Murphy v. Onondaga County: Causation, Official-Duty Speech, and Procedural Waiver in Public-Employee First Amendment Retaliation Claims

Murphy v. Onondaga County: Causation, Official-Duty Speech, and Procedural Waiver in Public-Employee First Amendment Retaliation Claims

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Docket: No. 24-904
Date: November 18, 2025
Disposition: Summary order affirming grant of summary judgment for all defendants

Note: This is a summary order of the Second Circuit. As the panel itself emphasizes, it has no precedential effect under the Court’s rules, though it may be cited under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1 and can serve as persuasive authority and practical guidance.

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Second Circuit’s summary order in Murphy v. Onondaga County, a § 1983 case in which Kevin Murphy, a former sergeant in the Onondaga County Sheriff’s Department, alleged that various county and law-enforcement officials retaliated against him for engaging in protected First Amendment activity.

The case sits at the intersection of several important strands of constitutional and procedural doctrine:

  • The elements of First Amendment retaliation claims by public employees, including the need to show protected speech, adverse action, and causation;
  • The distinction between speech made as a private citizen and speech made pursuant to official duties (building on Garcetti and applied in the Second Circuit’s Ruotolo decision);
  • The requirement to prove each defendant’s personal involvement in § 1983 cases;
  • The consequences of procedural missteps at summary judgment, including failure to comply with local “statement of material facts” rules and inadequate briefing on appeal; and
  • The role of temporal proximity and evidentiary support in establishing causation for retaliation claims.

Although the order is nonprecedential, it offers a clear application of established doctrines that is particularly instructive for litigants in public-employee speech cases and for practitioners navigating summary judgment practice in the Northern District of New York and the Second Circuit more broadly.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Parties and Core Dispute

Plaintiff-Appellant: Kevin Murphy, formerly a sergeant in the Onondaga County Sheriff’s Department.

Defendants-Appellees (as relevant to this appeal):

  • Sheriff Defendants (all sued individually and in official capacities):
    • Sheriff Eugene Conway
    • Captain Michael Dickinson
    • Lt. Jammie Blumer
    • Lt. Jonathan Anderson
    • Sgt. Joseph Peluso
    • Assistant Chief Roy Gratien
  • County Defendants:
    • Onondaga County
    • Onondaga County Sheriff’s Department
    • Commissioner Carl Hummel
    • District Attorney William Fitzpatrick
    • Assistant District Attorneys Melanie S. Carden and Lindsey M. Luczka

Murphy alleged that these defendants retaliated against him for a series of purportedly protected activities, including:

  • Reporting allegedly improper or unlawful conduct by fellow officers (e.g., a sexual relationship between an officer and a confidential informant; failure of an officer to act on an assault report); and
  • His involvement in a June 2017 incident at a concert involving his wife and a security guard employed by Westcott Security Services, followed by his subsequent investigation into Westcott’s alleged use of unlicensed security guards.

Murphy contended that he was ultimately barred from performing police work and subjected to a grand jury investigation as retaliation for these activities.

B. District Court Proceedings

Murphy originally filed his complaint in October 2018, asserting a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He later amended the complaint in July 2019 to add the County Defendants following a grand jury inquiry into his conduct during and after the June 2017 concert incident.

The district court (Hurd, J.) entered summary judgment in two stages:

  1. February 2024 – Sheriff Defendants: The court granted summary judgment to the Sheriff Defendants after Murphy failed properly to oppose their Statement of Material Facts, as required by the Northern District of New York’s Local Rules. Because Murphy’s response did not comply, the court deemed the Sheriff Defendants’ factual assertions admitted and ruled in their favor on the merits.
  2. April 5, 2024 – County Defendants: As to the County Defendants, the court sua sponte issued an Order to Show Cause why summary judgment should not also be granted in their favor, emphasizing Murphy’s failure to identify any actionable conduct personally attributable to these defendants or to show any causal link between his alleged protected activity and the adverse actions. Murphy responded with a 10-page Statement of Material Facts and voluminous exhibits, including an affidavit, but the district court concluded he had not complied with its instructions, and confined its review to the Statement of Material Facts. It then granted summary judgment for the County Defendants.

Murphy appealed from the April 2024 amended judgment, challenging both the substantive merits and the district court’s handling of the summary judgment process.

III. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Decision

The Second Circuit (Chief Judge Livingston and Circuit Judges Parker and Carney) affirmed the district court’s judgment in full, disposing of the appeal on both procedural and substantive grounds.

