Gunther R. Lessing, for plaintiffs in error. — Under the Constitution of Texas, article 1, section 28, declaring that no power of suspending laws shall be exercised except by the Legislature, the Legislature has alone the power of suspending the operation of articles 359, 361, 362, 362a, 362b and 363, of the Penal Code, and the Legislature, in exercising the power must make the suspension general and can not suspend said general laws for individual cases, like El Paso, or for any particular locality as the El Paso reservation, nor delegate authority to the city of El Paso to suspend said general laws, whether adjective or substantive, or any of them of the State, as to its prostitutes within certain territory designated within its corporate limits within the State of Texas, nor has the Legislature the power of delegating the suspension of any section or proviso of said laws. Art. 3, sec. 35, Const. of Texas; Malone v. Williams, 103 S.W. 798; Doeppenschmidt v. I. G.N., 101 S.W. 1080; Black's Law Dict., pp. 946, 37 and 691; Covington v. City of East St. Louis, 78 Ill. 548; Gill v. Scowden, 14 Phila., 626; 25 Cyc., 164; Burrill's Law Dict.; Clark v. Eddy, 10 Ohio Dec. (Reprint), 539; 5 Words and Phrases, 4016; State v. Swan, 44 N.W. 492; Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa 488, 54 Am. Rep., 19; 1 Dillon Mun. Corp., par. 75; Const. of Texas 1876, art. 1, sec. 28; Charter of the City of El Paso, sec. 70, par. B, secs. 116 and 110; Brown Cracker C. Co. v. City of Dallas, 104 Tex. 290 [ 104 Tex. 290], 137 S.W. 342; McDonald v. Denton, 132 S.W. 823; Penal Code of Texas, arts. 359 to 362, 363, Rev. Stats., art. 2989, sec. 3, as amended by sec. 1 of the Acts of 1909; Cooley on Const. Lim., 558; Chap. 59, Laws of 1909, entitled "Vagrancy"; Ex parte Garza, 13 S.W. 779, 19 Am. St. Rep., 845; San Antonio v. Schneider, 37 S.W. 767; Burton v. Dupree, 19 Texas Civ. App. 275[ 19 Tex. Civ. App. 275], 46 S.W. 272; Coombs v. State, 38 Texas Cr., 648, 44 S.W. 854; Ex parte Patterson, 58 S.W. 1011; Ballard v. City of Dallas, 44 S.W. 864; Clark v. State, 46 Texas Cr., 566, 81 S.W. 722; Crowley v. City of Dallas, 44 S.W. 865; Ex parte Knox, 39 S.W. 670; Ex parte Wickson, 47 S.W. 643; Leach v. State, 36 Texas Cr., 248, 36 S.W. 471; Ex parte Fagg, 38 Texas Cr., 573, 44 S.W. 294; Bohnny v. State, 21 Texas Cr., 597, 2 S.W. 886; Lynn v. State, 33 Texas Cr., 153, 25 S.W. 779; Ex parte Vance, 42 Texas Cr., 619, 62 S.W. 568; Mantell v. State, 117 S.W. 855; City of Austin v. Cemetery Assn., 28 S.W. 528; Ex parte Solomon, 91 Cal. 440, 27 P. 757; Robinson v. Franklin, 34 Am. Dec., 625; Loeb v. City of Attica, 42 Am. Rep., 494; Hewlett v. Camp, 115 Ala. 499; State v. Godfrey, 54 W. Va. 54, 46 S.E. 185; State v. Clarke, 14 Am. Rep., 471; State v. Oleson, 26 Minn. 507, 5 N.W. 959; In re Baxter, 12 R.I. 13; State v. McCoy, 116 N.C. 1059, 21 S.E. 690. Overruled: Davis v. State, 2 Texas Cr., 425; Hatcher v. City of Dallas, 133 S.W. 914. That portion of the Act of the Legislature of 1907, being House bill No. 10, chapter 132, article 362a, hereinbefore called "The proviso," is null and void, because said proviso is not mentioned in the title of the Act. Article 3, section 35, of the Constitution of Texas. The proviso is not calculated to carry out the declared subject in the title of said Act, and as a matter of fact is contradictory to the declared subject, is inconsistent with the subject of the Act expressed in the title, and not only repeals the Act in certain respects and under certain conditions, but is entirely a new scheme of legislation from that expressed in the title. State v. McCann, 72 Tenn. (4 Lea.), 1, 13; Anderson v. City of Wellington, 40 Kan. 173, 19 P. 719, 723; Singer v. Henneman, 38 Wis. 504; Hedding v. Gallagher, 69 N.H. 650, 45 A. 96, 98, 76 Am. St. Rep., 204; United States v. Harris, 26 Fed. Cas., 185, 193; Otto Gas Eng. Works v. Hare, 64 Kan. 78, 67 P. 444; Fisher v. Brower, 159 Ind. 139, 64 