waivers of rights to each other’s premarital property and statutory estate rights (e.g., elective shares).
   • Even if the $100 were never actually paid, that would constitute at most a failure of consideration (a breach), not a lack of consideration invalidating the contract.
2. Interpretation of the postnuptial agreement.
   • The key provision for property acquired after marriage was Section 1(d), which covers “all other real and personal property that either party may acquire from any source whatsoever during their marriage.”
   • Husband’s earnings from his chiropractic practice during the marriage were not “assets obtained as a consequence of the use, investment, reinvestment or transfer” of his separate estate under Section 1(b), nor were they “income therefrom” in the sense used in that clause.
   • Purchases such as the marital residence and vehicles, even when funded largely with Husband’s earnings, fell under Section 1(d), making them subject to distribution either by agreement or by the court.
   • “Commingling” under Section 1(c) was interpreted narrowly as mixing pre‑existing separate assets, not the mere act of buying new assets during the marriage with separate funds.
3. Valuation and distribution of the marital residence.
   • The district court’s valuation of the home at $925,000 as of 2023 (near trial) was supported by the evidence, particularly the opinions of Husband’s own experts (an appraiser and a realtor).
   • The choice to value the property as of the time of trial, rather than the date of separation, fell within the trial court’s broad discretion under Wyoming law.
   • The method of distribution—reimbursing each party’s specific contributions ($209,000 to Husband, $35,500 to Wife) and then splitting the remaining equity equally—did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

III. Analysis

A. Enforceability of the Postnuptial Agreement

1. Summary judgment framework and “verified briefs”

The Court began by reciting the familiar Rule 56 standard, relying on Drewry v. Brenner, 2025 WY 121, and Leeks Canyon Ranch, LLC v. Jackson Hole Hereford Ranch, LLC, 2025 WY 63:

• Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
• The Court reviews summary judgment de novo, examining the record in the light most favorable to the non‑moving party.
• The moving party must first make a prima facie showing; if it does, the burden shifts to the non‑movant to come forward with evidence beyond the pleadings showing a genuine factual dispute.

Wife attempted to resist Husband’s motion by filing a legal brief that she “verified” under oath and notarization. The brief contained factual assertions but did not cite to separate affidavits, deposition excerpts, or other record materials as contemplated by W.R.C.P. 56(c)(1)(A).

The Court underscored several procedural principles:

• Compliance with the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure in summary judgment is mandatory (Braunstein v. Robinson Fam. Ltd. P’ship LLP, 2010 WY 26; Platt v. Creighton, 2007 WY 18).
• Summary judgment materials must be as “professionally correct” as trial evidence (Gumpel v. Copperleaf Homeowners Ass’n, 2017 WY 46; Rivers v. Moore, Myers & Garland, 2010 WY 102).

The Court sidestepped the technical question of whether a “verified brief” can ever stand in for an affidavit. Instead, it assumed for argument’s sake that Wife’s verified brief would be treated as compliant and held that, even on that assumption, the brief did not create genuine disputes of material fact:

• Many assertions were conclusory, lacking specific, concrete facts.
• Other assertions conflicted with the express written terms of the postnuptial agreement.
• Still others simply did not affect the legal enforceability of the contract (e.g., alleged non‑payment of the $100).

Doctrinally, this reinforces that:

• Conclusions and general characterizations, even when sworn, are insufficient to defeat summary judgment (Lewis v. Francis, 2025 WY 109): a party must present specific facts.
• Speculation or “internet research” on values or legal consequences is not evidence (Lovato v. Tim Case, 2022 WY 151).

Practically, litigants in Wyoming should not rely on “verified briefs” in lieu of properly structured affidavits and admissible evidence. Even if a court generously treats such a brief as sworn testimony, it must be specific, fact‑rich, and consistent with the written contract to avoid summary judgment.

2. Unconscionability: substantive and procedural

Whether a contract is unconscionable is a question of law (Long v. Long, 2018 WY 26). Wyoming uses a two‑pronged test, rooted in Pittard v. Great Lakes Aviation, 2007 WY 64, and Roussalis v. Wyo. Med. Ctr., Inc., 4 P.3d 209 (Wyo. 2000):

1. Substantive unconscionability: Do the contract terms unreasonably favor one party?
2. Procedural unconscionability: Did the disadvantaged party lack meaningful choice—due to compulsion, surprise, inability to negotiate, or grossly unequal bargaining power?

