Murray v. Miranda: Eleventh Circuit Forecloses Bivens Damages for Federal Prison Medical-Indifference Claims Where BOP Grievance Procedures Exist

Introduction

In this unpublished, non-argument decision, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Aaron Michael Murray’s Eighth Amendment Bivens action against federal prison officials and medical providers for alleged deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Murray, a federal inmate at FCI Coleman Medium, alleged a nine-month delay in gallbladder surgery and denial of prescribed hydrocodone, causing severe pain and elevated blood pressure against the backdrop of a preexisting cardiac condition.

The district court disposed of the claims at the pleadings stage—granting judgment on the pleadings to nurse practitioner Jeanette Miranda and physician Richard Qi Li; granting physician assistant Linda Criswell’s motion to dismiss; and dismissing sua sponte the claim against unit counselor Michelle Cortopassi. On appeal, Murray argued his case was “materially indistinguishable” from Carlson v. Green (1980), where the Supreme Court recognized a Bivens damages remedy for deliberate indifference leading to a prisoner’s death.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected that contention. Leaning on its own recent, published decision in Johnson v. Terry (2024) and Supreme Court precedents including Ziglar v. Abbasi (2017) and Egbert v. Boule (2022), the court held that Murray’s claim presents a “new Bivens context” and that the existence of the Bureau of Prisons’ administrative remedy program (ARP) is a “special factor” precluding any extension of Bivens. As a result, the court never reached the merits of Murray’s Eighth Amendment claims.

Summary of the Opinion

The panel (Judges Newsom, Lagoa, and Wilson) affirmed the district court’s judgment. Applying the current two-step Bivens framework:

Step One—New Context: Murray’s Eighth Amendment medical-care claim is “meaningfully different” from Carlson. Two key distinctions, drawn directly from Johnson v. Terry, drove this conclusion: (1) Carlson did not apply the modern “alternative remedial structure” analysis; and (2) Murray alleged non-fatal injuries that were eventually treated, whereas the prisoner in Carlson died following egregious treatment failures.
Step Two—Special Factors: Because the BOP’s ARP existed and Murray used it, there is at least one rational reason to think Congress is better suited than the courts to design any damages remedy. Under Egbert, that single reason is sufficient to foreclose a Bivens extension.

Having determined that Murray’s claims are not cognizable under Bivens, the court declined to reach whether his pleadings plausibly stated deliberate-indifference claims under the Eighth Amendment. The bottom line: the court affirmed dismissal as to all remaining defendants.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents (1971): The origin of implied constitutional damages actions against federal officials, initially for a Fourth Amendment violation. This case remains one of only three Supreme Court-approved Bivens contexts.
Davis v. Passman (1979): Recognized a Bivens remedy for a Fifth Amendment sex-discrimination claim against a Congressman. It anchors the second of the three approved contexts.
Carlson v. Green (1980): Recognized a Bivens remedy for Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference by federal prison officials leading to a prisoner’s death. Murray sought to fit his case within Carlson’s ambit.
Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko (2001): Signaled the Supreme Court’s retreat from expanding Bivens and emphasized separation-of-powers concerns when crafting new damages remedies.
Ziglar v. Abbasi (2017): Reframed Bivens as a “disfavored judicial activity,” introduced the “new context” inquiry, and cataloged what can count as a “meaningful difference” between a plaintiff’s case and the three recognized Bivens contexts. The Eleventh Circuit quotes Ziglar’s instruction that even small differences can suffice.
Hernandez v. Mesa (2020): Reinforced that courts should be highly reluctant to extend Bivens and suggested the original three cases might not be recognized if decided today.
Egbert v. Boule (2022): Clarified that if there is any rational reason to pause before extending Bivens to a new context, courts must not recognize a damages remedy. Crucially, the existence of any “alternative remedial structure” (whether judicial or administrative, and even if it does not provide damages) is a powerful special factor counseling hesitation.
Johnson v. Terry (11th Cir. 2024): Controlling Eleventh Circuit authority squarely on point. Johnson held that federal prisoner deliberate-indifference claims are a new Bivens context because (a) Carlson did not use today’s alternative-remedy analysis, and (b) the injuries alleged were non-fatal and were eventually treated—meaningfully different from Carlson. Johnson also held that the BOP’s ARP is an alternative remedial structure that forecloses a Bivens extension. The panel in Murray expressly applies Johnson “foursquare.”
Robinson v. Sauls (11th Cir. 2024): Cited for the articulation of the “new context” inquiry in the Eleventh Circuit.
Prior panel rule authority: United States v. Archer (11th Cir. 2008) is cited to explain that the panel is bound by Johnson unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court.
Standards of review: Cited authorities include Almanza v. United Airlines (12(b)(6) de novo review), Christmas v. Nabors (sua sponte dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A de novo), and Cannon v. City of West Palm Beach (Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings de novo).

These precedents collectively drive the outcome: the court finds Murray’s claim to be “new” under Ziglar/Egbert as applied through Johnson, and the BOP grievance system serves as the “alternative remedial structure” that forecloses new Bivens damages actions.

