Municipal Inaction Toward DEI/Implicit-Bias Trainings Can Constitute a Monell Policy Creating a Hostile Work Environment: Commentary on Chislett v. N.Y.C. Department of Education (2d Cir. 2025)

Introduction

In Chislett v. N.Y.C. Department of Education, No. 24-972-cv (2d Cir. Sept. 25, 2025), the Second Circuit addressed whether a public employer’s equity agenda and mandatory implicit-bias trainings, along with supervisors’ responses to ensuing workplace conduct, can expose a municipality to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell for a racially hostile work environment. The plaintiff, a Caucasian executive director in the New York City Department of Education’s Office of Equity & Access (OEA), alleged three theories of Equal Protection race discrimination: (1) demotion pursuant to a race-driven municipal policy; (2) a racially hostile work environment, largely fostered by implicit-bias programming and tolerated by supervisors; and (3) constructive discharge.

The district court granted summary judgment to the Department and then-Chancellor Richard Carranza, principally concluding that plaintiff failed to connect any municipal policy to her alleged harms. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part: it sustained summary judgment on the demotion and constructive discharge theories, but held that the hostile work environment claim presented genuine disputes of material fact—both as to severity/pervasiveness and as to municipal policy by inaction—requiring a trial.

The opinion situates long-standing Monell doctrine in a contemporary setting: diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives and implicit-bias trainings. It underscores that such trainings are not per se discriminatory, but that how they are conducted—and how management responds to complaints about their content and spillover effects—can produce a race-based hostile environment attributable to a municipal “policy or custom,” including one proved by inaction.