Most courts, including Wyoming, require both elements—unfair terms and a defective bargaining process—to invalidate a contract as unconscionable (Long).

a. Substantive unconscionability

In the district court, Wife’s substantive unconscionability argument was extremely brief: she claimed the agreement unreasonably favored Husband because it protected his “lucrative business and various vehicles.” She did not offer values, expert affidavits, or evidence of gross disproportionality.

On appeal, she tried to rehabilitate this theory by:

• Asserting approximate values of Husband’s assets using online valuation tools and county records; and
• Comparing those estimated values to the property protected for her.

The Supreme Court firmly rejected this approach for two independent reasons:

1. Record limitation on appeal. The Court reviews summary judgment decisions based on the same record that was before the district court (Drewry). Wife’s new valuations and external sources were never part of the record below and could not be considered.
2. Issue preservation. A party must present at least a minimally cogent legal argument to the trial court to preserve an issue for appeal (WyoLaw, LLC v. Office of Att’y Gen., 2021 WY 61; Holding v. Luckinbill, 2022 WY 10). A bare assertion that the agreement “unreasonably favors” one party, without developed analysis or factual support, does not preserve a sophisticated one‑sidedness argument for appeal.

Confining Wife to the minimal argument she actually made, the Court found no basis to hold the contract substantively unconscionable. It cited Long’s admonition that courts should not rescue parties from “unwise” bargains; freedom of contract carries inherent risk, and courts do not lightly intervene.

b. Procedural unconscionability

The procedural unconscionability factors, as summarized in Long and Pittard, include:

• Lack of meaningful choice or compulsion to accept terms;
• Opportunity for meaningful negotiation;
• Gross inequality of bargaining power;
• Characteristics of the aggrieved party (e.g., illiteracy, underprivilege, ease of exploitation); and
• Surprise due to fine print or concealed terms.

In the district court, Wife pointed to several alleged procedural defects:

• Husband’s attorney drafted the agreement.
• She “did not have counsel to advocate on her behalf” and “did not have an opportunity to consult an attorney.”
• She “did not have an opportunity for meaningful negotiation.”
• She allegedly had “several of the characteristics of someone who has unequal bargaining power” and did not have Husband’s education/experience.

But on appeal, she altered her posture dramatically, conceding that she is educated, successful, and far from underprivileged, and instead arguing emotional pressure (fear of losing a brand‑new marriage) prevented her from refusing to sign.

The Court resolved this as follows:

• No concrete evidence of denied counsel. The postnuptial agreement itself contained a strong recitation:
  • Both parties stipulated they either had counsel or knowingly waived that right.
  • They affirmed they understood the agreement.
  • Wife specifically acknowledged that the drafting lawyer (Husband’s counsel) advised her to seek independent counsel.
  Against that, Wife offered only a conclusory statement that she “did not have an opportunity to consult an attorney,” without details about timing, logistics, or any obstruction.
• Conclusory assertions insufficient. Reliance on broad statements like “I had characteristics of someone with unequal bargaining power” or “I did not have an opportunity for meaningful negotiation” is inadequate on summary judgment; specific facts are required (Lewis).
• New emotional‑pressure theory unpreserved. Her argument that she felt compelled to sign to avoid an immediate divorce was not raised below and had no evidentiary support in the record. Under Sharpe v. Evans, 2025 WY 70, and related cases, new arguments and theories cannot be introduced for the first time on appeal absent jurisdictional or truly fundamental issues.

Taken together, these points led the Court to conclude that Wife had not shown any genuine dispute of fact as to procedural unconscionability. The undisputed contents of the agreement and her own sophistication undermined her claims; her verified brief lacked the specific, contradictory facts necessary to overturn the contractual recitals.

3. Unilateral mistake and the doctrine of consideration

Wife also claimed a unilateral mistake regarding the $100 recited as consideration in the agreement. She believed, she said, that the check she wrote for $100 was to pay the lawyer, not to serve as consideration flowing between the spouses.

