Municipal Incorporation and the Doctrine of Mootness in Land-Use Referendum Litigation:
A Comprehensive Commentary on Haney v. Tooele County, 2025 UT 30

1. Introduction

Haney v. Tooele County (2025 UT 30) presents the Utah Supreme Court’s newest explication of the mootness doctrine in the specific context of local land-use referenda. A citizen group, hoping to preserve agricultural land in the unincorporated community of Erda, attempted to place a county rezoning ordinance on the ballot. Their petition fell short of the signature count imposed by the county clerk, and litigation ensued. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, a pivotal factual change had occurred: the territory in question had been incorporated as the City of Erda, which assumed exclusive zoning authority.

The justices unanimously dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that once the new municipality took over, the courts could no longer give the sponsors any meaningful relief, even if every legal contention they raised were accepted. Although the outcome turned on mootness, the opinion contains important guidance on standing, vested rights, and the timing of referendum challenges—all of which will influence future land-use, election, and constitutional litigation in Utah.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Matter before the Court: Direct appeal from district-court orders (i) granting summary judgment to Tooele County on statutory claims and (ii) granting judgment on the pleadings to Governor Spencer Cox on constitutional claims.
• Core holding: The case became moot when the property at issue entered the newly incorporated City of Erda, depriving Tooele County of zoning authority; consequently, no court-ordered referendum could afford the petitioners effective relief.
• Relief granted: None. The appeal was dismissed.
• Opinion by: Justice Petersen (unanimous).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court anchored its decision in a line of Utah cases distinguishing standing from mootness and defining the limits of justiciability:

1. Grewal v. Junction Market Fairview, L.C., 2024 UT 20 – clarified that courts independently evaluate mootness (a question of law) even if not addressed below.
2. Teamsters Local 222 v. Utah Transit Authority, 2018 UT 33 – reiterated that a case is moot if “the relief requested is rendered impossible or of no legal effect.”
3. Salt Lake City Corp. v. Utah Inland Port Authority, 2022 UT 27 – explained that a controversy may become moot when later events eliminate the dispute.
4. Natalie R. v. State, 2025 UT 5 – synthesized the three classic standing elements (injury, causation, redressability), providing contrast to mootness doctrine.
5. Cedar Mountain Environmental, Inc. v. Tooele County, 2009 UT 48 (as modified) – recognised that standing is measured at filing, whereas mootness can arise thereafter.
6. Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980) – seminal Utah case on vested rights in zoning, invoked by the sponsors in arguing that developer rights might hinge on repeal of the ordinance.

These precedents collectively supplied the doctrinal framework. The Court drew particularly on Teamsters and Salt Lake City Corp. to frame mootness as a question of present remedial capacity. Natalie R. and Cedar Mountain served to mark the conceptual boundary between standing (assessed at inception) and mootness (arising from subsequent events).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Change in factual landscape: The incorporation of Erda in January 2022 transferred all land-use jurisdiction from Tooele County to the new city under Utah Code § 17-27a-102(1)(b). Consequently, the challenged county ordinance no longer governed the property.
2. Redressability analysis: Even if the Court ordered the referendum, a successful vote would repeal the ordinance prospectively only (§ 20A-7-611(1)), and would have no legal effect on current Erda zoning or on any vested development rights that may have accrued post-2021. Therefore, no “meaningful relief” was possible.
3. Standing vs. Mootness: Although the appellees framed their argument as lack of standing, the Court re-characterised it as a mootness objection, because the sponsors clearly had standing when they filed; the inability to provide relief arose only after the new city was created.
4. Vested-rights digression: The sponsors’ theory that a referendum victory would extinguish a developer’s vested rights was rejected as speculative and unsupported. Moreover, neither the developer nor the City of Erda was a party, foreclosing adjudication of those rights in this lawsuit.
5. Prospective nature of referenda: The Court underscored that Utah’s referendum procedure suspends an ordinance only if the petition is timely declared sufficient. Once in effect, an ordinance remains operative until repealed, and any repeal works only going forward.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

• Practical caution for referendum sponsors: Citizen groups must now account for the possibility that annexations or incorporations will gut their desired remedy. Speed, completeness in signature gathering, and the inclusion of potential successor jurisdictions as parties will be strategic necessities.
• Guidance for local governments: Counties and municipalities have clearer authority to invoke mootness when jurisdiction shifts during litigation. This decision may shorten land-use controversies and reduce litigation exposure when boundary changes intervene.
• Clarification of Utah justiciability doctrine: By meticulously separating standing and mootness, the Court provided a template for lower courts and litigants confronted with mid-case factual shifts.
• Effect on vested-rights jurisprudence: Although the Court left substantive vested-rights questions unaddressed, its dicta emphasise that referendum-based repeal alone will rarely reach back to disturb rights vested during an ordinance’s effective period. Developers may perceive greater security once an ordinance is operative.
• Broader constitutional implications: The sponsors’ First-Amendment and state-constitutional claims against the Governor were never reached. Future litigants challenging emergency measures will need to frame claims that are not vulnerable to mootness in the face of evolving factual environments.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Mootness

A lawsuit becomes moot when events occur that make it impossible for a court to grant the plaintiff any practical relief. Courts refrain from issuing advisory opinions on moot questions.

Standing v. Mootness

Standing exists (or not) at the moment a suit is filed; it requires injury, causation, and redressability. Mootness can arise later, if circumstances change so that redressability disappears.

Referendum (Local)

A direct-democracy procedure allowing local voters to approve or repeal a newly enacted law. In Utah, if a petition is timely declared sufficient, the law is suspended until the election.

Incorporation

The legal process by which an unincorporated area becomes a city or town. Upon incorporation, municipal powers such as zoning automatically shift from the county to the new city.

Vested Development Rights

A developer acquires a right to proceed under existing zoning ordinances once it submits a complete application that complies with those ordinances and diligently pursues approval, unless a compelling public interest justifies denial (Western Land Equities).

5. Conclusion

Haney v. Tooele County does not alter substantive zoning or election law, but it cements an important procedural rule: When municipal incorporation divests a county of regulatory authority, pending referendum litigation aiming to overturn the county’s ordinance will ordinarily become moot because no court can grant meaningful relief. The decision’s careful doctrinal parsing of standing and mootness, coupled with its practical guidance on redressability, will shape future strategies for citizen activists, developers, and government lawyers alike. Ultimately, Haney underscores a recurring theme in public-law litigation: achieving an effective remedy often hinges as much on timing and jurisdictional foresight as on substantive legal merit.