Summary of the Opinion

Demotion claim: Affirmed summary judgment for defendants. Applying the McDonnell Douglas framework as adapted to § 1983, the court held that once the employer articulated non-discriminatory reasons (leadership concerns and team dysfunction) for removing supervisory duties, the prima facie presumption “dropped from the case.” Plaintiff failed to adduce evidence from which a jury could find race was the but-for cause of the action.
Hostile work environment claim: Vacated summary judgment. Viewing the “totality of the circumstances,” a reasonable jury could find the workplace was objectively hostile to the plaintiff on the basis of race (e.g., repeated negative stereotyping of “white culture,” physical “privilege” line-ups, and frequent use of racialized accusations in daily workplace interactions), and that the employer’s consistent non-response to complaints could amount to a municipal policy or custom of acquiescence sufficient for Monell liability.
Constructive discharge claim: Affirmed summary judgment. The record did not support that the employer intentionally created conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign, a standard higher than that for a hostile environment.
Disposition: Affirmed in part (demotion; constructive discharge), vacated in part (hostile work environment), and remanded for further proceedings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978): Establishes that a municipality is liable under § 1983 only when a policy or custom is the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation, not under respondeat superior. The panel leans on Monell’s framework to require proof that the hostile environment flowed from a DOE policy or custom—here, potentially a custom of inaction.
Board of County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997): Confirms that customs need not be formally approved; a widespread practice can have the force of law. This supports the court’s acceptance that tolerance of racially charged trainings and repeated inaction could be a “custom.”
Sorlucco v. N.Y.C. Police Department, 971 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1992): Recognizes that persistent and widespread discriminatory practices and constructive acquiescence by policymakers can establish a custom. The opinion borrows this framing to infer policy from alleged tolerant awareness.
Cash v. County of Erie, 654 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2011), and Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2007): Clarify that a municipal policy can consist of “inaction” when officials are on notice of misconduct and do nothing. This is central: plaintiff’s evidence of repeated complaints to multiple supervisory officials with no corrective action sustains a triable Monell claim.
Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2000): Causation under Monell is a question of fact for the jury. The court invokes Jeffes to underscore that whether senior officials’ conduct caused the injury is for jurors.
Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015): Applies Title VII frameworks to § 1983 Equal Protection claims and emphasizes totality-of-circumstances assessment. The panel uses Littlejohn both for the McDonnell Douglas architecture and the hostile environment totality approach.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993): Together delineate the burden-shifting regimen and the dropping away of the presumption once the employer articulates a non-discriminatory reason. The court applies these to the demotion claim, stressing that the ultimate burden remains with plaintiff.
Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services, 605 U.S. 303 (2025): Reaffirms a flexible fourth prong for the prima facie case and moves away from rigid formulations. The panel cites Ames to explain the evolving prima facie frame and the need to consider context.
Naumovski v. Norris, 934 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2019): Requires “but-for” causation under § 1983 employment discrimination, a more exacting standard than Title VII’s motivating-factor standard. This heightened causation requirement helps sustain summary judgment on demotion.
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 2002): Define the “severe or pervasive” hostile environment threshold and the “extraordinarily severe” single-incident alternative. These provide the doctrinal yardsticks for evaluating the trainings and workplace remarks.
Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2004): Confirms that pervasive discriminatory conduct can establish a custom; also emphasizes that whether incidents of harassment alter working conditions is often for juries. The panel quotes Patterson to caution against resolving such disputes as a matter of law.
Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2014); Richardson v. NYS DOCS, 180 F.3d 426 (2d Cir. 1999): Require both subjective and objective hostility and reinforce totality analysis. The court assumes subjective hostility and focuses on the objective question, given the volume and tenor of the conduct.
Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Center, 957 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1992); Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2013): For coworker/non-employee harassment, the employer is liable if it knew and did nothing or provided no reasonable avenue to complain. The panel uses this standard to assess imputation and, by extension, Monell policy by inaction.
Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2004); Gorzynski v. JetBlue, 596 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010); Williams v. NYCHA, 61 F.4th 55 (2d Cir. 2023): Support that supervisory awareness coupled with non-action can suffice to impute harassment to the employer and preclude summary judgment.
Matusick v. Erie County Water Auth., 757 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 2014); Lucente v. County of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284 (2d Cir. 2020): Recognize Monell liability where pervasive harassment proceeds with management’s tacit authorization or acquiescence. These authorities directly support sending DOE’s alleged inaction to a jury.
Rasmy v. Marriott Int’l, 952 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 2020); Cruz v. Coach Stores, 202 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 2000): Conduct not directed at the plaintiff, but occurring in her presence, can contribute to a hostile environment. The court relies on these to include “white adjacent” comments about a colleague in the analysis.
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002): Hostile environment claims are based on the cumulative effect of individual acts. The panel’s totality approach follows Morgan.
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring/dissenting); Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2012); Okin v. Village of Cornwall-on-Hudson, 577 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2009); Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1980): Elaborate when notice plus repeated non-response amounts to tacit authorization—key to transforming repeated failures to address complaints into a “policy.”
Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004); Fincher v. DTCC, 604 F.3d 712 (2d Cir. 2010); Serricchio v. Wachovia, 658 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2011): Articulate the elevated standard for constructive discharge—intentional creation of intolerable conditions—which the evidence here did not meet.
Vavra v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 688 F. Supp. 3d 758 (N.D. Ill. 2023), aff’d, 106 F.4th 702 (7th Cir. 2024), and De Piero v. Penn State Univ., 711 F. Supp. 3d 410 (E.D. Pa. 2024): Recent cases at the intersection of DEI/implicit-bias programming and discrimination law. The panel cites them to emphasize two points: such trainings are not per se unlawful, but persistent essentialist and negative race-based messaging can risk liability.

Legal Reasoning

1) Demotion Claim: Presumption Drops; But-For Causation Not Shown

The court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework as adapted to § 1983 claims. After the DOE articulated non-discriminatory reasons—that a leadership coach gathered a near-consensus of feedback that plaintiff’s leadership style was ineffective and “created chaos,” plus unprofessional conduct—the initial presumption of discrimination dropped out of the analysis (Burdine; Hicks).

At that point, plaintiff had to present evidence permitting a finding that her race was the but-for cause of the removal of supervisory duties (Naumovski). She did not. The court credited that negative feedback was admissible not for the truth of accusations (ineffectiveness), but for its effect on the decision-maker (McPherson v. NYCDOE). Plaintiff presented no evidence that the individuals who made the decision to strip responsibilities were motivated by racial bias or knew feedback was tainted by anti-white bias. On that record, summary judgment was appropriate.