N.E. 614, 618; Packing Co. v. Chicago, 30 Am. Rep., 545; Minturn v. Larue, 64 U.S. (23 How.), 435, 436; City of New York v. Mt. Pleasant Cemetery Co. (N.J.), 33 A. 396, 397; St. Johnsbury v. Thompson, 9 A. 571, 573; The Laundry Cases, 22 Fed., 701, 703; Ex parte Bell, 19 Fla. 608, 614; Richards v. City of Bayonne, 39 A. 708, 709. The invalidity of a proviso does not destroy a law, unless going to show that the law would not have passed without it. This proviso is special, a clause calling for specific municipal action before vitality can be given the proviso, and the void portion is incidental merely to the main statute as is specifically shown by the title of the Act, as well as by the paragraphing thereof. Art. 4689, R.S.; art. 4690, R.S.; Sweeney v. Webb, 33 Texas Civ. App. 324[ 33 Tex. Civ. App. 324], 76 S.W. 776; City of Westport v. McGee, 128 Mo., 152, 30 S.W. 523; People v. Richmond, 59 Mich. 570, 26 N.W. 770; Meyers v. State, 105 S.W. 48; Shelby v. Johnson, Dallam, 600-601; Linn v. State, 2 Tex. 321 [ 2 Tex. 321]; Western Union Tel. Co. v. State, 62 Tex. 633 [ 62 Tex. 633]; Lytle v. Halff, 75 Tex. 138, 12 S.W. 610; Zwernemann v. Von Rosenberg, 76 Tex. 527 [ 76 Tex. 527]; Ex parte Kennedy, 23 Texas Civ. App. 79[ 23 Tex. Civ. App. 79]. There are conditions under which irreparable injury need not be alleged or shown that are exceptions to the rule laid down by the court in its opinion. Thus, where an injunction is sought to abate a nuisance. The rule is even stronger where a crime has been declared a nuisance by statute. Simkins on Equity, p. 746; Railway Co. v. Tait, 63 Tex. 226; Railway Co. v. Davis, 29 S.W. 483; Barbee v. Shannon, 1 Ind. T., 199, 40 S.W. 584; Walker v. Brosius, 90 S.W. 655; Taylor v. Railway Co., 122 Fed., 148; Anderson v. Rowland, 18 Texas Civ. App. 460[ 18 Tex. Civ. App. 460], 44 S.W. 911; Railway Co. v. Miller, 93 S.W. 177; Hockaday v. Wortham, 22 Texas Civ. App. 419[ 22 Tex. Civ. App. 419], 54 S.W. 1094. Where it appears that the party applying for a writ of injunction is entitled to the relief demanded, and such relief, or any part thereof, requires the restraint of some act prejudicial to the petitioner, the injunction should issue. Secs. 17, 19 and 29 of art. 1 of the Constitution of Texas, 1876; Penal Code of Texas, arts. 359-363; Rev. Stats., art. 2989, sec. 3, as amended by sec. 1 of the Act of 1909; Penal Code, art. 362b; City of Austin v. Austin Cemetery Assn., 28 S.W. 528; Lynn v. State, 33 Texas Cr., 153, 25 S.W. 779; Cooper v. City of Dallas, 83 Tex. 239; Railway Co. v. DeGoff, 110 S.W. 1006; Railway Co. v. Hall, 73 Tex. 169; Railway Co. v. Fuller, 63 Tex. 467. Cases from other States having a constitutional guaranty like ours. that "no person's property shall be taken, damaged, or destroyed for, or applied to public use, without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent of such person." United States Supreme Court: Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161. Arkansas: Railway v. Williamson, 45 Ark. 429. California: Reardon v. San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492. Georgia: City of Atlanta v. Green, 67 Ga. 386. Illinois: Railway Co. v. Ayers, 106 Ill. 518; Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445, 67 Am. St. Rep., 224. Kentucky: Shinkle v. Covington, 83 Ky. 420. Louisiana: Manning v. Shreveport, 119 La. 250, 44 So. Rep., 882. Maryland: Henson v. State, 50 Am. St. Rep., 204. Mississippi: Crito v. Dohma, 13 So. Rep., 37. Michigan: People v. Mollette, 44 N.W. 962. Missouri: Householder v. Kansas City, 83 Mo., 488. New Hampshire: State v. Jackson, 42 L.R.A., 440. Nebraska: Omaha v. Struder, 22 Neb. 343; Seifer v. Rose Dillon, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.), 1018. Tennessee: Jones v. Memphis, 47 S.W. 138. West Virginia: Johnson v. Parkersburg, 16 W. Va. 402. Text-books: Wood on Nuisances, 743; 1 High an Injunctions (3rd ed.), secs. 20, 68, 272, 782 and 762, and note; 1 Dillon on Mun. Corp., secs. 373, 378 and note; Cooley on Const. Lim., p. 558; Tied. on Limit. of Police Power, secs. 312, 433 and 434; Suth. on Stat. Con., secs. 322, 324, 370; 2 Greenleaf on Ev., sec. 46. The allegations in appellants' petition are sufficient to entitle them to the writ of injunction for selling, storing, keeping for sale, and dispensing intoxicating liquors on the premises of appellees. Title 6, par. 1, subdiv. 