A. Sheriff Defendants

  • The Sheriff Defendants argued that Murphy had only appealed the April 2024 order concerning the County Defendants, not the February 2024 order granting summary judgment for them.
  • The panel assumed arguendo that Murphy had properly appealed the February order but held that he failed to show any error in the district court’s decision to deem the Sheriff Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts admitted when Murphy did not comply with the Local Rules.
  • Because Murphy did not meaningfully challenge this ruling or demonstrate why the underlying merits decision was wrong in light of the deemed-admitted facts, the Second Circuit declined to disturb the summary judgment for the Sheriff Defendants.

B. County Defendants

The appellate court addressed two main issues concerning the County Defendants:

  1. Procedural Issue – Alleged Failure to Consider Evidence:
    Murphy argued it was error for the district court to “never read plaintiff’s papers and proceed[] only” on his Statement of Material Facts, allegedly ignoring his attached exhibits.
  2. Merits – First Amendment Retaliation Claim:
    The core substantive question was whether Murphy raised a triable issue of fact under the First Amendment retaliation framework.

The Second Circuit held:

  • Even assuming some procedural irregularity below, Murphy had the opportunity to submit evidence in response to the Order to Show Cause and did so. Under Kowalchuck v. MTA, the absence of procedural prejudice (i.e., no lack of opportunity to present evidence) meant that any putative error would not warrant reversal.
  • Reviewing the entire record on appeal, the court concluded that summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the County Defendants because:
    • Murphy failed to provide sufficient evidence of causation linking his alleged protected speech to the adverse actions; and
    • As to the investigation related to the Westcott incident, Murphy’s activities were conducted in his official capacity as a law-enforcement officer and therefore did not constitute protected First Amendment expression for purposes of a retaliation claim.
  • Additionally, Murphy’s appellate brief did not meaningfully contest the district court’s causation analysis; this constituted waiver under Tolbert v. Queens College.

Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Murphy’s § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against all defendants.

IV. Legal Framework and Reasoning

A. Elements of a First Amendment Retaliation Claim

The panel relied on Wrobel v. County of Erie, 692 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2012), for the standard elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim:

  1. Protected Conduct: The plaintiff must show that the conduct in question—usually speech or expression—is protected by the First Amendment.
  2. Adverse Action: The plaintiff must show that the defendant took an action that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that protected activity.
  3. Causation: There must be a causal relationship between the protected conduct and the adverse action—often phrased as the protected speech being a “substantial or motivating factor” in the adverse action.

In addition, under Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2014), a plaintiff suing under § 1983 must demonstrate the personal involvement of each individual defendant in the alleged constitutional violation; there is no respondeat superior liability.

The Second Circuit assumed arguendo that Murphy could satisfy the elements of personal involvement, protected activity, and adverse action, focusing its analysis on causation and on whether the asserted speech was indeed protected (in the context of official-duty speech).

B. Causation and Temporal Attenuation

Central to the court’s reasoning was a determination that Murphy failed to marshal evidence connecting his alleged protected activities to the actions of the County Defendants, particularly the District Attorney and his staff.

Murphy alleged retaliatory motives tied to events such as:

  • His report that an officer was having a sexual relationship with a confidential informant;
  • His response to an assault report that another officer had allegedly ignored; and
  • His repeated internal complaints about “improper arrests, improper police conduct, citizen complaints and poorly trained personnel.”

However, the court found:

  • No evidentiary link between these alleged internal complaints and the subsequent actions by DA Fitzpatrick and staff (including the grand jury inquiry);
  • A time gap of over two years between much of the alleged protected activity and the adverse actions. The district court had found such a span “far too attenuated to create a jury question on causation,” and the Second Circuit agreed.
  • Murphy’s allegations of causation were largely conclusory: he asserted, without specifics, that the grand jury investigation was retaliatory because he had complained about misconduct.

The Second Circuit endorsed the district court’s analysis that such conclusory assertions, especially given the long temporal gap and lack of concrete tying evidence, were “far from enough to support a reasonable jury determination” that the County Defendants acted with retaliatory motive.

The court cited Cotarelo v. Village of Sleepy Hollow Police Department, 460 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2006), for the proposition that a plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence to allow an inference that the protected speech was a “substantial motivating factor” in the adverse employment action. Murphy’s record failed this standard.

C. Waiver of the Causation Argument on Appeal

Importantly, Murphy’s appellate briefing did not develop a reasoned attack on the district court’s causation determination. The Second Circuit noted that his brief merely acknowledged causation as a necessary element but did not explain why the district court’s analysis was wrong.

