Municipal § 1983 Liability Requires a Pleaded Policy/Custom; Recusal Cannot Rest on Adverse Rulings and Unbriefed Claims Are Abandoned on Appeal (11th Cir.)

1. Introduction

In Carolyn Wright v. City of Atlanta, No. 24-11886 (11th Cir. Jan. 28, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of a pro se civil action brought by Carolyn Wright against the City of Atlanta and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Georgia (including related corporate entities).

Wright alleged that the City offered her a court clerk position, then rescinded the offer after realizing it intended to hire a different individual with the same name. She further alleged her personal information was used to create a health insurance account and was “merged” with and exposed to the other “Carolyn Wright.” Based on these events, Wright asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ERISA, HIPAA, and IRCA, among other theories.

On appeal, Wright principally argued (1) the district judge should have recused himself for bias and (2) the case was wrongly dismissed. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the recusal argument, held that several claim-types were abandoned on appeal, and affirmed dismissal of the remaining § 1983 claim for failure to plead municipal liability under Monell.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Recusal: No reversible error. Alleged bias was based on the judge’s rulings and case management, which “almost never” support recusal absent extrajudicial bias or pervasive prejudice. (Liteky v. United States).
Dismissal / merits: The court affirmed dismissal of Wright’s federal claims. Challenges to dismissal of ERISA, HIPAA, and IRCA claims (and a discussed § 1981 theory) were deemed abandoned due to inadequate appellate briefing.
§ 1983 (City of Atlanta): Affirmed dismissal because the complaint failed to allege a City “policy, custom, or practice” causing a constitutional deprivation, as required for municipal liability. (Hoefling v. City of Miami; Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.).
Other points: Criminal identity-theft statute 18 U.S.C. § 1028A provides no civil cause of action (Hanna v. Home Ins. Co.), and denial of default judgment is not reversible where the complaint fails to state a claim (Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp.).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Recusal framework (28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455)

United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2004): Used for the standard of review (generally abuse of discretion) and the key principle that bias must stem from extrajudicial sources unless the judge’s acts show pervasive bias.
Jenkins v. Anton, 922 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2019): Supports the proposition that when a party fails to seek recusal in the district court, appellate review is “arguably only for plain error.”
United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2003): Organizes § 455 into (a) “appearance of impropriety” and (b) enumerated circumstances showing “fact of partiality,” and supplies the “objective, disinterested, lay observer” test.
Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1988): Quoted (via Patti) for the “objective observer” test assessing significant doubt as to impartiality.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994): Central to the holding that “judicial rulings alone almost never” justify recusal.
United States v. Bailey, 175 F.3d 966 (11th Cir. 1999): Quoted (via Berger) for the extrajudicial-source rule and the “pervasive bias and prejudice” exception.
In re Moody, 755 F.3d 891 (11th Cir. 2014): Reiterates that doubts should be resolved in favor of recusal, while warning against recusal based on “unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation.”
United States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1986): Source for the caution that judges should not recuse based on speculation.

B. Pleading and dismissal standards

Watts v. Joggers Run Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 133 F.4th 1032 (11th Cir. 2025): Cited for de novo review of dismissal and taking factual allegations as true with favorable inferences to the plaintiff.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): Supplies the plausibility requirement—facts must support a reasonable inference of liability.

C. Pro se construction and substance-over-label

United States v. Webb, 565 F.3d 789 (11th Cir. 2009) and Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 1998): Cited for liberal construction of pro se filings (explaining the panel’s approach to treating two “amended complaints” together).
Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334 (1963): Supports looking past document titles to the substance of claims.

D. Appellate abandonment / waiver by inadequate briefing

Irwin v. Hawk, 40 F.3d 347 (11th Cir. 1994): Basic authority that an issue may be abandoned if not challenged on appeal.
Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014) and Singh v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 561 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2009): Explain abandonment through “passing references” or perfunctory argument without authority.
Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004): Holds abandoned issues are not considered absent “exceptional” circumstances.
Big Top Koolers, Inc. v. Circus-Man Snacks, Inc., 528 F.3d 839 (11th Cir. 2008) and Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870 (11th Cir. 2008): Stand for the rule that arguments cannot be raised for the first time in a reply brief, including for pro se litigants.

E. ERISA, HIPAA, IRCA disposition (via abandonment and underlying district-court reasoning)

Wright v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Georgia, No. 1:23-cv-00409, 2024 WL 2975757 (N.D. Ga. May 16, 2024): Referenced for the district court’s conclusion that the plan at issue was exempt from ERISA and that Wright failed to state a viable ERISA claim.
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 486 (1996): Quoted by the district court (as recounted on appeal) for ERISA equitable relief principles.
Wright v. City of Atlanta, No. 1:23-cv-00409, 2024 WL 6951601 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 16, 2024): Referenced for the district court’s conclusion that allegations were insufficient under IRCA pleading requirements.

F. Harmless error, default judgment, and service-related points

Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. STME, LLC, 938 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2019): Cited for applying harmless-error principles in civil cases.
Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1997): Quoted for the rule that “a default judgment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim.”

G. Criminal statutes, binding precedent, supplemental jurisdiction

Hanna v. Home Ins. Co., 281 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1960): Cited for the proposition that Title 18 criminal provisions provide no civil remedies.
Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc): Establishes former Fifth Circuit decisions (pre-Oct. 1, 1981) are binding in the Eleventh Circuit.
Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733 (11th Cir. 2006): Provides standard of review for supplemental jurisdiction decisions.
Dynes v. Army Air Force Exch. Serv., 720 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1983): Notes dismissals without prejudice are rarely abuses of discretion because claims can be refiled.