2, p. 232, supplement to Sayles' Texas Civil Statutes, 1908; Paul v. State, 106 S.W. 448. Under the Constitution of Texas, art. 1, sec. 28, providing that no power of suspending laws shall be exercised except by the Legislature, the charter of the city of El Paso of 1907, Special Acts of 1907, chapter 5, can not authorize the city council to set apart a portion of the city where lewd women may ply their vocation, and where they can not be enjoined by suit of these appellants. We submit that the express provision for the regulation and control of bawdy houses in the charter and ordinance clearly contemplates and provides for the "continued existence" of common prostitutes and bawdy houses in the reservation. State v. McCann, 72 Tenn. (4 Lea), 1, 13; Anderson v. City of Wellington, 40 Kan. 173; Hedding v. Gallagher, 69 N.H. 650, 76 Am. St. Rep., 204. The term "regulate" implies the arrangement in proper order, when the State law absolutely prohibits bawds and bawdy houses throughout Texas. U.S. v. Harris (U.S.), 26 Fed. Cas., 185, 193. The synonyms of the word "regulate" are "to govern," "to direct," "to rule," "to conduct." implying and requiring existence. Otto Gas Works v. Hare, 64 Kan. 78; Fisher v. Brower, 159 Ind. 134; Packing Company v. Chicago (Ill.), 30 Am. Rep., 545. To "regulate" bawdy houses does not mean to prohibit them, as commanded by the State law. Minturn v. Larue, 64 U.S. (23 How.), 435, 436; City of New York v. Mt. Pleasant Cemetery (N.J.), 33 A. 396, 397; St. Johnsbury v. Thompson (Vt.), 9 A. 571, 573; The Laundry Cases, 22 Fed., 701, 703. In other words "regulate," in the charter means "provide" or "provide for" prostitutes and bawdy houses in El Paso, and not "prohibit." Ex parte Bell, 19 Fla. 608, 614; Richards v. City of Bayonne (N.J.), 39 A. 708, 709. The trial court had jurisdiction and power to file in this cause the findings of law and fact, because it has jurisdiction over its own record, and may revise, alter, add to, revoke and amend the same as it sees fit during the same term in which the judgment, decree and trial was held, even after an appeal has been taken. Blum v. Wettermark, 58 Tex. 125; Ellis v. Harrison, 24 Texas Civ. App. 13[ 24 Tex. Civ. App. 13], 56 S.W. 292; note, 23 Am. St. Rep., 104; Garza v. Baker, 58 Tex. 488; Bartley v. Conn, 4 Texas Civ. App. 299[ 4 Tex. Civ. App. 299], 23 S.W. 383; Wood v. Wheeler, 7 Tex. 16; Sweeney v. Jarvis, 6 Tex. 39; Chambers v. Hodges, 3 Tex. 517 [ 3 Tex. 517]; Puckett v. Reed, 37 Tex. 308; Milam County v. Robertson, 47 Tex. 222; Briorly v. Clark, 48 Tex. 353; Churchill v. Martin, 65 Tex. 368; Sharp v. Elliott, 70 Tex. 669 [ 70 Tex. 669]; Carlton v. Miller, 2 Texas Civ. App. 619[ 2 Tex. Civ. App. 619], 21 S.W. 699. Under the decisions in Texas, as well as by virtue of article 4663, Revised Statutes of Texas, no injunction shall be dissolved before final hearing, because of a denial of the material allegations of the plaintiff's petition, unless the answer is verified. It is an analogous proposition of law that upon a hearing on notice to show cause why an interlocutory injunction should not be granted pending the final trial, that the writ should not be refused because of an unsworn general denial coupled with verified pleas in confession and avoidance, unsupported by evidence, and especially is this true where the petition shows equity and the burden is on the respondent. Simkins on Equity, p. 755; Love v. Powell, 67 Tex. 910; Hansborough v. Towns, 1 Tex. 58; Daniels v. Daniels, 127 S.W. 569; Smith