Relying on Tolbert v. Queens College, 242 F.3d 58, 75 (2d Cir. 2001), the panel reiterated that an issue is waived on appeal when a party “raises it only in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation.” Here, the absence of any developed causation argument independently doomed Murphy’s appeal as to the County Defendants.

D. Official-Duty vs Citizen Speech: The Westcott Investigation

Regarding the June 2017 concert incident and Murphy’s subsequent investigation into Westcott’s allegedly unlicensed security guards, the panel grappled with whether this activity constituted protected speech.

The record showed that DA Fitzpatrick explicitly stated he investigated whether Murphy’s conduct in relation to the Westcott guards might amount to criminal conduct. Murphy contended that the ensuing grand jury inquiry and related steps were retaliatory.

The Second Circuit held that Murphy’s activities here—investigating Westcott guards, seeking subpoenas and warrants, and conducting related law-enforcement tasks—were actions taken “in his official capacity” as a sergeant in the Sheriff’s Department. The court invoked Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 2008), which itself applies the Supreme Court’s citizen/employee distinction in public-employee speech cases.

Under Ruotolo and the governing Supreme Court doctrine (from Garcetti v. Ceballos, though not named in the order), speech made pursuant to a public employee’s official duties is not protected by the First Amendment for purposes of a retaliation claim. Because Murphy:

  • Never contended that his Westcott-related actions were undertaken as a private citizen rather than as a law enforcement officer; and
  • Appeared to concede that the investigation was part of his official duties,

the Second Circuit concluded that this line of alleged retaliation could not support a First Amendment retaliation claim at all.

E. Lawsuit as Alleged Basis for Retaliation

Murphy also suggested that the grand jury investigation could have been in retaliation for his filing of this lawsuit itself. The Second Circuit referenced Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 108 (2d Cir. 2004), which recognizes that filing a lawsuit can, in some circumstances, constitute protected First Amendment petitioning activity.

However, the panel found that Murphy had not offered sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the grand jury investigation was in fact triggered by or motivated by his private lawsuit as opposed to his on-duty conduct. Thus, even if the lawsuit itself could be protected speech, the evidentiary record did not support the causal nexus necessary for a retaliation claim.

V. Procedural Issues and Standards of Review

A. Summary Judgment Standard – De Novo Review

Relying on Naimoli v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 22 F.4th 376, 381 (2d Cir. 2022), the Second Circuit reiterated that it reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. This means the appellate court:

  • Applies the same legal standard as the district court;
  • Views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (here, Murphy); and
  • Asks whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

B. Local Rules and Deeming Facts Admitted

One of the decisive features of this case was Murphy’s failure to comply with local rules governing summary judgment practice, specifically the requirement to respond properly to the movants’ Statements of Material Facts.

When Murphy did not adequately oppose the Sheriff Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts, the district court deemed those facts admitted. This is a common feature of local rules in federal districts: a party’s failure to properly controvert factual statements (with citations to admissible evidence) permits the court to treat those facts as undisputed for purposes of summary judgment.

On appeal, Murphy did not articulate any meaningful legal or factual argument as to why this was error. Consequently, the Second Circuit left this procedural ruling undisturbed, and the admitted facts effectively controlled the merits analysis as to the Sheriff Defendants.

C. Alleged Procedural Error as to County Defendants: Kowalchuck

Murphy’s principal procedural objection on appeal was that the district court “never read plaintiff’s papers and proceeded only on the Statement of Material Facts” in granting summary judgment to the County Defendants.

The Second Circuit cited Kowalchuck v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 94 F.4th 210 (2d Cir. 2024), which addresses procedural error in summary judgment practice. In Kowalchuck, the plaintiff was found to have been prejudiced because he lacked a fair opportunity to submit evidence before summary judgment was granted against him.

Here, in contrast, Murphy himself acknowledged: “Judge Hurd asked for my evidence and it was provided.” He did, in fact, submit a Statement of Material Facts and hundreds of pages of exhibits in response to the Order to Show Cause.

Thus, the Second Circuit concluded:

  • Murphy had a full opportunity to present evidence in opposition to summary judgment;
  • There was no showing that the outcome would plausibly have been different had the district court more explicitly addressed each exhibit; and
  • Even if the district court’s method was less than ideal, any such error was non-prejudicial, because on de novo review of the entire record, the appellate court agreed that summary judgment was warranted.

Accordingly, the Second Circuit declined to decide definitively whether there was procedural error, reasoning that the absence of prejudice and the correctness of the merits ruling made that question academic.