Two legal questions were implicated:

1. Could a unilateral mistake vitiate the contract?
2. Was there, in any event, sufficient consideration to support the postnuptial agreement?

a. Unilateral mistake as a ground for relief

As summarized in McNeill Family Trust v. Centura Bank, 2003 WY 2, and Givens v. Fowler, 984 P.2d 1092 (Wyo. 1999), a unilateral mistake by one party generally does not justify rescission unless:

• The mistake was induced by the other party’s fraudulent or inequitable conduct; or
• Other strict conditions for equitable relief are satisfied (not fully addressed here because the case resolves on consideration).

The Court did not need to fully explore that doctrine because it found the alleged mistake immaterial to the key concern: whether there was adequate consideration for the agreement.

b. Consideration in postnuptial agreements

Under Wyoming law, a postnuptial agreement must be supported by consideration other than the marriage itself. The marriage cannot retroactively serve as consideration for an agreement executed after the wedding (Combs v. Sherry‑Combs, 865 P.2d 50 (Wyo. 1993); Long).

The Court reaffirmed that “other identifiable consideration” is required, and that consideration can take various forms: performance of an act, forbearance, or the creation, modification, or destruction of legal relations (Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc. v. Boyd, 2017 WY 122; Schlesinger v. Woodcock, 2001 WY 120).

Applying those principles, the Court held there was ample consideration here, even if the $100 was never actually exchanged:

• Expressly recited $100 exchange. The agreement on its face stated it was made “in consideration of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) exchanged between the parties.”
• More importantly, mutual waivers of legal rights. Each party:
  • Waived claims to the other’s premarital property (including Husband’s chiropractic business and Wife’s premarital contributions to real estate), and
  • Waived statutory rights to elective shares or other claims in the other’s estate.
  These mutual relinquishments of property and inheritance rights constitute textbook “other identifiable consideration.”

The Court bolstered this conclusion with out‑of‑state cases:

• Hollar v. Hollar, 403 So.3d 843 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023) – mutual waivers of rights to separately titled premarital property and certain after‑acquired property supported a postnuptial agreement.
• Hershkowitz v. Levy, 139 N.Y.S.3d 617 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021) – similar holding regarding waivers of obligations such as maintenance and rights to each other’s income.

c. Lack of consideration vs. failure of consideration

A critical doctrinal clarification in this opinion is the distinction between lack of consideration and failure of consideration, drawing on Williston on Contracts:

• Lack of consideration means no valid exchange of promises or legal detriment ever existed, so no contract was formed at all.
• Failure of consideration means:
  • There was valid consideration and a contract at formation, but
  • One party later failed to perform their side of the bargain (e.g., never paid the promised $100).
  This creates a breach of contract, not automatic invalidity.

Under this framework:

• Even if Wife never paid Husband the $100, the contract was still validly formed because of the mutual waivers and other consideration.
• At most, her non‑payment would be a breach giving Husband a potential claim, which he did not pursue.

Thus, any unilateral misunderstanding about the $100 could not cancel the entire agreement. The holding significantly limits attempts to invalidate marital agreements by attacking nominal recitals of consideration when substantive mutual waivers of rights are present.

B. Interpreting the Postnuptial Agreement: Separate vs. Marital Property

The central interpretive dispute was whether the postnuptial agreement effectively shielded:

• Husband’s earnings during the marriage from his chiropractic practice; and
• Assets purchased with those earnings (vehicles, marital residence).

Everyone agreed the agreement was unambiguous; the question was its proper construction.

1. Governing contract principles

The Court reiterated long‑standing Wyoming rules for interpreting marital agreements, citing Morrison v. Hinson‑Morrison, 2024 WY 96, and Van Vlack v. Van Vlack, 2023 WY 104:

• Marital agreements (pre‑ or postnuptial) are construed like any other contracts.
• The goal is to ascertain the parties’ intent from the plain language of the agreement, read as a whole.
• Where terms are clear and unambiguous, courts:
  • Look only within the “four corners” of the document; and
  • Enforce it according to its terms without judicial rewriting.
• Each provision should be given effect; courts avoid interpretations that:
  • Render any clause meaningless; or
  • Create internal inconsistencies (Eiden Constr., LLC v. Hogan & Assocs. Builders, LLC, 2024 WY 138; Wallop Canyon Ranch, LLC v. Goodwyn, 2015 WY 81).
  • If a contract is silent on an issue that could easily have been drafted into it, courts will not “fill the gap” under the guise of interpretation (Morrison; In re CDR, 2015 WY 79).