v. Palo Pinto Co., 128 S.W. 1193; Chemical Co. v. Spell, 120 S.W. 577; Lone Star Lodge v. Cole, 131 S.W. 1180; Dawson v. Baldridge, 118 S.W. 593; Brightman v. Fry, 43 S.W. 60; Woodside v. Railway Co., 184 Fed., 358. The statutes of the State of Texas require the application and answer in proceedings for an interlocutory injunction to be verified. It is true that evidence may be heard on unverified petition or answer in the proceedings on a final hearing; but the courts will not presume that evidence was introduced in support of an unverified plea, and especially is this true in interlocutory proceedings by virtue of said statutes. The presumption is that no evidence was heard unless shown to the contrary by the record. Johnson v. Daniel, 25 Texas Civ. App. 587[ 25 Tex. Civ. App. 587], 63 S.W. 1033; Edrington v. Allsbrooks, 21 Tex. 186; Eccles v. Daniels, 16 Tex. 137. The words "suing for themselves and other citizens and taxpayers of El Paso, Texas," means directly and by implication that the plaintiffs are citizens, and no other construction, can be placed upon such language, and especially is this true where defendants in error have failed to specially except. Cobbs v. Coleman, 14 Tex. 593, 45 Am. Dec., 254, 61 Am. Dec., 588; Harper v. Nichol, 13 Tex. 160; Risewick v. Davis, 19 Mo., 82; Judd v. Lawrence, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.), 531; State v. Trustees, 11 Ohio, 24; Smith v. Birmingham W. Co., 104 Ala. 315; Lumman v. Clark, 22 N.E. 113. Turney Burgess, Beall, Kemp Parker, T.A. Falvey, and Caldwell Sweeny, for defendants in error. — To give the Supreme Court jurisdiction in such cases, the appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals involving these questions must be from a final judgment of the trial court, in a case that the Court of Civil Appeals has appellate, but not final jurisdiction, and where the Court of Civil Appeals has either rendered a judgment affirming the cause, or has reversed and remanded the same. If any of those questions are involved in an interlocutory judgment or appeal, and the Court of Civil Appeals has erred in their judgment, the Supreme Court can always correct the error on an appeal from the final judgment, when rendered, but not before that time on an interlocutory order or judgment rendered in the court below, nor on any interlocutory appeal. Act of 33rd Leg., pp. 107-108; art. 4644, Rev. Civ. Stats. of 1911; arts. 1521 and 1522, Rev. Civ. Stats. of 1911; art 1591, Rev. Civ. Stats. of 1911; art. 1997, Rev. Civ. Stats. of 1911; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 106 S.W. 329; Linn v. Arambould, 55 Tex. 611; Freeman on Judgments, sec. 29; 3 Blackstone's Commentaries, p. 396; First Natl. Bk. of Montague v. Robertson, 85 Tex. 578; Stone v. Stone, 18 Texas Civ. App. 88[ 18 Tex. Civ. App. 88], 43 S.W. 567; Pitman v. Byars, 101 S.W. 789; M.K. T. Ry. Co. v. Allen, 107 S.W. 526. This case was an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals allowed by law during the pendency of the suit before final judgment on the merits, and as to such appeals, the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is final and conclusive as to the law and fact, and a writ of error to the Supreme Court prohibited by law. And the judgment of this trial court not being final no appellate jurisdiction is conferred on the Supreme Court. There being no statement of facts, bill of exceptions or conclusions of facts, the Court of Civil Appeals will examine the pleadings and the judgment and if the latter is such that could be rendered lawfully under any circumstances, will affirm the same. Whitaker v. McGhee, 61 Tex. 219. The new statutory right to an injunction to abate a bawdy house or the sale of liquors without license when plaintiff is not personally damaged in comfort or property is given only to citizens of the State of Texas, and appellants having failed to aver that they are such citizens, the court rightfully