VI. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Naimoli v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 22 F.4th 376 (2d Cir. 2022)

Cited for the standard of review—summary judgment rulings are reviewed de novo. The case underscores that appellate courts independently reassess the legal conclusions drawn from undisputed or properly established facts.

2. Kowalchuck v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 94 F.4th 210 (2d Cir. 2024)

Cited in connection with procedural due process at summary judgment. Kowalchuck held that a plaintiff suffered procedural prejudice when he was denied a real opportunity to submit evidence prior to the grant of summary judgment. In Murphy, the court distinguished Kowalchuck because Murphy did have and used such an opportunity.

3. Wrobel v. County of Erie, 692 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2012)

Provides the canonical Second Circuit statement of the three elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim: protected speech, adverse action, and causation. Murphy applies this framework and focuses on the causation prong.

4. Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2014)

Cited for the principle that § 1983 plaintiffs must show the personal involvement of each defendant. Although the panel assumed arguendo that Murphy could meet this requirement, the citation emphasizes the individualized nature of § 1983 liability.

5. Cotarelo v. Village of Sleepy Hollow Police Department, 460 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2006)

Used to articulate the requirement that proof of causation in a First Amendment retaliation case must allow a jury to infer that the protected speech was a “substantial motivating factor” in the adverse employment action. In Murphy, the lack of evidence meeting this standard, particularly in light of the extended time lapse and conclusory allegations, was fatal.

6. Tolbert v. Queens College, 242 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2001)

Cited for the rule that issues not adequately briefed on appeal are deemed waived. The court applied Tolbert to find that Murphy had waived any challenge to the district court’s causation analysis because his brief lacked developed argumentation on that issue.

7. Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2008)

At the heart of the official-duty speech issue, Ruotolo reiterates that public employees speaking pursuant to their official duties are not speaking as citizens and thus are not protected by the First Amendment in the Garcetti sense. The Second Circuit in Murphy explicitly relies on Ruotolo to characterize Murphy’s Westcott-related investigatory activities as unprotected official-capacity conduct.

8. Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2004)

Cited to acknowledge that the filing of a lawsuit itself may constitute protected First Amendment petitioning activity in some contexts. However, Murphy distinguishes this scenario on evidentiary grounds—there was insufficient proof that the grand jury investigation resulted from Murphy’s lawsuit rather than from his official conduct.

VII. Complex Concepts Explained (For Non-Specialists)

A. Summary Order and Precedential Effect

A summary order is a non-precedential ruling issued by the Second Circuit. Under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1:

  • Parties may cite summary orders filed on or after January 1, 2007.
  • But such orders do not have binding precedential effect—they do not formally control future cases in the way a published opinion does.
  • They can, however, be persuasive, indicating how the court is likely to apply existing law to similar factual patterns.

B. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is a procedural mechanism allowing a case to be decided without a trial when:

  • There is no genuine dispute over any material fact; and
  • The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The movant (often the defendant in civil rights cases) points to evidence—depositions, documents, affidavits—and argues that, even taking all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor, no reasonable jury could rule for the non-movant.

Local rules typically require the movant to file a Statement of Material Facts, and the non-movant must respond, paragraph by paragraph, with precise citations to evidence. Failure to properly dispute a fact generally results in that fact being deemed admitted.

C. Personal Involvement in § 1983 Cases

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a federal remedy for violations of constitutional rights committed under color of state law. However:

  • There is no vicarious or respondeat superior liability—officials are not automatically liable for the acts of subordinates.
  • A plaintiff must show each named defendant’s personal involvement in the violation (e.g., by direct participation, failure to supervise, policy-setting, or deliberate indifference).

Raspardo elaborates on these pathways to personal liability. In Murphy, the court assumed for the sake of argument that personal involvement could be shown but resolved the case on other grounds.

D. Citizen vs. Employee Speech in Public-Employee Retaliation

Public employees have First Amendment rights, but those rights are limited by their status as government workers. Under Garcetti and Ruotolo:

  • If an employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the First Amendment may protect that speech from employer retaliation (subject to balancing tests).
  • If an employee speaks pursuant to their official job duties—for example, a police officer writing an incident report or conducting an investigation—the speech is treated as part of the job and is not protected for purposes of a retaliation claim.

In Murphy, the court determined that investigating Westcott’s guards and seeking warrants were core job-related tasks, not citizen speech.