Importantly, the panel cautioned that an employer’s proffered reason need not be “legitimate” in some abstract sense; it need only be non-discriminatory with respect to the protected characteristic. The example given—firing prompted by bribery—illustrates that the burden of production is to state a non-discriminatory reason, after which the presumption disappears and the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination.

2) Hostile Work Environment: Sufficient Evidence; Municipal Policy by Inaction

The Second Circuit held that the record, viewed most favorably to plaintiff, allowed a jury to find the workplace was objectively hostile and that the hostility was “because of” race. It highlighted:

Content of trainings: repeated assertions that “white culture” is “supremacist,” “paternalist,” “entitled,” and “privileged”; powerpoints on “white supremacy culture” traits (e.g., perfectionism, sense of urgency, objectivity); a “privilege” line-up physically separating employees by race and perceived privileges; and facilitators telling plaintiff her pursuit of excellence reflected “white supremacy.”
Spillover into daily work: subordinates accusing plaintiff of acting from “white privilege” and “white supremacy” in response to ordinary supervision, calling her “white and fragile,” or labeling colleagues “white dominant” or “slave master.”
Frequency and persistence: ongoing meetings with monthly “race” conversations, repeated incidents over many months (2018–2019), and corroboration by coworkers who viewed the environment as hostile to white employees.

The court explicitly rejected the argument that statements made “in the context of” anti-bias work are insulated from hostile environment scrutiny. Purpose does not immunize content. Nor is there a “magic number” of incidents. The totality could permit a jury to find the conduct severe or pervasive enough to alter working conditions (Harris; Richardson; Patterson).

Imputation to employer: Some remarks came from supervisors, which are automatically imputable (Gorzynski). For coworker conduct, plaintiff adduced evidence that supervisors were repeatedly notified and failed to intervene, thus satisfying the “knew and did nothing/no reasonable avenue for complaint” test (Kotcher; Feingold; Williams).

Monell policy or custom: The key move is recognizing that repeated, informed non-response by senior officials can itself be a municipal policy of inaction (Cash; Sorlucco). Plaintiff presented evidence that: she repeatedly complained to a leadership coach, a senior executive director, a deputy chancellor, and operations leadership; post-session surveys were collected; senior officials had “upward” conversations reporting to the Chancellor; and some supervisors voiced confidence that “this Chancellor truly has our back.” Yet, there was no corrective action; instead, plaintiff was told the trainings would not change, and even attempts to arrange private discussions were scuttled.

On that record, a jury could infer a DOE custom of acquiescing to race-based harassment of white employees in trainings and in daily interactions, thereby satisfying Monell’s policy or custom requirement (Lucente; Matusick; Jones; Okin; Turpin). The panel emphasized it was unnecessary to show that Carranza personally designed or attended every session: it suffices that senior policymakers created, supervised, or tolerated a regime under which the unconstitutional practices occurred (Back; Herrera).

The court also took care to say implicit-bias/DEI programming is not inherently unlawful (Vavra); the problem is when training content and implementation adopt a “constant drumbeat of essentialist, deterministic, and negative language” about a race such that it crosses into discrimination (De Piero), and leadership then ignores ensuing complaints.

3) Constructive Discharge: A Higher Bar Not Met

Constructive discharge requires proof that the employer intentionally created conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign (Suders; Green; Serricchio), a standard “higher than” hostile environment (Fincher). Although plaintiff’s working conditions could be found hostile, the record did not support the required intent or degree of intolerability. Summary judgment was therefore appropriate.

Impact and Likely Reach

1) DEI/Implicit-Bias Programming in Public Agencies

Not per se unlawful: The Second Circuit reaffirms that requiring anti-bias training does not, in itself, violate federal law.
Content and facilitation matter: Repeated essentialist and negative stereotyping of a race, physically segregating or ranking employees by “whiteness,” or singling employees out for chastisement premised on race can create hostile environment exposure.
Oversight and response are critical: When complaints surface, inaction by senior officials risks converting sporadic problems into a Monell “custom” of acquiescence. Agencies must promptly investigate, adjust training content or facilitation, and address spillover conduct in the workplace.