  2. Operative provisions of the agreement

  The key subsections in Section 1 of the postnuptial agreement were:

  • Section 1(a): Defines as separate property “all real and personal property owned by either of the parties as of [the agreement date]” (two days after the wedding).
  • Section 1(b): Provides that any “assets obtained” by either party as a consequence of the “use, investment, reinvestment or any transfer” of any portion of his/her separate estate, “and any income therefrom, and any appreciation in the value thereof,” remain part of that person’s separate estate.
  • Section 1(c): States that any “commingling or pooling of assets” is not to be interpreted as abandonment of the agreement; each party’s ownership in a pooled fund or asset is proportional to their contributions from separate property.
  • Section 1(d): Provides that “all other real and personal property that either party may acquire from any source whatsoever during their marriage (except future inherited property), shall be distributed as agreed between the parties and if the parties are not able to agree, as decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction.”

  3. Husband’s interpretation vs. Wife’s interpretation

  Husband argued:

  • His chiropractic practice was a premarital separate asset.
  • His earnings from that practice during the marriage were “assets obtained” as a consequence of using that business, or “income therefrom,” under Section 1(b); therefore, they remained his separate property.
  • Assets purchased solely with those earnings (five vehicles) were entirely his separate property under Section 1(b).
  • Assets purchased with mixed funds (the Ford Raptor and the marital home) were “commingled” separate property subject to Section 1(c), giving him a superior separate property interest.

  Wife contended:

  • Section 1(d) governed all property acquired after the marriage, regardless of the source of funds, except inheritances.
  • Sections 1(b) and 1(c) were limited to:
    • The growth and transformations of premarital separate assets; and
    • Situations where those pre‑existing separate assets were mixed together (e.g., funds pooled in a joint account).
  • Employment earnings and post‑marriage purchases were not captured by Sections 1(b) or (c) and were therefore subject to equitable distribution under Section 1(d).

  4. The Court’s construction: earnings from a premarital business are not automatically separate

  The Court agreed with Wife, and its reasoning is one of the most important doctrinal contributions of this decision:

  • Scope of Section 1(a). This clause clearly protects property “owned” on the agreement date—i.e., premarital or very early‑marriage acquisitions. It does not speak to:
    • Future income; or
    • Assets acquired after that date.
  • Rejection of Husband’s reading of Section 1(b). The Court emphasized that Section 1(b) focuses on:
    • Assets obtained by using, investing, reinvesting, or transferring an existing separate estate; and
    • The “income” and “appreciation” of those existing assets.
    It is about preserving the character of a separate estate as it changes form or grows. It is not written in a way that expressly captures:
    • Wages and salary paid to a person as an employee of a business (even if they own the business); or
    • New earnings from labor.
    The Court explicitly stated it could not “see the act of working for an entity as a ‘use’ of that entity” within the meaning of Section 1(b), nor did Husband offer persuasive analysis to stretch the language that far.
  • No judicial rewriting to make wages separate property. The Court noted that if the parties intended “all income earned by either party during the marriage” to remain separate, they could have said so. They did not. Under Morrison and In re CDR, courts will not insert such a term where the contract is silent.
  • Result: Wages or earnings Husband received as a chiropractor during the marriage were not part of his protected premarital “separate estate” under Section 1(b). Consequently, assets bought with those wages were not automatically his separate property by virtue of that clause.

  This is a key holding: in Wyoming, a generic clause preserving the growth and income of premarital assets does not, without more, transmute all labor‑earned wages from a premarital business into separate property. Drafters who want that result must use much clearer language.

  5. Narrow reading of “commingling” under Section 1(c)

  Husband further argued that the marital residence and Ford Raptor were “commingled” assets within the meaning of Section 1(c), because each had contributions from separate and marital funds.

  The Court rejected this as well, grounding its reasoning in:

  • The ordinary meaning of “commingling” as “a mixing together” (citing Black’s Law Dictionary); and
  • The structure of the agreement as a whole.

