Municipal Indemnification and Monell Liability Under Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07

Introduction

Roger Dean Gillispie was convicted of sexual assault in 1991, spent over two decades in a maximum‐security prison, and was finally exonerated in 2011 when his habeas petition revealed suppressed exculpatory evidence. After the State of Ohio dismissed all charges and declared him wrongfully imprisoned, Gillispie filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the detective who assembled the photo line-up (Detective Moore) and Miami Township, Ohio. He alleged constitutional violations arising from suppression of Brady material and suggestive identification procedures. At trial a jury awarded Gillispie $45 million in compensatory damages and found that Detective Moore acted in good faith and within the scope of his duties. Miami Township was later held liable under Ohio’s indemnification statute (Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07) to pay the full amount. All parties appealed various rulings.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court in full. Key holdings include:

Monell supervisory liability claims against Miami Township were properly dismissed: Gillispie failed to show a ratification by a final policymaker or deliberate indifference in training/supervision under Jackson v. City of Cleveland.
The jury’s $45 million award was supported by the evidence of decades-long emotional, reputational, and family‐planning harms and did not “shock the conscience.”
Miami Township had standing to challenge the damage award under Rule 59(e), but the motion for remittitur was appropriately denied.
Miami Township’s late constitutional challenge to Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07(B) was untimely under Rule 5.1 and prejudicial to the State and Detective Moore.
The plain language of Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07 requires a political subdivision to indemnify its employee for the full amount of compensatory damages unless the employee acted in bad faith or outside the scope of employment. The jury’s findings foreclosed those exceptions.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. (436 U.S. 658, 1978) – A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its own policies or customs are the “moving force” behind a constitutional injury, not under respondeat superior.
Canton v. Harris (489 U.S. 378, 1989) – Established the deliberate‐indifference standard for failure-to-train claims.
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati (475 U.S. 469, 1986) – Clarified that ratification requires an official who “establishes final government policy.”
Jackson v. City of Cleveland (925 F.3d 793, 2019) – Enumerated four theories of municipal liability under Monell, including inadequate training and ratification.
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown (520 U.S. 397, 1997) – Defined “deliberate indifference” as a stringent standard requiring proof of disregard of a known or obvious consequence.
Moldowan v. City of Warren (578 F.3d 351, 2009) – Held that bad faith is not required for a Brady claim under § 1983, but has no bearing on Ohio’s indemnification statute.
Ayers v. City of Cleveland (156 N.E.3d 848, 2020) – Confirmed that only an “employee” may seek indemnification under Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07, not a judgment creditor.
Ohio cases on indemnification: McCormack v. Jefferson Area, Strayer v. Barnett, Buckeye Union Ins. v. New England Ins., and Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati – Defined “good faith,” “bad faith,” and “scope of employment.”

Legal Reasoning

1. Monell Claims. Gillispie argued supervisory liability under two Monell theories:

Ratification: He pointed to general compliance with departmental policies, but offered no evidence that a final policymaker specifically approved Moore’s alleged Brady violations or suggestive lineup. Under Pembaur, ratification requires explicit policy-making authority, which was absent.
Inadequate Training/Supervision: He contended the Township provided no guidance on Brady obligations or lineup procedures. The Court found the Township had written guidelines, an academy curriculum, and supervisory review processes. He further failed to show “deliberate indifference” via prior patterns of misfeasance or failure to correct a known problem (Jackson).

2. Damages Review (Rule 59(e)). The $45 million award reflected decades of mental anguish, loss of reputation, family disruption, confinement in a maximum‐security environment, and sex-offender registration. Under Sixth Circuit precedent, a jury may consider “intangible” harms in § 1983 cases. Comparative awards (e.g., Wheatt, Limone) vary widely and are of limited utility. The award neither exceeded proof nor shocked the conscience.

3. Indemnification (Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07).

Good Faith: Ohio law requires “dishonest purpose or conscious wrongdoing” to defeat indemnification. The jury could rationally find that Moore’s errors were reckless or incompetent rather than malicious or fraudulent.
Scope of Employment: Conduct is within scope if “logically related” to official duties and not purely self-serving. All of Moore’s activities took place as part of the criminal investigation, so the jury’s finding was proper.
Statutory Text: Section 2744.07(B)(1) mandates indemnification for any compensatory judgment “unless” punitive or outside the two enumerated exceptions. There is no text limiting payment to what an employee can afford.
Late Constitutional Challenge: Miami Township raised Due Process, Equal Protection, and Supremacy Clause attacks ten months after verdict without Rule 5.1 notice in its original pleading. The Court found the delay prejudicial and refused to entertain those claims.

Impact

• Municipalities in Ohio must indemnify officers for compensatory § 1983 judgments unless the jury or trier of fact finds bad faith or actions manifestly outside the scope of employment.
• Monell claims demand specific proof of policymaker ratification or deliberate indifference tied to past misconduct or predictable harm.
• Late‐stage constitutional challenges to state indemnification statutes face strict timeliness under Federal Rule 5.1.
• Juries retain broad discretion to assess large awards for intangible harms in civil rights cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

42 U.S.C. § 1983: Federal statute allowing lawsuits for constitutional rights violations committed under “color of state law.”
Monell Doctrine: Municipalities are not vicariously liable; a policy or custom must directly cause the violation.
Brady Material: Exculpatory evidence the prosecution must disclose; failure to do so violates due process.
Bad Faith (Ohio): More than negligence—requires conscious wrongdoing or an intent to deceive.
Scope of Employment: Acts an officer reasonably believes further his employer’s business, not personal ventures.
Deliberate Indifference: Municipality’s knowledge of a “known or obvious” risk and failure to act.
Rule 50/J.M.L.O.L.: “Directed verdict” motion arguing insufficient evidence to go to the jury.
Rule 59(e): Motion to alter or amend a judgment, including remittitur of excessive verdicts.
Rule 5.1: Requires prompt notice to the attorney general when challenging a statute’s constitutionality.

Conclusion

Gillispie v. Miami Township clarifies that Ohio political subdivisions face indemnification liability for compensatory § 1983 judgments unless an officer’s conduct is proven in bad faith or beyond official duties. Monell supervisory claims demand targeted evidence of policy‐maker ratification or deliberate indifference in training. Large jury awards for life-altering harms in wrongful‐imprisonment cases remain within the jury’s prerogative. Finally, parties must timely invoke Rule 5.1 when contesting a state statute’s constitutionality or forfeit the defense.