H. Municipal liability under § 1983

Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2016): Applied to require allegations that the City had a policy, custom, or practice causing the constitutional injury.
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978): The foundational rule that municipalities are not vicariously liable under § 1983; liability requires an official policy/custom causing the violation.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Why recusal was rejected

The panel treated Wright’s recusal theory as grounded in alleged misstatements, perceived unequal application of procedural rules, and adverse rulings (including default-judgment and service disputes). Applying the recusal statutes and governing case law, the court reasoned:

Under 28 U.S.C. § 144, recusal requires a timely and sufficient affidavit showing personal bias or prejudice. Wright did not pursue recusal until after judgment, which also implicated the appellate “plain error” approach described in Jenkins v. Anton.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), the question is whether an objective, informed observer would harbor significant doubt as to impartiality (United States v. Patti; Parker v. Connors Steel Co.). The panel found no such doubt on this record.
Under § 455(b), recusal is mandatory when enumerated circumstances show actual partiality; Wright alleged no extrajudicial bias, and the record did not reflect pervasive prejudice.
Critically, the panel invoked Liteky v. United States: adverse judicial rulings “almost never” establish bias. Absent extrajudicial evidence (or truly pervasive prejudice), dissatisfaction with rulings does not trigger recusal.

The court also addressed Wright’s allegations of opposing-party misconduct in service and concluded that—even assuming service errors—any such errors were harmless given the dispositive failure to state a claim (Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. STME, LLC), and default judgment would not cure a legally insufficient complaint (Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp.).

B. Why most statutory theories were not reviewed on the merits

The court applied Eleventh Circuit abandonment doctrine: issues not meaningfully argued in the opening brief are forfeited. Relying on Irwin v. Hawk, Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., and Singh v. U.S. Att'y Gen., the panel held Wright abandoned appellate challenges to the dismissal of:

ERISA claims (including the district court’s conclusion that the plan was exempt and no viable ERISA cause was stated);
HIPAA claims (where the district court noted HIPAA provides no private cause of action);
IRCA claims (where the district court found the allegations did not satisfy pleading requirements); and
a discussed § 1981 theory (dismissed below for failure to allege race-based discrimination).

The panel declined to reach these abandoned issues absent “exceptional” circumstances (Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co.), and also refused to consider new arguments raised only in Wright’s reply brief (Big Top Koolers, Inc. v. Circus-Man Snacks, Inc.; Timson v. Sampson).

C. Why the § 1983 claim failed against the City

Even construing Wright’s allegations liberally, the panel affirmed dismissal because municipal liability requires more than describing a mistaken hiring event. Under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. and Eleventh Circuit applications such as Hoefling v. City of Miami:

A city is a “person” under § 1983, but it is not vicariously liable for employees’ constitutional violations.
The complaint must allege a policy, custom, or practice that caused the deprivation (or facts supporting a plausible inference of one).
Wright did not plausibly allege that the City regularly failed to verify information, maintained a defective hiring protocol as a custom, or that an authorized official adopted/acquiesced in the challenged conduct.

The court emphasized that although a plaintiff need not always identify specific policymakers at the pleading stage, she must still allege a policy/practice/custom link. The absence of that municipal-causation element was fatal.

3.3 Impact

Although “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” and therefore nonprecedential in the strict sense, the decision consolidates several recurring Eleventh Circuit themes with practical consequences:

Recusal motions must be grounded in objective, extrajudicial indicators of bias, not dissatisfaction with case rulings or perceived procedural unfairness. The opinion reinforces that litigants should raise recusal promptly in the district court or risk more deferential “plain error” review on appeal.
Appellate abandonment is outcome-determinative, particularly for pro se litigants: statutory claims dismissed below will not be reviewed unless clearly and substantively challenged in the opening brief, with developed argumentation and authority.
Monell pleading remains a hard gatekeeping requirement for § 1983 suits against municipalities. Even where a plaintiff alleges an individual wrong, failure to connect it to a policy/custom/practice (or equivalent municipal decision) will typically result in dismissal.
Procedural victories (service defects, default requests) do not substitute for a viable claim: harmless-error review and the rule that default cannot stand on an insufficient complaint reduce the strategic value of default-focused litigation where the underlying pleading is deficient.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Recusal (28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455): Federal law requires judges to step aside when impartiality is reasonably questioned or when specific conflicts/bias exist. Importantly, disagreement with a judge’s rulings is usually not enough; the bias generally must come from outside the case (an “extrajudicial source”).
Plain error vs. abuse of discretion: “Abuse of discretion” is deferential; “plain error” is typically even harder for an appellant because it applies when an issue was not properly raised below. Here, the court noted recusal was not sought until after judgment, triggering the possibility of plain-error review.
Failure to state a claim (Rule 12(b)(6)) and plausibility: The court accepts factual allegations as true, but the complaint must plausibly show legal liability—not merely speculate or assert conclusions. (Ashcroft v. Iqbal).
Abandonment on appeal: If an appellant does not meaningfully argue an issue in the opening brief—beyond brief mentions—the appellate court treats it as forfeited and will not decide it.
Monell municipal liability: You cannot sue a city under § 1983 solely because a city employee allegedly did something unconstitutional. You must plausibly allege the harm was caused by a city policy/custom/practice (or a decision attributable to the municipality itself).
No private cause of action: Some statutes (e.g., criminal statutes, and—per many courts—HIPAA) do not let private individuals sue for damages unless Congress created that right. The court reiterated that criminal provisions like 18 U.S.C. § 1028A do not create civil remedies.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s affirmance in Carolyn Wright v. City of Atlanta underscores three practical rules: (1) recusal requires more than adverse rulings and must rest on objective indicia of partiality; (2) appellants must fully brief challenges or they will be deemed abandoned; and (3) § 1983 claims against municipalities fail without well-pleaded allegations tying the asserted harm to a municipal policy, custom, or practice under Monell and Hoefling.