  It held:

  • Section 1(c) addresses instances where existing separate assets are mixed—e.g., Husband’s premarital account and Wife’s premarital account both poured into a joint account.
  • In that situation, Section 1(c) seeks to prevent inferences that the parties abandoned the agreement by commingling; instead, ownership is to remain proportional to separate contributions.
  • The purchase of completely new property during the marriage is conceptually different from “mixing” existing assets. That situation is explicitly governed by Section 1(d): property “acquired from any source whatsoever during their marriage.”
  • This interpretation gives independent meaning to Section 1(d) rather than reading it out of the contract.

  Thus, neither Section 1(b) (growth of separate estate) nor Section 1(c) (commingling) protected the marital residence or vehicles as Husband’s separate property. Those assets fell squarely within Section 1(d), to be distributed equitably by the court when the parties could not agree.

  C. Valuation and Distribution of the Marital Residence

  1. Standards for property division and valuation

  The Court reaffirmed settled Wyoming principles governing property division on divorce, citing Bailey v. Bailey, 2024 WY 65, Hyatt v. Hyatt, 2023 WY 129, Metz v. Metz, 2003 WY 3, and others:

  • Trial courts have broad discretion to fashion a “just and equitable” property division under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20‑2‑114(a).
  • An appellate court will not disturb that division unless it “shocks the conscience” and is so unfair that reasonable people cannot abide it.
  • Factual findings, including asset valuations, are reviewed for clear error: the reviewing court must be left with a “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake was made to overturn them (Morrison).
  • When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, ignoring contrary evidence (Bailey).

  2. Support in the record for the $925,000 valuation

  Husband challenged the district court’s valuation of the marital residence at $925,000, arguing it was contrary to the evidence, especially his post‑trial appraisal of $850,000.

  However, the Court emphasized the trial evidence produced by Husband himself:

  • 2021 Appraisal. Certified appraiser John Bayer appraised the home at $775,000 shortly after separation. He conceded the real estate market had changed “somewhat dramatically” upward by 2023.
  • 2023 Comparative Market Analysis (CMA). Licensed realtor Robert Schutterle:
    • Analyzed comparable properties in February 2023.
    • Opined that the home’s value was between $890,000 and $925,000.
    • Testified that the best comparable was a nearly identical property next door listed at $957,000.
    • Stated he would have recommended listing the marital residence at $925,000 as of trial.

  Given that the $925,000 figure was:

  • Within the range supported by Husband’s realtor expert; and
  • Consistent with the market appreciation acknowledged by Husband’s appraiser,

  the Court found no clear error. The valuation fell well within the fact‑finder’s discretion to weigh expert opinions and choose a value within an established range.

  3. Choice of valuation date: trial vs. separation

  Husband also argued that equity in the home should have been calculated as of the separation date because:

  • He had exclusive possession of the residence after separation; and
  • He made all mortgage payments and maintenance expenditures during that period.

  The Court approached this in two steps:

  1. Waiver of argument on equity calculation date. While Husband objected below to valuing the property as of trial, he did not specifically object to the court’s later request for a current mortgage balance or argue that equity should be computed using the earlier balance. Under Sharpe, new arguments not raised below are not considered on appeal; the Court therefore declined to entertain this specific equity‑date contention.
  2. Discretion on valuation date for the asset itself. On the general question whether the court abused its discretion by valuing the home as of trial rather than separation, the Court reiterated its holdings in Williams v. Williams, 2016 WY 21, and Wallop v. Wallop, 2004 WY 46:
     • Wyoming has not fixed a universal valuation date for marital property.
     • The appropriate date is a matter within the trial court’s broad discretion, guided by § 20‑2‑114(a)’s “just and equitable” standard.

  Here, the Court noted an important countervailing consideration: although Husband was paying the mortgage, Wife remained liable on it and her credit capacity was tied up for over two years, impairing her ability to buy her own home and build equity. Both spouses, in different ways, bore burdens related to the marital residence during separation.

  Given the statute’s factors—especially “the condition in which they will be left by the divorce” and “the burdens imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party”—the Court held it was rational and within the bounds of reason to:

  • Value the property as of trial; and
  • Distribute equity by:
    • Reimbursing each spouse’s direct contributions (Husband’s premarital home proceeds and refinance payments; Wife’s cash contribution to the land and refinance); and
    • Equally splitting the remaining equity.

