Motive, Not Mere Linkage: Territorial/Economic Threats Do Not Establish the Nexus for Asylum or Withholding in the Sixth Circuit

Introduction

In Elvia Romero Morales v. Bondi, No. 25-3195 (6th Cir. Nov. 4, 2025) (not recommended for publication), the Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review brought by a Guatemalan mother and her minor daughter challenging the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of their asylum and withholding of removal claims. The case turns on the “nexus” requirement—i.e., whether the harm feared or suffered is “because of” a protected ground. Reaffirming that nexus is a question of motive rather than mere correlation, the court held that threats arising from territorial disputes and extortionary motives do not satisfy even the lower withholding standard (“a reason”), much less the asylum standard (“one central reason”), when the record shows the persecutors were driven by generalized criminal aims rather than a desire to overcome a protected characteristic.

The petitioners alleged persecution on account of religion (evangelical Christianity) and membership in a particular social group (PSG) defined—on appeal in the court of appeals—only as “Guatemalan women living on their own, or with children, without a spouse or male partner to provide protection or support.” The immigration judge (IJ) and BIA found no nexus between the harms and either protected ground; the Sixth Circuit affirmed under the substantial-evidence standard. The court also noted that protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) was waived before the BIA and thus not at issue.

Background

The petitioners, citizens of Guatemala, fled to the United States in 2017 after two episodes at Ms. Romero Morales’s small diner. First, two men threatened to kill her unless she paid them more than half of her daily earnings. Eight days later, the same men returned; upon seeing Ms. Romero Morales’s daughter, they threatened to kidnap the child. One man displayed a firearm. Ms. Romero Morales shut down her business and fled. Separately, while proselytizing as an evangelical Christian, her church group was chased out of a village by gangsters who warned them not to enter territory that was not theirs—an incident the record characterizes as territorial rather than religiously targeted.

In removal proceedings, the petitioners conceded removability and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. Ms. Romero Morales asserted persecution on account of (1) religion and (2) two proposed PSGs: (i) Guatemalan women business owners perceived as having access to money, and (ii) Guatemalan women living alone (or with children) without a male partner. The IJ denied all relief. On appeal, the BIA affirmed the denial of asylum/withholding and deemed the CAT claim waived because it was not challenged. Before the Sixth Circuit, the petitioners pressed only the PSG relating to single women without male protection, along with the religion theory.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court:

Applied de novo review to legal issues and substantial-evidence review to factual findings, including the BIA’s nexus determination.
Clarified that nexus is a question of persecutor motive, not mere correlation or linkage.
Held that the record supported the BIA’s finding of no nexus: the threats at the diner were motivated by extortionary and opportunistic aims, and the proselytizing incident reflected territorial control, not religious animus.
Did not reach the cognizability of the single-women-without-male-protection PSG because the case is dispositively resolved on nexus.
Reiterated that failure to satisfy the weaker withholding nexus standard (“a reason”) necessarily defeats the stronger asylum nexus standard (“one central reason”).
Noted that the CAT claim was waived at the BIA and thus not before the court.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Mohammed v. Bondi, 129 F.4th 988 (6th Cir. 2025): Cited for jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review final BIA orders. Frames the court’s authority to adjudicate the petition for review.
Juan Antonio v. Barr, 959 F.3d 778 (6th Cir. 2020): When the BIA issues its own decision, the court reviews the BIA’s decision as the final agency action and consults the IJ’s decision to the extent adopted. This defined the scope of review here.
Tista-Ruiz de Ajualip v. Garland, 114 F.4th 487 (6th Cir. 2024): Articulates the bifurcated standards of review (de novo for law; substantial evidence for fact). This undergirds the deference given to the BIA’s nexus findings.
Mazariegos-Rodas v. Garland, 122 F.4th 655 (6th Cir. 2024): Restates substantial-evidence review as sustaining agency decisions supported by “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.” The panel relies on this deferential posture.
Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357 (2021): The court will not reverse factual findings unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise. This “compelled to conclude” test frames why the petition fails on nexus.
Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland, 87 F.4th 838 (6th Cir. 2023): Defines persecution and emphasizes nexus: persecution entails harm inflicted by the government or actors the government is unwilling or unable to control to overcome a protected characteristic. Also clarifies the “one central reason” asylum standard.
Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr, 959 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2020): Distinguishes asylum’s “one central reason” from withholding’s “a reason.” The opinion leans on this hierarchy to conclude that failure on withholding nexus necessarily defeats asylum.
Patel v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 377 (6th Cir. 2025): Summarizes the nexus requirement across asylum and withholding: the risk of persecution must be because of a protected ground.
Cruz-Guzman v. Barr, 920 F.3d 1033 (6th Cir. 2019): Nexus is a question of motive, not simple causation. The panel quotes and operationalizes this to show why “linkage” to religion/gender is insufficient absent proof of persecutor’s purpose.
Turcios-Flores v. Garland, 67 F.4th 347 (6th Cir. 2023): Holds that the nexus assessment is a factual finding reviewed for substantial evidence. This channeling to a highly deferential standard is pivotal in affirming the BIA.
Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023): Quoted for the use of “noncitizen,” but more broadly reflects the Supreme Court’s recent treatment of administrative immigration doctrines. Here, its substantive exhaustion holding is not central; the panel notes waiver of CAT before the BIA.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeds in three key steps:

Standards and burdens: Asylum requires that a protected ground be “one central reason” for persecution; withholding requires only that a protected ground be “a reason.” Because “a reason” is the lower standard, an applicant who fails to meet it necessarily fails the more demanding asylum standard. The BIA’s nexus determination is factual and receives substantial-evidence deference on review.
Nexus as motive, not mere linkage: The panel emphasizes that evidence must show persecutors sought to overcome a protected characteristic (religion or PSG membership). It is not enough that the events occurred while proselytizing, involved a woman living without a male partner, or affected a mother with a child. Rather, the motivating reason behind the threats must be religious animus or hostility to the PSG. Here, the record showed (a) the proselytizing incident arose from territorial control—“it wasn’t [her group’s] village”—and (b) the diner incidents were extortionary and opportunistic, targeting the petitioner because she was alone and thus an easier victim, not because she was a single woman or an evangelical Christian.
Dispositive nexus failure obviates other questions: Because the court found substantial evidence for no nexus, it did not decide whether the PSG of “Guatemalan women living on their own or with children, without a spouse or male partner” is legally cognizable. Likewise, any internal-relocation analysis or CAT protection was unnecessary to the disposition; CAT was independently waived at the BIA.

In applying these principles, the court treated extortion and territorial control as paradigmatic examples of generalized criminality that often defeats nexus. The court acknowledged that the harms were serious but concluded they were not inflicted to overcome religion or PSG membership. On this record, a reasonable adjudicator would not be compelled to reach the opposite conclusion.

Impact

Although unpublished and therefore not precedential, the decision is likely to be persuasive in several respects:

Reinforcement of the “motive” requirement: The opinion underscores that practitioners must marshal direct or circumstantial evidence that persecutors acted because of a protected ground—not merely during religious activity or against a vulnerable demographic. Statements by perpetrators, comparative targeting patterns, country-conditions evidence linking the specific group to targeted violence, and proof that similarly situated persons outside the group were not targeted, become critical.
Generalized crime and extortion as insufficient nexus: Claims grounded in routine criminality, extortion, or territorial gang control will face heightened scrutiny absent clear indicators of protected-ground motive. This decision aligns with a line of Sixth Circuit and BIA reasoning treating such harms as non-protected unless tied to a protected trait.
PSG litigation strategy: The court did not decide the cognizability of the “single women without male protection” PSG. That leaves room for future litigants to develop the immutability, particularity, and social distinction prongs. However, even a cognizable PSG will not matter without evidence of nexus. This shifts practical emphasis toward motive evidence first; group definition second.
Asylum/withholding hierarchy: The court’s a fortiori reminder—failure on withholding’s lower nexus standard necessarily defeats asylum—gives adjudicators a straightforward pathway to deny both where nexus fails.
Issue preservation and CAT: By noting the BIA’s waiver finding regarding CAT, the opinion reinforces the necessity of raising all claims on administrative appeal. Failure to do so will foreclose judicial review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Nexus: The required causal connection between the persecution and a protected ground (race, religion, nationality, PSG, political opinion). It is about the persecutor’s motive: did they harm the person to overcome that protected characteristic?
“One central reason” vs. “a reason”: Asylum demands the protected ground be one central reason for the harm; withholding requires it be at least one reason. If you cannot show “a reason,” you cannot show “one central reason.”
Particular Social Group (PSG): A legally recognized subset of people who share an immutable characteristic, defined with particularity, and perceived as distinct by society. Even if a PSG is cognizable, relief still requires nexus.
Persecution: Serious harm inflicted by the government or by persons the government is unwilling or unable to control, aimed at overcoming a characteristic of the victim.
Substantial-evidence review: A deferential standard. The court will uphold agency findings unless the evidence compels the opposite conclusion.
Generalized crime: Violence or threats arising from general criminality (e.g., extortion, territoriality) not aimed at a protected trait typically do not satisfy nexus.
Waiver/Exhaustion: Issues not raised to the BIA are generally forfeited for judicial review. Here, CAT was waived at the BIA and therefore not addressed by the court.

Key Takeaways and Practice Notes

Build motive evidence: Gather statements by perpetrators referencing religion, gender, or PSG membership; show patterns of targeting the same group; present expert/country reports explicitly linking the harm to the protected trait.
Delineate from generalized crime: Demonstrate why the client was targeted because of who they are, not merely because they were convenient targets. Comparative evidence (how perpetrators treat similarly situated non-members) is useful.
Preserve all issues at the BIA: Raise asylum, withholding, and CAT bases on administrative appeal. Failure to challenge an IJ ruling at the BIA can result in waiver.
PSG clarity helps, but nexus is dispositive: Even a well-defined PSG will not carry the day without evidence that persecutors were motivated by that membership.

Conclusion

Romero Morales reaffirms a core principle of protection law in the Sixth Circuit: nexus turns on the persecutor’s motive to overcome a protected characteristic. Territorial enforcement and extortion—even when they occur during religious proselytizing or against women lacking male partners—do not, without more, satisfy the nexus requirement for withholding or asylum. The decision also illustrates the powerful interplay between a deferential standard of review and the motive-centered nexus inquiry. While the court leaves open the cognizability of certain gender-based PSGs, it sends a clear message to litigants: success will hinge on evidence that criminals or gangs targeted the applicant because of the protected trait, not merely because she was vulnerable or accessible. In short, motive—not mere linkage—drives the nexus analysis, and failure to establish nexus is dispositive across asylum and withholding claims.

Note: This commentary summarizes and analyzes an unpublished Sixth Circuit decision, which is not binding precedent but may be cited for its persuasive value.