Legal Reasoning

The Eleventh Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s two-step Bivens analysis, as synthesized in Egbert and its own decision in Johnson:

New Context: The question is whether Murray’s claim is meaningfully different from the three Supreme Court-recognized Bivens contexts (Bivens, Davis, Carlson). It is not enough that the same constitutional right (Eighth Amendment) and the same general “mechanism of injury” (denial or delay of medical care) are involved. Under Ziglar and Johnson, even small differences that matter will suffice. The panel identified two:
- Doctrinal posture difference: Carlson did not apply the modern “alternative remedial structure” step-one inquiry; today’s landscape, post-Ziglar/Egbert, makes that distinction meaningful.
- Factual difference in the injury: Carlson involved a prisoner’s death after egregiously inadequate care; Murray alleged non-fatal injuries and eventual surgery. Johnson treats that divergence—“the severity, type, and treatment” of the injuries—as meaningful.
Given these differences, Murray’s case arises in a “new Bivens context.”
Special Factors Counseling Hesitation: Under Egbert, if there is any rational reason to think Congress is better positioned than the courts to weigh the costs and benefits of creating a damages remedy, the court must not extend Bivens. The panel found such a reason: the BOP’s administrative remedy program. The ARP exists, and Murray used it. That program qualifies as an “alternative remedial structure” adopted by Congress through the Executive Branch. Recognizing a new Bivens damages remedy would “arrogate legislative power” and allow prisoners to bypass the process Congress has endorsed.

Because the claim fails at the threshold—no cognizable Bivens cause of action—the panel did not analyze whether the allegations plausibly stated an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim on the merits (for example, whether Murray pleaded a serious medical need and subjective deliberate indifference).

Impact

This decision, while unpublished, is an unambiguous application of binding circuit precedent in Johnson and cements, for the Eleventh Circuit, a practical rule of sweeping consequence:

Federal prisoners’ damages claims against individual federal officials for deliberate indifference to medical needs will be treated as presenting a new Bivens context—indeed, Johnson’s step-one reasoning makes virtually any such claim “new.”
The existence of the BOP’s administrative grievance program operates as a special factor at step two, categorically counseling hesitation and foreclosing any extension of Bivens to this context.
Together, these holdings functionally close the door on Bivens damages suits in the Eleventh Circuit for Eighth Amendment medical-care claims against individual federal officials, even when the allegations concern serious (but non-fatal) harm and delayed care.
Plaintiffs must look to alternative avenues: administrative remedies, potential Federal Tort Claims Act suits against the United States for negligence, and forward-looking equitable relief (such as injunctions) where available. But damages in individual-capacity suits under Bivens for these claims will almost invariably fail at the threshold.

The opinion also underscores a broader national trend post-Egbert: courts are exceedingly reluctant to recognize new Bivens contexts. In the Eleventh Circuit, Johnson’s approach makes it especially difficult to fit modern prison medical-care suits within the narrow, aging contours of Carlson.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Bivens: A judge-made damages remedy allowing suits against federal officers in their individual capacities for constitutional violations. The Supreme Court has recognized this remedy in only three contexts (Bivens, Davis, Carlson) and has repeatedly cautioned against expanding it.
New Bivens Context: A case is “new” if it is meaningfully different from one of the three approved contexts. Differences can include the facts, the legal framework, the category of defendants, the injury, the statutory backdrop, or separation-of-powers considerations. Even small differences can suffice.
Special Factors Counseling Hesitation: Reasons courts should refrain from creating a new damages remedy, primarily rooted in separation of powers. If Congress has established any alternative remedial structure—even an administrative grievance system that does not award money damages—courts should not create a new Bivens remedy.
BOP Administrative Remedy Program (ARP): A multi-step grievance system that addresses inmate complaints. While it may not provide monetary damages, its existence demonstrates that Congress and the Executive have crafted a remedial process, which Egbert treats as a sufficient reason to avoid extending Bivens.
Judgment on the Pleadings (Rule 12(c)): A mechanism to resolve a case based solely on the pleadings when there is no material factual dispute and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Sua Sponte Dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A: In prisoner cases, courts must screen complaints and may dismiss them on their own if they fail to state a claim.
Deliberate Indifference (Eighth Amendment): A high bar requiring a serious medical need and proof that officials knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health. The court did not reach this merits inquiry because it found no cognizable cause of action under Bivens.
Prior Panel Rule: In the Eleventh Circuit, panels are bound by earlier published panel decisions (like Johnson v. Terry) unless overturned en banc or by the Supreme Court. Murray’s argument that Johnson was wrongly decided could not prevail at the panel level.

Conclusion

Murray v. Miranda confirms, and operationalizes, the Eleventh Circuit’s post-Egbert landscape: federal prisoners’ Eighth Amendment medical-care damages claims against individual officials are treated as a new Bivens context and are foreclosed by the existence of the BOP’s administrative grievance program. The panel faithfully applies Johnson v. Terry and Supreme Court guidance in Ziglar and Egbert: even small differences from Carlson—such as non-fatal injuries and the modern doctrinal emphasis on alternative remedies—suffice to render the claim “new,” and the ARP supplies a special factor that bars extension.

The practical upshot is decisive. Absent dramatic factual or legal distinctions not present here, federal prisoners in the Eleventh Circuit will not obtain Bivens damages for deliberate-indifference medical claims against individual federal officials. Their recourse lies instead in the administrative process, potential FTCA actions against the United States, and prospective equitable relief where appropriate. Murray underscores the separation-of-powers principle at the heart of modern Bivens jurisprudence: crafting new damages remedies for constitutional violations is a task for Congress, not the courts.