  No abuse of discretion was found.

  IV. Precedents and Their Influence

  Although the Court cited a large number of cases, several clusters of precedent are particularly influential in shaping the decision.

  A. Summary judgment and preservation of issues

  • Drewry v. Brenner, 2025 WY 121; Leeks Canyon Ranch, LLC v. Jackson Hole Hereford Ranch, LLC, 2025 WY 63.
    These cases set out the modern Wyoming summary judgment framework: de novo review, burden‑shifting, and the rule that courts review the same materials considered below.
  • Braunstein, Platt, Hickey, Gumpel, Rivers.
    These decisions stress strict compliance with procedural rules in summary judgment and the need for evidence that would be admissible at trial.
  • Lewis v. Francis, 2025 WY 109; Lovato v. Tim Case, 2022 WY 151.
    They underscore that mere allegations, conclusory assertions, and speculation cannot create genuine factual disputes; non‑movants must present concrete facts.
  • Sharpe v. Evans, 2025 WY 70; WyoLaw, LLC v. Office of Att’y Gen., 2021 WY 61; Holding v. Luckinbill, 2022 WY 10.
    These cases collectively tighten the rules on issue preservation, requiring at least minimally developed arguments and forbidding new legal theories on appeal.

  Together, these precedents support the Court’s refusal to credit Wife’s minimally supported unconscionability claims and to consider her new emotional‑pressure theory or extra‑record valuation evidence on appeal.

  B. Unconscionability and consideration in marital agreements

  • Long v. Long, 2018 WY 26.
    A leading Wyoming case on marital agreements, it establishes:
    • Unconscionability is a question of law;
    • Courts should be cautious in interfering with freedom of contract; and
    • Marital agreements must be supported by consideration beyond the marriage in the postnuptial context.
    • Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc. v. Boyd, 2017 WY 122; Pittard v. Great Lakes Aviation, 2007 WY 64; Roussalis.
      These cases articulate the dual substantive/procedural unconscionability framework and the principle that unconscionability is assessed at the time of contracting, not in hindsight.
    • Combs v. Sherry‑Combs, 865 P.2d 50.
      It establishes that postnuptial agreements require “other identifiable consideration” beyond the marriage itself, paving the way for the Court’s reliance on mutual waivers of property and estate rights in Jones.
    • Schlesinger v. Woodcock, 2001 WY 120.
      This case provides the general definition of consideration (act, forbearance, or alteration of legal relations) that the Court applies to the parties’ mutual waivers.

    By applying these cases, Jones reinforces a pro‑contract regime: marital agreements will be enforced unless they are truly one‑sided and the product of a seriously defective bargaining process, supported by specific evidence.

    C. Contract interpretation and omitted terms

    • Morrison v. Hinson‑Morrison, 2024 WY 96; Van Vlack v. Van Vlack, 2023 WY 104.
      These decisions reiterate four‑corners interpretation and the plain‑meaning approach. They inform the Court’s refusal to treat wages as “income” of a separate business asset or to import a general “earnings remain separate” clause that does not exist.
    • Eiden Constr., Larson, Wallop Canyon Ranch.
      These cases support the principle that each provision of a contract must be given effect, which is used to preserve the distinct roles of Sections 1(b), 1(c), and 1(d) of the postnuptial agreement.
    • In re CDR, 2015 WY 79.
      It provides the key canon that courts will not supply missing terms on issues that could easily have been addressed in drafting—central to rejecting Husband’s attempt to treat all wages as separate.

    D. Property division, valuation, and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20‑2‑114

    • Bailey v. Bailey, 2024 WY 65; Hyatt v. Hyatt, 2023 WY 129; Metz v. Metz, 2003 WY 3; Snyder v. Snyder, 2021 WY 115.
      These cases afford broad discretion to trial courts in dividing marital property, limit appellate reversal to situations that “shock the conscience,” and set the standards for reviewing factual findings.
    • Williams v. Williams, 2016 WY 21; Wallop v. Wallop, 2004 WY 46.
      These establish that there is no fixed rule in Wyoming for the valuation date of marital property; the trial court may choose an appropriate date within its discretion.
    • Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20‑2‑114(a).
      This statute governs equitable distribution in divorce, requiring consideration of:
      • The merits of the parties;
      • The condition in which they will be left by the divorce;
      • The party through whom property was acquired; and
      • Burdens imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party.