refused them a preliminary injunction to abate the supposed bawdy house. Rev. Stats., arts. 4689, 4674; Wood v. Wagnon, 2 Cranch (U.S.), 9; Anderson v. Watt, 138 U.S. 694. Plaintiffs having failed to aver in substance that defendants were engaged in the business of selling intoxicating liquors without first having procured the necessary license and paying the taxes required by law, the court did not err in refusing to enjoin defendants from continuing in a business in which they were not charged to be engaged. Rev. Stats., 1911, art. 4674, sec. 1. The statutes of Texas do not require the defendants' answer, in an application for an interlocutory injunction, to be verified, and defendants' unverified general denial not having been excepted to as unverified, it was sufficient to allow evidence to be heard in support thereof. 22 Cyclopaedia of Law and Procedure, 933; Moses v. Risdon, 46 Iowa 251. The issuance of a preliminary injunction which will put restraints on defendants before the rights of the parties have been fully investigated and tried, rests solely in the discretion of the chancellor, and as a general rule his action will not be reviewed on appeal or otherwise controlled. 10 Encyc. of Pleading and Practice, 983, 988; 22 Cyc. of Law and Procedure, 746; High on Injunction, 2nd ed., vol. 2, sec. 11; Story's Equity Jurisprudence, 13th ed., vol. 2a, sec. 950a. Equity will not at the suit of either the State or an individual abate by injunction either a bawdy house, gambling house, or any criminal thing that does not injure property or civil rights. State v. Patterson, 14 Texas Civ. App. 465[ 14 Tex. Civ. App. 465], 37 S.W. 478; York v. Ysaguaire, 31 Texas Civ. App. 26[ 31 Tex. Civ. App. 26], 71 S.W. 561. Defendants having denied under oath in their answer any injury to plaintiffs, and the trial court by its judgment having found that plaintiffs were not injured in person or property, appellants are not entitled to an interlocutory injunction. Story, Equity Jurisprudence, vol. 2 (13th ed.), p. 228, sec. 924, and note by editor. Even if appellants ever had a right to an injunction to abate a disorderly house injurious to their property, by their long acquiescence, they abandoned their right to the drastic remedy of an interlocutory injunction. 1 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (2nd ed.), secs. 418-419; 2 Pomeroys' Equity Jurisprudence (2nd ed.), sec. 817; 1 High on Injunction (2nd ed.), secs. 7-10; G.H. S.A. Ry. v. DeGroff, 118 S.W. 138. The provision in article 4689, Revised Statutes, that said section shall not be in force in cities incorporated under special acts and regulating bawds by ordinance, is constitutional. Lane v. Bell, 115 S.W. 918. If said provision in article 4689, Revised Statutes, be unconstitutional, its rejection will make the whole article 4689 invalid, as to strike it out would manifestly make the article a wholly different one from that intended by the Legislature. Ex parte Towels, 48 Tex. 427; Gustafson v. State, 40 Texas Cr., 67, 48 S.W. 518; Kimborough v. Barnett, 93 Tex. 301, 55 S.W. 120; W.U. Tel. Co. v. State, 62 Tex. 630. In articles 4689 and 4690, Revised Statutes, it was the intention of the Legislature to give two remedies against bawdy houses, one criminal, coextensive with the State, the other by injunction in those parts of the State not in cities incorporated by special charters, as to which cities those articles did not apply, but the civil law remained in the same state as before their passage. Lane v. Bell, 115 S.W. 920. Neither the Legislature of Texas by the proviso in the last part of Revised Statutes, 4689, nor the city council of the city of El Paso by the ordinance in question, suspended any part of the law of Texas. The criminal law remained in full force, but the new civil remedy of injunction, by the very terms of the law creating it, was not given in cities like El Paso. R.S., 1911, art. 4689; Lane v. Bell, 115 S.W. 920.