2) Hostile Environment and Monell by Inaction

Doctrinal clarification: The court squarely applies “Monell by inaction” to a hostile work environment allegedly emanating from DEI programming. Pervasive harassment plus notice and non-response can equal policy or custom.
Discovery implications: Plaintiffs will seek post-session surveys, facilitator materials, complaint logs, coaching notes, internal emails, and “upward” reporting to policymakers (e.g., Chancellor). Defendants should preserve, produce, and be ready to show timely corrective measures.
Summary judgment posture: Where a plaintiff offers a “mosaic” of incidents over time, corroboration by peers, and repeated notice to management, courts are less likely to grant summary judgment (Patterson; Rivera; Vega).

3) Symmetry of Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause protects all races. This case underscores that “reverse” (anti-white) hostile environment claims are cognizable where evidence shows harassment because of race and employer knowledge with acquiescence. The panel’s careful note that merely calling someone a “racist” is not itself race discrimination reflects sensitivity to doctrinal boundaries, but the surrounding essentialist “whiteness” framing can tip the analysis.

4) § 1983 Versus Title VII

Causation: § 1983 requires but-for causation (Naumovski), unlike Title VII’s motivating-factor standard in some contexts.
Employer liability: Title VII can impose vicarious liability for supervisors under Faragher/Ellerth; § 1983 requires a Monell policy or custom for municipal entities.
Practical effect: Plaintiffs in public employment cases must connect hostile environments to policy/custom, including by proving inaction in the face of notice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Monell liability: A city is not automatically liable for employees’ wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show a city policy or widespread practice caused the harm. A “policy” can be written rules, decisions by a final policymaker, or a consistent failure to act despite known problems (inaction).
“Policy by inaction”: If leaders are repeatedly told about harassment and do nothing, juries can conclude the inaction itself is the city’s policy.
Hostile work environment: Workplace conduct is unlawful if it is because of a protected trait (like race) and is so severe or pervasive that it changes the conditions of employment, viewed from both the victim’s perspective and that of a reasonable person.
Imputation: If a supervisor harasses you, the employer is generally responsible. If coworkers do it, the employer is liable only if it knew or should have known and failed to act.
McDonnell Douglas: A three-step framework. Plaintiff makes a basic showing of discrimination; employer states a non-discriminatory reason; plaintiff must then show intentional discrimination (and, in § 1983, that the discrimination was the but-for cause).
Constructive discharge: Quitting can count as being fired if the employer deliberately makes work so unbearable that a reasonable person would feel forced to resign. It is harder to prove than a hostile work environment.

Practical Takeaways for Public Employers and Counsel

Audit training content: Avoid essentialist labeling of any race with uniformly negative traits; avoid exercises that physically segregate, rank, or single out employees by race; ensure facilitators are trained to keep discussions non-accusatory and policy-compliant.
Provide and publicize complaint avenues: Multiple reporting channels; anti-retaliation assurances; clear, prompt, documented responses.
Respond, don’t tolerate: Investigate complaints, adjust training materials or facilitators, mediate team conflicts, and take corrective action where lines are crossed. Document all steps.
Train supervisors: On what constitutes race-based harassment (including “spillover” from trainings), how to de-escalate and when to intervene, and how to escalate concerns.
Preserve evidence of oversight: Keep post-session surveys, agendas, facilitator instructions, and communications up and down the chain of command to show proactive monitoring and adjustments.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s decision in Chislett charts a careful path through the modern landscape of DEI in public employment. It reaffirms familiar doctrines—McDonnell Douglas burdens, but-for causation for § 1983, and the demanding constructive discharge standard—while clarifying that hostile environment claims rooted in the content and implementation of implicit-bias trainings can proceed where the record reflects pervasive, race-based messaging, spillover harassment in daily work, and repeated supervisory inaction.

The central contribution is not a departure from Monell but a concrete application: municipal “policy” can manifest as persistent non-response to known racially hostile conduct occurring in and around DEI programming. Trainings are not immune from scrutiny; their legality depends on how they are conducted and how complaints are handled. For municipalities, this opinion is a reminder that aspirational equity goals must be matched by lawful execution and responsive oversight. For litigants and courts, it underscores that the existence of a hostile environment and a Monell custom of acquiescence commonly present fact questions for juries, not judges on summary judgment.