    Jones applies these authorities to sustain the trial court’s discretionary choice of valuation date and method of allocating equity in the marital home.

    V. Complex Concepts Simplified

    1. Substantive vs. procedural unconscionability

    • Substantive unconscionability asks: Are the terms so one‑sided that they “shock the conscience”? Example:
      • One spouse receives virtually all property and the other receives nothing, with no justification.
    • Procedural unconscionability asks: Was the bargaining process unfair? Examples:
      • The weaker party had no chance to read or understand the contract.
      • They were misled, threatened, or denied access to legal advice.
      • Important terms were hidden in fine print.
    • In Wyoming, you generally need both to invalidate a contract on unconscionability grounds.

    2. Consideration, and “lack” vs. “failure” of consideration

    • Consideration is what each party gives up or promises in exchange for what the other gives up or promises. It can be:
      • Doing something (e.g., paying money);
      • Not doing something you are legally free to do (forbearance); or
      • Changing legal relationships (e.g., waiving rights you otherwise would have).
    • Lack of consideration means there was no real exchange at all—no contract ever formed.
    • Failure of consideration means there was an exchange at the time of contracting, but one party later failed to perform (e.g., never pays the full amount promised). The contract is valid, but one side may be in breach.
    • In Jones, even if the nominal $100 was never paid, the agreement still had plenty of consideration (mutual waivers), so at most there was a failure, not a lack, of consideration.

    3. Unilateral mistake

    • A unilateral mistake occurs when only one party is mistaken about a material fact relating to the contract.
    • As a rule, a unilateral mistake does not invalidate a contract, unless:
      • The other party knew or should have known of the mistake and acted inequitably or fraudulently; and
      • Other equitable factors justify relief.
    • Wife’s mistaken belief about the $100 check, even if true, did not undermine the core mutual exchange of rights in the agreement.

    4. “Commingling” of assets

    • Commingling is the mixing together of separate property assets so that they cannot easily be distinguished—e.g., putting premarital funds from both spouses into a single joint account.
    • Many marital agreements attempt to preserve each spouse’s separate interest in commingled funds.
    • Jones clarifies that simply purchasing a new asset during the marriage with various funds is not “commingling” of pre‑existing assets in the sense used in Section 1(c) of this agreement; such bought‑during‑marriage assets fall under a separate clause (here, Section 1(d)).

    5. “Just and equitable” property division

    • “Equitable” does not necessarily mean “equal 50/50,” although equal division is common.
    • Court considers:
      • Where the property came from;
      • Each party’s contributions (financial and otherwise);
      • Each party’s future prospects and needs; and
      • The burdens each has borne (such as debt obligations, credit impacts, or caretaking responsibilities).
    • In Jones, the court:
      • Reimbursed each spouse’s direct investments in the marital home; then
      • Split the remaining equity equally, considering broader statutory factors and fairness.

    VI. Impact and Practical Implications

    1. Drafting postnuptial (and prenuptial) agreements in Wyoming

    Jones carries important lessons for practitioners drafting marital agreements:

    • If you intend to keep labor earnings separate, say so expressly.
      Clauses preserving “assets obtained by use of separate estate” and “income therefrom” are not enough to ensure that:
      • All wages, salaries, and bonuses earned during the marriage remain separate; or
      • All property purchased with those earnings automatically remains separate.
      Clear language is needed, e.g., “All wages, salaries, and other earned income of each party during the marriage, regardless of source, shall remain that party’s separate property, and property acquired with such earnings shall likewise remain that party’s separate property.”
    • Be explicit about property acquired during the marriage.
      If the intent is to exclude post‑marriage acquisitions from later equitable distribution, the agreement must:
      • Either treat them as separate property by default; or
      • Provide a clear formula for ownership (e.g., tracing contributions).
      Section 1(d) here did the opposite: it expressly left post‑marriage acquisitions subject to division by agreement or court order.
    • Use “commingling” clauses carefully.
      Do not assume that a commingling clause will automatically protect all new purchases during marriage. If the aim is to treat any asset purchased with separate funds as proportionally separate, that must be stated directly.
    • Include robust recitals about counsel and understanding.
      The recitals in this agreement—that each party either had counsel or knowingly waived it, and that Wife was advised to obtain independent counsel—were powerful evidence against her later claims of procedural unconscionability.