E. Temporal Proximity and Causation

In retaliation law, the timing between protected activity and adverse action can support an inference of causation:

  • When adverse action follows very soon after protected speech, courts may infer a retaliatory motive.
  • As the time gap grows longer—especially beyond several months—the inference weakens, and plaintiffs must present additional evidence (statements, patterns of conduct, irregularities) to establish causation.

In Murphy, a gap of more than two years between key alleged complaints and the adverse actions, combined with the absence of other connecting evidence, was deemed too attenuated to create a triable question of causation.

VIII. Practical Impact and Doctrinal Significance

Although this order is not precedential, it illustrates several practical and doctrinal lessons that are likely to influence litigants and lower courts within the Second Circuit.

A. Strictness of Summary Judgment Practice

The decision underscores the high stakes of complying with local summary judgment rules. For plaintiffs:

  • Failure to properly respond to a Statement of Material Facts can be effectively dispositive, because uncontroverted facts are deemed admitted.
  • Even in the face of voluminous exhibits, courts may disregard materials that are not clearly tied to specific factual disputes via the required statements and citations.

For counsel and pro se litigants alike, Murphy is a warning: technical missteps in summary judgment procedure can doom potentially colorable claims.

B. Appellate Waiver Through Inadequate Briefing

The Second Circuit’s reliance on Tolbert to find waiver of the causation argument highlights the importance of developed appellate advocacy. An appellant cannot assume the court will reconstruct or infer an argument not clearly articulated and supported by record citations and legal authority.

Practitioners should take from Murphy that:

  • Every key element of a claim (here, causation) must be explicitly and robustly argued on appeal;
  • Silent or cursory treatment of an issue is tantamount to abandonment of that issue.

C. Evidentiary Demands for Causation in Public-Employee Retaliation Cases

Murphy reinforces the message that conclusory accusations of retaliation, without specific evidence linking protected speech to adverse action, will not suffice at summary judgment:

  • General phrases like “I complained about wrongdoing, and later they retaliated” are inadequate without factual details showing how decision-makers knew of the speech and how it influenced their actions.
  • Lengthy time gaps, without other connecting facts, will rarely survive summary judgment.

D. Continued Strength of the Official-Duty Speech Limitation

The application of Ruotolo underscores the continuing vitality of the official-duty speech limitation in public-employee speech jurisprudence:

  • Even if a public employee believes they are exposing wrongdoing by performing their job conscientiously, that does not transform their on-duty activity into protected citizen speech.
  • Law-enforcement officers, in particular, may find that a large portion of their expressive activity (investigations, reports, recommendations) is categorically unprotected under the First Amendment for purposes of retaliation claims if it is part of their job duties.

This does not mean such conduct has no legal protection—other statutory or contractual protections may exist (e.g., whistleblower statutes, civil service rules)—but it does narrow the First Amendment path.

E. Limited but Real Persuasive Value

As a summary order, Murphy will not formally bind future Second Circuit panels or district courts. Nonetheless, it:

  • Signals how the Second Circuit is likely to apply existing precedents (especially Ruotolo, Cotarelo, and Tolbert) in similar contexts;
  • Provides guidance to district courts, particularly in the Northern District of New York, on handling:
    • Defective summary judgment responses;
    • Orders to show cause in summary judgment contexts; and
    • Challenges to causation in public-employee speech cases.

IX. Conclusion

Murphy v. Onondaga County is a nonprecedential but instructive illustration of several enduring principles in § 1983 and First Amendment litigation:

  • For public-employee retaliation claims, the plaintiff must marshal concrete evidence that:
    • They engaged in speech as a citizen (not merely as part of their job duties);
    • The employer took materially adverse action; and
    • The protected speech was a substantial motivating factor in that adverse action.
  • Causation cannot rest on long-separated events and bare assertions; it demands specific, linking evidence.
  • Procedurally, local summary judgment rules and proper appellate briefing are not mere technicalities—they can and do determine case outcomes.
  • The line between official-duty speech and citizen speech remains a powerful limiting principle: much of what public employees say and do in the course of their employment simply does not receive First Amendment protection against employer discipline.

Murphy’s case ultimately faltered for three interconnected reasons: his failure to comply with summary judgment procedures, his inability to substantiate a causal nexus between his alleged protected activities and the adverse actions, and the official-duty nature of some of the key conduct on which he relied. For practitioners and public employees, the decision provides a clear roadmap of what is required—and what is insufficient—to sustain a First Amendment retaliation claim in the Second Circuit.

Disclaimer: This commentary is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Specific cases may turn on facts and authorities not addressed here.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

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