Muniz v. United States (3d Cir. 2025): The Administrative-Remedy Bar to New Bivens Actions

1. Introduction

Rolando Muniz, a federal inmate, sought damages after an allegedly avoidable toe amputation that he claims resulted from prison officials’ deliberate indifference to his diabetic condition. He sued under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and under §504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed both theories and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit – in a precedential opinion authored by Judge Scirica and joined by Judges Montgomery-Reeves and Restrepo – affirmed.

Muniz argued that his Eighth Amendment claim was indistinguishable from the Supreme Court’s Eighth-Amendment Bivens analogue in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). The Third Circuit disagreed, holding that (1) the presence of the Bureau of Prisons’ Administrative Remedy Program (ARP) creates a new context under the Supreme Court’s modern two-step test for implied damages actions, and (2) that same alternative remedy constitutes a special factor counselling hesitation, independently foreclosing the cause of action. The court also confirmed that sovereign immunity bars damages claims against the United States under the Rehabilitation Act absent an express waiver.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Bivens Claim. Affirms dismissal. The prison ARP is an adequate alternative remedial structure; therefore no new Bivens action can be recognized.
Rehabilitation Act. Affirms dismissal without prejudice: damages claims against the federal government are barred by sovereign immunity.
Standard of Review. Plenary review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal; pleadings viewed most favorably to Muniz.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Bivens (1971). Originated the judge-made damages remedy against federal officers for constitutional violations.
Davis v. Passman (1979) and Carlson v. Green (1980). The only two additional contexts where the Supreme Court has ever allowed a Bivens remedy (gender discrimination under the Fifth Amendment and fatal denial of medical care under the Eighth Amendment).
Ziglar v. Abbasi (2017). Introduced the modern “new-context / special-factors” framework, warning lower courts to extend Bivens only rarely.
Egbert v. Boule (2022). “Tightened” Abbasi: the availability of any plausible alternative remedy alone forecloses a new Bivens action, and steps one and two often collapse into a single inquiry.
Kalu v. Spaulding, 113 F.4th 311 (3d Cir. 2024). Third Circuit precedent holding that the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program is a special factor creating a new context distinct from Carlson.
Other Comparators. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001); Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93 (2020); the Court’s 2025 term decision Goldey v. Fields, 145 S. Ct. 2613, further reinforcing Egbert.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Step One – “New Context” Analysis
The panel compared Muniz’s claim to Carlson under the seven non-exhaustive factors listed in Abbasi. Six factors (rank of defendants, constitutional right, type of conduct, etc.) mirrored Carlson. The seventh factor – potential special factors not previously considered – introduced the decisive difference: the BOP’s ARP, created after the events in Carlson. Under Kalu, the presence of that administrative scheme automatically marks the case as a “new context.”
Step Two – “Special Factors Counselling Hesitation”
Because Congress and the Executive crafted an internal remedy (ARP) for inmates’ grievances, the judiciary should not imply a parallel damages action. Citing Egbert, the court stressed that adequacy of the alternative process is irrelevant; its mere existence suffices to bar judicial creation of a new remedy.
Rehabilitation Act Claim
Following Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187 (1996), the court held that §504 contains no unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity for monetary damages. Muniz sought only money, so the claim fails for lack of jurisdiction (dismissed without prejudice).

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation

Severe Contraction of Carlson-Type Bivens suits. Any Eighth-Amendment medical-indifference claim by a federal inmate that could have been processed through the ARP will likely be dismissed in the Third Circuit.
Deepening Circuit Split. The opinion acknowledges the Ninth, Tenth, and Seventh Circuits’ contrary holdings (Watanabe, Rowland, Brooks) that the ARP does not alone create a new context. A conflict now exists that may invite Supreme Court review.
Practical Consequences for Prisoners. Inmates must exhaust the ARP not merely under the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, but now also as their sole pathway for federal constitutional grievances—unless staff block access, in which case a narrow Carlson action might survive.
Legislative Pressure. The decision re-emphasises that crafting any new damages remedy is a task for Congress; reform advocates may turn to statutory solutions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Bivens action: A lawsuit for money damages directly under the Constitution, without a statute authorising it. Judges imply the cause of action.
New Context: A claim involves a new context if it differs in any meaningful way from the three existing Supreme Court Bivens precedents.
Special Factors Counselling Hesitation: Reasons courts should refrain from creating a remedy, chiefly respect for Congress and separation of powers.
BOP Administrative Remedy Program (ARP): A four-level grievance process (informal resolution, BP-9 warden review, BP-10 regional director, BP-11 central office) that federal prisoners must use before filing suit under the PLRA.
Sovereign Immunity: The United States (and its agencies) cannot be sued for damages unless it clearly waives immunity.

5. Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s opinion in Muniz cements a powerful barrier to new Bivens actions: whenever an administrative avenue crafted by Congress or the Executive exists, federal courts must step aside. Inmates may still pursue relief through the ARP and, if thwarted, may arguably revive Carlson-type claims, but the path is now dramatically narrowed. Combined with other post-Egbert decisions, the case underscores a judicial trend of confining Bivens to history and entrusting any expansion of constitutional tort remedies to Congress.