    2. Enforcing marital agreements via summary judgment

    The opinion implicitly encourages the use of summary judgment to enforce valid marital agreements where:

    • The agreement is facially clear and unambiguous.
    • There are no genuine factual disputes about execution, disclosure, or coercion.

    On the other hand, parties opposing such motions must:

    • Submit specific, admissible evidence (affidavits, deposition testimony, documents) of:
      • Concealment of assets;
      • Coercion or duress;
      • Misrepresentations during negotiation; or
      • Gross inequality of bargaining power that affected the process.
    • Avoid relying solely on argument, speculation, or generalized complaints about unfairness.

    3. Limiting attacks based on nominal consideration

    By distinguishing lack of consideration from failure of consideration and recognizing mutual waivers of rights as valid consideration, Jones makes it more difficult to invalidate a postnuptial agreement simply because the recited $1.00 or $100.00 was never actually paid.

    Going forward, challenges to marital agreements in Wyoming will likely need to focus on:

    • Procedural defects (e.g., fraud, misrepresentation, duress); and
    • Truly extreme substantive one‑sidedness combined with a defective bargaining process, supported by evidence.

    4. Property valuation and litigation strategy

    For divorce practitioners:

    • Valuation dates are flexible. Wyoming trial courts retain wide latitude to choose an appropriate valuation date for assets, taking into account:
      • Post‑separation payments by one spouse;
      • Credit impacts and opportunity costs borne by the other;
      • Market fluctuations; and
      • Overall equitable considerations.
    • Preserve valuation arguments clearly. If a party wants equity computed as of a particular date (e.g., separation), that argument must be explicitly made to the trial court, not introduced for the first time on appeal.
    • Expert testimony matters. The district court’s acceptance of $925,000 depended heavily on Husband’s own experts. Parties should be prepared for courts to choose any value within the supported range, especially one consistent with current market conditions.

    5. Recognition of non‑financial contributions

    While the Supreme Court did not dwell extensively on this, the district court noted that:

    • Husband made all mortgage payments and significant capital contributions; and
    • Wife “made significant contributions by cooking, cleaning, buying the bulk of the groceries, and maintaining the marital residence.”

    The district court reimbursed direct financial contributions, but it also considered these non‑financial contributions when splitting the remaining equity. This reflects the continued recognition in Wyoming that domestic labor and support—though not easily quantified—factor into what is “just and equitable” under § 20‑2‑114.

    VII. Conclusion

    Jones v. Young is a significant addition to Wyoming’s jurisprudence on marital agreements and property division. The Court:

    • Affirmed the enforceability of postnuptial agreements where there is adequate consideration—specifically, mutual waivers of property and estate rights—and no proven unconscionability.
    • Clarified that:
      • Generic clauses preserving the growth and “income” of premarital assets do not automatically convert all later earnings from a premarital business into separate property; and
      • Property acquired during the marriage “from any source whatsoever” remains subject to distribution as provided in the agreement or, failing agreement, by judicial decree.
    • Strengthened procedural expectations around summary judgment and appellate practice, insisting on:
      • Strict adherence to evidentiary rules;
      • Specific factual showings rather than conclusory claims; and
      • Proper preservation of issues for appeal.
    • Reaffirmed the broad discretion of trial courts in valuing and distributing marital assets, including their authority to choose appropriate valuation dates under § 20‑2‑114.

    For practitioners, Jones is both a drafting guide and a litigation roadmap. It underscores the need for clear, explicit language in marital agreements, careful evidentiary preparation in challenges to those agreements, and strategic attention to valuation and preservation issues in divorce proceedings. In the broader legal context, it deepens Wyoming’s commitment to freedom of contract in domestic relations while maintaining robust, but disciplined, equitable oversight at the time of divorce.